ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

other cases have expressed doubts in regard to the general responsibility of common carriers for bank bills.15 And in another case,16 where the passenger had in his trunk sixty dollars for the purpose of purchasing clothing at the place of his destination, it was held the carriers were not liable as such for any additional damages on account of the loss of this money.

5. And where the plaintiff sent, by a passenger train, a quantity of merchandise, expecting to go himself in the same train but did not, and the goods were lost without any gross negligence or any conversion by the carriers, it was held they were not liable.17

[ocr errors]

6. But where a passenger in a vessel had his baggage put on board another vessel because it did not arrive by cars in time for that on which he had taken passage, it was held that the owner of the vessel was not to be regarded as a gratuitous bailee but as a common carrier,. being entitled to demand pay for the transportation under the circumstances, either in advance or at the end of the voyage. It is here said, that in the common case, where the baggage accompanies the passenger, his fare includes fare for his baggage, but in any case, where a passenger orders his baggage sent by a carrier independent of any one to accompany it, if the carrier consent to accept the charge he may demand compensation, as before stated, and is liable as in ordinary cases.18

7. But companies cannot make such restrictions in regard to the kind of baggage and the mode of transportation as to virtually exonerate themselves from just responsibility.19 But in any case, where the company are justified in refusing to carry a package, they may lawfully take it, if left on their premises, to the

15 Chicago & Aurora Railw. v. Thompson, 19 Ill. R. 578. In Ill. Cent. Railw. v. Copeland it is held a reasonable amount of bank bills may be carried in a trunk, and their value recovered as lost baggage. 24 Ill. R. 332.

16 Hickox v. Naugatuck R. R. Co., 31 Conn. R. 281. We should have thought, on first impression, that this amount of money, for this purpose, might well enough have been included in the category of necessary or convenient personal baggage; but the court thought otherwise, and reversed the judgment of Mr. Justice McCurdy in the court below, upon this ground alone.

17 Collins v. Boston & Maine Railw., 10 Cush. 506.

18 The Elvira Harbeck, 2 Blatch. C. Ct. 336.

19 Munster v. Southeastern Railw. Co., 4 C. B. N. S. 676.

lost property office, and charge their regular fee upon redelivery.19

8. It is often made a question under the English Carriers' Act what is embraced under the word "trinkets." They must be either things of mere ornament, or, where that element predominates, such as bracelets, shirt pins, rings, portmonnaies.20 Common carriers of passengers may restrict their common-law responsibility as insurers of the delivery of baggage.21

9. In England, where the act of Parliament allows every passenger to carry a certain weight of luggage, it is held not to preclude the companies from excluding all luggage from cheap excursion trains, and where a passenger on such trains puts his baggage in the van, the company may demand reasonable compensation for its transportation.22 But a railway company is. liable for a passenger's luggage, although carried in the carriage in which he himself is travelling.23

20 Bernstein v. Baxendale, 6 C. B. N. S. 251; 5 Jur. N. S. 1056. So silk watch-guards are “silk in a manufactured state"; and smelling-bottles come within the term "glass," used in the act. Ib.

21 Peninsular & Oriental Steam Nav. Co. v. Shand, 11 Jur. N. S. 771.

22 Rumsey v. Northeastern Railw. Co., 14 C. B. N. S. 641; s. c. 10 Jur. N. S. 208. And a passenger who accepts a ticket for an excursion train, referring him to a bill on which it is announced that luggage in such trains is at the owner's risk, is not entitled to recover of the company for loss of such baggage, although in fact ignorant of the statement in the bill. Stewart v. London & N. W. R. Co., 10 Jur. N. S. 805. And it will make no difference in the responsibility of the company that they do not allow the passenger to retain his baggage under his own personal control. Stewart v. London & N. W. R. Co., 3

H. &. C. 135.

23 Le Conteur v. London & So. W. R. Co., 13 L. T. N. S. 325.

* SECTION XXII.

Carriers' Lien for Freight.

1. Lien exists, but damage to goods must be | 12. Delivery obtained by fraud, goods will be

[blocks in formation]

1

Carrier is bound to keep goods reasonable
time, if refused by consignee.
Lien does not cover expense of keep.
Covers back charges.

§ 172. 1. As a general rule the carrier is entitled to a lien upon the goods carried for freight. But if he once deliver the goods, this lien is waived.2 Or if the goods be damaged in a manner for which the carrier is liable, the owner may deduct the amount of injury from the freight. But the goods must be

3

1 Skinner v. Upshaw, 2 Ld. Raym. 752. And for advances made for freight and storage by other carriers. White v. Vann, 6 Humph. 70; Galena & Chicago Railw. v. Rae, 18 Ill. R. 488.

2 Boggs v. Martin, 13 B. Monroe, 243. This lien extends to all the freight upon the goods throughout their transportation which may be advanced by the last carrier or warehouse-man. Bissel v. Price, 16 Ill. R. 408.

* Same case as n. 2. Snow v. Carruth, Dist. Court, U. S. Dist. of Mass., before Sprague, J., 19 Law Rep. 198, where the cases of Davidson v. Gwynne, 12 East, 380, and Sheelds v. Davies, 4 Camp. 119; s. c. 6 Taunt. 65, are considered and overruled, so far as this question is concerned.

The right of the owner of the goods to insist upon any damage done the goods, for which the carrier is liable, by way of recoupment, or deduction from the freight, is well established in this country, and is a most elementary principle, as applicable to analogous cases. Bartram v. McKee, 1 Watts, 39; Leech v. Baldwin, 5 Id. 446; Humphreys v. Reed, 6 Wharton, 435; Edwards v. Todd, 1 Scam. 462. But it is said the carrier is not subject to have damage done by some other party in the transit deducted from his lien. Bowman v. Hilton, 11 Ohio R. 303. But it is no answer to the carrier's lien that the goods have been damaged during the transit by inevitable accident, to an amount exceeding that of the lien, provided they were still of sufficient value to satisfy it. Lee v. Salter, Lalor's Supp. to Hill & Denio, 163.

And where goods were carried by a continuous line of steamboats and railway

*

carried and ready for delivery, or the carrier has no right to detain them for freight, the performance of the contract, on the part of the carrier, being a condition precedent to the right to demand freight.4

6

2. In general the consignor of goods is prima facie liable to the carrier for freight, but the consignee may, by the implied understanding at the time of shipment, and by the relation he sustains to the goods, be the only party liable; or the consignor and consignee may both be liable, either jointly or severally.5 But the owner of the goods is always the proper party to bring an action for the loss or injury of the goods, and may generally be held liable for the freight. The person receiving the goods. is responsible for freight, and damages by injury to the goods or non-delivery may be first deducted. And the relation of debtor and creditor must exist between the carrier and the owner of the goods, so that an action at law might be maintained for the payment of the debt sought to be enforced by the lien. Hence where one shipped goods at Burlington, upon Lake Champlain, for Detroit, Michigan, care of D., by common carriers, through whom he had previously transported goods to Detroit, and paid the freight in advance; the goods coming into the possession of another line of carriers at Troy, N. Y., without the knowledge from New York to Fitchburg, Mass., being delivered upon the pier of the steamboat company in good condition, and having been injured before their arrival at Fitchburg to an amount exceeding the freight, it was held no defence against the claim to set off the damage to the goods against the claim for freight, at the suit of the last railway company, in the line of transportation, that the damage accrued to the goods before the goods were laden upon the boat, and without negligence on the part of the carriers. The court say the carrier, in such case, may, if he choose, make a special acceptance of the goods, as a warehouse-man, during the period between the delivery and the departure, but unless that is shown, he is liable, as carrier, from the time of the delivery for transportation. Fitchburg & Wor. Railw. v. Hanna, 6 Gray, 539.

* Palmer v. Lorilard, 16 Johns. 356. Opinion of Kent, Chancellor, and cases cited.

5 Moore v. Wilson, 1 T. R. 659.

6

* Danes v. Peck, 8 T. R. 330.

* Hill v. Leadbetter, 42 Me. R. 572; Ante, n. 3.

• Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1. So, too, if the carrier detain the goods for the payment of a sum beyond the freight, the owner being ready to pay freight, he and his agents are liable in trover, and in such case it is not requisite to make a formal tender of freight. Adams v. Clark, 9 Cush. 215; Isham v. Greenham, 1 Handy, Sup. Ct. Rep. 357.

of the owner, and being by them transported to Detroit, consigned to the care of F. who was a warehouse-man and forwarder, and who, without knowledge of the facts stated, advanced the freight due upon the goods from Troy to Detroit, and refused to surrender them to the owner until reimbursed the amount; in an action of replevin for the goods it was held that the owner was entitled to possession of the goods, without payment of the freight advanced by F.8

3. A common carrier, who innocently receives goods from a wrongdoer, without the consent of the owner, express or implied, has no lien upon them for their carriage, as against such owner.9 Not even for freight which he has paid to a previous carrier, by whom the owner had directed them to be carried.10 And a lien for freight, where it exists, can only be asserted by the party in whose favor it was created, or some one acting in privity with such party; but such lien presents no obstacle to a recovery, by the general owner of the goods, against a mere wrongdoer.1

9

4. Mr. Justice Fletcher, in delivering the opinion of the court, in the case just cited, alludes to the fact that so little is found in the books upon this point, and the dictum, in York v. Grenaugh,12* by Lord Chief Justice Holt, that in the case of the Exeter carrier, it was held, that where one who stole goods delivered them to a carrier, who transported them by his order, that the carrier thereby acquired a lien upon the goods for the freight, and that this had been adopted by some of the elementary treatises, and by the courts even, arguendo, sometimes,13 and after referring to the case of Fitch v. Newberry, thus continues:

5. "This decision is supported by the case of Buskirk v. Purinton, 2 Hall, 561. There property was sold on a condition which the buyer failed to comply with, and shipped the goods

9 Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. 137.

10 Stevens v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 8 Gray, 262.

11 Ames v. Palmer, 42 Maine R. 197.

12 2 Lord Raym. 866, where it was held that an innkeeper might detain a horse for his keep, although put at the stable by one who came wrongfully by him. But that case differs from a carrier, as the innkeeper cannot ordinarily demand pay in advance.

13 King v. Richards, 6 Wharton, 418. The court held here that the carrier might lawfully deliver the goods to the rightful owner, and defend against the claim of the bailer, or his assignee, for value, on that ground.

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »