plaintiffs in error should be sustained it could only affect the estate devised to testator's children. His four grandchildren, the children of his deceased son, Joseph, would be unaffected by the construction that would give the testator's children a base or determinable fee. Said grandchildren would become vested with a fee simple title to oneeighth of the property at the death of the life tenant. There is nothing in the will to indicate the testator intended to favor his four grandchildren above his own children. His purpose was to make provision for the children of such of his children as died before the death of the life tenant. After the estate devised his children vested it was not subject to be divested in any event. The testator's personal estate was disposed of by the same language the land was devised. Other paragraphs (4 and 5) of the will charged the shares of two of testator's sons with the payment of money they owed him and a note of one of them on which he was security. The charges against the share of one of the sons was $2000 and against the other $250. It is stated by counsel for defendants in error, and not denied, that the entire personal estate of the testator at the time of his death did not exceed in value $5000. It is apparent that one of his sons, at least, would not get enough of the personal estate to pay the charges against his share of the estate. No provision was made authorizing an executor or trustee to take charge and custody of his share or interest in the estate and apply the income to the payment of the charges until they were satisfied. To say the least, these matters would raise a doubt as to the estate devised the children, and it is well settled that in doubtful cases the law favors the construction that will give the first taker a fee simple. Mills v. Teel, 245 Ill. 483; Williamson v. Carnes, 284 id. 521; Sheridan v. Blume, 290 id. 508.

The decree of the circuit court was correct, and it is affirmed. Decree affirmed.

(No. 13995.-Reversed and remanded.)

SAM ELIE, Defendant in Error, vs. THE ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed December 22, 1921.

I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-an ordinance regulating speed of motor vehicles violates section 12 of Motor Vehicle law of 1915. An ordinance of the West Chicago Park Commissioners requiring motor vehicles to stop at all intersections of boulevards with the public streets and to then proceed across the boulevard at a speed of not more than six miles an hour is not strictly a traffic ordinance but is an ordinance for the regulation of speed of motor vehicles and violates section 12 of the Motor Vehicle law, as amended in 1915. (Laws of 1915, p. 592.)

2. SAME-State may regulate right to use streets and highways for travel. The right to use highways and streets for travel is not absolute but it may be controlled by the State or by a municipality under a proper exercise of its police power, and is subject to such reasonable and impartial police regulations as are calculated to secure to the general public the largest practical benefit from the easement and to provide for their safety while using it.

3. SAME-ordinance which limits natural rights must be reasonable as well as constitutional. A municipal ordinance of a regulatory nature in contravention of the natural rights of individuals, enacted under general charter powers, is not only required to be constitutional but must be reasonable as well, and the court before which it is brought must be able to see that it will tend to promote the public health, morals, safety or welfare and that the means adopted are adapted to that end and that it is impartial in operation and not unduly oppressive.

4. SAME what may be considered in determining reasonableness of an ordinance. In determining whether an ordinance is reasonable much must depend upon the requirements of different localities, the density of population of the town in which the ordinance has been enacted and the dangers and evils prevalent therein, and what would be reasonable in one place might be unreasonable in another.

5. SAME what necessary to render a motor vehicle ordinance valid as a regulation of traffic. To hold a motor vehicle ordinance valid as a regulation of traffic and not a regulation of the rate of speed of motor vehicles, in violation of the provision of the Motor Vehicle law against the regulation of speed of motor vehicles by municipalities, the ordinance must show on its face that it is passed

for the purpose of regulating traffic and that the traffic conditions are the basis of the regulations imposed.

6. Negligence when jury should not be permitted to take the declaration. It is never good practice to permit the jury to take the pleadings in civil cases to the jury room on their retirement, and in an action for injuries resulting from a collision of motor vehicles, where the declaration sets out the provisions of a void regulatory ordinance, it is error to permit the jury to take the declaration with them to their room.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOSEPH B. DAVID, Judge, presiding.

CHARLES B. ELDER, for plaintiff in error.

LYNN & HALLAM, and JOSEPH ORRICO, for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the

court:

Defendant in error, Sam Elie, recovered judgment for $2500 in an action for personal injuries against plaintiff in error, the Adams Express Company, in the superior court of Cook county. The trial judge certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance was involved and that in his opinion the public interest required that the cause be taken directly to this court, and so this writ of error is sued out. of this court to review the judgment of the superior court.

This litigation arises out of a collision occurring at the intersection of Desplaines street and Jackson boulevard, in the city of Chicago, July 4, 1916. Defendant in error was riding a motorcycle west on Jackson boulevard and plaintiff in error was operating a motor truck south on Desplaines street. The vehicles collided near the southwest corner of the intersection and defendant in error suffered a broken leg. The original declaration charged general negligence in the operation of the motor truck. Five additional counts were filed, the first three charging negligent operation of the motor truck contrary to the provisions of the Motor Ve

hicle law, and the fourth and fifth charging negligent operation of the motor truck in violation of provisions of an ordinance of the West Chicago Park Commissioners. This ordinance provided "that no person shall drive or propel any vehicle across any boulevard in the control of the West Chicago Park Commissioners at any place where such boulevard intersects any street without first causing such vehicle to come to a full stop, and no person shall drive or propel any vehicle across any boulevard within the control of the West Chicago Park Commissioners at any intersection, as aforesaid, at a greater rate of speed than six miles per hour," and fixed a penalty for violation of the ordinance. Jackson boulevard is an east and west street, sixty-six feet wide from building line to building line and thirty-eight feet wide from curb to curb, with the roadway paved with asphalt. It is under the jurisdiction of the West Chicago Park Commissioners. Desplaines street is a north and south street, eighty feet wide from property line to property line and forty-eight feet wide from curb to curb. Its roadway is paved with cobblestones north and south of the intersection. Double street car tracks are laid along the middle line of the street. It is under the jurisdiction of the city of Chicago. Jackson boulevard at and near this intersection is no different in appearance from any other public street paved with asphalt, and so far as the evidence shows there is nothing to indicate to the driver of a vehicle that it is a boulevard or that it is under the jurisdiction of the West Chicago Park Commissioners. Evidence was introduced to show that plaintiff in error did not bring its truck to a full stop before crossing this boulevard and that it drove the truck across the boulevard at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour. Plaintiff in error objected to the admission of the ordinance in evidence and offered instructions telling the jury that the ordinance in question was void and directing the jury to find the defendant not guilty under the fourth and fifth additional counts of the declaration. The

ordinance was admitted in evidence and these instructions were refused. The court gave to the jury an instruction which told them that the "declaration and pleas of defendant which will be handed you to take to your jury room create the issues which you, the jury, are sworn to try under the law and the evidence." At the conclusion of the trial the court gave to the jury all the pleadings on file and directed them to take the same to the jury room.

Section 12 of the Motor Vehicle law in force at the time this accident occurred prohibited cities and other municipalities from passing any ordinance limiting or restricting the speed of motor vehicles and declared all such ordinances void. (Laws of 1915, p. 592.) The West Chicago Park Commissioners is within the meaning of this act a municipal corporation, (West Chicago Park Comrs. v. City of Chicago, 152 Ill. 392,) and the ordinance in question being in direct conflict with the statute just mentioned is void. Ordinances requiring motor vehicles to stop at street intersections may be for the regulation of speed, (Christy v. Elliott, 216 Ill. 31,) in which case they are void, (City of Chicago v. Kluever, 257 Ill. 317; City of Chicago v. Shaw Livery Co. 258 id. 409; City of Chicago v. Francis, 262 id. 331;) or may be for the regulation of traffic, in which case they may or may not be void, depending on the reasonableness of the regulation. The ordinance in question shows on its face that it is clearly an ordinance limiting and regulating the speed at which motor vehicles may cross boulevards within the control of the park commissioners. The object and purpose of causing the vehicle to come to a full stop is to insure its proceeding across the boulevard at a rate of speed less than six miles an hour. It is clear that it has nothing to do with the regulation of traffic, for the reason that the amount or character of traffic on the boulevard is not taken into consideration. The ordinance requires vehicles to come to a full stop at every intersection, regardless of the amount or character of traffic using the