tors for the purchase of the lots, as a resulting trust can only arise in favor of parties who have contributed to the purchase of or paid for the property. The city has done nothing to indicate an acceptance of the property or a desire to become owner of the same and keep it up as a public park, except that it has voluntarily done some work on it in the way of improvements and has joined in this suit to have the lots declared exempt as a public park. In other words, there is no agreement or no state of facts in the record under which the city could compel a conveyance of the property or be compelled to accept a conveyance of it and keep it up as a public park. As the city is in no way bound to accept title to this property and continue it and keep it up as a public park, that, of itself, is sufficient to defeat the claim that the property is exempt as a public park of the city. The fact that the city authorities who were in authority when this suit was instituted are willing to accept a deed, if that much may be said, and the further fact that the Civic League and the present owners of this land indicate that they are willing to deed it to the city when they have finished the work of improving the property as they intend to do, are not sufficient to sustain the claim that the city is the owner of either the legal or equitable title to the property. If this property should be held to be exempt by the judgment of this court there would be nothing to estop or prevent the city, under the next administration of its officers, from refusing to accept a deed on behalf of the city and to bind it to incur further expense in keeping up the property as its park. Our conclusion must necessarily be, therefore, that the property is not exempt from taxation on the ground claimed and that the lower court properly so held.

The judgment of the county court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.

(No. 14159.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. George M. Reynolds, County Collector, Appellant, vs. THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 22, 1921.

I. TAXES-Detention Home act leaves method of levying tax to the provisions of Revenue law. Section 5 of the Detention Home act, as amended in 1919, confers upon the county board, when the act is adopted by vote, power to levy a tax for county purposes in addition to that provided for by the Revenue law for other county purposes; but the Detention Home act does not provide the manner of levying, extending or collecting the tax, and it leaves such matters to the provisions of the Revenue law.

2. SAME what may be included in tax levied to establish detention home. A tax levied under the Detention Home act for the establishment of such home includes the purchasing, erecting, leasing or otherwise providing for the home, and such tax may be used to enlarge, improve or add to the home; but the purpose of establishing such home must not be confused with that of maintenance, which involves those things having to do with carrying on the business for which the home is built or established.

3. SAME amounts for establishment and maintenance of detention home must be levied separately. As the tax-payer has a right to know what amounts are being levied by the county for the different purposes in connection with any public institution, a tax levied under the Detention Home act must state in separate amounts the sums required for the establishment and for the maintenance of such home, but these separate amounts need not be itemized.

4. WORDS AND PHRASES-meaning of the word "establish." The word "establish," in the ordinary definition of the term, means to create, institute or build, and it does not have the same meaning as the word "maintain."

APPEAL from the County Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. HARRY RECK, Judge, presiding.

ELMER E. ROBERTS, and H. M. KELLY, for appellant.

HOMER W. DAVIS, and JOHN R. ONG, for appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the

court:

Appellee filed its objection in the county court of LaSalle county to the tax levied by the county board for the establishment and maintenance of the LaSalle county detention home. The tax was computed at the rate of one mill on the dollar valuation, and appellee's tax amounted to $876.63. By stipulation of the parties the amount was abated one-third, owing to the amendment of the Detention Home act of 1919 reducing the rate to two-thirds of a mill. The cause was heard on the objection to $584.42 balance of the tax. The county court sustained the objection and abated the tax.

Appellee contends that the levy of a tax for the establishment and maintenance of a detention home should separate the items for the establishment from those for the maintenance of such home. The only question in this record is whether or not in the levy of the tax these two items should be separated.

Section 5 of the Detention Home act, as amended in 1919, conferred upon the county board the power to levy a tax for county purposes in addition to that provided for by the Revenue law, and it was held in People v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 291 Ill. 502, that the vote of the people adopting the act empowered the county board to levy the tax in addition to that authorized for other county purposes. The act does not prescribe the manner in which the tax shall be levied, and the case cited is not to be construed as so holding, or as deciding that section 5 in any way amended the Revenue law in that regard. While the act is complete in itself and provides the manner in which such tax may be authorized and that the power to levy the same shall be vested in the county board,—and this without regard to the provisions of section 27 of the Revenue act, it does not provide the manner of levying,

extending or collecting the tax but leaves such matters to the provisions of the Revenue law.

Section 121 of the Revenue act provides as to the levying of a tax, that "when for several purposes the amount for said purposes shall be stated separately." The terms "establish" and "maintain" do not mean one and the same thing. The term "establish" must be given its ordinary definition, in the absence of language showing that a special meaning is intended. To establish means to create, to institute, to build. While a tax levied under the act for the establishment of a detention home would include purchasing, erecting, leasing and otherwise providing, and such tax could be used to enlarge, improve or add to such home, such purpose must not be confused with that of maintenance.

Caldwell v. City of Alton, 33 Ill. 416, is not, as is thought, authority for the position that "establish" and "maintain" are one and the same thing. That case holds that the power to "establish and regulate" means the power to do two things: First, to purchase the site and erect and provide the buildings necessary for the operation of the institution; and second, to provide the necessary rules for such operation when it is established. The purposes are not one. The maintenance of a detention home involves those things having to do with carrying on the business for which it is built or established. "Maintain" and "operate" have been held to have the same meaning when used in connection with a public institution. People v. Clark, 296 Ill. 46; People v. Chicago and Alton Railway Co. 289 id. 282.

The tax-payer has a right to know what amounts are being levied for the different purposes in connection with any public institution. (People v. Klee, 282 Ill. 440.) This does not mean that the amount to be used for establishing and that to be used for maintenance must be itemized, but these two amounts should be levied separately, in order that the tax-payer may know whether or not the amount levied for either purpose is excessive. This in nowise interferes

with the fulfillment of the purposes of such a home, as the county board is in no way restricted in determining the amount or the part of the tax authorized by law which shall be levied for and devoted to each purpose. These items should have been separated.

The county court did not err in sustaining the objection urged.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 14246.-Reversed and remanded.)

JOSEPH WOITYNEK, Exr. Appellee, vs. JOSEPH FRANKEN et al. (WALTER LANGLOIS, Appellant.)

Opinion filed December 22, 1921.

1. TAX DEEDS- a tax deed conveys title in fee simple. A tax deed is effective at the time it is executed, and if the proceedings have been regular it conveys the title in fee simple and the grantee may maintain ejectment for the possession of the premises.

2. SAME-effect of failure of holder of tax title to acquire possession. The fact that the holder of a tax title does not acquire possession within a year and does not institute proceedings for that purpose does not avoid his deed nor deprive him of the title or the right to maintain an action for the possession, but the effect of such delay is that the owner of the property may compel a reconveyance by paying the amount law fully due the holder of the tax title.

3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-when executor cannot sell land free from claim of holder of tax title. An executor cannot sell land free from the claim of a holder of a valid tax title who has neglected to institute proceedings for possession of the premises within a year after acquiring his title, but such delay merely gives the executor or owner the right to make a tender of the amount lawfully due the holder of the tax deed and to demand a re-conveyance.

4. SAME-title of holder of tax deed cannot be sold without his consent. Under the statute the title of the holder of a tax deed cannot be sold without his consent, nor can he be required to reconvey the property or submit to a sale of his title until he has received the money lawfully due him.