BELLIGERENT'S RIGHT OF BLOCKADE UNRESTRICTED.

467

mors of the removal or abandonment of blockade, and thus individuals may be undesignedly damnified or the national credit for fairness and honor become compromised and disparaged.

The right to blockade is unlimited. Should it become necessary, a blockading belligerent may invest the entire coast of his adversary as well as a single port. And whenever it possesses the power and can command ample resources, an adequate blockading naval force need not be wanting. Recent experience in the United States well illustrates this statement. By the Federal Government both steam and sailing vessels were employed during the American Rebellion, effectually investing thousands of miles of coast, bordering on the Confederate States; so that, though the blockade had been frequently called in question for insufficiency and illegality, it has proved to have been effectual in regard to these States, and by the prize courts has been pronounced legal and effective.

II. Whenever an actual blockade exists, the commercial world is entitled to know its existence, and the blockading belligerent is bound to make the interdiction known.

The formal official mode of making a blockade known, is to promulgate it by proclamation of the sovereign power, or it may be sufficient if it become known to neutrals and others by general notoriety. And it is competent to show notice or notification in either way, and a knowledge so shown is sufficient ground to justify judicial proceeding, even to the extent of judicial condemnation in any case of capture, where intervening claimants raise the question of illegality for want of knowledge of a declared blockade.

468 CONFISCATION FOLLOWS BREACH OF BLOCKADE.

And whether the notice given be actual or only constructive, it will be equally effectual, provided it be brought home to the party claiming restitution.

III. Any violation of an established, actual, and legal blockade is followed by the recognized penalty, confiscation; and so also is an attempt at violation by running a blockade.

Whatever defense may be set up, unless the excuse be well founded or the pretense be something more than merely plausible, the penal consequences will attach; and both vessel and cargo may become subject to confiscation, by proper proceedings in recognized prize courts.

The cases in England and the United States exhibit many and varied grounds for pretended excuse and justification; sometimes for neutral vessels, and sometimes of cargoes which are claimed in whole or part to be neutral.

The presence of a portion of the cargo proved to be illegal or contraband, may taint the whole of the resi idue, and the whole lading, and vessel too, may thus become a fit subject for legal and judicial condemnation, by reason of the misconduct of the master or owner, in openly attempting a violation, or covertly attempting an evasion of an existing and known blockade.

If part of the cargo shall clearly appear to be of a contraband character, and any person shall falsely pretend that an innocent neutral owner of the vessel is also the sole owner of the whole cargo, such a course of conduct may stamp the whole enterprise with illegality, and subject both vessel and cargo to confiscation and condemnation. 2 Ch. Rob. 9, The Eenrom; 3 ibid. 169, The Imina; 2 Gall. 377, The Betsy and George; 1 Wheat. 417, The St. Nicholas; 3 ibid. 236, The Fortuna.

SHAM PRETENSES NO EXCUSE FOR VIOLATION.

469

The ingenuity of captured neutrals in inventing excuses for attempts to violate blockades has been severely taxed in order to reconcile culpable conduct with innocent intentions. But prize courts furnish a sharp sifting process by which they are enabled to detect and duly discriminate, and while sedulously guarding neutral rights, it is equally their duty to protect belligerent rights; being bound to distinguish and scrutinize alike between sham pretenses and real excuses or legitimate justifications.

On this point the cases of the Byfield (Edw. 188), and the Arthur (ibid. 20), are suggestive and instructive.

In the Hurtige Hane (2 Ch. Rob. 124), the pretense was stress of weather; in the Fortuna (5 ibid. 27), it was want of provisions; in the Spes and Irena (ibid. 79), it was a foreign minister's misinformation; in the Adonis (ibid. 256), it was to learn the coast; in the Shepherdess (ibid. 262), it was the master's intoxication; in the Elizabeth (Edw. 198), it was the loss of mate, binnacle, etc.; in the Arthur (ibid. 202), it was inability to procure a pilot; in the Mentor (ibid. 207), it was a forced deviation from the regular course caused by the pursuit of a frigate; in the Charlotte Christine (6 Ch. Rob. 101), it was approaching the shore batteries of a port blockaded.

But if these cases present specimens of sham pretenses and unsatisfactory excuses for attempting a breach of blockade, yet there are other reported cases, in which the supposed prizes have been decreed to be restored to neutral claimants; and where restitution has been so decreed, unless the prize court shall certify probable cause, the captors as a general rule are usually condemned in costs. The rule, however, is not universal,

470

COALITIONS AGAINST FRANCE

and the court may, at its discretion, allow the captor his costs.

The Neptunus, 3 Ch. Rob. 108; The Ocean, 3 ibid. 297; and The Potsdam, 4 ibid. 89, are of a class of cases in which the suggested excuses were deemed satisfactory and restitution was decreed, and other cases to the same effect may be found in the Admiralty Reports.

Several periods of history in Europe are noted for the occurrence and occasion of prize questions and decisions in reference to blockade, and its incidents. Subsequent to the appearance of Napoleon Buonaparte in the field of war and politics, the nations of Europe were deeply agitated for twenty or twenty-five years prior to 1815. During this period, collisions and coalitions were perpetually occurring; France and England being the conspicuous, if not the chief actors on the scenes of action, occasionally involving Russia, Prussia, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and other lesser States in their struggles. Even Denmark was, in 1801, the object of naval assault or investment. In 1807 Copenhagen was blockaded and bombarded by Lord Cathcart and Admiral Gambier; and her whole fleet of eighteen ships of the line and fifteen frigates captured or destroyed, from a mere suspicion of Denmark's siding with France, and without any known overt act.

The six coalitions against France were in 1792, 1798, 1805-6, 1809, and 1813.

Three years after the outbreak of the French Revolution, and before Napoleon had conspicuously appeared on the stage of action, the first coalition against France was formed in 1792, in which French refugee monarchists, Prussia, Austria, Great Britain, Holland, Russia, and Spain were the allies.

The second coalition was formed 1798, after Nelson had gained the battle of the Nile; and Napoleon, for his good conduct and bravery at the siege of Toulon, was advanced, though but twenty-seven years of age, to the command of the army of Italy; where by his rapid movements and successive victories he soon forced the Austrians to treat at Campo Formo.

The French arms, however, under the Directory lost their wonted prestige. But this political device was in 1799 abolished, and Napoleon becoming First Consul, at once suppressed all local factions, revived the nation's former prestige, put himself at the head of the army, crossed the Alps, gained the battle of Marengo in 1800, made terms of peace in 1801 with Austria and Germany, and with England in 1802 at Amiens; materially extended the territory of France, was elected First Consul for life, and afterward, in 1804, Emperor of France, assuming in 1805 the title of King of Italy.

The third coalition was formed in 1805, by England, Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Naples. Soon Napoleon was again in motion with the French army, defeated the Austrians at Ulm, and at Austerlitz overcame the combined forces of Russia and Austria; compelling the peace of Presburg, and making his brother Joseph king of Naples, and his brother Louis king of Holland.

Having thus annihilated the German Empire by practically subverting its constitution, Napoleon was chosen Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, reducing the title and dignity of Francis II. from that of Emperor of Germany and King of the Romans, to that of Hereditary Emperor of Austria, and making likewise kings of the Electors of Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Saxony, who had attached themselves to the Confederation.