property so employed to confiscation. Among all the contradictory positions that have been advanced on the law of nations, this principle has never been disputed. It is to be found in all the books of law, and in all the treaties. Every man knows it; the subjects of all states know it, as it is universally acknowledged by all governments who possess any degree of civil knowledge."

And in this case it was decided, that the actual sailing, with the intention to break a blockade, is a breach of it, and the penal consequences of such breach attach to the property of persons ignorant of the fact, by the conduct of the master, or of their consignee, if intrusted with power over the vessel.

The ship and cargo, belonging to the same person, were accordingly involved in the sentence of condemnation.

In the Vrow Johanna (2 Ch. Rob. 109), it was declared to be the duty of a country, notifying a blockade, to notify also its revocation, if revoked. In the absence of any such revocation, the legal presumption is that the blockade still exists. This decision was in July 18, 1799, and grew out of the blockade of Amsterdam.

The Neptunus (ibid. 110), was a case where a misrepresentation of a fact by a cruiser was deemed to be an excuse. The validity or efficiency of the blockade of Havre was considered, in 1799, to be impaired, and the prize was restored.

The Adelaide (ibid. 111, n.) was the case of alleged boná fide ignorance of the blockade for want of any notification; but the ship was condemned.

The Juno (ibid. 116) was the case of a master's innocent misapprehension of the terms of a license to carry cargo into a blockaded port; and the court said (p. 119):

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"A ship that has entered previous to the blockade may retire in ballast, or taking a cargo that had been put on board before the blockade. This is the distinction which I have held, and shall hold, till I am corrected by a superior court."

In the Weelvaart van Pillaw (ibid. 128), the alleged offense was escaping a blockading force. On a subsequent capture the ship was held to have been taken in delicto, and subject to confiscation.

The ports of the United Provinces were blockaded March 21st, 1799; the same day foreign ministers were notified, and March 26th notice was inserted in the Gazette. A Danish ship sailed from Rotterdam, March 28th. The lapse of one week's time was not deemed sufficient to affect the parties with legal knowledge of the blockade, and the ship was restored. The Jonge Petronella, 2 Ch. Rob. 131.

The Calypso (ibid. 298), was another case of prize, arising under the same blockade; and sailing with part of the cargo taken in after notice, was deemed a breach of the blockade.

Notification of blockade is a communication of its establishment, or declaration by the government of a belligerent to the representatives of foreign courts in a belligerent country, or by ministers of the belligerent country, resident abroad, to the respective governments to which they are accredited.

The main purpose of notification is to impart to neutrals timely knowledge of a declared blockade; and it is sufficient if that knowledge reach them, whether it be obtained from general notoriety, or the sovereign's proclamation, or other official promulgation, if formal and authentic.

Dr. Lushington concurs with Lord Stowell, that a blockade de facto may become, by lapse of time and other circumstances, so notorious that knowledge must be generally presumed. In some cases the notoriety may be so great as to amount to a presumptio juris et de jure; in others it may only throw the onus of proving ignorance on the claimant. But if there be room for reasonable doubt, the subjects of neutral states are entitled to the benefit of it.

Notice or notification, whether these two terms be synonymous or otherwise, are usually pretty well understood, but not so notoriety. What constitutes notoriety is, perhaps, incapable of a precise definition, though an approximation to it is indeed possible by enumeration or description of its constituents.

In 1855, a particular, yet comprehensive judicial exposition of this test and feature in blockade prize causes, was given by Dr. Lushington. As it is the most recent, it may, therefore, be deemed the most authentic English exposition on the subject, especially as that most learned and able of magistrates had all the benefit of his predecessors' experience, and free access to their reported decisions, and made ample use of them. All that was said by Lord Stowell in the Rolla (6 Ch. Rob. 367), or elsewhere, was manifestly fresh and familiar to him. He considered that the necessary materials "to form notoriety" were,—

"First, A state of circumstances arising out of the blockade itself;

"Secondly, Communications, however made, of the blockade having been established; and

"Thirdly, All the circumstances peculiar to the case." 1. The continuance for a time, more or less, of a

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blockading force off a blockaded port, the prevention of vessels entering or departing, the indorsement upon the papers of vessels turned back, and the fact of capture, must necessarily tend to constitute notoriety; for these are facts so deeply affecting the interests of the commercial world, that it would be contrary to all human experience to suppose that they are not circulated at least with the ordinary rapidity with which mercantile communications are made.

2. All verbal or written communications made by officers or other persons in authority to persons engaged or likely to be engaged in commercial transactions connected with the blockaded ports, may be comprised under the second head. These will have their weight towards establishing the requisite publicity, according to the clearness with which, and the times when they occurred, and the number and condition of persons who were made cognizant thereof.

3. There must be taken into consideration all the circumstances which may be said to be component parts of the history of the transaction; for instance, the locality of the places blockaded, the known probability of the blockade being imposed, the facility of communicating the fact of the blockade to all persons accustomed to trade with the port blockaded, and especially due consideration must be given, according to these facts, to the time which has elapsed between the establishment of the blockade and any attempt to trade with that port. Nor must it be forgotten, that the residence of the parties who may embark their property in such commercial undertakings, may require, in justice, to be duly considered; for it is obvious to all, that intelligence which must become known to countries in the

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EVERY SPECIES OF EVIDENCE RECEIVED.

neighborhood of blockaded ports, may be utterly unknown to the inhabitants of distant states, where all communications of facts must occupy a longer space of time, and in some instances be less likely to take place at all.

When complete notoriety once exists, all vessels seeking to trade with the blockaded port must be presumed to be cognizant of the blockade, and warning off is no longer necessary. Knowledge of the blockade and not the mode in which the knowledge is conveyed, justifies capture.

And the practice of the prize court has ever been to receive every species of evidence, without being restrained by the municipal law of evidence:

First, because the prize court being not a municipal court, but a court for the administration of public law, was not restrained with regard to evidence, by those rules which are applicable to questions of municipal law.

Secondly, it would be most difficult, even if possible, to have laid down any rules of evidence; because this court, having to concern itself with the transactions of various nations, could never construct a code in conformity with all their various rules, and consequently injustice might be done by excluding in transactions in which they were interested, proofs recognized by themselves.

Thirdly, because of the extreme difficulty of procuring what we are accustomed to call the best evidence, when such evidence is to be obtained from distant countries.

Fourthly, because, though a court may receive all, it will form its own judgment according to the circum