justified. The question is then squarely presented, what was the legislative intent in using the expression "lawfully terminated," and whether a person so occupying premises can be removed when he has been wrongfully discharged during the term of service. The subdivision provides for the removal of an occupant "where the person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a servant or employé and the relation of master and servant or employer and employé has been lawfully terminated."

If the word "lawfully" is used in its ethical sense, implying a discharge that is justified in law, the petition should be dismissed, because it has not been shown that the discharge was for legal cause; but if the word "lawfully" was intended simply to characterize the termination of the employment as one which is legally sufficient to sever the relation of master and servant, without regard to the merits of the discharge, the petition cannot be dismissed, because it is held that the relation of master and servant was severed by the discharge.

[2] It has long been the law of this state that when a servant became the occupant of premises as an incident to his employment, for the purpose of enabling him to perform better his services, his right to occupy the premises ceased when the relation of master and servant was terminated, and the master had a right to exclude him from further occupancy, and the parties were left to test in an action the legality of the discharge and the right to damages. Kerrins v. People, 60 N. Y. 221, 19 Am. Rep. 158; Haywood v. Miller, 3 Hill, 90; Bristor v. Burr, 120 N. Y. 427, 431, 24 N. E. 937, 8 L. R. A. 710; Bates v. Davis, 57 Misc. Rep. 557, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1094; Ballou v. Gorman, 62 Misc. Rep. 513, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1118.

Following the well-known rule of construction, it is not only possible, but easy, to read the provision quoted from section 2231 as a statement of the common-law rule, as expressed in the cases cited, rather than as a rule in derogation of the common law; and it is apparent that this rule has been incorporated into section 2231 for the purpose of applying the remedy which our summary proceedings law furnishes and in the manner therein prescribed. I conclude therefore that the Legislature, when it used the expression "lawfully terminated" in this statute, intended simply that the right to removal should arise in this class of cases whenever the relation of master and servant or employer and employé should be brought to an end as a matter of law, without reference to the fact that either party may or may not have been justified in thus ending the relation.

A final order may be entered awarding to the petitioner the delivery of the possession of the property in question, with costs.

Ordered accordingly.

MEIGHAN v. ROHE et al. (No. 6861.)

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. February 19, 1915.)

1. RECORDS (§ 9*)-TORRENS ACT-Purpose of.

The purpose of the Torrens Land Title Registration Law (Consol. Laws, c. 50, §§ 370-434, as amended by Laws 1910, c. 627) is to register good titles, and not to cure bad ones.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Records, Dec. Dig. § 9.*]

2. RECORDS (§ 9*)-TORRENS ACT-LAND ADMISSIBLE TO REGISTRATION.

A good title, which may be registered under the Torrens Land Title Registration Law, is a marketable one, which a court of equity would compel an unwilling purchaser to accept in an action for specific perform

ance.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Records, Dec. Dig. § 9.*]

3. RECORDS (§ 9*)-TORRENS ACT-INTEREST OF STATE.

It being to the interest of the state to prevent the registration of defective titles, as that would promote litigation and unrest, the Attorney General may object to the registration of a defective title under the Torrens Land Title Registration Law.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Records, Dec. Dig. § 9.*]

4. ADVERSE POSSESSION (8 58*)-ESSENTIALS OF.

Mere actual, open, and notorious possession for a period of over 20 years does not ripen into adverse title, for the possession must be coupled with claim of title adverse to the owner.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 279281 Dec. Dig. § 58.*]

5. ADVERSE POSSESSION (§ 60*)-ESSENTIALS-REQUISITE.

Plaintiff's father went into possession of land under a document reciting that the record owner was about to travel, and that in case he should not return within 10 years plaintiff's father should be his heir and owner of his lot. Plaintiff and her father had possession of the property for over 50 years. Held that, as the father, who went into possession immediately on the departure of the owner, could not at that time have held adversely neither his possession nor that of plaintiff can be construed as adverse to the true owner.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Adverse Possession, Cent. Dig. §§ 282312, 323, 328; Dec. Dig. § 60.*]

6. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 185*)-MATTERS REVIEWABLE.

Objections going to the jurisdiction may for the first time be raised upon appeal.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 11661176, 1375; Dec. Dig. § 185.*]

7. RECORDS (§ 9*)—TORRENS ACT-SERVICE.

Real Property Law (Consol. Laws, c. 50) § 380, as amended by Laws 1910, c. 627, § 3, provides that the official examiner's certificate of title shall state fully what search and efforts have been made to find actual or possible owners or claimants of the property sought to be registered. The record owner of property departed on travels and never returned, leaving a paper wherein he promised that, in case he did not return, plaintiff's father should be his heir. Plaintiff gave vague testimony as to efforts by her parents to discover the whereabouts of the owner. Held, that a certificate of the examiner that the owner was never heard of after his departure, though diligent efforts were made to find him, was not warranted under the statute, and did not authorize an order for substituted service; hence such service gave the court no jurisdiction. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Records, Dec. Dig. § 9.*]

For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes 151 N.Y.S.-50

8. RECORDS (§ 9*)-REGISTRATION OF TITLE-EVIDENCE-SUFFICIENCY.

Evidence in a proceeding for the registration of title to land held insufficient to show that plaintiff's ancestor had advanced any of the purchase money for the land.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Records, Dec. Dig. § 9.*]

9. RECORDS (§ 9*)—REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE-DUTY OF EXAMINER-“PUBLIC OFFICER."

Official examiners of titles are "public officers," and, as great importance is attached by the registration law to their certificates, they should state only those facts which are clearly established.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Records, Dec. Dig. § 9.*

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Officer.]

Appeal from Special Term, Bronx County.

Action by Catherine Meighan against Lillie E. Rohe and others for the registration of land, to which the People of the State of New York objected. From a judgment for plaintiff, the People appeal. Reversed, and complaint dismissed.

Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and MCLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.

Robert P. Beyer, of New York City, for the People.

Gilbert Ray Hawes, of New York City, for respondent Meighan.

SCOTT, J. The action is brought under article 12 of the Real Property Law, as amended by chapter 627 of the Laws of 1910 (known as the Torrens Land Title Registration Law), to register the title of plaintiff to certain real property described in the complaint, consisting of a plot about 25 feet in width, and 215 feet in depth, extending from Bergen avenue to Third Avenue, fronting on both. After a trial at Special Term the plaintiff recovered the judgment appealed from, which adjudges her to be the owner in fee simple absolute of the property in question, and grants registration thereof in accordance with the. provisions of the statute.

[1-3] Exceptions were duly filed by the Attorney General of the state of New York, and he now prosecutes this appeal. The questions presented are in part technical, having to do with the proper procedure to be followed in such cases, and in part substantial, having to do with the sufficiency of plaintiff's title as exhibited by the proofs. The plaintiff challenges the right of the Attorney General to criticize or attack her claim of title, because in his answer he contented himself with putting in issue, by appropriate denials, the allegation of the complaint, without specifically pleading controverting facts tending to establish title in the people of the state of New York. This objection renders it proper that some consideration should be given to the object of the registration law, and to the proper attitude to be taken by the Attorney General in actions prosecuted thereunder.

It is well settled that the purpose of the act is to register good titles, not to cure bad ones. Partenfelder v. People, 211 N. Y. 357, 105 N. E. 675. A good title, which may be registered, we understand to be one which is marketable and free from reasonable doubt, or, in other *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

words, such a title as a court of equity would compel an unwilling purchaser to accept in an action for specific performance. In the nature of things, actions to register a title under the act will frequently be practically ex parte, especially in view of the somewhat loose provisions for service of process upon absent defendants and possible claimants. The people of the state of New York have an interest to see that imperfect titles are not registered, and it is not only the right, but the duty, of the Attorney General, in the protection of that interest, to insist in each case that proper proof of title be made, acting in effect as amicus curiæ. This is expressly held in Barkenthien v. People, 212 N. Y. 36-44, 105 N. E. 808, 810, wherein the court uses the following language:

"In the provision that the complaint shall state what interest, if any, the state has in the property involved in the action 'other than the general governmental interest or such as exists as to all land in private ownership,' is the recognition of the fact that there inheres in the people of the state an interest in the true, just, and conclusive registration of the titles to the lands within the state. A system or procedure which would secure or permit the registration of false, defective, or questionable titles would give rise to conflicts of ownership, litigation, or appeals for legislative relief, and be inimical to public peace and contentment and of brief existence. American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47 [31 Sup. Ct. 200, 55 L. Ed. 82]; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 [10 Sup. Ct. 557, 33 L. Ed. 918]. The judgments rendered in the actions are well-nigh conclusive throughout the future as against all the world, and it is both wise and just that the people of the state in the capacity of representative or protector of parties having interests in the property should be empowered to compel the plaintiff to establish a title free from reasonable doubt."

[4, 5] In the present case the plaintiff makes no claim to a record title to that part of the premises described in the complaint which fronts on Third avenue and extends easterly there from about 200 feet. Her claim is that she has established a title, good against all the world, by adverse possession. The record title is in one Peter Wurm, to whom the lot was conveyed by Casper Zuern and wife by deed dated March 23, 1854, and recorded February 26, 1857. There is no record of any conveyance by Peter Wurm. There is extant, however, a paper writing, in the German language, signed by him and dated September 26, 1852, the translation of which reads as follows:

"I am about to travel, and hereby promise, in case I shall not return within four to ten years, Mr. Peter Biecker shall be my lawful heir, and owner of my lot situate at Melrose."

It will be observed that this paper antedates by about 18 months the deed by which Wurm acquired the title to the property. This fact is apparently accounted for by another paper, said to be in Wurm's handwriting, but not signed by him, which recites that he (Wurm) had already paid for the lot; that Zuern, the vendor, had not been able as yet to obtain a deed himself; and that said Zuern agrees to satisfy a mortgage on the lot within a year, and "to let me have, as legal owner of the lot bought of him, the deed of said property through the intervention of Mr. Peter Biecker of New York." This paper is dated September 28, 1852, and is signed by Casper Zuern and his wife, Agnes, as well as by a witness.

After signing the paper above quoted, under which plaintiff claims. title, Peter Wurm departed upon his travels and has not been heard from since. At some time thereafter Peter Biecker went into possession of the plot of land, improved it, built a fence around it, and he and the plaintiff, his daughter, have remained in possession thereof ever since. It is upon this possession that plaintiff rests her claim of title. That she, and her father before her, have been in actual, open, and notorious possession of the property for much more than 20 years is proven; but that fact alone is not sufficient to establish a title by adverse possession. It is necessary to show in addition that such possession was coupled with a claim of title adverse to the true owner. Of this there is no proof whatever.

The document signed by Peter Wurm in 1852 was neither a deed, nor a will, nor a contract to convey. It vested in Peter Biecker no title whatever. During the first 10 years after Peter Wurm started on his travels, Biecker certainly could not have occupied the premises under any claim of title from Wurm; and there is no evidence that at any time he asserted any claim in opposition to Wurm's title. It seems quite apparent that plaintiff's claim of a title in fee simple absolute could not prevail against Peter Wurm, if he should reappear and make claim to the property, or, in case of his death, against his heirs, if they should so appear and make claim. If Peter Wurm be dead, as from the lapse of time it may be presumed that he is, and if he left no heirs, the property has apparently escheated to the people of the state of New York; and it is very doubtful whether or not the estate of the state, created by escheat, can be defeated by any claim of adverse possession. Hamlin v. People, 155 App. Div. 680, 140 N. Y. Supp. 643.

It is not necessary, however, at the present time, to speculate as to where the title to the property in question has vested, and it is impossible, for lack of the requisite proofs, to determine that question. It is sufficient for the purposes of this appeal that the plaintiff has not shown upon the proofs that she possesses a good and marketable title -such a one as the court would compel an unwilling vendee to accept. Simis v. McElroy, 160 N. Y. 156, 54 N. E. 674, 73 Am. St. Rep. 673. Having failed to show this, she was not entitled to a judgment and decree of registration.

[6, 7] Apart from this fundamental objection to the registration of plaintiff's alleged title, there are deficiencies in the proceedings as disclosed by the papers on appeal. It was attempted to make substituted service upon Peter Wurm, and an order therefor was obtained, based in part upon the certificate of title and abstract of the official examiner, and the only evidence before the court as to the absence of Peter Wurm, his last known place of residence, and the efforts that have been made to find him were the statements contained in that certificate and abstract. Section 380 of the Real Property Law, as amended by chapter 627, Laws 1910, requires that the official examiner's certificate of title "shall state fully what search and efforts have been made to find" actual or possible owners or claimants of the property sought to be registered, not know or not found. The certificate in the present case notably fails to comply with this require