the state of New York. His last will and testament was duly admitted to probate in the Surrogate's Court of the county of New York on February 24, 1911, and letters testamentary were duly issued by one of the surrogates of the county of New York to the plaintiff as sole executor, the other executors named in the will having renounced the appointment, and the plaintiff has qualified as such executor and has ever since been and is now acting as such. The decedent left sufficient estate to pay all the pecuniary legacies, bequests, and charges specified in the will and all his debts, and also left seven $1,000 5 per cent. general mortgage bonds of the St. Louis & San Fransisco Railroad mentioned in the first subdivision of the first clause of the will, and a large amount of securities, consisting of bonds, in England, and securities, consisting of bonds and stocks and cash, in the United States. The value of the English estate is estimated at $243,560, and the value of the American estate is approximately $89,000. Since the death of the testator, Helene Peck (or Pick) and Theodore Pick, mentioned in the will, have departed this life. Taking up the several questions presented in the order in which they arise upon the face of the will, I have reached the following conclusions:

[1, 2] The $7,000 of St. Louis & San Francisco bonds mentioned in the first clause of the will were given to Helene Pick and should be delivered to her executor. This gift was, however, charged with the payment of the income to her brothers, and their rights, being derived from the will now under construction, should be determined in this action, and not, as suggested by plaintiff's counsel, in an action to be brought against the executor of Helene Pick. I am of the opinion that the gift of the income of the bonds was intended to be a gift of onehalf of such income to each of the brothers during their respective lives, and that the income which has or may come into the hands of the executor should be distributed on this principle; the share of Theodore which had accrued to the time of his death to be paid to his representatives. The executor of Helene Pick should be directed to pay one-half of the income which shall hereafter come into his hands to Emil during his natural life.

[3] The gift of $10,000 to each of the testator's grandchildren, the issue of his daughter, contained in the third clause of the will, was a simple and direct gift to a class, vesting in interest at the testator's death, and the members of the class are therefore to be determined as of that time. Matter of Brown, 154 N. Y. 313, 326, 48 N. E. 537. The language, "being or becoming the issue of my daughter," is to be understood as intended to embrace issue in being when the will was written and such as should come into existence between that time and the testator's death. The defendant Eleanor Seligman is the sole possible beneficiary under this clause of the will, and the executor need therefore retain only the sum of $10,000 for the purpose of carrying out its provisions.

[4] Since the gift was vested in interest from the time of the testator's death, the share of the accrued income to which this sum may be entitled, as well as such as may be earned upon the specific fund when it is set aside until the time for payment of the legacy arrives, will

belong to the legatee. Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92, 103, 109; Miller v. Gilbert, 144 N. Y. 68, 73, 38 N. E. 979; Matter of Conger, 81 App. Div. 493, 500, 80 N. Y. Supp. 933; Matter of Becker, 59 Misc. Rep. 135, 112 N. Y. Supp. 221.

[5] The directions of the fifth clause of the will should be followed by the trustees. Duncklee v. Butler, 30 Misc. Rep. 58, 62 N. Y. Supp. 921. See Lawton v. Lawton, 35 App. Div. 389, 54 N. Y. Supp. 760.

[6] As to the trusts attempted to be created relative to the testator's property in England by the first and second subdivisions of the seventh clause of the will, I am of the opinion that the trust for the benefit of the defendant Edith Seligman should be sustained, but that all the other dispositive provisions of the first, second, and third subdivisions of clause VII are void. I think the word "interest" in the expression "interest of about half of the net income" should be understood, as suggested by the learned guardian ad litem for the grandchild, as meaning an interest equivalent to half the income. It is true that the word "interest" in other parts of the clause is used in the sense of a return upon moneys invested. Reading the clause as a whole, however, I cannot think that he in any case contemplated the mere gift of income upon income. It follows that, under the valid provisions of the will, the defendant Edith Seligman will be entitled to one-half the income from the trust fund created by the first subdivision of this clause for 10 years following the testator's death, if she live so long. Thereafter, under those provisions, she will be entitled to the entire income as long as she lives.

[7] The provision for accumulation of half the income for the period of 10 years is invalid (Personal Property Law, § 16), and the income so directed to be accumulated, now accrued, and as it hereafter accrues, must go to the person presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate. St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. E. 981, 14 Ann. Cas. 708. Such person is the defendant Edith Seligman, who is given an equitable interest for life in the entire fund from the time when the accumulation was to come to an end. Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303. 385; Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 508, 519

[8] The attempted gift of the income to grandchildren for their lives is, I think, void. The gift not being immediate, but only to take effect after the termination of the first equitable life estate, must be understood to have been intended as a gift to a class whose members were to be determined at that future time. Persons answering the description may yet be born. Hence the class was intended to include grandchildren who might not be in being at the death of the testator. This is both the natural meaning of the language used and the established construction in such cases (Bisson v. West Shore R. R., 143 N. Y. 125, 38 N. E. 104), and it will not do to adopt a different construction merely for the purpose of saving the gift from the operation of the statute (Central Trust Co. v. Egleston, 185 N. Y. 23, 77 N. E. 989). If an ultimate gift of the absolute interest in the trust fund to the issue, if any, of the grandchildren, might be implied from the language of the second subdivision of the seventh clause, still both this gift and the alternative gift to the collateral relatives were not only

obviously dependent upon the enjoyment of the equitable life estates by the grandchildren, but they were too remote in vesting. Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497. I conclude, therefore, that, except for the trust estate for the benefit of his daughter Edith, the testator died intestate as to so much of his property in England as was included in that trust. Clark v. Cammann, 160 N. Y. 315, 54 N. E. 709; Matter of Wilcox, supra.

[9] As to the remaining provisions of the seventh clause of the will which relate to the testator's property in the United States, I am of the opinion that a trust was created for the benefit of the granddaughter Eleanor and the annuities mentioned, with certain contingent remainders to Eleanor or to her mother in the alternative, as the contingencies may happen. I do not think that the provisions of the will in regard to this property suspend the absolute ownership for more than a single life. If Eleanor shall die unmarried at any time before her mother, the trust will come to an end, and the fund will immediately vest in her mother in absolute ownership, except for the charge of the annuities, which may be disregarded, as will be shown. If Eleanor should marry with her mother's consent, either before or after the expiration of the five years, the fund would either vest in her absolutely or it would vest subject to being divested in favor of her mother upon her predeceasing her mother-alternatives which do not require to be decided now, and which may never require to be adjudicated. In either event the absolute ownership would not be suspended beyond the life of Eleanor. Should the mother predecease the daughter, and the latter die unmarried, the trust fund would immediately vest in the next of kin of the testator, no disposition of it in such a contingency having been made by the will. If Eleanor should marry at any time in the lifetime of her mother, but without her consent, or if she should marry after her mother's death, there might be some question as to what disposition was intended in that event. That question need not be determined now, for it may never arise. Neither of these contingencies, however, would result in an unlawful suspension of the absolute ownership of the fund.

[10] The provision for the payment of certain annuities out of the fund for a period of years does not suspend the absolute ownership within the meaning of the statute, since the annuities are not required to be paid out of the income of the trust fund and are therefore alienable. Wells v. Squires, 117 App. Div. 502, 102 N. Y. Supp. 597.

[11] The provision for the accumulation of income not being for a purpose permitted by the statute (Personal Property Law, § 16), the income for the period of five years, accrued and as it hereafter accrues, must go to the person presumptively entitled to the next eventual estate. This person is the defendant Eleanor Seligman, who is presumptively entitled to the entire income from and after the period fixed for the accumulation. Pray v. Hegeman, supra.

[12] We must now endeavor to ascertain somewhat more definitely what the testator's purpose was with regard to his property in the United States, so as to determine the precise interest which shall be adjudged to vest in the granddaughter Eleanor. It seems to me that the

testator intended that the income from this property should be accumulated for five years provided Eleanor lived so long and, perhaps, unless she married within that time. This accumulation he desired to be invested in certain bonds and to become a part of the capital of the trust. This was the only accumulation he directed, and I think it was all he intended. After this accumulation should have been accomplished and added to the trust fund, I think he intended to dispose of the entire income of the fund so augmented. In the event of Eleanor's marriage with her mother's consent, he certainly did, for he gave her the entire fund with its accumulation. If she should remain unmarried, he did not intend her to come into possession of the capital of the trust at all; but I have no doubt he intended her to have the entire income. This was all very natural. But it would be very unnatural to suppose that he ever intended to limit Eleanor's interest, while unmarried, to the mere income upon the income of the estate, and much more so to suppose that he intended to limit her to the income upon such income as could be accumulated and invested in the five years following his death. Yet the last is the literal meaning of his language when he makes use of the expression "interest on the above income." When he later employs the phrase "interest. on this income," it would be difficult to say whether the literal meaning was the income upon the income which had been accummulated and invested within the five years, or the income upon the income of the entire trust fund. I am satisfied that he meant neither the one nor the other, but that he meant the income upon the entire fund, which was made up of the original fund, plus the investmenť made from the first five years' income. He had expressly created the trust "for my dear granddaughter Eleanor," and he probably supposed that this was enough in itself to give her the income from the fund. But he wished to accumulate and invest the income for five years, and to add this investment of income to the capital of the trust. So I think what he meant to say was:

"And after five years (until which time no income at all will be available for distribution) at such times as my daughter Edith shall think proper, they shall pay the whole interest on the invested income (as well as the income from the original fund) to my granddaughter Eleanor."

Then follows the provision that upon Eleanor's marriage, with her mother's consent, she shall receive the entire trust fund with its accumulations. Then, quite unnecessarily, the testator reverts to the situation in the event of Eleanor's remaining unmarried, either indefinitely or for a time, and he repeats the provision already made, namely, that in that case the trustees shall hold the aforementioned securities (meaning the securities in which the accumulated income had been invested) and should pay to Eleanor the income on that investment of income-it being taken for granted that she was to receive the income of the original fund expressly created for her benefit. It is true that some liberties are necessarily taken with the testator's language in reaching this result, but the whole will is so inartificially written, and so much is left out which would be necessary to make a reasonably complete and intelligible disposition even of the corpus cf

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his property, both in this country and in England, that I have less. hesitation in dealing freely with his disposition of the income.

[13] The court is bound to find a rational scheme of disposition in the will, if it can be done, and even though it be necessary to supply words or phrases or to give those which are in the will a meaning other than they ordinarily bear. Roe v. Vingut, 117 N. Y. 204, 22 N. E. 933. For the present it is only necessary to adjudge that the trust for Eleanor is valid; that she is entitled to the income ineffectually sought to be accumulated; that after the expiration of the five years she will be entitled to the entire income of the fund, to be paid during her minority at such times as her mother shall indicate; and after she shall attain her majority, to be paid half yearly. Any power in her mother, if such was intended, to postpone payments and thus accumulate income after the majority of Eleanor, would be ineffective. What shall be done with the fund or its income upon Eleanor's marriage, with or without her mother's consent, is a matter which need not now be adjudicated.

Submit, with proof of service, requests for findings within five days after the publication of this opinion.

REICHMAN et al. v. PRETZFELDER.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department. March 4, 1915.)

1. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (§ 31*)-PROMISE TO PAY-RELEASE OF DEBTS OF AN

OTHER.

A promise to pay in consideration of a release of the debt of another is not within the statute of frauds.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Frauds, Statute of, Cent. Dig. §§ 47, 48; Dec. Dig. § 31.*]

2. CONTRACTS (§ 54*)-CONSIDERATION-RELEASE OF CLAIM.

While the release of an invalid claim may be no consideration, the release of a doubtful claim, as to which there is a dispute in good faith, is a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay money.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 233-239, 242, 243, 251, 254, 255, 291-315; Dec. Dig. § 54.*]

Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Seventh District.

Action by Lee Reichman and others, copartners doing business as Reichman Bros., against Albert Pretzfelder. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed, and new trial ordered.

Argued February term, 1915, before GUY, PENDLETON, and SHEARN, JJ.

Hays, Hershfield & Wolf, of New York City (Daniel P. Hays and Edwin D. Hays, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellants. Oscar Igstaedter, of New York City, for respondent.

PENDLETON, J. The action was brought to recover a sum defendant agreed to pay in consideration of plaintiffs' releasing a third party from an alleged indebtedness. The defense is want of con

*For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes