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The principles evolved in detail by the old National Labor Board represented the united viewpoint of a membership composed of such outstanding labor leaders as William Green, John L. Lewis, and George Berry; such leading industrialists as Walter Teagle, Pierre du Pont, Gerard Swope, Louis Kirstein, Clay Williams, Ernest Draper, and Henry S. Dennison; and such respected representative of the general public as Monsignor Francis J. Haas, Dr. Leon C.* Marshall, and Dr. Leo Wolman. In all the cases which came before the Board, there was only one important dissenting opinion. To my mind the complete agreement by so varied a group of men proves something of vital significance. It proves that no matter what a man's background, once he stops obtaining his information from fragmentary reports or a dilettante interest, and wrestles intimately with the heavy problems of capital and labor, he is forced inescapably to accept the validity of principles enunciated so often by our Government and now embodied in the National Labor Relations Act.

But despite the unanimity of the old National Labor Board, its effectiveness gradually broke down because of the violent opposition of a relatively few powerful organizations who would not accept the principles of industrial democracy. They would not bargain, they would not talk, they would not even sit in the same room with the representatives of their workers. Strife grew because there was no other way out.

To remedy these deficiencies, and to establish permanent machinery for dealing with the mounting industrial warfare, I introduced the first national labor relations bill in the spring of 1934. The bill was not rushed through Congress. Very extensive hearings were held before this committee over a period of 4 weeks, and more than 1,000 pages of testimony was taken. The bill did not pass that year, but instead the life of the old National Labor Board was prolonged with some slight variations in its set-up. Again the authority of this Board was widely flouted, and in 1935, with the industrial front aflame with strikes and threats of strikes, I reintroduced an improved draft of the national labor relations bill. Hearings were again held for several weeks before this committee and the House Labor Committee. With the active cooperation of the American Federation of Labor throughout, the measure was finally approved by an overwhelming vote and signed by the President.

The present law as adopted by Congress was simple in outline and sound in conception. It did not propose to establish compulsory arbitration, to fix hours, wages, or working conditions. It did not displace the conciliation functions of the Department of Labor. It did not interfere with the normal exercise of the employer's right to hire or fire, or to operate his business in his own way. All it did was to codify and clarify the old-age bill of industrial rights, and to prohibit the specific practices that were antagonistic to the realization of these rights. The discriminatory discharge, the yellow-dog contract, and the company-dominated union were proscribed. The law required the employer to bargain collectively with representatives chosen by a majority of employees in the appropriate unit, and authorized the holding of elections to determine employee representation. By these means, the act was designed to mitigate bitter industrial strife over employee organization and representation, and to

encourage the voluntary settlement around the conference table of controversies over wages, hours, and working conditions. The administrative provisions of the law followed the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and other accepted statutes. There was created a quasi-judicial agency known as the National Labor Relations Board, to hold hearings, to certify representatives, and to issue orders subject to appropriate judicial review before they became effective.

Under the most favorable circumstances it would have been difficult in 1935 to launch the administration of a new law so widespread in its application and so far-reaching in its purposes. But the ink was hardly dry upon the President's signature, when the law's effectiveness was destroyed by a carefully guided attack, led by the same narrow interests that had misrepresented its provisions and fought its

enactment.

Even before the Labor Board had issued its rules and regulations the notorious Liberty League brief was issued by 58 lawyers of a selfconstituted supreme court. Their brief, copies of which were circulated by the thousands throughout the country, solemnly pronounced the law unconstitutional on almost every count. There was widespread noncompliance; and in the district courts throughout the land about 100 injunction suits were filed to resist even the holding of hearings on elections under the act. Behind this screen of injunction suits and wide-publicized claims of unconstitutionality a new trade flourished, thriving on industrial munitions, guards, and spies. I need not recall to this committee the result of the exhaustive and brilliant investigation made by your own subcommittee, which exposed widespread violation of the rights of labor and shocking denial of common civil liberties.

The purveyors of guns, bullets, and scabs were not concerned with improving the administration of the law. They had a golden interest in strikes and violence, and their motivation was expressed by one munition salesman when he wrote, in a letter which is now a matter of record:

I think someone should get out a restraining order on the President of the United States to prevent him from stopping all those strikes. It seems to me that his actions are absolutely in restraint of trade-that is, as far as we are concerned.

What was the outcome? Workers who had placed faith in the power of their Government to vindicate the law were victimized by the thousands. Only by brute economic force could they defend the rights which the law recognized but did not enforce. Their forces were met with counterforce. Consequently there descended upon the country almost an unprecedented reign of industrial terror and terrorism.

At the peak of this development came the five Supreme Court decisions of April 12, 1937, upholding the Labor Act in full and giving the Board the power to seek its enforcement through the circuit courts. That marked the real birth of the National Labor Relations Act and the real date from which its functioning must be conscientiously appraised.

In order to show the driving force of the Labor Act in the direction of industrial peace I have prepared a number of charts, indicating in

graphic detail the tremendous decline of strikes since the law has been in effective operation.

Chart No. 1 shows the number of strikes, the workers involved, and the working time lost throughout the country over a period of years. This chart shows that in 1938, the first full year of operation

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1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS

under the Supreme Court's mandate, there were only about one-half as many strikes, one-third as many workers involved, and less than one-third as much working time lost, as in the year 1937.

Not only does 1938 show a tremendous improvement over 1937, but it represents the best record in recent years:

The steady upward trend in the number of strikes, over a period of 8 successive years, was definitely reversed.

Fewer workers were involved in strikes during 1938 than in any year since 1932.

Less aggregate working time was lost through strikes in 1938 than in any year since 1931.

The precipitate decline in industrial strife during 1938 cannot be explained away on the ground of diminished business activity in the early part of the year. The national income produced during 1938 the best index of general business activity-while lower than in 1936 and 1937, was higher than in 1932, 1933, 1934, and 1935; and yet less working time was lost through strikes in 1938 than in any of these years. Moreover, the rapid stepping-up of business activity in the second half of 1938 was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in labor strife, and no such increase is on the horizon at the present time.

There is ample evidence that this solid improvement in labor relations is due largely to the operation of the Labor Act. Let me demonstrate this first by reference to charts analyzing the data on industrial strife according to the major issues involved. In chart No. 2, the black area at the base of the bars represents disputes over wages and hours; the heavy shaded area in the middle of the bars represents disputes involving the major issues, in whole or part, of union recognition, discrimination, closed shop, or other organization matters; the light area at the top of the bars represents miscellaneous controversies.

Chart No. 2 shows a drop during 1938 in the proportion of “organization" strikes. More significant still, the proportion of workers involved in such strikes declined from about 60 percent in 1937 to 33 percent in 1938, a level far lower than the average for the past 10 years.

Chart No. 3 shows that the proportion of working time lost through "organization" strikes declined from 76 percent in 1937 to 44 percent in 1938, a level lower than in any year since 1932. And these are figures for all strikes in the United States, not simply those which occur in interstate industry or are involved in cases before the Labor Board.

The Labor Act was designed to eliminate the causes of "organization" strikes, and it is rapidly accomplishing that result. Chart No. 4 shows very clearly just how industrial strife is giving way to the orderly processes of law. For each month between the appointment of the Labor Board in October 1935, and the end of the last fiscal year, the chart indicates the number of new strikes, and the number of new cases filed with the Board. Notice how significantly the trend is disclosed. In the first few months of the Board's operation, there were more cases filed with the Board than strikes called. But as resistance to the law stiffened and injunction suits multiplied, this proportion shifted. All during 1936 and through March 1937, there were more strikes called than cases filed. The turning point came in April 1937, with the Supreme Court decisions upholding the law. Beginning in May 1937, and in every month since, the number of cases filed with the Board has averaged three and one-half times the number of strikes.

The contrast is even more significant when limited-as it should be to "organization" strikes, represented by the darker area at the base of the shaded bar. Since May 1937, the number of new Board

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cases each month has ranged from 32 to 10 times the number of "organization" strikes.

Substantially the same story is told by chart No. 5, comparing the number of workers involved in new Board cases with those in

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