transferred from one railroad station to another. Incidentally they may become connected with interstate commerce, but not necessarily so. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern, and, certainly, until Congress acts in reference to their interstate relations, the state may exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. We do not say that a case may not arise in which it will be found that a state, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the exclusive domain of Congress in respect to interstate commerce, but we do say that, upon the facts as they are represented to us in this record, that has not been done."

The statute is held constitutional.

100 U. S., 82.

Statement.

Trade-Mark Cases.

October, 1879.

In 1870 Congress passed an act providing for the registration of trade-marks in the Patent Office; in 1876 another act was passed punishing the fraudulent use, sale or counterfeiting of trade-marks thus registered, the two acts being so connected that they stand or fall together. Under the latter act three persons were indicted. In defense the constitutionality of the legislation is assailed. The cases come to the Supreme Court.

Opinion.

If an act of Congress can in any case be extended, as a regulation of commerce, to trade-marks, it must be limited to their use in "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." The legislation in question is not in its terms or essential character a regulation thus limited, but in its language embraces and was intended to embrace all commerce, including that

between citizens of the same state.

The acts are unconstitutional.

116 U. S., 446.

Statement.

Walling v. The State of Michigan.

January 18, 1886.

Walling, a "drummer," came to Michigan to solicit orders liquors to be shipped from Chicago, and was arrested under

a Michigan statute requiring one engaged in that business to have a license. Walling carried the case to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Opinion.

"We think that the act in question operates as a regulation of commerce among the states in a manner within the exclusive power of Congress, and that it is for this reason repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and void."

Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District.

120 U. S., 489. Statement.

March 7, 1887.

A Tennessee statute required "all drummers, and all persons not having a regular licensed house of business within the taxing district, offering for sale or selling goods, wares or merchandise therein by sample" to pay for a license. Robbins was selling goods in Tennessee by sample for a firm in Ohio. Being indicted for a breach of the said statute, Robbins brings the case before the United States Supreme Court. Opinion.

"The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which the negotiation is made is interstate commerce.” Therefore, as applied to persons soliciting orders for houses doing business in other states, the statute in question is unconstitutional, it being inconsistent with the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states.

135 U. S., 100. Statement.

Leisy v. Hardin.

1890.

A statute of Iowa prohibited the sale of any intoxicating liquors, except for pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical or sacramental purposes, and under a license from a county court of the state. Plaintiff shipped intoxicating liquor from Illinois into Iowa and sold it there in the original packages. A large number of these packages were seized by defendant, a constable of Iowa, by virtue of the said statute. Plaintiff brings replevin to obtain possession of the liquor, claiming the statute is repugnant to the power given to Congress to regulate commerce among the states.

Opinion of Supreme Court.

"The doctrine now firmly established is, * * * 'that where the subject upon which Congress can act under its commercial power is local in its nature or sphere of operation, such as harbor pilotage, the improvement of harbors, the establishment of beacons and buoys to guide vessels in and out of port, the construction of bridges over navigable rivers, the erection of wharves, piers and docks, and the like, which can be properly regulated only by special provisions adapted to their localities, the state can act until Congress interferes and supersedes its authority; but where the subject is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of legislation, affecting alike all the states, such as transportation between the states, including the importation of goods from one state into another, Congress alone can act upon it and provide the needed regulations. The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free. Thus the absence of regulations as to interstate commerce with reference to any particular subject is taken as a declaration that the importation of that article into the states shall be unrestricted. It is only after the importation is completed, and the property imported has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the state that its regulations can act upon it, except so far as may be necessary to insure safety in the disposition of the import until thus mingled.""

The statute in question as applied to a sale by the importer, and in the original packages or kegs, unbroken and unopened, of liquors manufactured in and brought from another state is unconstitutional and void.

140 U. S., 545. Statement.

In re Rahrer, Petitioner.

May 25, 1891.

An act of Congress (26 Stat., 313), provides that intoxicating liquors transported into any state or remaining therein for use, sale or storage shall upon arrival in such state be subject to the laws of such state as if produced therein and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages. Petitioner sold beer and whiskey in the original packages as shipped from Missouri, in Topeka, Kansas. By the law of that state this was a crime. Petitioner

is arrested, and prays for a writ of habeas corpus. The case comes before the United States Supreme Court for a decision on the constitutionality of the said laws.

Opinion.

"The power to regulate" interstate commerce "is solely in the general government, and it is an essential part of that regulation to prescribe the regular means for accomplishing the introduction and incorporation of articles into and with the mass of property in the country or state. No reason is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to do so." The act of Congress is valid. The original laws of Kansas became operative in respect to imported packages of intoxicating liquors in their original condition as soon as the act of Congress removed the impediment.

Prayer for writ of habeas corpus denied.

Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Company.

154 U. S., 413. Statement.

May 26, 1894.

The Mercantile Trust Company was trustee in a deed of trust executed by the Texas and Pacific. Railway Company. The legislature of the State of Texas appointed a commission to regulate the rates to be charged by railroads for business done within the state. The Trust Company seeks to enjoin the commission from enforcing any rates against the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, on the ground that being incorporated by Congress it is not subject to state legislation. The case comes to the United States Supreme Court.

Opinion.

"Conceding to Congress the power to remove the corporation in all its operations from the control of the state, there is in the act creating this company nothing which indicates an intent on the part of Congress to so remove it, and there is nothing in the enforcement by the state of reasonable rates for transportation wholly within the state which will disable the corporation from discharging all the duties and

exercising all the powers conferred by Congress. By the act of incorporation Congress authorized the company to build its road through the State of Texas. It knew that, when constructed, a part of its business would be the carrying of persons and property from points within the state to other points also within the state, and that in so doing it would be engaged in a business, control of which is nowhere by the Federal Constitution given to Congress. It must have known that, in the nature of things, the control of that business would be exercised by the state, and if it deemed that the interests of the nation and the discharge of the duties required on behalf of the nation from this corporation demanded exemption in all things from state control, it would unquestionably have expressed such intention in language whose meaning would be clear. Its silence in this respect is satisfactory assurance that, in so far as this corporation should engage in business wholly within the state, it intended that it should be subjected to the ordinary control exercised by the state over such business. * * * We are of opinion that the Texas and Pacific Railway Company is, as to business done wholly within the state, subject to the control of the state in all matters of taxation, rates, and other police regulations."

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company; Hyde v. Continental Trust Company.

158 U. S., 601. Statement.

May 20, 1895.

It is provided in the Federal Constitution that direct taxes shall be apportioned among the states according to their representative population. In 1894 Congress passed an act imposing a tax on incomes from whatever source derived. This tax not being apportioned among the states according to their population, its constitutionality is assailed. Opinion on first hearing.

A tax on the income of real estate is a direct tax, and in this act, not being apportioned as provided by the Constitution, is void.

A tax upon income derived from bonds issued by a municipal corporation is a tax upon the power of the state and its instrumentalities to borrow money, and is consequently repugnant to the Constitution.