You accompany your request with an opinion communicated to you by the Judge-Advocate General, which states the case and the principles of law to be applied and the proper conclusions therefrom so satisfactorily and so in accord with my own views that I quote the same, as follows: "In this case Mr. H. M. Shannon, a clerk of the Record and Pension Office, is stated to have been absent during the present year thirty-nine days, with pay, on account of sickness; and the question has arisen as to whether he is entitled to twenty-one days additional as annual leave. "In my opinion the substance of the two acts taken together is that a clerk may be granted as much as sixty days' leave with pay in the whole year, provided that as much as thirty days of it was made really necessary by his personal illness. In other words, he may be granted as much as thirty days without any cause given (called in the statutes annual leave'), and he may be granted this notwithstanding he 'may have had' not exceeding thirty days' sick leave. And if he shall take his thirty days' annual leave and then become sick afterwards, he may be granted leave on account of his sickness for as many days as he may be sick up to thirty days. "Mr. Shannon was absent sick more than thirty daysi. e., it is said he was absent sick thirty-nine days-and was paid for the whole time. It is assumed that he was paid for thirty days of the time because his absence was made necessary by sickness, and for the other nine on account of annual leave, notwithstanding he was sick at the time. "It is further asked in the first indorsement hereon whether the exceptional, meritorious, etc., provisions of the said act of March 15, 1898,' are nullified by the later act. In my opinion they are. Under either act the head of the Department may grant as much as sixty days, under certain circumstances named. Clearly one of the objects of the later act was to authorize the annual leave to be granted after the sick leave had been taken, for it provides that it may be granted, notwithstanding the applicant may have had' not exceeding thirty days' sick leave. In fact, this seems to be the principal, if not the sole, object of the last act. "Now, the first act provided, in substance, that the sick leave should be an extension of the annual leave, and that this extension of the annual leave should not be granted with pay unless the circumstances of the case were of such exceptional and meritorious character as to make it a hardship not to grant it. "And if the sickness comes before the annual leave is taken it can not be determined at the time the sick leave is taken whether or not it would work a hardship not to extend the annual leave on account of it. If, for instance, the clerk is sick ten days early in the year, and before the annual leave. is taken, it could not be determined then whether it would be a hardship to deduct the time from his thirty days' annual leave or not, because it could not be determined then whether the person would need more than twenty days' annual leave that year or not. Therefore, to provide that the sick leave may be granted first and thirty days' annual leave afterwards makes it impracticable to apply the said exceptional and meritorious, etc., clause or provision of the act of March 15, 1898. And to so legislate as to prevent the application of preivous legislation is to repeal the previous legislation by implication. "I am, therefore, of the opinion that, taking the whole of the law as it stands now, and construing it together, it is proper to hold that it reestablishes the old and simple law and custom of the Department to the effect that the Secretary of War may (through the heads of bureaus or personally) grant clerks and employees thirty days' leave with pay each year without any cause being given, and may also, aside from that, grant the applicant leave with pay during such time as he is compelled by sickness to be absent, up to as much as thirty days." The conclusions reached by the Judge-Advocate-General are, in my opinion, sound and correct, and you are therefore advised accordingly. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. 7843-VOL 22, PT 1- -17 JOHN W. GRIGGS. ARMY OFFICERS SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES. The suspension of hostilities provided for by the protocol of agreement between the United States and Spain is not tantamount to the termination of the war, but creates only an interval in the war and supposes a return to it. Officers exercising, under assignment in orders, a command above that pertaining to their grade, in connection with the Army of the United States, if performing no other service of a domestic nature, but held in readiness to resume hostilities, are entitled to the increased pay and allowance provided for by the act of April 26, 1898. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, October 26, 1898. SIR: Under date of October 24, 1898, you request my opinion as to whether, in view of the suspension of hostilities between the United States and Spain at the present time, there are any United States troops that can be said to be operating against an enemy within the meaning of section 7 of the act of Congress for the better organization of the line of the Army of the United States, approved April 26, 1898. The clause referred to reads as follows: "That in time of war any officer serving with troops operating against an enemy who shall exercise, under assignment in orders issued by competent authority, a command above that pertaining to his grade shall be entitled to receive the pay and allowances appropriate to the command so exercised." I had occasion, at your request, to expound the meaning of this clause in an opinion rendered to you under date of June 17, 1898. I then stated that the clear purpose of the President and of Congress, as evidenced by this legislation and subsequent proceedings, was to form the volunteers, in connection with the regular troops, into an army of the United States for service in the war against Spain; that the object of the clause under consideration was undoubtedly to give the officers assigned to commands above those pertaining to their rank in the regular service just and proper pay commensurate with the rank in which they were actually serving in the war forces, instead of the smaller pay allowed to them by law according to their commissions in the regular service in time of peace. I further stated that the clause in question was intended to apply to all instances where the troops of the United States are assembled into separate bodies, such as regiments, brigades, divisions, or corps, for the purpose of carrying on and bringing to a conclusion the war with Spain, and that if the operations of troops are with the direct object of assisting in the military measures of the Government for subduing the forces of Spain they could, within the reasonable intendment of this act, be considered as operating against an enemy, although such operations might not be direct, but in the nature of necessary component steps, though remote, in one great military objective. The question that now arises is whether the status of armistice prevailing between the United States and Spain by virtue of the protocol of agreement between the two Governments, signed at Washington, August 12, 1898, has rendered these views inapplicable, so that the conditions under which increased pay should be allowed have terminated. By article 6 of said protocol it is agreed that upon the conclusion and signature of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces. In my judgment the suspension of hostilities provided for by the protocol is not tantamount to a termination of the war, but creates only what you happily describe in your letter as an interval in war and supposes a return to it. The Volunteer Army of the United States has not been disbanded, but is still armed and in the field, ready for the resumption of hostilities provided the negotiation for a final and definite peace, which are now being conducted, shall eventually fail. The United States is in possession of various points of Spanish territory, holding and governing it by virtue of military law. No treaty of peace has been signed, and in the eye of the law a condition of war still continues, actual hostilities only being suspended. I therefore advise you that in all instances where officers are exercising, under assignment in orders, a command above that pertaining to their grade, in connection with the Army of the United States, either in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, or within the United States, if performing no other service of a domestic nature, but held merely in readiness to resume hostilities, if necessary, and cooperate with the forces in carrying out the purposes of the war, they are entitled to the increased pay and allowance provided for by the act in question. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS, CHINESE. A Chinese person not connected with the diplomatic service is not entitled to admission to the United States unless an official, teacher, student, merchant, or traveler for curiosity or pleasure. A trader not being expressly known to the law as among the exempt classes, and not being included therein as a merchant, is not entitled to admission into the United States. The status of a valid wife and her relation to her husband fairly embrac ing her with him in the permitted classes, if she is not in fact a laborer, does not extend so far as to confer upon her immunity from the certificate requirement to which her husband is entitled because of his having acquired a domicile here. The wife is a distinct Chinese individual, and since all Chinese persons of the privileged classes must produce upon their original entry the prescribed certificate, the wife of a merchant must in any case produce that certificate upon her original entry. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of October 31, in which you inform me that since the 1st of October, 1896, customs officers have been instructed, in accordance with Syn. Dec. 17445, to require the certificate prescribed by section 6 of the act of July 5, 1884, relating to the exclusion of Chinese, to be presented by all applicants for admission to this country, without reference to sex or age, and that under my opinion of July 15, last, such officers have been instructed that only such Chinese persons as are specifically enumerated, viz, |