sulting from what is called a slight omission, as to which the applicant is innocent, and for which, perhaps, a transcribing official at the American consulate in question is responsible, is emphasized and brought into relief by the statements made and the papers submitted. Whether you in your administrative discretion may recognize this hardship and the merit of the applicants by taking a proper bond for their departure and, perhaps, placing them under surveillance pending the return of their certificates to China for completion and correction, is a subject with which it is not proper for me to deal. I return the correspondence on the subject, as you request. Very respectfully, HENRY M. HOYT, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. BONDS DISBURSING OFFICERS. The five years' limitation within which suits may be brought upon the official bonds of disbursing officers begins to run from the time the accounting officers of the Treasury make the statement of the account showing an indebtedness to the United States, as provided by section 2 of the act of August 8, 1888. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of October 6, 1899, in which you request my opinion as to the proper construction of section 2 of the act of August 8, 1888 (25 Stat., 387), as to when the five years' limitation in that section for suits upon the official bonds of disbursing officers begins to run. The first section of this act provides for notice to the obligors of the official bonds of disbursing officers and officers chargeable with public funds, and directs that "whenever any deficiency shall be discovered in the accounts of any official of the United States, or any officer disbursing or chargeable with public money, it shall be the duty of the accounting officers making such discovery to at once notify the head of the Department having control over the affairs of such officer of the nature and amount of such deficiency, and it shall be the immediate duty of said head of Department to at once notify all obligors upon the bond or bonds of such official of the nature of such deficiency and the amount thereof." Section 2 provides "that if upon the statement of the account of any official of the United States, or of any officer disbursing or chargeable with public money by the accounting officer of the Treasury, it shall thereby appear that he is indebted to the United States, and suit therefor shall not be instituted within five years after such statement of said account, the sureties on the bond shall not be liable for such indebtedness." * * * Obviously, the five years within which suit must be brought under this section begins to run from the time of making such "statement of the account by the accounting officer of the Treasury," showing an indebtedness to the United States, for if "suit therefor shall not be instituted within five years after such statement of said account the sureties on the bond shall not be liable for such indebtedness." The statute is absolute in its discharge of the sureties if suit on the bond be not instituted "within five years after such statement of said account" by the accounting officer of the Treasury. And it makes no exception in case the accounting officer does not make such statement as early as he should, or when a deficiency is discovered by him. And yet, a very important and more difficult question is that suggested by your statement of the practice in your Department, viz, in substance, that where in the account of a disbursing officer there appears, prima facie, a deficiency which may or may not prove to be real, such items are suspended for further evidence, and later a final statement is made showing the true state of the account. And the question is whether upon the discovery by the accounting officer of an apparent deficiency he should notify the head of the Department, as provided in section 1 of that act. That section provides that "whenever any deficiency shall be discovered," etc., the accounting officer shall notify the head of the Department. Does this mean a final and certain discovery, or does it mean that whenever from the statement of the account of the disbursing officer it appears, prima facie, that there is a deficiency, he shall notify the head of the Department? Or, if neither of these, then at what time should he give such notice? Taking the whole statute together, with its obvious intent and purpose, I do not think it was intended that the accounting officer should delay this notice until it has become certain that there is a deficiency; nor, on the other hand, do I think he should always report a deficiency whenever from the account of a disbursing officer it may appear, prima facie, that there is one. This may be from insufficient vouchers or evidence, or from clerical error or omission, or in one or more of various ways not inconsistent with a proper disbursement of the moneys in his hands. But I think that whenever in the exercise of a sound judgment, and after a reasonable time allowed for explanation and correction, it appears to the accounting officer that there is a probable. deficiency, he should notify the head of the Department, as provided in section 1 of the act. But, as before said, whether the accounting officer makes the statement showing an indebtedness to the United States as early as he should, or does not, I am of opinion that the limitation fixed by section 2 of that act begins to run only from the time that the accounting officer of the Treasury makes the statement of account showing an indebtedness to the United States, as provided in that section. Respectfully, JOHN W. GRIGGS. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. FREE-DELIVERY OFFICES CIVIL SERVICE. When free delivery is discontinued at a post-office, such office ceases to be under the civil-service rules. Free delivery offices as a class, and not offices formerly free delivery offices, were intended to be within Postal Rule I, and the present Rule III. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, October 23, 1899. SIR: I have your letter of the 9th instant, in which you say: "I have the honor to request a ruling on the following question: "When free delivery is discontinued at a post-office, does the post-office cease to be a classified office, or is it still classified under civil-service rules? In the event of a vacancy in the clerical force after the discontinuance of free delivery, would such vacancy have to be filled by a selection from the eligible register upon certification from the Civil Service Commission?" "On the 5th of January, 1893, the President amended postal rule 1 of the civil-service rules so as to include in the classified postal service all free-delivery post-offices. The amendment to the rule reads as follows: "The classification of the postal service, made by the Postmaster-General, under section 6 of the act of January 16, 1883, is hereby extended to all free-delivery post-offices, and hereafter when any post-office becomes a free-delivery office the said classification of any then existing classification made by the Postmaster-General under said section and act shall apply thereto, and the Civil Service Commission shall provide examinations to test the fitness of persons to fill vacancies in all free-delivery post-offices, and these rules shall be enforced therein; but this shall not include any postoffice made an experimental free-delivery office under the authority contained in the appropriation act of March 3, 1891. Every revision of the classification of any post-office under section 6 of the act of January 16, 1883, and every inclusion of a post-office within the classified postal service, shall be reported to the President.' "The law provides for the establishment of free delivery in cities having a population of 10,000 or more, or at any post-office which produces a gross revenue for the preceding fiscal year of not less than $10,000, and gives the Postmaster-General authority to discontinue free delivery within his discretion." It is clear that, according to the language of the rule, the Civil Service Commission were to examine persons only in cases of vacancies in free-delivery offices; also, that, according to the language, no civil-service rule was to be enforced except in cases arising in free-delivery offices. As, obviously, the first part of this amendment intended to extend classification only with a view to the examinations and to the enforcement of the civil-service rules, it seems to follow that, according to the natural meaning thereof, the whole first sentence is intended to regulate present and future freedelivery post-offices, and no other. If so, we must have some strong reason for giving a different meaning to it, for the law insists on giving it its natural meaning, in the absence of absurdity or unreasonableness or the like. No such absurdity is apparent; and it seems not unreasonable, whether wise or not, for the President to have intended, what his words naturally mean, that the set of post-offices known as free-delivery offices-a set whose membership was liable to diminution and increase under the statutes (act of January 3, 1887)-should have the civilservice rules extended to the force of employees therein. It would, in fact, be anomalous and strange to see those rules enforced in post-offices for the sole reason that they had been free-delivery offices, and not enforced in any other offices identical in character with them, as they actually are. Your communication takes no note of the fact that this postal rule No. 1 has been altered by the President; but I am not of the opinion that the alteration was intended to change the general sense of it so far as it relates to the matter now under consideration. On the contrary, the sense I am attributing to that rule seems to be again, and in a different form, expressed by the opening words of it: "The post-office service shall include the officers and employees in any free-delivery post-office who have been, or may hereafter be, classified under the civil-service act." Certainly this would not include employees in any office which then (1896) had been, but was no longer, a free-deliv |