improved, running from the old highway to the bridge over the premises."

But it has been held that where, in connection with the description of premises abutting on a highway, an easement over the highway is expressly granted, the fee to the highway is excluded. Hobson v. Philadelphia (1892) 150 Pa. 595, 24 Atl. 1048; Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (1909) 36 Utah, 257, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 86, 102 Pac. 740.

So, a recital that the road in question was laid out for the "accommodation" of lot owners has been referred to as raising an implication that "the use only of the road was to be accorded by way of accommodation, and that the roadbed was not conveyed." Peabody Heights Co. v. Sadtler (1885) 63 Md. 533, 52 Am. Rep. 519.

By a parity of reasoning it has been held that where, to the description, there are added the words, "reserving to the public the use of" the highway, an intent that the fee shall pass is shown. Richardson v. Palmer (1859) 38 N. H. 212.

In Oliver v. Ormsby (1909) 224 Pa. 564, 73 Atl. 973, the description in question called for an alley as a boundary, and added the following words: "Together with the free use and privilege of the said alley, called Carpenter's alley, as by the plan intended to be recorded in the office for recording of deeds in and for Allegheny county, relation thereunto being had, will more fully appear." It was held that the grantee took the fee to the center of the alley.

Where a deed of property abutting on a street describes the property by lot number and then adds, "also doth quitclaim all title in being or reversion to the land now occupied by" the street, the title to the fee of the street is separated from that to the abutting land, and a subsequent reconveyance to the grantor of the land without mentioning the fee to the street, which had, in the meantime, been vacated, gives no title to the vacated street. Overland Mach. Co. v. Alpenfels (Colo.) supra.

A partition decree appropriating as 2 A.L -2.

a street a strip on which all the lots were bounded has been held to give the abutters title to the center of the street. Clark v. Parker (1871) 106

Mass. 554.

But in Codman v. Evans (1861) 1 Allen (Mass.) 443, a deed referring to a street as being "between" the property conveyed and other property was held to pass no rights in the fee of the street.

b. Reference to map or plat.

By the great weight of authority a conveyance of land by lot, block, or tract number, with reference to a map or plat which shows that the property abuts on a highway, gives to the grantee the fee to the center of the highway though the map, by its lines. or coloring, shows the lot, block, or tract as extending only to the side line of the highway.

England. Berridge v. Ward (1861) 10 C. B. N. S. 400, 142 Eng. Reprint, 507, 30 L. J. C. P. N. S. 218, 7 Jur. N. S. 876. Compare Pryor v. Petre [1894] 2 Ch. 11, 63 L. J. Ch. N. S. 531, 7 Reports, 424, 70 L. T. N. S. 331, 42 Week. Rep. 435.

United States.-Banks V. Ogden (1865) 2 Wall. 57, 17 L. ed. 818; Stone v. Waukegan (1913) 123 C. C. A. 563, 205 Fed. 495.

Arkansas.-Taylor v. Armstrong (1863) 24 Ark. 107; Dickinson v. Arkansas City Improv. Co. (1906) 77 Ark. 570, 113 Am. St. Rep. 170, 92 S. W. 21.

California-Frazer v. Ott (1892) 95 Cal. 661, 30 Pac. 793.

Florida.-Smith v. Horn (1915) 70 Fla. 484, 70 So. 435.

Georgia. Harrison v. Augusta Factory (1884) 73 Ga. 447.

Idaho.-Shaw v. Johnston (1910) 17 Idaho, 676, 107 Pac. 399.

Illinois. Thompson V. Maloney (1902) 199 Ill. 276, 93 Am. St. Rep. 133, 65 N. E. 236; Brewster v. Cahill (1902) 199 Ill. 309, 65 N. E. 233.

Indiana. Cox v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. (1874) 48 Ind. 178. Iowa.-Dubuque v. Maloney (1859) 9 Iowa, 450, 74 Am. Dec. 358. Kentucky. Jacob Woolfolk (1890) 90 Ky. 426, 9 L.R.A. 551, 14

V.

S. W. 415; Coppin v. Manson (1911) 144 Ky. 634, 139 S. W. 860.

Minnesota.-Re Robbins (1885) 34 Minn. 99, 57 Am. Rep. 40, 22 N. W. 356; Gilbert v. Emerson (1895) 60 Minn. 62, 61 N. W. 820.

Missouri.-Snoddy v. Bolen (1894) 122 Mo. 479, 24 L.R.A. 507, 24 S. W. 142, 25 S. W. 932.

New York.-Bissell v. New York C. R. Co. (1861) 23 N. Y. 61; Perrin v. New York C. R. Co. (1867) 36 N. Y. 120; Hennessy v. Murdock (1893) 137 N. Y. 317, 33 N. E. 330; Sizer v. Devereux (1853) 16 Barb. 160; Lozier v. New York C. R. Co. (1864) 42 Barb. 465; Edsall v. Howell (1895) 86 Hun, 424, 33 N. Y. Supp. 892; Gere v. McChesney (1903) 84 App. Div. 39, 82 N. Y. Supp. 191; Trowbridge v. Ehrich (1906) 116 App. Div. 457, 101 N. Y. Supp. 995, modified in (1908) 191 N. Y. 361, 84 N. E. 297; Woolf v. Woolf (1909) 131 App. Div. 751, 116 N. Y. Supp. 104; Stevens V. New York (1880) 14 Jones & S. 274, affirmed in (1881) 84 N. Y. 296; Pollock v. Morris (1884) 19 Jones & S. 112, affirmed in (1887) 105 N. Y. 676, 12 N. E. 179.

Pennsylvania.-Dobson v. Hohenadel (1892) 148 Pa. 367, 23 Atl. 1128.

Rhode Island.-Tingley V. Providence (1867) 8 R. I. 493; Clark V. Providence (1873) 10 R. I. 437; Faulkner v. Rocket (1911) 33 R. I. 153, 80 Atl. 380.

Virginia.-Durbin v. Roanoke Bldg. Co. (1908) 107 Va. 753, 60 S. E. 86.

Wisconsin. - Kimball V. Kenosha (1855) 4 Wis. 321; Jarstadt v. Morgan (1879) 48 Wis. 245, 4 N. W. 271; Andrews v. Youmans (1890) 78 Wis. 56, 47 N. W. 304; Brown v. Barabo0 (1898) 98 Wis. 273, 74 N. W. 223; Smith v. Beloit (1904) 122 Wis. 396, 100 N. W. 877.

A description of lots by their numbers on a plot by which they are shown to bound on a street "is exactly equivalent to express language in a deed giving the street as a boundary." Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co. (1895) 19 C. C. A. 99, 37 U. S. App. 539, 71 Fed. 626.

In Henderson v. Hatterson (1893) 146 Ill. 555, 34 N. E. 1041, the court said that "where a deed refers to a

plat or subdivision the particulars shown upon such deed or subdivision are as much a part of the deed as though they were recited in it."

In Cox v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. (1874) 48 Ind. 178, the court said: "Without citing or examining other authorities, we think it may be laid down that the established inference of law is, that a conveyance of land bounded on a highway carried with it the fee to the center of the road, as part and parcel of the grant, unless such inference shall be expressly excluded, and that this rule is applicable where the land conveyed is a lot or part of a lot in a town or city, designated on the plat by its number, or ascertained by its appropriate description, and abutting on a public street, lane, or alley."

In Jarstadt v. Morgan (1879) 48 Wis. 245, 4 N. W. 27, the description in question was as follows: "Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 in block 1, 'according to the Clark's Mills village plat on record.'" The plat was not in fact on record. Holding that the grantee took to the center of the street, the court said: "Now upon the facts of this case we are disposed to adopt this rule, namely: Where the owner of a tract of land, which is laid out into blocks and lots that are bounded on what are represented on an unrecorded or defective plat as streets, conveys lots, referring to the plat as containing the true description of the premises, thus making the plat a part of his deed, the grantee will take to the center of the street abutting on his lots, as against his grantor or assigns. It may well be that such grantee would not only take the fee to the center of such streets, but would also acquire the right to use all passageways or streets on which his lots were bounded, and which were thus represented on the plat, as would enable him to reach the public ways in either direction, provided his grantor's title extended thus far. It is not necessary to decide this last point in this case, and it is not decided; but we are clear that, upon the facts of the case, the defendant must be deemed to take, under his deed, to the

center of River street on the north. There is no doubt that this would be the extent of his rights if the plat had been properly certified and acknowledged, so as to entitle it to record and operate as a conveyance of the streets to the public. But there is the same reason for applying the estoppel, as against the grantor, where the lots conveyed were bounded on the north by River street, 'according to the village plat on record,' which is referred to in the deed as containing a description of the estate granted."

In Anthony v. Providence (1894) 18 R. I. 699, 28 Atl. 766, the court said: "Why cannot the line of a platted lot be construed to be in the middle of the street as well as a line described in words as 'on,' 'by,' or 'along' a street? Is the line drawn any stronger or more sacred than the line described?"

An addition to a description by lot and block number to the effect that the lot "fronts" on a street does not rebut the presumption that the grantee takes to the center. Hamilton County v. Rape (1898) 101 Tenn. 222, 47 S. W. 416.

The fact that lots are described by reference to a plat which states the length of the lots does not prevent the grantee from taking to the center of the street. Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co. (Fed.) supra, wherein the court said: "It might well be that the plat regarded as a statutory dedication and conveyance would make impossible a construction by which a numbered lot should include one half the adjoining street, and this because of the peculiar effect of a statutory dedication; and yet a description of lot number on the plat, after it has ceased to have statutory efficacy, made merely for convenience in showing the boundaries and courses and distances of the land to be conveyed, must be construed without regard to the terms or effect of the statute, and exactly as if the description of the lot on the plat by word and drawing had been incorporated into the deed without reference to the plat."

When to a designation by lot num

bers is appended a further description, bounding the property by the side line of the street, the grantee takes only to the side line. Augustine v. Britt (1878) 15 Hun (N. Y.) 395. And see to the same effect, Trowbridge v. Ehrich (1908) 191 N. Y. 361, 84 N. E. 297.

Where the map by reference to which a conveyance is made shows that a space in the center of a street is reserved for railroad purposes, the grantee does not take to the center. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Ayres (1888) 50 N. J. L. 660, 14 Atl. 901, reversing (1886) 48 N. J. L. 44, 57 Am. Rep. 538, 3 Atl. 885.

In at least two jurisdictions it is held that a description of property by lot and block number with reference to a map gives to the grantee title only to the side line of a street on which the granted premises abut. Sutherland v. Jackson (1850) 32 Me. 80; Palmer v. Dougherty (1851) 33 Me. 502, 54 Am. Dec. 636; Bangor House v. Brown (1851) 33 Me. 315; Hanson v. Campbell (1863) 20 Md. 223. See also Merrill V. Newton (1894) 99 Mich. 225, 58 N. W. 70, wherein, however, the decision that the grantee took only an easement apparently rests on the fact that the dedication of the street was not accepted by the public. See infra, VI. a.

In Sutherland v. Jackson (Me.) supra, it was said: "But the lots are conveyed by a plan, and by the copy of the plan, furnished to us, it does not appear that the lot last mentioned embraces any part of the way. The southern line of the lot separates it from the way, whether that is regarded as the line of the lot or the line of the way, or both; it clearly delineates the limits of each, and a conveyance of the lot by the plan does not carry the fee to the center of the way, for in order to have that effect, the grant must extend beyond the southern line of the lot as laid down on the plan. The boundary of a lot by a wall or fence would limit the grantee to it, although it might also be the boundary of a road. The same rule of construction must apply to a line on a plan."

In Hanson v. Campbell (Md.) supra, the court said: "The deed being made with reference to the plot of the town, the beginning must be strued to be at the point where the lot as designated on the plot abuts upon the street; and in its true location cannot include any part of the bed of the street. Whatever rights to the soil of the street or to the use thereof, as a street, may have passed by implication under the deed, it is clear to us that the land described in the deed was the lot, as contradistinguished from the street."

c. Call for distances or dimensions. Where land is described in a conveyance thereof in any manner which raises a presumption of an intent to convey the fee to the middle of a highway on which it abuts, that presumption is not rebutted by the fact that the dimensions of the land are stated, and that those dimensions carry the land only to the side line of the highway. Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co. (1895) 19 C. C. A. 99, 37 U. S. App. 539, 71 Fed. 626; Bergan v. Co-operative Ice & Fuel Co. (1908) 41 Ind. App. 647, 84 N. E. 833; Oxton v. Groves (1878) 68 Me. 371, 28 Am. Rep. 75; Foreman v. Presbyterian Asso. (1894) Md., 30 Atl. 1114; Gould v. Eastern R. Co. (1886) 142 Mass. 85, 7 N. E. 543; Sherman v. McKeon (1868) 38 N. Y. 266; Stevens v. New York (1880) 14 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 274; Pettibone v. Hamilton (1876) 40 Wis. 402; Brown v. Baraboo (1898) 98 Wis. 273, 74 N. W. 223.

On the principle that a call for a monument prevails over one for a distance, if a street is mentioned as a boundary, the grantee takes to the center, though the measurement of the side, as stated in the deed, carries the lines only to the side of the street. Henderson v. Hatterman (1893) 146 Ill. 555, 34 N. E. 1041; Newhall v. Ireson (1851) 8 Cush. (Mass.) 595, 54 Am. Dec. 790.

A call for courses and distances, by which the land does not touch a highway, yields to a subsequent description by metes and bounds, giving the highway as a boundary, and the grantee takes to the center of the high

way. Chatham v. Brainerd (1835) 11 Conn. 60.

A call for the street as a boundary establishes a monument which prevails over a call for courses and distances, and the grantee takes to the center of the street, though the stated distance carries the line only to the side thereof. Henderson v. Hatterman (1893) 146 Ill. 555, 34 N. E. 1041. In Van Winkle v. Van Winkle (1906) 184 N. Y. 193, 77 N. E. 33, affirming (1904) 95 App. Div. 605, 89

N. Y. Supp. 26, the court said: "Where a survey gives the dimensions and quantity of the land conveyed exclusive of the public way, it does not operate to destroy the presumption that the fee to the roadbed was conveyed; for the reason that such dimensions and quantity of the usable land is ordinarily deemed by the purchaser of paramount importance in determining its availability for the uses designed by him."

In Schneider v. Jacob (1887) 86 Ky. 101, 5 S. W. 350, it was said obiter: "The fact that the description only brings the lot to the edge of the street can make no difference, for the description which thus brings the lot to the edge of the street must be merely understood as specifying the land that the purchaser may hold and use as exclusively his own, and as defining the line at which the public easement begins; the purchaser owning, subject to that easement, to the center of the street."

A description of lots as having "a depth of 85 feet to an alley" gives to the grantee title to the center of the alley. Lindsay v. Jones (1890) 21 Nev. 72, 25 Pac. 297.

In Chicago v. Rumsey (1877) 87 Ill. 348, it was held that the fee to the street was not conveyed by the following description: "Beginning at a point on the east line of lot 1, in block 33, original town of Chicago, 140 feet from the northeast corner of said lot, running thence south along the line of said lot to the alley, thence west 72 feet, thence north 40 feet, more or less, to a point, and west of the point of beginning, thence east to the place of beginning." The court

said: "Here the boundary is fixed. by such express terms as necessarily exclude any presumption that it was intended to pass any interest in the soil under the street."

In Grant v. Moon (1895) 128 Mo. 43. 30 S. W. 328, the description in question was by courses and distances which in fact brought the property to a highway. The highway was not mentioned in the deed. It was held that the grantee took the fee to the center of the highway.

A call for quantity may aid in resolving a conflict in other calls. Williams v. Sparks (1873) 24 Ohio St. 141, wherein land was described as lying on the north side of a road, but was bounded by the south side thereof. The fact that the inclusion of the road was necessary to satisfy the call for quantity was referred to in holding that the grantee took the fee to the whole road.

A conveyance for railroad purposes of a strip 100 feet wide, "50 feet on each side of line as now located," gives no rights in the fee of a highway to which the side of the grantee strip extends. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Willard (1910) 245 Ill. 391, 92 N. E. 271.

d. Call for monument or corner. In construing a description by metes and bounds or courses and distances with respect to its effect to give title to the center of a highway which forms one of the bounds, many of the decisions attach importance chiefly to the language describing the line abutting on the highway, and determine the question chiefly thereby. See the following subdivisions of this note. But where a place of beginning on the highway is designated, this is often deemed a controlling factor in determining whether the grantee takes to the side or the center of the highway. As to the importance of the location of the point of commencement the court said in Van Winkle v. Van Winkle (1906) 184 N. Y. 204, 77 N. E. 33, affirming (1904) 95 App. Div. 605, 89 N. Y. Supp. 26: "The commencement of the description of premises at a corner or a point particularly specified is always considered impor

tant, for ordinarily more attention is given by the parties to the locating of the point of commencement of the description than to the other points; but it is not conclusive, and where it is inconsistent with the other lines described, which show an intent to include or exclude the fee of the highway, effect will be given such intent."

Thus, the fact that a description by metes and bounds begins "at a point" on the exterior line of a highway, and returns thereto, has been held to evince an intention that the grantee shall take to the side line only. Warren v. Blake (1866) 54 Me. 276, 89 Am. Dec. 748; Holloway v. Southmayd (1893) 139 N. Y. 390, 34 N. E. 1047, affirming (1892) 64 Hun, 34, 28 Abb. N. C. 190, 18 N. Y. Supp. 704; Holloway v. Delano (1892) 64 Hun, 27, 28 Abb. N. C. 183, 18 N. Y. Supp. 700, appeal dismissed in (1893) 139 N. Y. 412, 34 N. E. 1052; Blackman v. Riley (1893) 138 N. Y. 318, 34 N. E. 214. Compare Brooklyn, Q. C. & Suburban R. Co. v. Bird (1912) 76 Misc. 63, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1, affirmed in (1912) 152 App. Div. 932, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1112, which has reargument denied in (1913) 156 App. Div. 882, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (beginning "at a point on" a highway).

A description which begins "at a point on a southerly side" of a road, thence by various courses "to" and "along" the road to the place of beginning, gives no rights in the fee. Kings County F. Ins. Co. v. Stevens (1882) 87 N. Y. 287, 41 Am. Rep. 361. In Hoboken Land & Improv. Co. v. Kerrigan (1864) 31 N. J. L. 13, it was held that the fee to the center of a road was not given by a deed which described the property as beginning at a point on the side of the road, and thence by courses and distances, without further mention of the road. The court said: "Here the boundary is limited to strict courses and distances, without mention of any monument but the beginning corner; and it is manifest that if the tract is run, as it would seem it should be, according to the courses and distances as they stand, it will not touch the road except at the beginning corner. And