Benjamin on Sale. Second edition, 1873. Dart's Vendors and Purchasers. (Dart, V. & P.) Fifth edition, 1876. Law Journal. Always cited by the number of the vol. in the New Series. Lewin on Trusts. Sixth edition, 1875. Lindley on the Law of Partnership. (Sometimes cited by the author's Saunders' Reports, notes to by the late Serjeant Williams (Wms. Saund.) Savigny, System des heutigen römischen Rechts (Savigny, or Sav. Syst.) Berlin, 1840-1849. Savigny, Das Obligationenrecht (Sav. Obl.) Berlin, 1851-3. Smith's Leading Cases (Sm. L. C.) Seventh edition, 1876. Vangerow, Lehrbuch der Pandekten (Vangerow, Pand.) Seventh edition, Pothier's and Story's works are cited by the consecutive sections. Savigny and Vangerow are cited indifferently by volume and page, or by the consecutive sections, often by both. ADDENDA. Pages 24, 28. On the question when a contract is concluded, notwithstanding that the parties intend it to be put into a more exact shape, and on the subject of acceptance by conduct, see now Brogden v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 2 App. Ca. 666. The doctrine that a mere mental assent uncommunicated to the proposer is not an acceptance, on which doubt seems to have been thrown in the Court below, is also reaffirmed; see especially per Lord Blackburn, at pp. 691, 692. "When an offer is made to another party, and in that offer there is a request express or implied that he must signify his acceptance by doing some particular thing, then as soon as he does that thing, he is bound:" p. 691. In this case the conduct of the parties, who in fact dealt for some time on the terms of a draft agreement which had never been formally executed, was held, as being inexplicable on any other supposition, to show an actual though informal consent to a contract upon those terms: see Lord Cairns' opinion. See further, as to "the distinction between an agreement which is final in its terms and therefore binding, and an agreement which is dependent upon a stipulation for a formal contract," Winn v. Bull, 7 Ch. D. 29, where Jessel, M. R. decided that an agreement "subject to the preparation and approval of a formal contract was not binding, and expressed an opinion that the authorities had gone too far in enforcing specific performance of agreements made out from informal documents. Pages 37, 48. As to infants' contracts of service, add reference to Leslie v. Fitzpatrick, 3 Q. B. D. 229. Pages 63, 72. In actions against a married woman in respect of her separate estate the husband must still be joined as a party in all cases except those in which the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, expressly provides that she may be sued alone: Hancocks v. Lablache, in C. P. D. Mar. 9, 1878. Page 68, note (a). Morrell v. Cowan has been reversed in C. A. 7 Ch. D. 151, on the construction of the guaranty. The point for which the case is cited is not affected. Page 146, note (c). Add reference to Kronheim v. Johnson, 7 Ch. D. 60. Page 158. (As to adequacy of consideration not being material). "A. is possessed of Blackacre, to which B. has no manner of right, and A. desires B. to release him all his right to Blackacre, and promises him in considera. tion thereof to pay him so much money; surely this is a good consideration and a good promise; for it puts B. to the trouble of making a release." Holt, C. J. 12 Mod. 459, cited in Viner's Abr. Plea and Pleadings, G., pl. 9. Pages 188, 198, 233. It has been held in Spiller v. Paris Skating Rink Co. 7 Ch. D. 368, that a company can ratify a contract made by promoters before the company was in existence. Sed qu. Page 224, note (a). Add reference to observations of James, L. J. in German v. Chapman, 7 Ch. D. at p. 279. Page 258. Sottomayor v. De Barros, in C. A. is now reported, 3 P. D. 1. The precise point decided is that where two persons go through a ceremony of marriage in England, being under no disability to marry one another by English law, but being at the time of the ceremony both domiciled in a country the laws of which prohibit their marriage, such marriage is null and void. Page 327, note (b). Add reference to Allkins v. Jupe, 2 C. P. D. 275. Page 345. As to the Truck Act add reference to Smith v. Walton, 3 C. P. D. 109. Page 409, note (d). Lindsay v. Cundy, 2 Q. B. D. 96, has been affirmed in the House of Lords, nom. Cundy v. Lindsay, Mar. 4, 1878. Pages 416, 420. As to performance of the contract with compensation in a case of error in quantity, add reference to McKenzie v. Hesketh, 7 Ch. D. 675. Pages 464, 482. On the question how far conduct without any statement in words may amount to a representation, for the purposes of an action of deceit, see Ward v. Hobbs (C. A.) 3 Q. B. D. 150. Page 531. As to transactions between solicitor and client, add reference to McPherson v. Watt, 3 App. Ca. 254; as to re-opening accounts between them, Watson v. Rodwell, 7 Ch. D. 625. PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY. CHAPTER I. AGREEMENT, PROPOSAL, AND ACCEPTANCE. complex tion. Ir is somewhat curious that no such thing as a satisfactory Contract a definition of Contract is to be found in any of our books. The special and truth is that not one definition but a series of definitions is conceprequired, and this want is supplied by the interpretation clause of the Indian Contract Act (to be presently quoted) with a completeness and accuracy which in the present writer's judg ment are not likely to be much improved upon for any practical purpose. Before we come to this, however, it is worth while to show, by approaching the conception of Contract from a more general point of view, of how special and complex a nature the conception really is. One always thinks of the consent of the parties as the main thing that goes to make a contract, as beyond question it is. A contract is before all things a transaction in which two or more persons consent. But this is a generic, not a specific description. Every contract involves consent, but many legal transactions involve consent without being contracts. For a generic name A branch of all legal transactions in which consent is necessary we may provisionally, for want of any better word, use the term Agree- wider ment in the widest possible sense (a). Let us now see how sensemany things are included in the consent that makes a legal analysis. (a) Vertrag as used by Savigny, whose analysis (Syst. § 140, vol. 3., p. 307) we follow almost literally in B of Agree ment in |