(143 N. E.)

West & Eckhart, Charles L. Bartlett, and, act of 1921, which should properly have apSherman C. Spitzer, all of Chicago (William plied to the proceedings here in issue. M. Klein, W. L. Bourland, and Herbert Becker, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

under the law before 1917 and since 1921 the, mortgages or trust deeds executed between property was sold first and the redemption 1917 and 1921. The General Assembly in period ran from the date of the sale. Under amending the act in 1921 sought to apply a the act of 1917 the certificate was, in effect, previously existing rule to transactions that a certificate of the judgment; under the act had taken place within the time when such as amended in 1921 it was a certificate of pre-existing rule was in effect. We deem sale. Under the decree of foreclosure of this the proper function of a saving clause, July 1, 1921, the sale of October 27, 1922, and find no constitutional objection to it. was had after the expiration of the 15 The saving clause here is substantially the months from the certificate of the judgment, same as that in the amendment of 1917. We in compliance with the act of 1917 as pre- regard the saving clause as constitutional, served in force with reference to this trans- and as not violative of section 29 of article 6 action by the saving clause in the amended of the Constitution, which requires that "the act of 1921. force and effect of the process, judgments and decrees of such courts, severally, shall be uniform."

When the Judgment Act of 1872 was enacted, and that of 1845 repealed, a saving clause provided that the change should not affect "any rights that may have accrued or any suits or proceedings that may be pending when this act shall take effect." In commenting upon the saving clause of 1872, this court said, in Dobbins v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Ill. 553, on page 563:

"We think the manifest object and effect of this provision was to continue the old law in operation as to all existing rights, and to all cases where suits had been actually commenced."

We further said in that case (p. 565):

[1, 2] So far as we can determine, the issue here presented is that appellants claim they will be deprived of their constiutional rights if the amendment of 1917 is applied to them. In taking this view they contend that the saving clause in the act of 1921 is unconstitutional and void in seeking to apply to this transaction the terms of the Judgment Act as amended in 1917, and that the act as amended in 1921 therefore applies. Upon this basis their contention is that under the act of 1921 no right to redeem existed until after the sale, and that the 12 and 3 months' redemption periods for the defendant and for judgment creditors, successively, would not begin to run until the sale of October 27, 1922. On the other hand, appellees rely upon compliance with the act as amended in 1917, under which the redemption period was to run, and has run, for 15 months before the sale of the property. Under the amendment of 1917 the appellees contend, therefore, that the title to the property vested in them as a result of the sale of October 27, 1922, and the deed based thereon. A period of more than 15 months had run between the decree of July rule of construction we have already seen the 1, 1921, and the sale thereunder of October repealing clause of the act of 1872 expressly 27, 1922, within which there could have been provided the repeal of the act of 1845 was not to affect any suits or proceedings that might be redemption by the defendant and the judg-pending when that act went into effect.” ment creditor, respectively, if the act as amended in 1917 is applicable. On the other hand, it is appellants' contention that the act of 1921 is applicable, and that the 15 months' period for redemption did not begin to run until a sale had been made, and admittedly the sale was made on October 27, 1922.

At the time Ryan sold the premises to Somers the decree of foreclosure of July 1, 1921, had been in effect for a number of months, and it continued to run until the time when Ryan obtained his judgment against Somers, on October 27, 1922. The appellants rely upon the contention that they were entitled to disregard all actions purporting to be taken under the act of 1917 and to proceed under the act of 1921, on the ground that the saving clause in the act of 1921 is unconstitutional and void. We cannot so hold. The act of 1921 merely sought by its terms to preserve the operation of the act of 1917 with respect to sales of real estate made pursuant to decrees foreclosing

"It is well settled by authority that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation except where it is manifest the Legislature intended they should have such operation; and, as already shown, it is not competent even for the Legislature to give such operation to an act where it will affect existing or vested rights. But outside of this well-established

* *

We consider the rule of this case as applicable here, although the saving clause here is broader than that involved in the Dobbins Case.

While it is conceded by counsel for both parties that where a statute confers a vested right it cannot afterward be altered or amended so as to destroy the right, yet both parties agree, if a change in the statute affects only the remedy or procedure, all rights of action are governed thereby in the absence of a saving clause, without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change, and without regard to whether suit had been previously instituted or not. Otis Elevator Co v. Industrial Com., 302 Ill. 90, 134 N E. 19, and cases there cited.

It seems to be conceded that, if the doctrine laid down in the case of Dobbins v. First Nat. Bank, supra, is controlling, the decision of the trial court must be controlling here; but it is argued by counsel for appellants that the doctrine of the Dobbins

(143 N.E.)

question as to female companion with prosecuting witness at time of robbery held prop

er.

In a prosecution for robbery, the court did not err in sustaining an objection to a question on cross-examination of prosecuting wittomobile with him at the time of the alleged ness as to who the young lady was in the auholdup; defendant having been furnished with a list of the witnesses whom the state expected to call, and the name of the girl not being given, and defendant apparently having no desire

Case has been largely, if not entirely, re- 4. Robbery 23 (2)-Sustaining objection to versed by the opinion of the United States Supreme Court (195 U. S. 1, 24 Sup. Ct. 748, 49 L. Ed. 65) in its reversal of the case of Bradley v. Lightcap, 202 Ill. 154, 67 N. E. 45. It is not directly pointed out in the briefs wherein the decision of the United States Supreme Court has, in terms, directly or indirectly overruled the former ruling of this court in the Dobbins Case, and we do not understand that the doctrine which we have quoted from the Dobbins Case was directly or indirectly overruled by the United States to call her. Supreme Court in Bradley v. Lightcap, su- | 5. Criminal Law 739(2)—Alibi held for pra. A careful examination of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Bradley Case, together with the reasoning of this court in the Dobbins Case,

causes us to reach the conclusion that the doctrine laid down by this court in the Dobbins Case, as relied on in this opinion, is still the law, and still in full force in this state. We cannot discover that the saving clause in the act of 1921 deprives either Ryan or Somers of due process of law or of the equal protection of the laws. The act of 1917 applies uniformly to all of the transactions to which it is made applicable by the saving clause of 1921.

Jury.

In prosecution for robbery, whether defendant established an alibi held for the jury. 6. Criminal law 508 (2)-Testimony of accomplice not inadmissible because made under promise of some sort.

The testimony of an accomplice, if otherwise admissible, is not rendered inadmissible because it was made under a promise of some sort, but such fact may be considered by the jury as affecting the credibility of the witness. 7. Criminal law 671-Permitting jury to see arrangements for accomplice testimony held not prejudicial.

Allowing a jury to see what occurred in

The decree of the circuit court will there- arranging for testimony by an accomplice infore be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

(312 III. 257)

PEOPLE v. McGUIRK. (No. 15894.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. April 14, 1924.)

Rehearing Denied June 5, 1924.)

1. Criminal law

dicating motive, or absence of motive, in testifying for the state, held not prejudicial.

8. Criminal law 815(9)-Instruction as to accomplice's testimony held not to eliminate reasonable doubt.

An instruction that one may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, and that the testimony of an accomplice, like all other evidence in the case, is

for the jury to pass upon, held not erroneous as eliminating the requirement of proof be

369(2)-Competency of ev-yond a reasonable doubt.

idence of other crimes.

Evidence of an offense wholly unconnected with the crime charged is inadmissible, but any testimony that tends directly to show the defendant guilty of the crime charged is competent, though it shows the commission of another crime; the test of admissibility being the connection of the facts proved with the offense charged.

2. Criminal law 369(15)-Evidence of other offenses admissible for purpose of identification.

Evidence which tends to aid in identifying the accused as the person who committed the particular crime under investigation is admissible, even though it might tend to show him guilty of other crimes.

3. Robbery 23(1)—Evidence as to what occurred at time of arrest of associate held admissible for purpose of identification. Facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest of an associate, including admissions as to ownership of revolver and conversations with prosecuting witness, etc., held admissible for purpose of identification in a prosecution for robbery.

9. Criminal law 822 (1)—Instructions considered as series.

It is sufficient if the instructions, considered as a series, substantially present the law of the case fairly to the jury.

10. Robbery 24 (1)—Evidence held to sustain conviction.

Evidence held to sustain conviction for rob

bery.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; John A. Swanson, Judge.

Frank McGuirk was convicted of robbery, and brings error. Affirmed.

Frank A. McDonnell and S. B. McDonnell, Jr., both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, and VirEdward J. Brundage, Atty. Gen., Robert gil L. Blanding, of Moline (Edward E. Wilson and Clyde C. Fisher, both of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

CARTER, J. Plaintiff in error was indicted, tried, and convicted in the criminal

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

court of Cook county of the crime of robbery., to get information from the witness to get The case is here on writ of error.

himself liberated, and said the witness was lucky that he "didn't get trimmed"; that he had a chance to play ball some place, and if he got out of this (evidently referring to the trouble following his arrest) he would get out of town and play ball. The witness testified that plaintiff in error came to the witness' office in the city hall and asked him if he was going to identify him and if he could not let him off, and the witness replied that he did not see why he should; that he and the girl had suffered the scare of a holdup and he was going through with it. At the Sheffield avenue station, when questioned by the judge, the witness, in referring to plaintiff in error, said, "Evidently he is the man,” plaintiff in error having previously talked with the witness on the subject of his identification.

Thomas J. White testified that on the evening of March 26, 1921, while he was sitting in an automobile with a girl friend, just south of the German building, in Jackson Park, two men approached him, one on either side of his car. One man came up to the driver's seat, showed the witness a revolver, and said, "Start the car." This man the witness identified as Robert Olson, who at the time of the hearing was serving an indeterminate sentence in the penitentiary. The other man climbed into the back seat and was the man identified by the witness as the plaintiff in error. The witness stated that upon the command to start the car he "stalled around" for awhile, and then said he could not start the car, but would if he could, and one of the men (the witness did not know which one) said, "See how much dough he Robert Olson, who was brought from the has got." The witness said, "I have $15, but penitentiary for the purpose of testifying, tesyou are not going to take it all, are you?" and tified that on the evening in question he and one of them said, "No; give us ten." The plaintiff in error were walking in Jackson witness passed $10 to the two men, who were Park, near the southeast corner of the Gerthen in the rear of the car; Olson having man building where there was a machine climbed into the rear seat in the meantime. standing; that plaintiff in error went to the The men then got out of the car, walked right-hand side and witness went to the leftback about 100 feet, and then came past wit-hand side, and that the intention was to ness' car again and up to a car ahead of him; one of them going on one side and one on the other. The man who was in that car got out and ran, and the two men transferred the girl, who was in the front seat, to the rear and ran it (apparently meaning running the engine) for some time, and then got out and walked across the park behind the Field Museum. The witness testified that both men had guns, and when he turned to look at them they brought their guns up to the position of ready. There was an arc light close to witness' car so that he could see. He testified that Olson had on dark clothes, a dark cap, and an overcoat about three-quarters in length, and that both men had the collars of their coats turned up, but the witness did not think the collars extended above the chin; that he could see the lower part of the fore-ing, Ind., about two weeks previous, and he head, nose, mouth, and eyes; that the man who put the gun to his side weighed about 175 or 180 pounds. The witness could not testify to the kind of clothes the man in the rear seat had on, except that his overcoat was about three-quarters length, of the ulster type, coming to slightly below the knees, and that he wore a dark cap. The witness testified that later-he thought about 10 days afterward-he saw plaintiff in error at the Sheffield avenue (or Town Hall) police station, on the north side in Chicago, and that plaintiff in error asked him if he was going to identify him, and witness replied that he was not going to tell him whether he was going to identify him or not, and told him he did not think he was entitled to any consideration, so far as witness was concerned; that plaintiff in error was trying

take the machine; that they pointed revolvers at the man (White) and told him to drive ahead, but the machine would not start; that plaintiff in error asked the man how much money he had, and he replied $15, and witness said, "Give me the 15," which the man did, and witness gave him back $5; that he and plaintiff in error then walked about 125 feet back of the machine and then went to a machine in front of White's machine; that when the man in the machine ahead of White's got out the witness and plaintiff in error ran; that neither of them had anything on to conceal their faces, but that they both had on overcoats with the collars turned up and both wore caps. Later in the examination the witness testified that he and plaintiff in error got their revolvers at Whit

identified the 38-caliber gun which was shown him at the hearing as the one he purchased and which was taken from him at the time of his arrest and that the 32-caliber revolver was plaintiff in error's. The revolvers were nickel-plated, but the witness did not know the make and stated that they were not used though they were loaded. The witness testified that he identified both plaintiff in error and White at the Sheffield avenue station, and testified to the circumstances of such identification and that he signed a statement or confession at that time. At the time of the trial the witness also identified White as the man in the automobile from whom he and plaintiff in error took $10. After the witness' arrest by the town hall officers, plaintiff in error was taken from his home a fews hours later the same night and placed

(143 N.E.)

in custody at the Sheffield avenue station. [ were unable to describe how Olson was dressThe witness testified that at the time of his ed when he was arrested or how the man trial he pleaded guilty under the impression who ran away was dressed. that he would get a sentence of from 3 to 20 years; that he was not warned by the judge as to the result of his testimony; that he was made no promises, except that the assistant state's attorney told him he would see the trial judge and would see to it that "they" recommended a shorter sentence, or a recommendation to the pardon board, or something of that sort, but that he afterward understood he was actually given a sentence of from ten years to life, and testified if he had known that was to be the result he would have taken a jury trial.