from the borough of Madison. It appeared that no passengers were taken on or discharged within the corporate bounds of Madison, except at the terminus. Passengers were not carried from place to place in Madison. The municipal regulation provided for a license tax on all persons using vehicles for hire for the transportation of passengers "within the borough of Madison." The decision of the court was to the effect that the act was meant to apply only to a local, and not an interborough, business, and the court declared that if the ordinance had necessarily included the latter it would have been declared invalid. So, a city empowered by statute to make and establish ordinances to license and regulate cartmen and other vehicles used for the transportation of passengers, baggage, etc., is not authorized to require a license tax for revenue from a cartman, having his stand and living in another city, who comes into the city enacting the ordinance, for several loads of furniture to be carried to the city where he resides. Cary v. North Plainfield (1886) 49 N. J. L. 110, 7 Atl. 42, affirmed in (1887) 50 N. J. L. 176, 17 Atl. 1103. The court said: "The inconvenience attendant upon the exercise by every municipality in the state of the power of excluding from its limits all unlicensed vehicles engaged in transporting goods or passengers for hire is manifest. Its legitimate operation would require the owners of such vehicles to obtain licenses not only from the authorities of the place where their business had its headquarters, but also from every neighboring town into which their casual engagements might call them, or else to unload their vehicles at the border line. Å general law having effects so burdensome or so absurd is not to be anticipated, and only unequivocal language could convince a court that such legislation was intended. The statute now under review is not of this character. Its terms are satisfied by holding that license taxes are to be imposed only by that municipality in which the business or occupation is carried on or conducted. It is the business, and not the mere incidents of the business, which constitute the subject of taxation." In a Massachusetts case involving a tax on one who operated an omnibus between Boston and Roxbury for the carriage of passengers for hire, it was held that a statute authorizing municipalities to regulate hackney coaches and other vehicles did not authorize the imposition of a license tax by the city of Boston upon carriers operating from other towns. Com. v. Stodder (1848) 2 Cush. (Mass.) 562, 48 Am. Dec. 679. In St. Charles v. Nolle (1872) 51 Mo. 122, 11 Am. Rep. 440, a city whose charter provided that the mayor and council should have power to provide for licensing, taxing, and regulating hacks, drays, and other vehicles used within the city for pay, and further provided that it should have power to pass ordinances for the regulation and policing of the city, was held to have no authority by virtue of its charter to impose a license tax on wagons owned by a nonresident, which were used for hire to carry property from places outside of the city to a place within its limits. But it has been held that a city having the right to exercise exclusive control over all streets within its limits, and which is given the power to regulate and license merchants of all kinds, drays and all other vehicles, has authority to impose a license fee upon a transfer company having its office in another city which is but a few miles from the city enacting the ordinance, it appearing that these two cities and one situated between them comprise one trade area and district, from which the company obtains its transfer business; and this was held to be true although the company had only transferred property from points outside the city to points within, and from points within to points without, and had refused to transport property from one point within the city to another point within its limits. Carterville v. Blystone (1911) 160 Mo. App. 191, 141 S. W. 701; Joslin Transfer & Storage Co. v. Carterville (1911) 160 Mo. App. 186, 141 S. W. 705. The court (197 Ky. 674, 247 S. W. 956.) Bastardy bond effect of death of principal. Where bastardy proceedings are civil the death of the principal does not release liability on the bond executed after verdict. [See note on this question beginning on page 602.] APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Madison County in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover the amount alleged to be due on a bastardy bond. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion Clay, J., delivered the opinion of the court: The question on this appeal is whether a surety in a bastardy bond executed after verdict is released by the death of his principal. The question arises in the following way: On August 8, 1919, Green Kavanaugh, a negro boy who worked for appellant, was found guilty of bastardy, and adjudged to pay the sum of $50 per year in quarterly instalments for a period of twelve years, for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. September 11, 1920, he entered into bond, with appellant as surety, for the payment of $550 of the $600 adjudged against him. On January On January 8, 1922, the accused died, and this action was brought to recover on the bond. Appellant answered in two paragraphs. In the first paragraph he admitted his liability for the On of the court. amount due at the death of his principal. In the second paragraph he pleaded that the death of his principal released him from all further liability. To this paragraph a dewas sustained, and the judgment was rendered in favor of murrer the commonwealth for the use of the mother and child. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted. It is true that it is held in some jurisdictions that the death of the principal in a bastardy bond releases the surety. Com. use of Bruce v. Moran, 251 Pa. 477, 96 Atl. 1089; People v. Tice, 272 Ill. 516, 112 N. E. 372. These cases proceed on the theory that, under the statutes of those states, a bastardy proceeding is a criminal proceeding; that the payment of money is a part of the sentence and not a debt; that the bond is given to insure the performance of the sentence, and, being executed for the benefit of the people, does not create the relation of debtor and creditor between the reputed father and the people. Therefore, the sums adjudged. In other words, ANNOTATION. Death of principal as relieving against liability on bastardy bond. There is a wide diversity of opinion among the authorities as to the exact nature of a bastardy proceeding. In jurisdictions where the proceeding is simply to compel the putative father to support his child it is almost uniformly held to be civil in its nature, for, to determine the nature of an action, the court should look not so much to the method of procedure to be followed as to the end to be attained. In a few jurisdictions, however, bastardy proceedings are considered to be criminal in nature; this is usually because the statute creating the particular proceeding provides a punishment for the putative father, in addition to providing for the child's support. In several jurisdictions such proceedings are considered by the courts to partake of the nature of both civil and criminal suits. 3 R. C. L. 750, 751. These divergent views, as might be anticipated, are reflected in the cases coming within the scope of this annotation; and they are in the main responsible for whatever divergency exists here. In State v. Such (1891) 53 N. J. L. 351, 21 Atl. 852, an action upon a bond given by one adjudged guilty in a bastardy proceeding, and conditioned to pay to the overseers of the poor a weekly sum, as well for the better relief of the township as for the sustenance and relief of the child, for so long a time as the child should be chargeable to the township, it was held that the death of the putative father, the principal in the bond, did not relieve the sureties upon the bond from liability for the payment of weekly sums accruing subsequently to the date of such death. The opinion draws a distinction between a mere order of filiation, which becomes unenforceable upon death of the father, and a bond conditioned to perform such order, saying that when such bond requires "some act, or series of acts, which may reach beyond the life of the obligor, his death does not terminate the obligation. The death of Carpenter did not relieve the defendant from an obligation to see that the money was paid according to the terms of the order." In Hoch v. Lord (1831) Thacher, Crim. Cas. (Mass.) 263, the point under annotation was not presented. If an inference may be drawn, it is in favor of the rule announced in the reported case (EMMONS v. COM. ante, 601). Pursuant to the order of the court, the person adjudged to be the putative father gave bond with surety to the mother of the bastard child, conditioned to pay to her a certain sum weekly until the further order of the court. It was there held that, following the death of the father, and there being no one to represent his estate, the surety, because of his interest, may present affidavits and petition the court for an order relieving against the payment of further sums, which relief will be granted, both as to decedent's estate and the surety, where all the facts warrant cessation of payment. It would appear that the surety had continued payments for some time subsequently to the death of the principal; at least, it is certain that the considerations moving the court were the total amounts already paid the mother, the situation of the mother, and the age of the child. In Philadelphia v. Haslitt (1880) 14 Phila. (Pa.) 138, 37 Phila. Leg. Int. 386, the principal obligor had been convicted in the court of quarter sessions of fornication and bastardy, following which, sentence was imposed for the payment of money for lying-in expenses and a weekly sum for the support of the child, bond with surety being required to insure payment of said weekly sum. It was held that the death of the principal discharged the surety with respect to arrears accruing thereafter. It is plain that the court viewed the order for maintenance as part of a sentence imposed for the commission of a criminal act, intended as personal punishment, and not as creating a civil contract. In Com. use of Bruce v. Moran (1914) 58 Pa. Super. Ct. 362, affirmed in (1916) 251 Pa. 477, 96 Atl. 1089, under a state of facts for all practical purposes identical with those in the foregoing case, the court arrived at a similar conclusion, though professing not to be bound by that decision. In this case the bond was conditioned to pay a weekly sum for five years for the maintenance of the child, the principal dying about one year after the filing of the bond. As appears from the Moran Case, these bonds were exacted by authority of the Crimes Act of 1860, providing that, following conviction on a charge of fornication and bastardy, the con . victed criminal "shall be sentenced in addition to the fine aforesaid to give security .. to perform such order for the maintenance of the said child as the court . shall direct and appoint." Said the court in this latter case: "The obligations of the convicted defendant to pay the money named and to furnish the collateral security are by the very terms of the statute an integral part of the sentence itself. . . We cannot adopt as sound, then, the contention of the appellant that the portion of the sentence fixing the sum to be paid and appropriating it to the maintenance of the child can be essentially different from the remainder of the sentence. . . . It is difficult to see how the fact that a defendant in a criminal case, who, in the performance of his sentence, gave the bond required by it under the authority of the statute, has created a debt in the ordinary legal acceptation of that term, or a cause of action sounding in contract which under general law would survive his death. If sound reason, good morals, or wise policy demand a change in the legal status of the father of an illegitimate child, such change must be wrought by the legislative branch of the government. We but administer the law as we find it." People v. Tice (1916) 272 Ill. 516, 112 N. E. 372, reversing (1916) 200 Ill. App. 617, is governed by the peculiar provisions of the Bastardy Act of that state. The act provided that, following issue found against the defendant in bastardy proceedings, he shall be condemned by order and judgment of the court to pay to the clerk of said court for the support, maintenance, and education of the child certain sums at regular intervals for a period of ten years, security for the performance of which must be furnished by a bond with surety, made payable to the state; that, upon default in the payment of any instalment, the court shall issue a citation "to the principal and sureties in said bond" to show cause, followed by judgment and execution thereon; and, further, that upon default the putative father may be adjudged guilty of contempt of court, commitment for which, however, shall not operate to stay or defeat judgment or collection by execution against the principal and sureties upon the bond. Under this statute it was held that death of the principal discharges the surety as to instalments accruing thereafter. The court, following a previous decision (Rich v. People (1873) 66 Ill. 513), adopted the view that, since under the statute the bond was made payable to the state, and since for a default in payment the father may be proceeded against as for contempt and committed to jail, and because of the further provision that death of the child should make the bond void, liability upon the bond constitutes in no sense a debt. Said the court: "While it has been uniformly held that a prosecution under the Bastardy Act is a civil and not a criminal proceeding, the object being not the imposition of a penalty for the commission of an immoral act, but merely to compel the defendant to contribute to the support of his illegitimate child, it has also been held that the relation of debtor and creditor cannot exist between the reputed father of a bastard child and the people, who prosecute to com pel him to support his illegitimate child, and therefore the amount which the defendant in a bastardy proceeding has been condemned by order of the court to pay for the support of the child does not constitute a debt." The court was further influenced by the language of the provision authorizing a citation upon default, the only remedy provided for enforcing payment. The court said: "The statute, by providing that the court shall issue the citation to the 'principal and sureties' in the bond, thus presupposes that the principal is not deceased, and that the default has been wilful upon his part. The petition of the mother in this case set up the death of Albert Tice, and disclosed that the default was occasioned by reason of his decease. It was therefore impossible for the court to observe the provisions of the statute and issue a citation against the principal in the bond. As the obligation of this bond did not constitute a debt, the payment of which was guaranteed, in any event, by the sureties in the bond, the sureties cannot be held liable for the payment of any instalments becoming due after the death of the principal, unless the statute specifically provides that they shall be so liable." L. S. E. PAUL MURRAY, Admr., etc., of Mrs. A. G. Murray, Deceased, V. STANDARD PECAN COMPANY, Plff. in Certiorari. Illinois Supreme Court - June 20, 1923. (309 Ill. 226, 140 N. E. 834.) Principal and agent agreement to repurchase stock - effect. 1. A corporation authorizing an agent to sell its stock and collect and turn over the money for it is not bound by his agreement to repurchase the stock. [See note on this question beginning on page 607.] - binding effect of agent's acts. 2. Generally a principal is not bound by the acts of his agent not within the scope of his authority. [See 21 R. C. L. 849.] -duty of one dealing with agent. 3. When one deals with a special agent or an agent who has only special authority to act for his principal, he must acquaint himself with the extent of the agent's authority. [See 21 R. C. L. 853.] -effect of taking advantage of agent's act. 4. That a corporation retains the |