private person he wages war against it or renders comfort to its enemies.

Cobbett, for instance, when in the United States was never naturalized, nor did he ever restrain himself from declaring that he was and continued to be a British subject, yet no one would have pretended that Cobbett, while residing in the United States, was not liable to be indicted for all offenses, political or otherwise, made indictable in the place of his residence, and the same position has been, as we have seen, taken by the British Government in respect to citizens of the United States who when residing in Ireland have been engaged in conspiracies against the British Government.

And he closes with this quotation from Phillimore: All strangers commorant in a land owe obedience, as subjects for the time being, to the laws of it.

"It is not necessary to citizenship that the domiciled inhabitant should have the right to vote or hold political office;" and under all the authorities, without exception, a person so domiciliated owes civil and political allegiance to the local sovereignty. (See Judge Hoar in Commission, 1871, Report of British Agent, p. 280, Appendix 6: "Venice," 2 Wall., 274; "Peterhoff," 5 Wall., 60; "Mrs. Alexander's Cotton,” 2 Wall., 417; "Venus,” 8 Cr., 253; Story's Confl. of Laws, sec. 68; Morley's Int. Law, sees. 68, 168; Trist's Int. Law, II, 233, 298-9; I, 82, 83; Halleck's Int Law, 717, sec. 2g; 702, sec. 7; 705, secs. 12, 13, 14; 2 Kent's Com, sec. 25.)

And in return he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws of that sovereignty with other citizens, with the very limited qualification that the local sovereignty can not intervene to protect him from the consequences of his infraction of the sovereignty or of the exterritorial laws of the nation of his original allegiance.

The local sovereignty can protect him and protect his property and make reclamation for him against every other nation, except the one of his original allegiance, in any case; and in case of war, even if the country of his original allegiance is belligerent, the

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country of his local allegiance being neutral, may intervene to protect him as a neutral as against the country of his original allegiance; but never, even in that case, if he has been guilty of an act hostile to the country of his original allegiance.*

What right of protection or reclamation remains to the nation of original allegiance against the nation of domicile in respect of the subject of the former so domiciliated but not naturalized in the latter?

There is no conflict of authority in international law on this subject, and the strictest rule against the country of domicile in favor of the nation of original allegiance is laid down by Hall (sec. 87, pp. 291–292), as follows:

They (the nations of original allegiance) have the right to exact reparation for maltreatment of their subjects by the administrative agents of a foreign government if no means of obtaining legal redress through the tribunals of the country exist, or if such means as exist have been exhausted in vain; and they have the right to require that, as between their subjects and other private individuals, the protection of the state and the justice of the courts shall be afforded equally, and that compensation shall be made if the courts from corruption or prejudice or other like causes are guilty of serious acts of injustice.

Broadly, all persons entering a foreign country must submit to the laws of that country.

*

But even Hall qualifies this rule as follows, 235:

When the subject of a state is not merely passing through or temporarily resident in a foreign country, but has become domiciled there, the right of his state to protect him is somewhat affected.

Hall says further that the jurisdiction of the state of domicile is complete over foreigners who are amenable to all its laws (pp. 216-221).

* Great Britain held that a person who was a British subject, the son of a British father, born in France, but still a British subject by the laws of England, and taking a commission in the French army in a war with England, was guilty of high treason, and he was convicted. (State Trials, XVIII.)

Lord Westbury says (in Udny e. Udny, L. R. I. H. L. Sc. 441):

The law of England and of all civilized countries ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions, one by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status. The political status may depend on different laws in different countries, whereas the civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status.

But this subject will be considered more directly when we come to the status of American citizens alleged to have been domiciled in Great Britain (intra, pp. 53-66).

The cases cited in the British argument on the subject of domicile (p. 53), serve to illustrate the principle, thus:

In 2 Knapp, P. C. 295, it was decided: (1) That Drummond was a British subject; (2) that he was domiciled in France; (3) that under a treaty providing for compensation by the French Government for losses to British subjects, Drummond could not claim compensation from France as a British subject because of his domicile in France.*

Here in this case our positions are as to Cooper precisely the same as there held as to Drummond and France, thus: (1) That he is a British subject by original allegiance, as Drummond was; (2) that at the time of the alleged injury he was domiciled in

*In the same report (2 Knapp, P. C. 51) will be found similar holdings equally strong against the claim in behalf of Cooper. In Long's case it is held that a corporation composed of British subjects existing in a foreign country by the latter's assent must be held to be a foreign corporation.

the United States; (3) that under a treaty providing for compensation for injuries to persons for whom Great Britain is entitled to make reclamation against the United States, reclamation can not be made for Cooper because of his domicile in the United States; but the added objection in Cooper's case is that he was engaged in violating the laws and defying the sovereignty of his domicile.

But the whole question as to any claimant standing in the shoes of Cooper is not only concluded against Great Britain by the rules of international law, but by the treaty between the nations of July 3, 1815, as follows:*

The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports, and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and RESIDE in any parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation, respectively, shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their commerce, BUT SUBJECT ALWAYS TO THE LAWS AND STATUTES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES, RESPECTIVELY.

It can not be seriously contended that in behalf of her subjects residing in the United States as provided in this treaty, and enjoying complete protection and security of their laws, but subject to their laws and statutes, as provided and stipulated in the treaty, Great Britain can make reclamation on account of any such subject for injuries suffered at the hands of the United States while in the act of violating those laws and statutes, more especially when such statutes are in the nature of regulations of trade and commerce of exterritorial effect, directly applicable to all citizens of the United States everywhere and "all persons.

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*Treaties and Conventions between the United States and other Powers (p. 410, ed. 1889).

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In point under this treaty is the opinion of the Commission for the settlement of claims between the United States and Great Britain under the convention of 1853 (pp. 336-337), and also cited in Barclay's case under the Commission of 1871.

Finally, as to the Cooper class of claims, the logical position of Great Britain is:

(a) That under the rules of international law and the treaty of 1815 unnaturalized British subjects legally domiciled in the United States are entitled to the protection of the laws equally with American citizens; but—

(b) They are at the same time exempt and privileged from the effects of the operation and execution of the laws that protect them, and thus possess the privileges and protection of both nationalities and obligations of obedience to neither; not to Great Britain, because beyond her territory and jurisdiction, and not to the United States because they may claim protection against them as British subjects.

It is not true, and Fiore emphatically denounces the extension of such protection as is here claimed by Great Britain in this class of cases in his Nouveau Droit International Public, I, 561: "The protection is illicit and unjustifiable when its object is to confer a privileged position upon the subjects or citizens (Nationaux) residing abroad."

Cooper was, at the time he became the legal owner of these vessels, and at the time of the seizures quoad the United States, and in their relations to him as against Great Britain, an American citizen, and as such his ships, as we shall see, were entitled to carry no flag but that of the United States, and were not even entitled to British registry.

There remains to be considered in cases like Cooper's the position taken in the British argument, which, we take the liberty to observe, should carry its own refu