incur the penalties of a criminal offense against his own country, which penalties may be enforced whenever he comes within the reach of its municipal laws.-(Citing: Folix, Droit Int. Privé, sections 510-532; American Jurist, Vol. XXII, pp. 381-386; Masse, Droit Commercial, tom. II, sec. 38, 376, et seq.; Bello, Derecho Internacional, pt. I, Cap. IV, sees. 5, 6.)

It need not be argued that the absolute rights of States, lying at the foundation of everything else, is the right of self-preservation (Dana's Wheaton, see. 61), and it would be a vain right if a nation could not protect its public property against its own citizens wherever it and they may be.

Of course such laws can not be enforced upon the person of a citizen if he be beyond the jurisdiction, but no one would deny the power of the government to seize upon his property for violation of such laws, if the property be found within the jurisdiction or upon the high seas.

It is laid down in Lawrence's Wheaton (Elements of Int. Law, 6th ed., p. 175) that offenses against the law of a State, prohibiting or regulating a particular traffic, or regulating the laws of trade and navigation, are binding upon the citizens of a State wherever they may be.

In Bars' Private Int. Law (Gillespie Trans. Edinburgh, 2d ed., p. 135 and notes) the undoubted rule in this case is laid down: "The State of domicile may extend protection to a domiciled foreigner as against other countries, EXCEPT THE COUNTRY OF ORIGINAL

ALLEGIANCE."

Judge E. Rockwood Hoar, of New England, former Attorney-General of the United States and one of the most distinguished lawyers of America, in the Barclay case, before the Mixed Commission of 1871, demonstrated that legal domicile in a country constituted citizenship of that country.

In a learned and most careful argument, showing

in its citations the most exhaustive research, he was compelled to admit that the conclusion of all the authorities on international law was that the nation of domicile could intervene for the protection of a person so domiciliated as against every nation except the nation of his original citizenship; that for certain purposes the local sovereignty could intervene and protect him even against that country, but never in derogation of the rights of the country of his birth as recognized by international law. (See argument of Judge Hoar on demurrer, Report of British Agent, Claims Commission of 1871, p. 280, and citations.)

The British position in that case was of course strongly for the exception so stated by Judge Hoar, as appears by the reported arguments of Her Majesty's counsel in the last citation.

In such case as stated by Kent (Lect. IV, sec. 25, p. 49): "The domiciled does not cease to person so be bound by the allegiance due to the country of his

birth."

It has been seen that in the Barclay Case the demurrer was decided adversely to the United States on two grounds only:*

(1) The use of the term "British subject" in the convention, and

(2) That it appeared affirmatively, as admitted by the demurrer, that Barclay had not violated the allegiance due from him to the country of his domicile. (Report of British Agent, Com. '71, p. 297.)

In the Koszta case the United States asserted in the strongest possible terms the general doctrine of the allegiance of a domiciled person to the nation of his domicile.

A synopsis of the opinion of the commissioners will be found at page 13 of the American Agent's Report (vol. 6), papers relating to the treaty of Washington.

It is the doctrine which is so strongly asserted in the British argument here. But the British argument takes no notice of the exception, which we have discussed, more strongly and emphatically laid down by international authorities, when the question has come up for consideration, than the general rule stated. As has been seen, that exception was not in in any of the cases cited in the British argument here, and in them there were no facts bringing the question up for consideration.

Koszta was a native-born citizen of Austria, and the right of the Government of the United States to protect him was asserted against Turkey-not Austria. What the position of the United States would have been as to Austria is stated as follows by the Secretary of State:

Had Koszta been within the jurisdiction of Austria when he was seized, the whole character of the case would have been changed, and the forcible taking of him from the legal custody of Austrian officers could not have been defended on any principle of municipal or international law.* (2 Wharton's Int. Dig., p. 505, sec. 203.)

Joseph Burns was a sailor on an American whaleship, which was sunk by the Alabama. The whaler was American, because she was American owned, and sailed from New Bedford, Mass. He therefore, for the purposes of protection by his nation, had all the rights of a domiciliated citizen, and something more, that of a sailor on a ship which was beyond question American territory, because American owned. (See Domicile authorities supra.)

His claim was disallowed by the Geneva Arbitration on the British showing that he was apparently a

The point came up directly with Austria in Simon Tonsig's case, and the American Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, who had sought to protect Koszta in Turkey, declined to intervene to protect Tonsig, an original subject of Austria, and who had returned there temporarily. (See Halleck, c. XXIX, § 4.) Am. Ed.

British subject.* (See West v. United States, cited in the British argument at p. 50 as the Worth case, and papers relating to Treaty of Washington-"Claims.")

It inevitably follows that Great Britain could not intervene for the protection of and reclamation for American citizens domiciled in Great Britain as against the United States in cases where their property had been taken by the authority of the sovereignty of the United States for violation of the municipal laws in question and for defiance of the sovereign claims of

that nation.

NOT NATIONAL CLAIMS.

The British argument seeks to avoid this conclusion, both in the case of Cooper and in the case of the American citizens alleged to be domiciliated in Great Britain, on the ground that these are not private claims, but national claims, in the sense that they are to be recovered in the individual right, so to speak, of the Government of Great Britain; and it cites (p. 49) the case where China paid to the British Government $3,000,000 on account of debts due to British subjects from certain Chinese merchants. Hence, the contention is that no defense going to the national status of a claimant can be made.

Of course, in the case stated there was no Claims Convention and no provision in the treaty, as in this, limiting the recovery of the British Government to the case of "persons" on whose account she might

*An examination of the record discloses that Burns, the sailor, was deceased, and that his claim was presented by his father as his legal representative, who resided at Manchester, England; but before the Mixed Commission of 1871 it was held in such a case that the right to recover depended upon the national character of the deceased, and not upon that of his adininistrator.

"The Commissioners are all of the opinion that the particular nationality of the administrator does not affect the question." (P. 18, cases 109-212-205.)

be entitled to claim, and no provision for the auditing and finding of "each" claim.

49, 53.

The distinction between that case, as stated by B. Arg., pp. Blackburn, J., in the passage quoted at page 49, and this case is broadly drawn in the British argument itself, where it quotes from the Drummond case (2 Knapp) at page 53.

That was a Claims Convention, and it is clearly shown in the passage quoted from the vice-chancellor that the recovery depends upon the personal relations and status of the claimant quoad the claim.

It is true that these are national claims in the sense that they are presented against the United States by the nation because there is no other way to present them; and any Government owes it to those within its protection in respect of its obligations to its citizens. to take up their cause as a nation, and this is the entire doctrine quoted from Wharton in the British brief at page 48.

Of course it is the universal doctrine, to which there are no exceptions, that if a citizen of one nation complains of wrong done him by another nation, his Government must assume the responsibility of presenting the claim. A claim on behalf of foreign subjects of another Government under the established rules of international law is not entitled to consideration unless a demand is made by the Government of the country of which the claimant is a subject or citizen. (See United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520, and 2 Wharton's Dig., sec. 214 et seq.)

This is the entire extent of Great Britain's interest in the claims.

Under all claims conventions between nations throughout their history, the Commissioners under them have been occupied for the most part in deciding for or against claimants on the question of their personal status; and this much space is devoted to that