erations weighed by one contemplating the purchase of property in any part of a city or village. If the owner of the remaining part of the plat or of a considerable portion of it can at will, and without the consent either of interested parties or of authorities competent to pass upon such matters, arbitrarily vacate a plat or such part thereof as may include the facilities and considerations which have entered into the purchase by those who have acquired lots therein, the owner would be afforded an opportunity to injure others which the law does not recognize without their consent or a suitable consideration.

As we have indicated, the complaint in the case at bar contains a copy of the plat of this addition, which shows that a considerable tract of land, designated Spring park, was located within a short distance of the property of one of these plaintiffs; that some of the streets and alleys attempted to be vacated were continuations or parts of the same streets and alleys on which the individual plaintiff's properties were situated; and these facts were doubtless an essential part of the consideration in their purchase, as alleged. It is said in Shearer v. Reno,

Nev., 136 Pac. 705, the purchasers took not merely the interest of the grantor described in his deed, but, as appurtenant to it, an easement in the streets and in the public grounds named on the plat or map, with an implied covenant that subsequent purchasers should be cntitled to the same rights. In that case it was held that the grantor could no more recall his casement and covenant than he could recall any other part of the consideration. They added materially to the value of every lot purchased. That case differs from the instant case in that there was no formal acceptance, and here there was an acceptance by the city as well as by the organization which preceded it. It was held that the dedication was irrevocable when third parties had been induced to act and part with value and consideration on it, and that it was not affected because the property was not at once subject to the uses designed. We commend the reading of that opinion for authorities on this question. which we need not review. However, in some material respects, the Nevada statute differs from ours.

Several Iowa authorities are cited bearing upon the case here involved. In McGrew v. Lettsville, 71 Iowa, 150, 32 N. W. 252, it is held that the term "proprietors" as used in the chapter relating to vacation of plats or parts of plats indicates the owners of the land, and not alone

the persons who originally plat the land. In Chrisman v. Omaha & C. B. R. & Bridge Co. 125 Iowa, 133, 100 N. W. 63, the court says: "It is possible that under § 918 the title of the municipality in streets and alleys may be devested, even after their acceptance, where the original plat is vacated in its entirety. Ordinarily, such action would not seriously affect any public interest, for the reason that it will not be likely to occur after any considerable improvements have been made. On the other hand, it is not reasonable to suppose that it was intended by the legislature to confer on the proprietors of a plat the power to devest a city or town of title in streets on which public moneys had been expended, without the knowledge or consent of its officers. fair interpretation would seem to be that the public rights in the streets which may be devested are those of acquiring title by acceptance."

A

We construe the last sentence above as an intimation that the arbitrary vacation of a part of a plat may be only made by the proprietor prior to its acceptance by the municipality. In the case at bar, however, we need not go as far as the Iowa court seems to have gone in the case quoted. All we need consider is whether the rights and privileges of purchasers of lots in the Northern Pacific addition to LaMoure are abridged or destroyed by the vacation of the portion of the plat attempted to be vacated. While, as we have heretofore said, the complaint in this respect may be imperfect, and some of the allegations indefinite and perhaps incomplete, yet facts are charged which tend to show an abridgment of the rights and privileges of these purchasers and owners, and whether their rights and privileges are abridged or destroyed is a question for determination on trial after issues are framed. So far as the personal plaintiffs are concerned, the most that the appellants can claim under this statute is that they may arbitrarily vacate the portion of the plat of the addition, if none of the parties entitled to be heard in the premises object, and subject to the determination of the question suggested in a proper judicial proceeding. As to the city, the complaint charges facts showing that it has acquired rights which will be infringed if not destroyed by the vacation of the plat. It is true that the complaint does not specify the streets and alleys, or the portions of the plat, wherein the sewers, water mains, sidewalks, crossings, and roads have been constructed, but if it is nec

essary to enter into these details in the complaint, the statements are only incomplete, and not bad on demurrer. The court must take the allegations for the purpose of this case as admitted by appellants, and, when so taken, they show an abridgment or obstruction of public use and rights. Our conclusion is that the order of the District Court overruling the demurrer must in all things be affirmed.

INDEX.

ABANDONMENT.

Of assignment of error, see Appeal and Error, 8.

Of homestead, see Homestead.

ABUSE OF DISCRETION. See Appeal and Error, 22, 23.

ACCEPTANCE.

Of dedication, see Dedication, 1.

ACCOMMODATION MORTGAGOR. See Cloud on Title, 1.

ACCOUNTING.

Review on appeal of findings in suit for accounting, see Appeal
and Error, 28.

By guardian, see Guardian and Ward.

By county auditor, see Officers, 2.

ACQUIESCENCE.

In invalid judgment, see Appeal and Error, 26.

ACTION OR SUIT.

Dismissal of, see Dismissal.

As to parties, see Parties.

Venue of, see Venue.

Service of process, see Writ and Process.

1. A cause of action implies a right to begin an action and someone who has

a right to sue, and someone who may be lawfully sued. It involves both a

ACTION OR SUIT-continued.

subject of an action and a person who is able and permitted to assert it.
Gronna v. Goldammer, 122.

2. Under N. D. Rev. Codes 1905, § 7345, permitting the consolidation of actions
between the same parties, which might have been joined, four distinct ae-
tions in claim and delivery brought by different parties and involving
different property, but against the same defendant, cannot be consolidated,
either for the purposes of trial in the district court, or of appeal to the
supreme court, even though they involve similar questions of law and fact.
Willoughby v. Smith, 209.

ADMINISTRATION.

Of decedents' estates, see Executors and Administrators.

ADMISSIONS.

By seller of defects in article sold, see Sale, 1.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Easement by prescription, see Easements, 1.

AFFIDAVITS.

On motion for new trial, see New Trial, 4, 5.

For substituted service of summons, see Writ and Process.

AGENCY. See Principal and Agent.

AGGRAVATION.

Of damages, see Damages, 3.

ALLEYS.

Suit to quiet title to, see Cloud on Title, 2.

ALTERNATIVE JUDGMENT. See Claim and Delivery, 9.

AMENDMENT.

Of notice of appeal, see Appeal and Error, 3.
Of pleading, see Pleading, 2.