Maphuz Khan, the brother of the Nabob, but, as it afterwards appeared, had entered into secret negociations with Nizam Ali, the Soubahdar of the Deckan, for an alliance that might enable him to conquer, and assume in his own right, the territory in question. A most expensive and disastrous contest had reduced us to great distress, when the apprehension of a Mahratta invasion of his own dominions, induced our opponent to sue for peace. The treaty that was concluded on this occasion, we are sorry to observe, demands our notice, as the breach of one of its articles was afterwards urged against us, as affording just occasion for another war. The circumstance is thus explained by Colonel Wilks.

The only article of the treaty with Madras, which demands observation, is the second; which stipulates, "that in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other, to drive the enemy out," the pay of the auxiliaries to be defrayed at fixed rates, by the party demanding assistance. Hyder's first demand, was for an alliance offensive and defensive, which, after much discussion, Mr. Du Prè distinctly refused; and declared, that if persisted in, the negotiation must there cease. Now as it was notorious to all India, and openly avowed by Hyder himself, that his country was periodically invaded by the Mahrattas, it is obvious, and the sequel will abundantly unfold it, that by the article ultimately adjusted, the Company subjected themselves to all the embarrassments of an offensive alliance without any of its advantages: and that Mr. Du Prè had acquiesced in the spirit of an article, to the letter of which he had objected, as fundamentally inadmissible. Historical justice demands this reluctant notice of an error committed by Mr. Du Prè, to whose profound wisdom and distinguished talents, the subsequent narrative will bear a willing testimony.

In a subsequent page, the difficulties we experienced, in consequence of this unfortunate stipulation, are related as follows:-We must premise, however, that the plenipotentiary alluded to is Sir John Lind say, who had been sent out a short time previously, as ambassador from

the king of England to the Nabob of Arcot.

When Hyder, on the invasion of Mysoor by Mâdoo Row in 1770, demanded from

the Government of Madras the execution of the treaty of 1769, the erroneous conceptions of Mr. Du Prè in negotiating the 2d article of that treaty began to be distinctly unfolded. Mahommed Ali, whose views required the extinction of Hyder general conquest, reminded the govern as the very first step in his march of ment, that being no party to that treaty, he was not bound to furnish funds for its execution. (It will be recollected that he had fraudulently refused to execute according to compact the instrument of his participation.) And the King's plenipotentiary, ever acting in unison with Mahommed Ali, upbraided the Government with the circumstances under which it was concluded, as an argument to impeach its validity "the time when, the place where, the peace was made," are the insinuations of the minister; peace (as the Directors afterwards remark,) to which the want of aid from his idol compelled us ;"" such (as they emphatically observe,) are the honours, &c. (of the royal mission) the honour of humbling the East India Company before the throne of Mahommed Ali Khan."*

;

66 a

The Nabob and royal plenipotentiary urged not merely a passive infraction of the treaty, but its active violation, without one assignable pretext, by uniting with Mâdoo Row for the destruction of Hyder; and the Government finding itself pledged to all the practical evils of an offensive alliance with Hyder, which they had so carefully professed to avoid; feeling the impossibility of executing the treaty in opposition to the Nabob and the representative of Majesty, and resolved not to

destroy the power which they were bound by treaty to defend, evaded the whole question, by representing both to Hyder and the Mahrattas the necessity of waiting for the result of a reference which they had made on the subject to their superiors in England.

The interval between the war which terminated in 1769, and the succeeding one of 1780, presents us with several instances of delinquency, which we are reluctantly obliged to notice. We allude first, to the conquest of Tanjore in the asserted right of Mahommed Ali ;-secondly, to our refusal to restore to Bassalut Jung, (the only remaining brother of Nizam Ali,) the Circar of Guntoor ;-and

* Company's Records.

lastly, to our breach of the treaty of Worgaum, in not causing the army of Colonel Goddard to retire upon Bengal. We cannot admit, that the argument which was urged in justification of our conduct in the last mentioned instance, viz. that the officer who agreed to these conditions had no authority thus to stipulate, amounts even to a reasonable palliation, since we did not hesitate to reap the benefits of the treaty, although we positively refused compliance with the requisitions which had an opposite tendency. The two former offences, however, were, under existing circumstances, by no means flagrant crimes; and the restitution which immediately followed, sufficiently exempts us from the necessity of entering into further explanation.

As it was Mahommed Ali who, by false representations, instigated us to the conquest of Tanjore, so it was likewise the ambitious schemes of the same disinterested ally, that occasioned our rupture with Hyder in 1780. His constant endeavours to engage us in hostilities with that chieftain, and his incessant intrigues in other quarters, could scarcely have failed, with a less dangerous and determined enemy, of exciting the most active preparations for measures of retaliation:and Hyder was no common foe.

We had unquestionably abundant grounds, on various occasions, for making a common cause with Hyder, against the encroachments of the Mahratta power, and of thus complying with the letter of the requisitions of the treaty of 1769. But we were invariably thwarted in all our plans for the furtherance of this object, sometimes by the secret machinations, and at others by the open resistance of Mahommed Ali. Colonel Wilks is exceedingly strong in censuring the unmanliness of our conduct, in allowing ourselves to be thus duped and trifled with on all occasions, by a despicable knave under the title of Nabob, and for not assuming in our own right a Asiatic Journ,-No. 27.

more commanding rank amongst the potentates of the peninsula. We had rescued Mahommed Ali from the brink of ruin, and invested him with the Nabobship of the Carnatic; we were also the sovereigns of considerable districts in different part of India. Whenever, therefore, our interests were endangered by the selfish policy of this faithless prince, we had an indubitable right, not only to dictate terms, but also to enforce compliance. Such, at a subsequent period, was the enlightened policy of Lord Cornwallis: but we were first to be instructed in the lessons of wisdom by the most cruel and exterminating contest that ever engaged our arms.

However imbecile were our civil arrangements for the conduct of the ensuing war, and however dishonorable to the government of Madras were the negociations with Tippoo Sultaun, which brought it to its close; we have at least the con. solation of reflecting, that we terminated a disastrous conflict with an approving conscience, though our dignity was degraded to the utmost, by the insults that were tamely permitted to be offered to

our name.

These insults,-the detention of many of the European prisoners, and a variety of suspicious circumstances which occurred during a peace of several years continuance, from the treaty of 1784, were manifest indications of a hostile disposition. No sooner, therefore, was Lord Cornwallis invested with the office of governor general of India, than he deemed it requisite to commence a system of active preparation, and to strengthen the British interest by foreign alliances. The negociations into which he en tered on this occasion are thus related and commented upon by Co❤ lonel Wilks,

The act of parliament prohibiting the Governor-General from declaring war, or entering into any treaty for making war, against any native state, except VOL. V. 2 M

when hostilities had commenced or impended, and the express orders of his sovereign and the India Company to the same effect, were so many arguments in bar to the execution or renewal of the offensive engagements proposed. But in a letter to Nizam Ali, dated the 1st July, 1789, which may be deemed the final result of Abd-ul-Kasim's mission, and which is expressly declared to be equally binding as a treaty, after reciting these prohibitions, and explaining the grounds of the demands regarding Guntoor, his lordship proceeds, not to announce the annulment of the treaty of 1768, but to declare his "intentions that it should be carried into full effect; to explain one of its articles, which regulates the demand of a subsidiary force to be furnished by the Company to Nizam Ali, and to enumerate the powers against whom that force shall not be employed, which enumeration recites by name every power of Decan and the South, with the single exception of Tippoo Sultaun. The letter further goes on to state that "circumstances have totally prevented the execution of those articles of the treaty of 1768, which relate to the Dewanny of the Carnatic Balagaut; but should it hereafter happen that the Company, with his Highness's assistance, should obtain possession of the countries mentioned in those articles, they will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of his Highness and the Mahrattas." It is highly instructive to observe a statesmau, justly extolled for moderate and pacific dispositions, thus indirectly violating a law enacted for the enforcement of these

virtues, by entering into a very intelligible offensive alliance, which, although the effective revival of the abrogated conditions of an old treaty, was certainly neither a declaration of war, nor that technical instrument named a treaty for making war, executed subsequently to the prohibitory act of parliament; and his lordship's observations on the same restrictions, written eight months afterwards, in his dispatches to the resident at Poona, not only furnish the best comment on their inconvenience, but seem to intimate an unconsciousness of the evasion which has been noticed. "Some considerable advantages," his lordship observes, "have no doubt been experienced by the system of neutrality which the legislature required of the governments of this country; but it has at the same time been attended with the unavoidable inconvenience of our being constantly exposed to the necessity of commencing a war, with out having previously secured the assistance of efficient allies" for some years past we have been almost daily obliged

It was afterwards so pronounced by a resolution of the House of Commons.

to declare to the Mahrattas and the Ni zam, that we were precluded, &c. &c. &c." It may not perhaps be necessary to examine, whether the direct violation of that article of the treaty of Mangalore, which most sensibly affected national ho nour and individual feeling by the brutal detention of native British subjects, as well as the population of Coromandel, were not at all times, since March 1784, not only a legitimate, but an imperious ground of war, of which the time was fairly and honourably in the hands of the British government; nor is it necessary to recite the innumerable minor insults to which our frontiers had been incessantly exposed, in consequence of experienced impunity; but adverting to the course of transactions which have been described, it was not to be expected that Tippoo Sultaun should view, as a slip of the pen, the exception of his name from the enumeration of friendly powers not to be attacked; or misapprehend the eventual arrangements dependent on the conquest of his dominions. The early occupation of Travancore, which he contemplated as an easy achievement, was certainly the most efficient preparation he could make for such a contest, and he commenced his march from Coimbetoor with a force, abundantly sufficiently for the service.

It is necessary that we should observe, that the Rajah of Travancore was an ally of the English, and had already been acknowledged as such by the prince who now attacked him.

The war that was thus commenced was conducted in person by the distinguished nobleman already mentioned, and was terminated in 1792, in a manner that was equally creditable to the energy of his mind and the integrity of his character.

The utter detestation of the English name, which Tippoo inherited from his father, was always inconsistent with the faintest prospect of a solid and permanent peace. No sooner, therefore, was he delivered from the immediate terror of an invading army, than he commenced with various powers a course of political intrigue, for the absolute expulsion of the English from every station they possessed upon the

Regular infantry, 20,000; efficient spearmen and matchlock-men, 10,000; horse, 5,000; field guns, 20.

continent of India. The negocia tions he was carrying on with the French republic in particular, for the attainment of this object, were brought to light by the most indubitable evidence, about the period of the arrival of Lord Mornington in India. Frequent expostulations were made, but every attempt at explanation was utterly unavailing; he seemed doomed by an unaccountable fatality to pursue that line of conduct which must inevitably end in his destruction. Our repeated endeavours to preserve tranquillity, and extensive military resources; the magnitude of our preparations, and the rapidity of our success, were lost alike on this infatuated prince; he fell in the defence of his capital, and the Mahommedan dynasty was at once extinguished.

The arrangements that were made in regard to the disposal of the conquered territory, present to the observation of future statesmen a bright example of political wisdom, strictly consistent with the principles of justice.

The importance of the following extract must apologize for its length,

The East-India Company and Nizam Ali derived an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions conquered by their united arms; the cession of any portion of it to any other party might be a consideration of policy or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground of justice or right. The Mahrattas had obviously forfeited every pretension to participate; the progeny of Tippoo Sultaun could claim no title which had not been superseded by the right of conquest; and in estimating their claims it was impossi ble to forget the usurpation of Hyder, and the sufferings of the family expelled by his crimes. A descendant of that family existed at Seringapatam, but although he might have much to hope from the humanity of the conquerors, he could assert no right to any share of the conquered territory.

To the free and uncontrolled exercise of the right of conquest no obstacle existed in the internal state of the country: the people had manifested the most anxious desire for a new settlement; all the Mahommedan officers of the late go

vernment were in Seringapatam, at the discretion of the allies, and from the uniform policy of the late dynasty, never possessed any influence in the country capable of disturbing such a plan of internal government as should be deemed just and expedient.

In regulating therefore the right of conquest, no principle could be more justly assumed than that indemnification and

security, the original objects of the war, should constitute the basis of the peace.

To have divided the whole territory Ali, would have afforded strong grounds equally between the Company and Nizam of jealousy to the Mahrattas; and by injudiciously enlarging the dominions of Nizam Ali, who was incompetent to manage what he already possessed, and thus placing many of the strong fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysoor in his possession, that important barrier would be in a situation to endanger, not to strengthen, the British possessions.

The establishment of a central government in Mysoor, under the protection of the English state, would obviate many of these objections; and the admission of the Mahrattas, however destitute of every claim of right, to a limited participation in the division of the conquered territory, (on the express condition, however, of a new treaty calculated to preserve the general tranquillity of India,) was, after a full consideration of various plans, that which appeared best calculated to reconcile che interests of all parties, and to secure to the English government a less invidious and more efficient share of financial, commercial, and military strength. The future distribution of territory on these principles having been calculated, on a fair consideration of the convenience of the parties, to whom it should be allotted, the delicate and important question remained, of determining in what hands the new government of Mysoor should be placed; and although no positive right existed, the choice would naturally fall on either the family of Tippoo Sultaun, or the ancient house of the rajas of Mysoor.

The claims of humanity on both sides rendered the decision a painful and ungracious task. The usurpation, although comparatively modern, had yet subsisted a sufficient time to have extinguished the hopes of the ancient family, and accustomed them to the humility of their for tune; while the sons of Tippoo Sultaun, educated with the proudest expectations, would be deeply sensible to the disappointment of their hopes.

The heir of Tippoo Sultaun, if placed on the throne, must be subjected to the same diminution of power and territory, which had formed a leading object of the war against his father. and, educated in

the same principles and prejudices, would have felt such a condition to be little short of the most abject and humiliating degradation. In the most narrow view of the subject, the son of Tippoo Sultaun must have felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of a settlement, founded on the partition of his father's dominions. The foundation of such a settlement would have been laid in the principle of its own dissolution. The interests, the habits, the prejudices and passions, the vices, and even the virtues of such a prince, must Eave concurred to cherish an aversion to the English name and power, and an eager desire to abet the cause of their enemies. A hostile power would have been weakened, not destroyed and a point of union for every hostile machination would have remained in the centre of the English possessions.

:

The restoration of the descendant of the ancient rajas of Mysoor, was recommended by the same course of reasoning which excluded the heir of the usurpation. The kingdom of Mysoor, so long the source of calamity and alarm, would become a barrier of defence and an accession of strength; and, in addition to these motives of policy, every moral consideration, and every sentiment of generosity, favoured the restoration of the Hindoo family of Mysoor. Such is the brief statement, imperfectly abstracted from the public records, of the principles which guided Lord Mornington in détermining to re-establish that ancient family in the government of Mysoor; and, to soften the de cision to the heirs and adherents of the usurpation, he granted to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, a more munificent maintenance than they had enjoped during the late reign; and to the Mahommedan officers, and chiefs of the state, who had survived the Sultaun, pensions founded on the same truly económical views of wise liberality.

The delicacy was observed of removing from Seringapatam to their future residence at Vellore, the families of the late dynasty, before the commissioners should hold any intercourse with the family of the raja of Mysoor: but on the departure of the principal branches, they paid a visit to the future Raja, whom they found with others of his persecuted family, in a condition of poverty and humiliation which excited the strongest sensations of compassion. The future Raja himself was a child of five years of age, but the widow of that raja from whom Hyder usurped the government still remained, to confer with the commissioners, and to regulate with distinguished propriety the renewed honors of her house.

The adjustment of the treaty of partition, and of the subsidiary treaty of Mysoor, followed as the necessary conse

quences of those principles which have been stated. The portion of territory conditionally reserved for the Mahrattas was ultimately divided between the other allies, because no inducements were sufficient to procure from that people an assent to conditions which involved some relaxation of their pretensions to universal plunder. The subsidiary treaty of Mysoor was founded on principles which established the most perfect community of interests between the English government and the new state: the English government was charged with the duties of external defence, the new state with those of internal administration, including the extent of military police required in a country composed of the re-union of a multitude of petty principalities. The raja was installed at the seat of his ancestors, in the presence of an immense multitude of Hindoos, who testified the most unfeigned delight at a spectacle which revived the long extinguished hope of perpetual emancipation from Mahommedan tyranny. The practical efficiency of the government was secured by the uncommon talents of Poornea in the office of minister to the new Raja, and that efficiency was directed to proper objects, by the control reserved to the English government in the provisions of the treaty; and by the happy selection of Lieut-Colonel Close to be political resident at the new court, a man whose eminent talents, extensive experience, and conciliatory manners, enabled him to guide the new minister, without permitting him to feel the existence of control. A large portion of the wreck of the infantry was employed under the new government; and by a supplemental treaty, concluded after the experience of a few years, a respectable part of the excellent cavalry of Mysoor, who in the intermediate time had been employed with distinguished credit under Colonel Wellesley, in Decan, were reserved for the service of the state, and prevented from swelling the numbers of that confederation of disbanded armies which, under the designation of Pindarees, is in the year 1817, opposing to the English prosperity in India, a more embarrassing necessity for incessant and extensive preparation, than they have hitherto experienced from long established governments; the Mahommedans of the nineteenth century retracing the steps of Sevajee in the seventeenth.

Among the inconveniences of that singular and generally beneficial government, established by the British nation in India, is the practice of committing the higher offices of the army and the state, and almost all situations of trust and emolument to Europeans; and thereby excluding the natives of the country from every object of honorable ambition. The settlement of