"None of said bonds shall be sold or issued in payment of the cost of said improvements at less than par value and accrued interest."

Should we look no further, this would seem to call for the conclusion that appellant's counsel here contend for, assuming for argument's sake that the question is one that is contemplated by the statute shall be submitted to the voters, and their decision become binding upon the city's authorities. But the ordinance also provides that the sale of the bonds "shall be made in such manner as the city commission shall deem for the best interest of the city,"

which is, in substance, the same as is provided in section 8007, Rem. Code, relating to the issuance and disposition of such bonds. Reading these provisions together, in view of the fact that we must proceed upon the presumption that the city authorities are not contemplating selling any of

the bonds at such a discount below par that the total amount of such discount and interest, computed at the rate therein specified, will result in the city, in effect, paying interest in an amount greater than the maximum rate allowed by the statute and ordinance, we feel constrained to hold that there is not here alleged or shown any facts warranting the court in interfering upon the ground that the city is disposing of the bonds at less than their par value. Observations made in our recent decision in Hill

v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 572, 185 Pac. 631, we think, support this conclusion.

[8] It is contended that the election was of no legal effect as a final authorization by the voters of the city for the making of the proposed improvements or the issuance of the bonds, because the election amounted only to the ratification of the ordinance submitting the proposition, rather than a final ratification of the proposition submitted by the ordinace. The notice of election, as well as the ordinance, in terms, submitted to the voters for their final ratification or rejection the proposition of making the improvements and issuing the bonds. The ordinance provides that

"If the voters of said city voting at said election shall ratify said proposition and shall ratify this ordinance, by a three-fifths vote as provided by law, then and thereupon the propositions and plans to make additions, and betterments to and extensions of said waterworks system and to pay the cost thereof by the issue and sale of bonds as in this ordinance provided shall be carried out by the city commission. * *

And the prescribed form of the ballot, after submitting the proposition to the voters, concludes with these words, "and shall said ordinance be ratified," so the voters do seem to have expressed themselves in form upon the question of the ratification of

they also express their decision upon the question of the adoption of the proposition. The ordinance concludes with the declara

tion that it shall take effect immediately. It seems plain to us that the intent expressed in the ordinance and the ballot, when their provisions are considered together, is that the ordinance shall be deemed in full force and effect in so far as it provides for the submission to the voters of the proposition of making the improvements and the issuance of the bonds, and that the voters could not have understood otherwise. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the election did not fail, in its legal effect, as an authorization for the city authorities to proceed with the improvements and the issuance of the bonds. Our decision in Uhler V. Olympia, 87 Wash. 1, 151 Pac. 117, 152 Pac. 998, dealing with a somewhat similar situation, we think, supports this conclu

sion.

[9] It is contended in appellant's behalf that the election became of no legal effect as a ratification of the proposition, because the notice of election was first published less than 30 days following the passage of the ordinance. This contention is rested upon the theory that the ordinance could not legally go into effect before 30 days following its passage, because of the provision of section 7670-22, Rem. Code, relating to ordinances passed by a commission of a city having the commission form of government, reading as follows:

"No ordinance passed by the commission, except when otherwise required by the general laws of the state of Washington or by the provisions of this act, except an ordinance for the immediate preservation of the public peace, its urgency and is passed by unanimous vote health or safety, which contains a statement of of the commission, shall go into effect before thirty days from the time of its final passage.

This language is followed by provisions enabling the voters of the city to invoke a referendum upon ordinances passed by the city commission during a period of 30 days following their passage. This ordinance concludes with a declaration of emergency, and that it "shall take effect and be in force immediately upon its passage and publication." It is argued that the ordinance is by its nature such that it cannot be emergent, and therefore not capable of being put into effect immediately as such, and thus take away from the voters the right of referendum thereon. It seems to us that this ordinance, in so far as it submits the proposition of making the improvements and the issuance of the bonds to pay therefor, is in no event subject to a referendum; because by its very terms in that regard, and by the express provision of the statute under which

for a referendum. In view of this fact, together with the fact that the ordinance was passed in the exercise of the power conferred upon the city authorities by the law relating especially to cities acquiring public utilities, rather than in the exercise of general powers given by the general organic law of cities having a commission form of government, we are of the opinion that there was no legal impediment to the ordinance going into effect immediately upon its passage and publication, in so far as the submission of the proposition to the voters is concerned; that it did go into effect immediately upon its passage and publication; that it was not subject to referendum so far as that purpose is concerned; and that therefore the publication of the election notice was not premature, but was as valid and effectual as if made after the expiration of 30 days following the passage of the ordinance.

[10] Some contention is made in appellant's behalf that the proposition was not properly submitted to the voters, because "no sufficient plan or system is set forth therein as required by law." The only requirement of the statute in this regard (section 8006, Rem. Code) is that the "corporate authorities shall provide therefor by ordinance, which shall specify and adopt the system or plan proposed, and declare the estimated cost thereof as near as may be." We think it is contemplated by the statute that the system and plan proposed need be specified only in such general terms as will fairly inform the voters of the general nature and extent of the proposed improvements, and that this ordinance sufficiently does so, by the specification of the system and plan, as summarized near the beginning of this opinion. Our decisions in Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138, 32 Pac. 1077, and Paine v. Port of Seattle, 70 Wash. 294, 126 Pac. 628, 127 Pac. 580, support this conclusion.

[11] It is contended in appellant's behalf that two or more separate propositions were submitted as one, so that the voters had no opportunity to vote separately thereon, and that therefore the election was of no legal effect. The argument is that the proposed construction of the reservoir is a proposition so independent of the other proposed extensions that there was in legal effect at least two separate propositions submitted to the voters. We cannot agree with this view of the submission of the proposition, since all of the things proposed to be done have to do with additions, betterments, and extensions to the city's waterworks system as a whole. In Blaine v. Hamilton, 64 Wash. 353, 116 Pac. 1076, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 577, where there was involved the submission to the voters several propositions looking to the construction of the Lake Washington canal, and the erection of wharves and docks, in the furtherance of that improvement, Judge

Gose, speaking for the court, in holding that all was in legal effect one proposition for the purpose of submitting the same to the voters, said:

"Counsel for the appellants, in his oral argument, stated that the true test of whether a proposition is single is, Will it stand alone? This, we think, is but one of the tests of singleness, and might often be no test at all. The true criterion is, Are the several parts of the project so related that united they form in fact but one rounded whole? Either of two converging highways, or either of two public highways terminating upon a highway common to both, would stand alone, but there are few cases which would hold that bonds were invalid where the two were submitted as a single project. Again, we have no doubt that a proposition could be submitted as a unit for bonding the city of Seattle for the construction of one schoolhouse on Capitol Hill and another on Queen Anne; or for the construction of isola

tion hospitals at points remote from each other, if the law permitted bonds for that pur

pose."

Our later decisions in Tulloch v. Seattle, 69 Wash. 178, 124 Pac. 481, Aylmore v. Hamilton, 74 Wash. 433, 133 Pac. 1027, and Chandler v. Seattle, 80 Wash. 154, 141 Pac. 331, are to the same effect and we think leave little room for arguing that the submission to the voters of the proposition here in question was in legal effect other than the submission of a single proposition to them.

[12] Contention is made in appellant's behalf that the issuance of the bonds in the sum of $500,000 as proposed will increase the city's debt beyond the amount allowed by the state Constitution, and the statutes

under which it is sought to incur such indebtedness. In section 6, art. 8, of the Constitution, it is provided:

"No county, city, town, school district, or other municipal corporation shall for any purpose become indebted in any manner to an amount exceeding one and one-half per centum of the taxable property in such county, city, town, school district, or other municipal corporation, without the assent of three-fifths of the voters therein voting at an election to be held for that purpose, nor in cases requiring such assent shall the total indebtedness at any time exceed five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county purposes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, except that in incorporated cities the assessment shall be taken from the last assessment for city purposes: Provided, that no part of the indebtedness allowed in this section shall be incurred for any purpose other then strictly county, city, town, school district, or other municipal purposes: Provided further, be allowed to become indebted to a larger that any city or town, with such assent, may amount, but not exceeding five per centum additional for supplying such city or town with water, artificial light, and sewers, when the works for supplying such water, light, and sewers

The second question it is not necessary here to refer to. In deciding the first question it was said:

"It will not be necessary to consider the second proposition or either of its divisions suggested by the argument, for in the view we take of the case the fact that all the water to be diverted by means of the headgate and ditch is to be used exclusively for the irrigation of land in another state is sufficient to cause a reversal of the judgment."

The trial court had sustained the claimed right to condemn. Before the opinion concluded it was suggested that it probably would be difficult to find authority in the stautes to condemn land for the benefit of the business of a foreign corporation conducted exclusively in another state, but this question was not decided, because the "petitioner has shown no right under the Constitution or statute of this state to condemn

the land in controversy." In Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, 19 Idaho, 595, 115 Pac. 682, the plaintiff, a Washington corporation, engaged in the business of supplying light and power in the state of Washington and also in the state of Idaho, sought to condemn land in the latter state for the purpose of enlarging its plant. The right to condemn was there sustained upon the sole ground that the condemning company was serving people of the state of Idaho, and that the purpose to which the property would be devoted was a public use within that state. The fact that the same company was serving the people of another state also would not deprive it of the right to condemn. In the course of the opinion it was said:

"Condemnation could evidently not be had in this state for the purpose alone of serving a public use in another state, but where the use for which the condemnation is sought is a public use in this state, and will serve the citizens of this state-their demands, necessities, and industries-the fact that it may incidentally also benefit the citizens and industries of a neighboring state will not defeat the right of condemnation. ⚫

*

"It would be difficult, and indeed unreasonable, to say that the energy generated by the water power of this state should only be used in operating cars to and from the state line, and that in order to propel them thence to Spokane and back to the state line the company must secure its power in some other way and from some other source. * This demonstrates the correctness of the proposition above stated that the test must be, Is the use a public use within this state, and does it serve the interests of the people of this state? If it does so, the fact that it incidentally or in connection therewith likewise serves the interests of a neighboring state, and the people of such state,

While the right of condemnation there was sustained, it was upon the sole ground that the property taken would in part at least be devoted to a public use in that state. The court recognized that if the property was being taken solely for the public use in another state the right of condemnation would not exist.

The writer of the article on Eminent Domain in 10 R. C. L. at page 20, expresses the opinion that property in one state cannot be taken under the power of eminent domain for a public use in another state. In Lewis on Eminent Domain, section 310, upon the same question it is said:

"The public use for which property may be taken is a public use within the state from which the power is derived."

In Nichols on Eminent Domain (2d Ed.) vol. 1, at page 97, the author states the law to be as follows:

"One state cannot take or authorize the taking of property situated within its limits for the use of another state. Any employment of the power of eminent domain for other purposes than to enable the government of the state to exercise and give effect to its proper authority, effectuate the purpose of its creation and carry out the policy of its laws could not be rested upon the justification and basis which underlie tion of the courts. Accordingly it would seem the power, and has never received the sancthat if a municipality was located close to the boundary of another state, and the only available property for satisfying the necessity and convenience of its people for such purposes as a water supply, a sewer outlet, or a park was situated across the boundary line, it would be impossible to take the necessary land by emi

nent domain even with the consent of the state in which it was situated, for the Legislature of neither state would have power to grant the requisite authority-in one case because the property sought to be taken was not within its jurisdiction, and in the other because the use for which it was sought to take the property was not one for which it lay within its power to invoke the exercise of eminent domain.

"

Two cases are referred to in the majority opinion as supporting the conclusion there reached, but I do not so read them. In the New York case of In re Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171, the right to take property in that state by the New Jersey Canal Company was sustained because the canal was a public benefit and of public use to the people of the state of New York. It was there said:

"It does not follow, because the canal is outside the state limits, that its construction and maintenance are not for a public use, within the meaning of our Constitution. If it were within our limits, what are the public benefits to result from its construction? Not merely