by a person's direction in his absence and beyond his control. Kidder vs. Prescott, 4 Foster 263. Hanson vs. Rowe, 6 Foster 327. We have thus far considered the provisions of this bill, as if they were in fact what they purport to be, provisions to allow the elector to vote by another in the meeting of the town, &c., in which he is entitled to vote. But the bill in effect permits the elector to vote at places other than those fixed, and at times different from those prescribed by the Constitution, and out of the meetings required by it for the purpose; and this, we think, is in conflict with its provisions. For, by the articles which we have cited, an election is to be determined by the will of the voters qualified at the time fixed agreeably to the Constitution for the election, as that will then exists and is then expressed in the mode pointed out. But the effect of a statute, in the terms of this bill, might be to substitute in the election for such will, so expressed, the will of voters, who, at various other times, had been qualified electors, as it had as these various times existed, and been expressed beyond the limits of the State, and in no meetings held in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution; and such a substitution we regard as a violation of its terms and of its spirit. These views are supported to a considerable extent by the opinions recently given by the Courts of Connecticut and of Pennsylvania. (Opinion, &c., 2 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 473. Chase vs. Miller, Ib. 146.) As these views lead us to the conclusion that this bill, in its most prominent feature, is in conflict with the provisions and the spirit of our Constitution, we have not deemed it necessary to consider whether it might also be objectionable as unequal in its practical effects; or as dispensing with those opportunities for conference and consultation, that have heretofore been deemed important, if not essential, to the successful practical operation of our institutions; or whether it contains provisions otherwise in conflict with the fundamental law of the State. SAM'L D. BELL, HENRY A. BELLOWS, GEO. W. NESMITH, WILLIAM H. BARTLETT. June 26, 1863. In The foregoing opinion, signed by a majority of Judges of the same political affinities with the Legislature by which the law was passed, we deem not unworthy of notice in the present trying crisis of public affairs. We should not feel at liberty to allude to the political affinities of the judiciary in ordinary times, or at any time when the soundest views of legal and constitutional rights were not liable to lose their just weight, from any suspicion that they came from those not well disposed towards the present National Administration. order, therefore, to give the foregoing opinion its just weight, and the Judges due credit for their willingness to do right if the sky does lower, we have felt at liberty to say that there are no more loyal men in New Hampshire than those whose names are subscribed to the foregoing opinion, and that a majority of the number have never allowed themselves to be seduced by the popular cry of democracy, if that be a delusion. It is humiliating in a law journal to be obliged to allude to such considerations, but we felt that it was indispensable in order to place the opinion above all suspicion. We believe in the integrity and independence of what may be called an elective judiciary, as that of New Hampshire is practically, but not nominally. We believe that liberty is safe so long as the purity and firmness of the Bench can be maintained. And we believe that there has been no satisfactory evidence of any general willingness in the judiciary, either State or National, to act upon partisan views of public law. And it seems to us the most hopeful symptom of the times, as its opposite would most unquestionably prove the most dis. astrous, that the judiciary thus far manifest so honorable a desire to keep above the low level of partisan views. The republic will be safe as long as the judiciary remains pure and incorrupt and not one hour longer. We feel a just pride in the creditable character of the foregoing opinion, whose perfect soundness no man could question. But no man who knew the character of the men as well as we do could have expected anything less; and such men do not desire to receive commendation for doing their duty only. It is the last thing for which such men look, or which they would willingly accept. And we feel that we owe them an apology for thus alluding to their public relations and private opinions. But it seemed requisite to a full understanding of the weight of the opinion. We desire also to be fully understood as not objecting to any civil right or privilege being conceded to our volunteer soldiery, which can be done consistently with principle and with existing constitutional restrictions. But we do object to breaking down all law, and all principle, and all constitutional restrictions, in a wild rush of blind enthusiasm on behalf of the army, or the navy, or the cabinet, or the President, or the judiciary. And as the judiciary is the only regulator, the pendulum and balance wheel of the machine of government, we are always rejoiced to find its responses true and firm, as the needle to the pole. The words of St Paul to his fellow-voyagers in the shipwreck are here of great significance-Ye cannot be saved except these abide in the ship. I. F. R. Supreme Court of Maine. JACKSON vs. THE Y. & C. RAILROAD COMPANY. Without some statutory provision, no action can be maintained in the name of an assignee, upon interest coupons, which contain no negotiable words, nor language from which it can be inferred, that it was the design of the corporation issuing them, to treat them as negotiable paper, or as creating an obligation distinct from, and independent of, the bonds to which they were severally attached when the bonds were issued. The negotiability of such coupons is a question of law, to be determined, from the papers themselves, by fixed and well-settled rules; and proof of custom, as to the negotiability of them, is inadmissible. The bonds being specialties, the remedy for breaches thereof, is by an action, not of assumpsit, but of debt or of covenant broken; not being legally assignable, no action is maintainable in the name of the holder, though he be assignee. GOODENOW, J., dissenting. It is indispensable to its maintenance that the cause of action exist at the time the action was commenced. The statute of 1856, c. 248, does not remedy this defect. This case was reported in full in the August number of the LAW REGISTER, p. 585, to which we refer the reader. In the following supplemental note, several decisions of great interest and importance are added. ADDENDUM.—Since preparing the note to the above case, we have discovered a considerable number of cases bearing upon the questions before discussed, of the existence of which we either were not aware, or else the fact had escaped present recollection. In Beaver Co. vs. Armstrong, Sup. Ct. Penna., February 1863, a learned and elaborate decision was delivered by Mr. Justice READ, in which the cases bearing upon the question were thoroughly reviewed, and the conclusion arrived at, that the coupons of railroad bonds are negotiable instruments, and may be sued by the holder separate from the bonds, and interest recovered from the date of the demand and refusal. This very point was also decided in Knox Co. vs. Aspinwall, 21 How. U. S. R. 539; and seems to have been recognised in Zabriskie vs. C. C. & C. Railway, 23 How. U. S. R. 381, 400. This affords very satisfactory confirmation of the views already expressed by us, and can scarcely fail to convince the Court in Maine, that the present weight of American authority is very decidedly in favor of the views maintained by Mr. Justice GOOD ENOW. I. F. R. Supreme Court of New York. IN THE MATTER OF WILLIAM J. JORDAN; SAME OF JOSEPH ECK; SAME OF JOHN HEDGES. 1. Where on a return to a writ of habeas corpus, a state Judge or Court is judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, such Judge or Court can proceed no further. The prisoner is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 2. Under the second section of chapter 24 of the Laws of Congress of 1862, it is declared that "hereafter no person under the age of eighteen years shall be mustered into the United States service, and the oath of enlistment taken by the recruit shall be conclusive as to his age." The prisoner having been mustered into the United States service, and having, at the time of enlistment, made a declaration under oath that he was twenty-one years of age, and these facts having been stated in the return to the writ of habeas corpus by the party claiming to hold him in custody under color of the authority of the United States: Held, that the state Judge was "judicially apprised" that the prisoner was in custody under the authority of the United States, and that he was ousted of his jurisdiction. 3. The case of Ableman vs. Booth, 21 How. U. S. 506, approved and followed. At Chambers, August 8, 1863, before E. DARWIN SMITH, Judge, &c. Cases of habeas corpus. The facts appear in the opinion. C. Nash and G. Parker, for petitioners. Job Hedges, for respondents. E. DARWIN SMITH, J.-In these three cases writs of habeas corpus had been issued returnable, and coming on to be heard upon the returns thereto together, on the 8th of August, instant. After argument, I dismissed the proceedings for reasons then stated orally, but as these applications are quite frequent, I thought it would be useful to state my reasons for such decision, and the principles governing the allowance of writs of habeas corpus more formally, and announced at the time that I should do so at my earliest convenience. These writs of habeas corpus were respectively allowed upon the allegation that the parties whose imprisonment was complained of, were minors under the age of eighteen years, and were unlawfully held and restrained of their liberty by military officers, on the pretence that they were duly enlisted as soldiers into the service of the United States. When the writs were allowed, I intimated to the parties applying for them, that I thought they would be unavailing, but I could not refuse to allow them. According to the Habeas Corpus Act of this State, the Judges of this Court and other State Judges authorized to entertain proceedings under the act, and to inquire into the cause of the im prisonment of any person restrained of his liberty within the State, have no discretion in respect to the allowance of such writs, if petitions are presented to them for that purpose in the form prescribed by the statute. The petitions in these three cases were in such form. It has been held in some of the States, that it is not the duty of the Judge or Court applied to for the allowance of a writ of habeas corpus, to allow the same if he is satisfied upon the petition and commitment annexed that it will be their duty to remand the prisoner. In the case of Passmore Williamson, 3 Am. Law Register 741, Chief Justice LEWIS, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, so held and refused the writ, and the Supreme Court of that State, in the same case, on an application to the Court for the writ, so held: 26 Penn. R. (2 Casey) 9. Whether the Habeas Corpus Act of Pennsylvania is the same as the statute in this State, I am not apprised; but, under this decision, as it is the decision of the highest Court in that State, it would doubtless be entirely safe and proper for any Judge in that State to refuse the writ when, upon the face of the papers, he was of the opinion that it ought not to be granted, for the above-mentioned reasons. But the statute of this State prescribes a different rule. Its language is as follows: "Any Court or officer empow ered to grant any writ applied for, &c., to whom such petition shall be presented, shall grant such writ without delay:" sect. 40, |