be one, the interests of which are identified with the interests of the country; and, arbitrary as it must be, such checks and influences might easily be applied, as would render it mild and paternal in its exercise.

It has occurred to us, then, that the only way to escape great evil, both to India and to England, is at once to give the latter country a government to itself. Instead of sending out a Governor-General, to be recalled in a few years, why should we not constitute one of our Royal family Emperor of Hindustan, with hereditary succession? The sovereign would then be surrounded by Britons; and the spirit of Britons would animate and direct his government: Europeans of all descriptions would be invited to settle in his country, and to identify their interests with those of the nation. The productive powers of European industry, under the protecting hand of a British government on the spot, would soon give new life and new riches to the state; and the commercial enterprise of Britons would find a field of boundless extent, every year presenting a more vast and precious produce, from which to cull for the commercial aggrandizement of their country.

We have no longer time to offer more than this general hint of the plan that appears to us most likely to obviate the greater part of the evils with which both countries are threatened, by the continuance of their present connexion. There are many objections to be answered, and many details to be given, for which we may perhaps find a future opportunity. But there is one point of so much importance, that we must bestow upon it a few words before we conclude. The grand concern to which we allude, is that of the administration of justice. Insure an excellent administration of justice, and almost all the terrors of despotism are fled. Now, such is the situation of the people of Hindustan, that, in perfect conformity with their ideas and manners, an admirable administration of justice might, we are persuaded, be with great ease established among them.

What is wanted is-in the first place, a code of laws, in which the principles of substantial justice shall be accurately adapted to the circumstances of the society, and which shall have the sanction of those names, and that authority, which the people revere.

The writings among the Hindus, which now go by the name of Laws, are so exceedingly vague, inconsistent and unmeaning, that they are worse than useless in the administration of justice; leaving the decision of the judge, almost always, as arbitrary as if there was no law, and, at the same time, introducing the nuisance of chicane. In the same degree, however, as those laws are vague and unmeaning, are they at the same time, and for the same reason, plastic. They may be easily moulded into any shape

whatever ;

whatever; and the object, therefore, should be, to give them a right shape. Much use may be made of the Brahmens, and even of their weaknesses, in effecting this object. The superior wisdom of the Europeans is very distinctly felt by them; but not at all acknowledged. The consequence is, that they endeavour to make all their own ideas appear as rational to Europeans as they can; and this they in general do, by twisting them into as near a conformity as possible with what they conceive to be European ideas. Thus, in conversing with them about their laws, advance any notions of ideal perfection you please, they will immediately prove to you, that their laws come up to them; and will produce quotations in abundance from their sacred lawgivers to support their pretensions. In this manner, by going over all the different heads of law, and advancing what is perfect on every point, you might get the Brahmens to assert, that such, in every case, was the law of the Hindus, and to afford you all their most sacred authorities in sanction of what wisdom itself might suggest. You might thus have a perfect code of laws, with such modifications as not to shock the prejudices and manners of the people, and with all the authority which the Brahmenical character, and the most sacred names could attach to it.

The project of Sir William Jones to obtain a code for the administration of justice among the Hindus, with the authority of their own lawgivers, was philanthropic and meritorious; but the mode in which it was undertaken was injudicious. His plan was, to employ the Brahmens, totally unaided by European intelligence; that is, to employ the lights of a people still semi-barbarous, to compile a body of laws from the crude materials of old sayings, old poems, old practices, and old maxims regarded as laws,when it was in his power to have applied all the mental powers of European knowledge and civilization. The result was, as might have been expected, the barbarous confusion and nonsense which we have in the digest of Hindu laws translated by Mr Colebrooke ;-precious, indeed, as a document of the manners and attainments of the people, but devoid of every quality as a guide for the administration of justice. With respect to tribunals, and the mode of procedure, the people of India are already in possession of the fundamental principles of excellence;-publicity, the open and immediate interrogation of parties and witnesses, with decision as soon as the mind of the judge is made up. Upon such a foundation, it would be easy to raise the most perfect fabric of judicature.

ART.

༡

ART. VII. A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review against Oxford; containing an Account of Studies pursued in that University. 8vo. pp. 190. Oxford, 1810.

WH HEN we undertake to give an account of a work directed against ourselves, we must be considered as acting in a twofold capacity, and as incurring, on that account, a double share of responsibility. We cannot review the pamphlet before us, without either refuting the argument contained in it, or acknowledging the justness of its remarks. To this alternative we willingly subscribe: our impartiality as reviewers will serve, we hope, to moderate our zeal as parties; and we think we may engage, that our zeal, as parties, shall have no other effect than to render our examination more accurate. We enter on the task, therefore, with a determination to proceed in our defence no further in any case than sound argument will bear us out; and, whenever this is wanting, to acknowledge our error without scruple or hesitation.

It

The author begins his attack at the title-page; and we must be permitted to begin our remarks from the same point- A Reply to the Calumnies of the Edinburgh Review. Now, the word calumny, in our apprehension, has two characters that belong to it, of which one only is at issue on the present occasion: it is an attack on the moral character, and it is grounded in falschool. may be defined, if we mistake not, a fictitious recital, made for the purpose of hurting the moral character of an individual, or a body of individuals. But if this be the true sense of the word, the strictures of the Edinburgh Review on the system of Oxford education, contain in them no calumny whatsoever. They relate to errors and mistakes committed in a matter no doubt of great importance; but they obviously infer no immorality; as they are not said to have been committed from any intention in the teachers to mislead their pupils-to confine or narrow the circle of their improvement. They may have that effect; but we do not believe, and we certainly never asserted, that it was an effect intended to be produced. The strictures of the Edinburgh Review are therefore very improperly brought under the head of calumny; and we must consequently blame this defender for bringing a heavier charge against his antagonists than he is authorised to do by the nature of the offence.

This attack-or defence, as it is pleasantly termed by the author -relates to three distinct subjects--the study of Aristotle and of the Mathematics,-the Edinburgh Review of the Oxford Strabo,and the English System of Classical Education in general. Upon

each

each of these subjects, we have a few words to say in support of our original statements.

In the first chapter, on the Study of Aristotle, and the Neglect of Mathematics,' the author endeavours to reply to some remarks made in the Twenty-second Number of our Journal, under the article of the Méchanique Céleste of La Place. The fact, which we could not but remark, of the small attention paid to the higher branches of the mathematics in England for almost a century past, led us naturally to inquire, to what cause we must ascribe the dereliction of a science, by what may be regarded as its native country, and the leaving the progeny of English genius to be nursed and trained up by strangers. In doing this, we ventured to give it as our opinion, that it is chiefly in the public institu 'titutions of England that we are to seek for the cause of the de'ficiency in mathematical learning, and particularly in the two great centres from which knowledge is supposed to radiate over 'all the rest of the island. In one of these,' we added,

where

the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees, or where the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity, the ' mathematical sciences have never flourished; and the scholar has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of Geometry. The author before us very rightly concludes, that what is here said is meant to be applied to Oxford; and he accordingly sets about combating these three propositions: 1. that at Oxford the dictates of Aristotle are still listened to as infallible decrees; 2. that the infancy of science is mistaken for its maturity; and 3. that the scholar has no means of advancing beyond the mere elements of geometry. To the proposition, it must be observed, which is the main scope of the sentence, that the mathematical sciences have never flourished at Oxford,' he is prudent enough not to make any reply; but he acknowledges, that if the other charges are truc, there is no ridicule or invective so keen which that university would not deserve. As to the influence of the Aristotelian philosophy, he tells us—

The only parts of Aristotle's writings which can interfere with the student's progress in natural philosophy, are his Physics, the doctrines of which, it is well known, were formerly made the basis of instruction, in that department of science, through all the universities of Europe. Early in the seventeenth century, they received their rudest shock from the writings of Bacon. Before the end of that century, the new method had succeeded in dislodging the Aristotelian philosophy from its strongholds; and, as usually happens in revolutions of that magnitude, after a short interval of confusion among contending factions, of which the Cartesian was for a time predominant, the old dynasty was, by universal consent, suspended;

and

and the Newtonian quietly established on the throne. Under this comprehensive title, I include, for the sake of convenience, the whole modern system of natural philosophy which derives its origin from the works of Bacon.' Reply, p. 15.

And, in the next page, he adds,- It may safely be asserted, that, for more than a century, the Physics of Aristotle have been set aside,' &c.

We will not at present dispute the correctness of the short account here given of the revolutions in Physics; although we must remark, that if the artillery which dislodged the Aristotelian Physics had come from the arsenal of Bacon, the Cartesian never would have succeeded to them; as no two plans of philosophizing, were ever more opposite, than those of Bacon and Descartes.

The pains, however, which the author has taken to prove that the Physics of Aristotle are not now taught at Oxford, are wholly superfluous. Moderately as we think of the scientific merits of that University, we really never once supposed this to be the case; and we are perfectly aware, that the support of Aristotle's Physics against the evidence of demonstration, and the weight of public opinion, is more than the veneration of antiquity, backed by the utmost exertions of academic authority, could venture to undertake. The power of the Pope himself, and of that tribunal which his paternal tenderness had appointed to watch over the faith of his children, did not succeed in proscribing, even in his own states, the system of Copernicus and Galileo; much less can we suppose the influence of a Protestant Univversity to have accomplished that object. Accordingly, we never supposed that they maintain at Oxford, that the Earth is fixed in the centre of the universe, and that the Sun and the planets are carried round it in a vehicle composed of 56 chrystalline orbs. We never meant to insinuate, that the inertia of matter was denied by the professors of that learned University, or that the velocity of falling bodies was asserted to be proportional to their weight. All these we certainly considered as conceptions much too infantine to be mistaken, by any body in the present day, for the mature judgments of science. It is not by propagating these false notions that we suppose the Oxonian system to have done an injury to science, but by not teaching any thing at all concerning Physics, and by turning its attention entirely to other objects. The abuse which the learned author of the Reply throws on the Edinburgh Reviewers, is therefore in consequence of opinions which they do not maintain: he has reproached them for doctrines which they never held; and has done so in a strain

of