Stuber v. Railroad. that the conductor and station agent cannot be considered fellow servants. Their departments are entirely distinct and separate. The duty of one, the conductor, pertains to the physical moving of trains, and in this case, also, the coupling and the uncoupling of cars when necessary. The station agent's duties did not extend to this, but only to the care of the station buildings and grounds and the transmission to the conductor of such orders as might be sent over the wires for the movement of trains. While in a certain sense both were concerned in the moving of trains, the duty of one was confined to the physical exertion and personal oversight necessary to move the train, while the other's duties pertained alone to the transmission of any orders or directions that may have been intended for the guidance of the conductor; but the agent was not to execute such orders or aid in executing them. But in transmitting these orders he was really acting as telegraph operator, and this court has held that such operator is not a fellow servant with the conductor." The case of Freeman v. Railroad Co., 107 Tenn., 346, is very much in point. The plaintiff, a member of a bridge crew whose duty it was to go up and down the road (of course upon the trains of the railroad company) and repair bridges and trestles, was injured through the negligence of the conductor and engineer operating a train of the defendant, and it was held that the doctrine of fellow servant did not apply, and that he could recover from the railroad company. This court Stuber v. Railroad. said: "We think the deceased deceased was not a fellow servant with the conductor and engineer of the train. They were in separate and independent departments. They had no connection with each other in their work and duties. Railroad Co. v. Carroll, 6 Heisk., 347; Railroad Co. v. DeArmond, 2 Pick., 73. It has been held that a car inspector is not a fellow servant with the crew of a switch engine in the same yard, although it was his duty to inspect the cars pulled around and about by the engine, and have cars placed for repairs. Taylor v. Railroad Co., 9 Pick., 307. The bridge crew had nothing to do with the operation of the trains. The train men had nothing to do with the bridge crew. Their duties and labors were entirely distinct and separate." This case is almost identical in its facts with the one under consideration. William Stuber was in no way connected with the operation of the trains of the defendant company. He was not associated with the numerous engineers in control of their locomotives, and had no opportunities of judging of their skill, care, and caution, and it is not to be presumed that he assumed the risk of their negligence or incompetency. His duties as foreman of the water supply of that division of the company's road, related to the physical condition of its water tanks located along its line, and, in order to inspect and direct repairs upon them, it was neces sary for him to travel upon its trains and he was authorized to do so upon them all, whether passenger, freight, or detached engines, but he had nothing to do with the Stuber v. Railroad. operation of the trains and engines. The duties of his department did not require him to have any knowledge of the conduct of trains or the qualification, skill and care required in their proper and safe operation. It is clear, we think, that he was employed in a different department from that of the engineer, and under the wellsettled rule of this State, he did not assume the risk of the negligence and want of care and skill of the engineer whose wrongful act caused his death, and that the defendant is liable for the damages sustained by him. The result is that the judgment of the judge of the circuit court is reversed, and, proceeding to assess the damages which plaintiff is entitled to recover, we find that William Stuber, when injured, was 56 years of age, sober and industrious, with steady employment, and earning $75 per month. That he suffered great physical and mental pain from his injuries for more than two years previous to his death, and was not guilty of any contributory negligence. These facts entitle the plaintiff to recover the full amount sued for, $1,999.99, and a judgment for the same will be entered. 113 Tenn-21 Creeping Bear's Case. CREEPING BEAR v. STATE. (Jackson. April Term, 1904.) 1. WITNESSES. Hostility or partiality shown by cross-examination or by independent testimony. 2. The friendliness or unfriendliness of a witness, his partiality for one party or his hostility to the other, may be proved by cross-examination of the witness, or independently by witnesses called for that purpose, in order that the jury may judge of his credibility and the trustworthiness of his testimony. Cases cited and approved: Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 1 Exchequer, 90; State v. McKendry, 100 Iowa, 83; State v. Trombly, 60 N. H., 491; Commonwealth v. Byron, 14 Gray, 31; Brewer v. Cassby, 11 Gray, 529; People v. Casey, 72 N. Y., 393; Martin v. Fanteau, 29 N. H., 195; Colmes v. Winchester, 39 N. H., 13; Summer v. Crawford, 45 N. Y., 416; Collins v. Stevenson, 8 Gray, 438; Day v. Stickney, 140 Allen, 255; Louisiana v. McFarlan, 41 La. Ann., 686; United States v. Schindler, 18 Blatchford, 227. SAME. Same. Answer to cross-examination as to hostility or partiality is not conclusive. The answer of a witness on cross-examination as to his hostility or partiality to the parties to the suit is not conclusive, because the evidence of his feelings towards the parties is relevant and material. (Post, pp. 327, 329.) 3. SAME. Same. Same. Hostility or partiality shown by conduct and expressions; case in judgment. The hostility or partiality of a witness may be shown by proving his conduct and expressions in relation to the parties, as, that he followed a party who was circulating a petition asking a pardon for the defendant and requested those to whom it Creeping Bear's Case. was presented not to sign it, stating that the deceased was a friend of his, and that the defendant was guilty of a coldblooded murder and he wanted him hung; and the refusal to admit such testimony is reversible error. FROM SHELBY. Appeal from the Criminal Court of Shelby County.JOHN T. Moss, Judge. HARRISON & ESTES, for Creeping Bear. ATTORNEY-GENERAL CATES, for the State. MR. JUSTICE SHIELDS delivered the opinion of the Court. Creeping Bear, a young Sioux Indian, left in Memphis by a Wild West show, struck G. H. Millard with a tomahawk, which he carried under his blanket, while, as he claims, the latter was insulting, badgering, and assaulting him, upon the streets of the city, from the effects of which, after lingering some two weeks, Millard died. Plaintiff in error was tried upon an indictment charg ing him with murder in the first degree, convicted and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for fifteen years, which judgment, upon appeal, was reversed by this court, and the case remanded for a new trial. Upon a second trial he was convicted of voluntary manslaugh |