be reasonable, and the provision should not be perverted so as to work injustice or as to include cases not intended to fall within it. Thus a statute requiring any writing, etc., upon which a petition (the plaintiff's first pleading in many States) or other pleading is founded, to be filed in court, was held not to apply to a subscription paper or to articles of association, when sued upon. Workman v. Campbell, 46 Mo. 305. Particular provisions are not to be extended beyond the general scope of the statute, unless manifestly designed. Thus a statute as to religious societies was limited to those within the State. Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44. "Assignee," in one case was held to include "grantee," as being within the reason and object of the act. Mattoon v. Young, 45 N. Y. 696. It has been said that the true rule is to suppose the law-giver actually present, and to ask him, "Did you intend to cover such a case?" etc. Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 746. But it is very plain that such a rule does not in the least remove any difficulty or suggest any criterion of interpretation, for as the questioner must answer his own question, he gains nothing by proposing it. The previous state of the law, and the existing facts as shown by recitals in the preamble or in the act, or as shown by extrinsic proof, are to be looked to. Atty. Gen. v. Powis, 1 Kay, 186.

The whole Statute to be harmonized.-The whole statute is to be so construed that all its provisions may be harmonized, if possible. Scott v. State, 22 Ark. 369; Davy v. Burlington, &c. R. R. 31 Iowa, 553. Thus when one section said that a certain notice should be published ten days in succession, and another section said that all notices under the act should be published daily, Sundays excepted, it was held that the publication of the notice first mentioned should be ten days, subtracting Sundays, that is, for a period of ten days, the Sundays being counted as part of the ten days. Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240. Incongruities are to be so construed as to harmonize with the general intent of the whole. Commonwealth v. Conyngham, 66 Penn. St. 99. An act required examiners "to be appointed by the Court of C. P. at the first term of the court in each year." This act was in fact not passed until after the first term of that year. It was held that examiners should be appointed for that year upon the passage of the act. Ibid. General words at the end of a statute refer to and qualify the whole; but if they occur in the middle, they are not to be extended to what follows them, unless clearly so intended. Coxon v. Doland, 2 Daly 66. The sections of a code upon one subject are to be construed as a single statute. Mobile, &c. R. R. v. Malone, 46 Ala. 391.

A Limiting Clause is generally to be restrained to the last preceding antecedent. Cushing v. Worrick, 9 Gray, 382.

Subsequent Clause.-If a subsequent clause is obscure, it will not control a previous clear provision. State v. Williams, 8 Ind. 191.

Consequences of a particular Interpretation.—Incidental effects are to be considered if the meaning is doubtful (In re Day, 9 Blatchf. C. C. 285), but not if the meaning is plain. Learned v. Corley, 43 Miss. 687. Where the meaning is plain, there is no room for construction. Bradbury v. Wagenhorst, 54 Penn. St. 180; U. S. v. Ragsdale, 1 Hempstead, 497; Fitzpatrick v. Gibhart, 7 Kans. 35; State v. Washoe Co. Comm'rs, 6 Nev. 104. And in such case the consequences are for the Legislature and not for the court. Bosley v. Mattingley, 14 B. Mon. 89; Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507; Dudley v. Reynolds, 1 Kans. 285.

Construction ut res magis valeat.—A statute by its terms amending section 293 will be held to refer to section 296, if it would otherwise be a nullity. People v. King, 28 Cal. 265. Words were treated as surplusage where the statute would otherwise fail of its object, in U. S. v. Stern, 5 Blatch. C. C. 512. Where the language is

eliptical, the necessary words supplied must be such and so construed as to have some force. Nichols v. Halliday, 27 Wisc. 406. Where a statute named eighty persons, and enacted that they, "or any three of them be and hereby are appointed commissioners," it was construed as leaving to the election of the persons named whether the whole or any three should act, and about forty having acted, their proceedings were held valid, as it appeared that the whole number had not elected to act, and the excess over three could do no harm. Commonwealth v. Westchester, &c. R. R. 3 Grant's Cas. (Penn.) 200.

Contemporaneous Construction.-The contemporaneous construction of a statute under which rights of property have been acquired, should be followed, if possible -e. g., construction by a Probate Court. In re Warfield, 22 Cal. 59. Contemporaneous construction by a Legislature is of high authority. Philadelphia, &c. R. R. v. Catawissa R. R. 53 Penn. St: 20. The practical construction given to a statute by the public officers of the State, and acted upon by the people thereof, is to be considered, and is perhaps decisive in case of doubt. Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge, 21 How. 35; Matthews v. Shores, 24 Ill. 27; Solomon v. Comm'rs, &c. 41 Geo. 157; see Plummer v. Plummer, 37 Miss. 185. A Constitution is to be construed in the sense it is supposed it was understood when adopted (Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kans. 479), and as to legislative construction of a Constitution, see Ex parte Selma & Gulf R. R. 45 Ala. 696.

Legislative Construction by Declaratory Acts, etc.—A rule of construction laid down by the Legislature is not necessarily invalid,-e. g., a provision that the statutes which may at any time be in force in the State relative to the Circuit Courts shall relate also to the County Courts of a certain county (Prentiss v. Danaher, 20 Wisc. 311); but in fact this provision was in no true sense a "construction" of any statute by the Legislature. It was a direct enactment in reference to the County Courts of the specified county, conferring or limiting jurisdiction, or regulating procedure, or whatever else might be the subject-matter. See, also, State v. Oskins, 28 Ind. 364; Morgan v. Smith, 4 Minn. 104. Where a statute declared that the charter of a city should be construed so as to give it full control over all ferries within its limits, this, although of no force as a construction of the charter, operated it seems as a grant of the power, if that was not already possessed under the charter. Aiken v. Western R. R. 20 N. Y. 370. That the opinion of a Legislature subsequent to that which enacted the statute, as to its construction, should have no more weight than that of private persons. See Bingham v. Supervisors, &c., 8 Minn. 441. This was a case where the Legislature had repealed so much of a certain statute as authorized the payment of a certain fee of seventy-five cents, and it was attempted to make this a Legislative declaration that the act repealed did authorize such fee. It seems, also, that an amendatory statute giving a right of appeal in certain cases, does not show that the right did not exist under the original statute. Tilford v. Ramsey, 43 Mo. 410. Where a statute in the emergency clause gives as a reason for the emergency that there is no law punishing the offence which it is to cover, this is equivalent to a declaration that the statute shall be prospective only in its operation. Smith v. State, 28 Ind. 321. That legislative construction should have weight, but should not be conclusive, see Pike v. Megoun, 44 Mo, 491.

Stare Decisis. For instances of the application of the rule, see Field v. Goldsby, 28 Ala. 218; Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal. 401. But if satisfied that the decision was erroneous, the courts will not follow the rule. Bane v. Wick, 6 Ohio N. S. 13. In the same case, and between the same parties, the rule is imperative, even in a second appeal. Matthews v. Sands, 29 Ala. 136; Miller v. Jones, Ib. 174; Clary v. Hoag

land, 6 Cal. 685. And where rules laid down may be fairly presumed to have been acted upon as rules of property, they should be sustained, though not upon points necessarily involved in the case. Matheson v. Hearin, 29 Ala. 210. That the rule will be adhered to in matter relating to property, unless it appears that the mischief resulting from such adherence will be greater than that resulting from a change. See Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246; Day v. Munson, 14 Ohio, N. S. 488. A construction of a clause in a State Constitution as to the method of amending statutes, is not a rule of property. Greencastle v. State, 28 Ind. 382.

Presumptions.-The fact that a rule of law or of equity is embodied in the Revised Statutes, does not raise a presumption that such was not the law before. Nunally v. White, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 584. It will not be presumed that a State intended to abridge its governmental powers (Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black. 510),—e. g., to surrender its power to tax. St. Louis v. Boatmen's Ins. Co. 47 Mo. 150. It is not to be presumed that a word is used in one tariff act in a different sense from that in which it was employed in a former act for which the present one was substituted. Roosevelt v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch. C. C. 391. It is not to be presumed that a State intended to waive or discharge a public right, e. g., to discharge the sureties on a sheriff's bond. Bennett v. McWhorter, 2 W. Va. 441. Nor that a statute intends what is unreasonable. Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 525. Nor will exemption from taxation be presumed. Minot v. Phil. W. & B. R. R. 2 Abb. (U. S.) 323. It will be presumed that the Legislature intended to require notice of proceedings to take private property under the power of eminent domain. Boonville v. Ormrod, 26 Mo. 193; Wickham v. Page, 49 Mo. 526.

Implication. When a statute commands an act to be done, it authorizes all that is necessary for its performance, e. g., when the Legislature increases the salary of an officer whom a municipality is bound to pay, it authorizes such municipality to raise the money. Green v. New York, 2 Hilton, 203. Where the Constitution provided that charters should not be granted except where in the judgment of the Legislature general laws are insufficient to meet the case, such judgment is implied in the passage of a charter without any recital upon the subject, the court relying somewhat upon the fact that many such charters had been granted without question, and that important rights had thus accrued. Johnson v. Joliet, &c. R. R. 23 Ill. 202. It is plain, however, that this construction makes the constitutional clause a dead letter. See, also, State v. Doneley, 8 Clarke (Ia.) 396, where, the Constitution providing that if the "Legislature shall deem any law of immediate importance," they may provide that the same shall take effect upon publication in newspapers, it was held that the direction that the statute was thus to take effect was a sufficient indication of the Legislative judgment as to its "immediate importance," and was a compliance with the Constitution. These cases are not entirely analogous, for in the latter one, the constitutional provision being affirmative in form, may fairly be treated as directory; while in the former the provision is negative in form and, according to all canons of interpretation, is not directory.

Where a statute prohibited all sales of liquor, not excepting sales for medicinal or sacramental purposes, such exception was made by implication in Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind. 449. And as a general rule, all cases to which a statute cannot constitutionally apply, will be excepted by necessary implication from even the most express and absolute general provisions. Opinion of Justices, 41 N. H. 553.

Where a statute assumes jurisdiction to exist, and makes explicit provision for the mode of its exercise, this is sufficient to create the jurisdiction. State v. Miller, 23 Wisc. 634. A statute is not unconstitutional because it is summary in its grant

of power, and fails to prescribe the form of proceeding to effect the desired object, since all reasonable and necessary incidents are impliedly granted with the power. People v. Eddy, 57 Barb. 593. Where the general policy of the laws in pari materia was to fix a maximum for the compensation of registers of the land office, and an act was passed giving in one section the right to charge certain fees for certain services, and giving in the next section the right to compensation for similar past services, at the same rate, to register now in or out of office, and the last section contained a proviso limiting the compensation to the maximum allowed by law, it seems a similar proviso should be implied in the first section. U. S. v. Babbit, 1 Black, 55.

Revision. A change of phraseology in a revision will not be regarded as altering the law where it had been well settled by plain language in the statutes, or by judicial construction thereof, unless it is clear that such was the intent. Hughes v. Farrar, 45 Me. 72; Burnham v. Stevens, 33 N. H. 247; Overfield v. Sutton, 1 Metc. (Ky.) 621; McNamara v. Minnesota R. R. 12 Minn. 388; Conger v. Barker, 11 Ohio N. S. 1. But where language is changed in a special enactment not part of a revision, it indicates a change of intent, and calls for a change of construction. Rich v. Keyser, 54 Penn. St. 86. Where a criminal code repealed all statutes upon the same "subject-matter,” it did not repeal statutes against certain crimes not provided for therein. State v. Fuller, 14 La. Ann. 678. The sections of a former statute, or chapter of a statute, being separated and scattered by a revision, are still to have the same construction as before. Smith v. Smith, 19 Wisc. 522. The General Statutes of Missouri, which were adopted in 1865, enact that their provisions, so far as they are the same as those of existing laws, shall be construed as a continuing in force of such laws, and not as new enactments; it was held that a section thereof curing certain defects in conveyances "heretofore" made, and identical with a provision of a statute passed in 1855, did not operate upon conveyances made subsequent to 1855. Bishop v. Schneider, 46 Mo. 472.

Reference Statutes.-If one statute refers to another for the powers given by the former, the statute referred to is to be considered as incorporated in the one making the reference. Turney v. Wilton, 36 Ill. 385. Thus, where certain proceedings of a water-works company were to be conducted according to an act of 1853, relating to railroad companies, and the act of 1853 was afterwards repealed and another act was substituted in its place, it was held that the act of 1853 remained in force so far as incorporated by reference into the water company's act. Spring, &c. Works v. San Francisco, 22 Cal. 434; Sika v. Chicago, &c. R. R. 21 Wisc. 370. A statute regulating procedure, and referred to as the rule for another case, is to govern as subsequently modified from time to time. Kugler's Appeal, 55 Penn. St. 123. Where an action given by a statute is by a subsequent statute extended to another case, everything annexed to the action by the first statute is included, and applies to that other case. Baltimore, &c. R. R. v. Wilson, 2 W. Va. 528. A statute authorizing the issue of certificates to assignees of certain claims, repeals a prohibition of the assignment of such claims. Perry v. Glass, 25 Tex. 368. As to when recitals of a settlement as though it were a valid settlement in a statute will validate it, see Howard v. Earl of Shrewsbury, Law R. 2 Ch. 759.

That a statute granting powers and referring to another statute for their definition only gives the general powers, and not the particular powers conferred by the statute referred to, see Ex parte Greene, 29 Ala. 52; Matthews v. Sands, Ib. 136. A statute requiring proceedings in replevin before justices to be the same as in the Circuit Court, a subsequent statute altering the proceedings in the Circuit Court was held to affect in the same manner those before justices. McKnight v. Crinnion, 22 Mo. 559.

Where the provisions of an act are adopted by general reference, they will be more liberally construed than if originally passed with reference to that particular subject, and only that portion applicable and appropriate is adopted. Jones v. Dexter, 8 Flor. 276. Thus, when the "law of descents " was by general reference adopted to govern the distribution of personal property, certain provisoes in the statute regulating descents, considered inapplicable to personal property, were held not to have been adopted. Ibid. Reference to a particular map in a statute makes it part of the statute. People v. Dana, 22 Cal. 11. As to whether reference to a contract as an existing contract in a subsequent statute validates it so far as it may be of questionable validity, on grounds of public policy, see Galloway v. London, Law R. 1 H. L. 39.

Similar Statutes.-Statutes having similar objects are to be construed alike. Thus the same principles applied in the construction of bankrupt laws are to govern in the case of a statute to prevent frauds by incorporated companies having a similar object in view, namely, an equal distribution of assets among creditors. Receivers of People's Bank v. Paterson Savings Bank, 2 Stockt. 13.

The following extracts, vide supra, p. 191, notes, are from that part of Vattel's work which relates to the Interpretation of Treaties, Liv. II, ch. 17, SS 262 to 310:

It is necessary to establish rules founded on reason, authorized by the law of nature, capable of diffusing light over what is obscure, of determining what is uncertain, and of frustrating the views of him who acts with duplicity in forming the compact. Let us begin with those that tend particularly to this last end-with those maxims of justice and equity which are calculated to repress fraud, and to prevent the effects of its artifices.

The first general maxim of interpretation is, that it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. When a deed is worded in clear and precise terms, when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd conclusion, there can be no reason for refusing to admit the meaning which such deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjunctures, in order to restrict or extend it, is but an attempt to elude it.

Those cavillers who dispute the sense of a clear and determinate article, are accustomed to seek their frivolous subterfuges in the pretended intentions and views which they attribute to its author. It would be very often dangerous to enter with them into the discussion of those supposed views, that are not pointed out in the piece itself. The following rule is better calculated to foil such cavillers, and will at once cut short all chicanery. If he who could and ought to have explained himself clearly and fully has not done it, it is the worse for him; he cannot be allowed to introduce subsequent restrictions which he has not expressed. This is a maxim of the Roman law: Pactionem obscuram iis nocere in quorum fuit potestate legem apertius conscribere. The equity of this rule is glaringly obvious, and its necessity is not less evident.

The third general maxim or principle on the subject of interpretation, is That neither the one nor the other of the parties interested in the contract has a right to interpret the deed or treaty according to his own fancy. For if you are at liberty to affix whatever meaning you please to my promise, you will have the power of obliging me to do whatever you choose, contrary to my intentions, and beyond my real engagements; and, on the other hand, if I am allowed to explain my promises as I please, I may render them vain and illusory, by giving them a meaning quite different from that which they presented to you,