and in which you must have understood them at the time of your accepting them.

On every occasion when a person could and ought to have made known his intention, we assume for true against him what he has sufficiently declared. This is an incontestible principle, applied to treaties; for if they are not a vain play of words, the contracting parties ought to express themselves in them with truth, and according to their real intentions.

In the interpretation of a treaty, or of any other deed whatsoever, the question is, to discover what the contracting parties have agreed upon-to determine precisely, on any particular occasion, what has been promised and accepted that is to say, not only what one of the parties intended to promise, but also what the other must reasonably and candidly have supposed to be promised to him, what has been sufficiently declared to him, and what must have influenced him in his acceptance. Every deed, therefore, and every treaty, must be interpreted by certain fixed rules calculated to determine its meaning, as naturally understood by the parties concerned at the time when the deed was drawn up and accepted. This is a fifth principle.

Let us now enter into the particular rules on which the interpretation ought to be formed, in order to be just and fair. Since the sole object of the lawful interpretation of the deed ought to be the discovery of the thoughts of the author or authors of that deed, whenever we meet with any obscurity in it, we are to consider what probably were the ideas of those who drew up the deed, and to interpret it accordingly. This is the general rule for all interpretations. It particularly serves to ascertain the meaning of particular expressions whose signification is not sufficiently determinate.

Let us suppose that a husband has bequeathed to his wife all his money. It is required to know whether this expression means only his ready money, or whether it extends also to that which is lent out, and is due on notes and other securities. If the wife is poor, if she was beloved by her husband, if the amount of the ready money be inconsiderable, and the value of the other property greatly superior to that of the money both in specie and in paper,there is every reason to presume that the husband meant to bequeath her as well the money due to him, as that actually contained in his coffers. On the other hand, if the woman be rich, if the amount of the ready specie be very considerable, and the money due greatly exceeds in value all the other property,— the probability is that the husband meant to bequeath to his wife the ready money only.

The contracting parties are obliged to express themselves in such manner that they mutually understand each other. This is evident from the very nature of the transaction. Those who form the contract concur in the same intentions; they agree in desiring the same thing; and how shall they agree in this instance, if they do not perfectly understand each other? Without this, their contract will be no more than a mockery or a snare. If, then, they ought to speak in such a manner as to be understood, it is necessary that they should employ the words in their proper signification-the signification which common usage has affixed to them-and that they annex an established meaning to every term, every expression, they make use of.

From all these incontestable truths, results this rule: In the interpretation of treaties, compacts, and promises, we ought not to deviate from the common use of the language, unless we have very strong reasons for it.

In all human affairs, where absolute certainty is not at hand to point out the way, we must take probability for our guide. In most cases, it is extremely probable that the parties have expressed themselves conformably to the established usage; and such probability ever affords a stronger presumption, which cannot be overruled but by a still stronger presumption to the contrary.

Mahomed, Emperor of the Turks, at the taking of Negropont, having promised a man to spare his head, caused him to be cut in two through the middle of the body. Tamerlane, after having engaged the city of Sebastia, under promise of shedding no blood, caused all the soldiers of the garrison to be buried alive: gross subterfuges which, as Cicero remarks, only serve to aggravate the guilt of the perfidious wretch who has recourse to them. To spare the head of any one, and to shed no blood, are expressions according to common custom, and, especially on such an occasion, manifestly imply to spare the lives of the parties. All these pitiful subtilties are overthrown by this unerring rule: When we evidently see what is the sense that agrees with the intention of the contracting parties, it is not allowable to wrest their words to a contrary meaning. The intention, sufficiently known, furnishes the true matter of the convention, what is promised and accepted, demanded and granted.

Is it necessary, in an enlightened age, to say that mental reservation cannot be admitted in treaties? This is manifest, since, by the very nature of the treaty, the parties are bound to express themselves in such manner that they may mutually understand each other. There is scarcely an individual now to be found who would not be ashamed of building upon a mental reservation. What can be the use of such an artifice, unless to lull the opposite party into a false security, under the vain appearance of a contract? It is, then, a real piece of knavery.

Technical terms, or terms peculiar to the arts and sciences, ought commonly to be interpreted according to the definition given of them by masters of the art, or persons versed in the knowledge of the art or science to which they belong. I say commonly, for this rule is not so absolute but that we may and even ought to deviate from it, when we have good reasons for such deviation; as, for instance, if it were proved that he who speaks in a treaty, or in any other deed, did not understand the art or science from which he borrowed the term, that he was unacquainted with its import as a technical word, that he employed it in a vulgar acceptation, etc.

If, however, the technical or other terms relate to things that admit of different degrees, we ought not scrupulously to adhere to definitions, but rather to take the terms in a sense agreeable to the context; for a regular definition describes a thing in its most perfect state,—and yet it is certain that we do not always mean it in that state of its utmost perfection whenever we speak of it.

Now, the interpretation should only tend to the discovery of the will of the contracting parties to each term. Would he who had stipulated for the assistance of ten thousand good troops have any reason to insist upon soldiers of whom the very worst should be comparable to the veterans of Julius Cæsar? And if a prince had promised his ally a good general, must he send him none but a Marlborough or a Turenne?

There are figurative expressions that are become so familiar in the common use of language, that in numberless instances they supply the place of proper terms; so that we ought to take them in a figurative sense, without paying any attention to their original, proper, and direct signification: the subject of the discourse sufficiently indicates the meaning that should be affixed to them. To hatch a plot, to carry fire and sword into a country, are expressions of this sort; and there can scarcely occur an instance where it would not be absurd to take them in their direct and literal sense.

There is not, perhaps, any language that does not also contain words which signify two or more different things, and phrases which are susceptible of more than one sense. Thence arises ambiguity in discourse. The contracting parties ought carefully to avoid it. Designedly to use it, with a view to elude their engagements in the sequel, is downright perfidy; since the faith of treaties obliges the contracting parties to express their intentions clearly. But if an

ambiguous expression has found its way into a deed, it is the part of the interpreter to clear up any doubt thereby occasioned.

The following is the rule that ought to direct the interpretation in this as well as in the preceding case: We ought always to affix such meaning to the expressions as is most suitable to the subject or matter in question. For by a true interpretation we endeavor to discover the thoughts of the persons speaking, or of the contracting parties in a treaty. Now, it ought to be presumed that he who has employed a word which is susceptible of many different significations, has taken it in that which agrees with his subject.

Let us illustrate this rule by examples. The word day is understood of the natural day, or the time during which the sun affords us his light, and of the civil day, or the space of twenty-four hours. Where it is used, in a convention, to point out a space of time, the subject itself manifestly shows that the parties mean the civil day, or the term of twenty-four hours. It was therefore a pitiful subterfuge, or rather notorious perfidy, in Cleomenes, when, having concluded a truce of some days with the people of Argos, and finding them asleep on the third night in reliance on the faith of the treaty, he killed a part of their number and made the rest prisoners, alleging that the nights were not comprehended in the truce. The word steel may be understood of the metal itself, or of certain instruments made of it; in a convention which stipulates that the enemy shall lay down their steel, it evidently means their weapons; wherefore, Pericles, in the example related above, gave a fraudulent interpretation to those words, since it was contrary to the nature of the subject manifestly pointed

out.

If any of those expressions which are susceptible of different signification. occur more than once in the same piece, we cannot make it a rule to take it everywhere in the same signification. For we must, conformably to the preceding rule, take such expression in each article according as the subject requires -pro substrata materia, as the masters of the art say. The word day, for instance, has two significations, as we have just observed. If, therefore, it be said in a convention, that there shall be a truce of fifty days, on condition that commissioners from both parties shall, during eight successive days, jointly endeavor to adjust the dispute,--the fifty days of the truce are civil days of twenty-four hours; but it would be absurd to understand them in the same sense in the second article, and to pretend that the commissioners should labor eight days and nights without intermission.

Every interpretation that leads to an absurdity ought to be rejected; or, in other words, we should not give to any piece a meaning from which any absurd consequences would follow, but must interpret it in such a manner as to avoid absurdity.

Those fanatic Jews who scrupled to defend themselves when the enemy attacked them on the Sabbath day, gave an absurd interpretation to the fourth commandment. Why did not they abstain from dressing, walking, and eating? These also are "works," if the term be strained to its utmost rigor.

It is said that a man in England married three wives, in order that he might not be subject to the penalty of the law which forbids marrying two.

It is not to be presumed that sensible persons in treating together, or transacting any other serious business, meant that the result of their proceedings should prove a mere nullity. The interpretation, therefore, which would render a treaty null and inefficient cannot be admitted. We may consider this rule as a branch of the preceding; for it is a kind of absurdity to suppose that the very terms of a deed should reduce it to mean nothing. It ought to be interpreted in such a manner as that it may have its effect, and not prove vain and nugatory. And in this interpretation we proceed.

Thucydides relates that the Athenians, after having promised to retire from

the territories of the Boeotians, claimed a right to remain in the country under pretense that the lands actually occupied by their army did not belong to the Boeotians; a ridiculous quibble, since, by giving that sense to the treaty, they reduced it to nothing, or rather to a puerile play upon words.

If he who has expressed himself in an obscure or equivocal manner has spoken elsewhere more clearly on the same subject, he is the best interpreter of his own words. We ought to interpret his obscure or equivocal expression in such a manner that may agree with those clear and unequivocal terms which he has elsewhere used, either in the same deed or on some other similar occasion.

Let us suppose, for instance, that two allies have reciprocally promised each other, in case of necessity, the assistance of ten thousand foot soldiers, who are to be supported at the expense of the party that sends them, and that by a posterior treaty they agree that the number of auxiliary troops shall be fifteen thousand, without mentioning their support; the obscurity which remains in this article of the new treaty is dissipated by the clear and express stipulation contained in the former one.

As the allies do not give any indication that they have changed their minds with respect to the support of the auxiliary troops, we are not to presume any such change; and those fifteen thousand men are to be supported as the ten thousand promised in the first treaty.

It frequently happens that, with a view to conciseness, people express imperfectly, and with some degree of obscurity, things which they suppose to be sufficiently elucidated by the preceding matter, or which they intend to explain in the sequel; and, moreover, words and expressions have a different force, sometimes even a quite different signification, according to the occasion, their connection, and their relation to the words. The connection and train of the discourse is therefore another source of interpretation. We must consider the whole discourse together, not so much the signification which it may individually admit of, as that which it ought to have from the context and spirit of the disSuch is the maxim of the Roman law, Incivile est, nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqui particula ejus proposita judicare, vel respondere.

course.

The very connection and relation of things in question helps also to discover and establish the true sense of a treaty, or of any other piece. The interpretation ought to be made in such a manner that all the parts may appear consonant to each other-that what follows may agree with what preceded, unless it evidently appear that, by the subsequent clauses, the parties intended to make some alteration in the preceding ones. For it is to be presumed that the authors of a deed had an uniform and steady train of thinking; that they did not aim at inconsistencies and contradictions, but rather that they intended to explain one thing by another-and, in a word, that one and the same spirit reigns throughout the same production or the same treaty. Let us render this more plain by an example.

A treaty of alliance declares, that in case one of the allies be attacked, each of the others shall assist him with a body of ten thousand foot, and supported; and in another article it is said that the ally who is attacked shall be at liberty to demand the promised assistance in cavalry rather than in infantry. Here we see that, in the first article, the allies have determined the quantum of the succor, and its value, that of ten thousand foot; and in the latter article, without appearing to intend any variation in the value or number, they leave the nature of the succors to the choice of the party who may stand in need of them. If, therefore, the ally who is attacked calls upon the others for cavalry, they will give him, according to the established proportion, an equivalent to ten thousand foot. But it appears that the intention of the latter article was, that the promised succors should in certain cases be augmented-if, for instance, it be said, that in case one of the allies happens to be attacked by an enemy of considerably

superior strength, and more powerful in cavalry, succors should be furnished in cavalry and not in infantry. It appears that, in this case, the promised assistance ought to be ten thousand horse.

The reason of the law or of the treaty-that is to say, of the motive which led to the making of it, and the object in contemplation at the time-is the most certain clue to lead us to the discovery of its true meaning; and great attention should be paid to the circumstance, whenever there is question either of explaining an obscure, ambiguous, indeterminate passage in a law or treaty, or of applying it to a particular case. When once we certainly know the reason which alone has determined the will of the person speaking, we ought to interpret and apply his words in a manner suitable to that reason alone.

But we ought to be very certain that we know the true and only reason of the law, the promise, or the treaty. In matters of this nature it is not allowable to indulge in vague and uncertain conjectures, and to suppose reasons and views where there are none certainly known. If the piece in question is in itself obscure-if, in order to discover its meaning, we have no other resource than the investigation of the author's views or the motives of the deed-we may then have recourse to conjecture; and, in default of absolute certainty, adopt, as the true meaning, that which has the greatest degree of probability on its side. But it is dangerous abuse to go, without necessity, in search of motives and uncertain views, in order to wrest, restrict, or extend the meaning of a deed which is of itself sufficiently clear, and carries no absurdity on the face of it. Such a procedure is a violation of that incontestible maxim, that it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. Much less are we allowed-when the author of a piece has in the piece itself declared his reasons and motives-to attribute to him some secret reason which may authorize us in giving an interpretation repugnant to the natural meaning of the expressions. Even though he should have entertained the views which we attribute to him, yet if he has concealed them and announced different ones, it is upon the latter alone that we must build our interpretation, and not upon those which the author has not expressed: we assume as true against him what he has suffi ciently declared.

We ought to be the more circumspect in this kind of interpretation, as it frequently happens that several motives concur to determine the will of the party who speaks in a law or in a promise. Perhaps the combined influence of those motives was necessary, in order to determine his will; perhaps each one of them, taken individually, would have been sufficient to produce that effect. In the former case, if we are perfectly certain that it was only in consideration of several concurrent reasons and motives that the Legislature or the contracting parties consented to the law or the contract, the interpretation and application ought to be made in a manner agreeable to all those concurrent reasons, and none of them must be overlooked. But in the latter case, when it is evident that each of the reasons which have concurred in determining the will was sufficient to produce that effect, so that the author of the piece in question would, by each of the reasons separately considered, have been induced to form the same determination which he has formed upon all the reasons taken in the aggregate, his words must be so interpreted and applied as to make them accord with each of those reasons taken individually. Suppose a prince has promised certain advantages to all foreign Protestants and artisans who will come and settle in his estates; if that prince is in no want of subjects, but of artisans only,--and if, on the other hand, it appears that he does not choose to have any other subjects than Protestants-his promise must be so interpreted as to relate only to such foreigners as unite those two characters of Protestants and artisans. But if it is evident that this prince wants to people his country, and that, although he would prefer Protestant subjects to others, he has in par