SEC. 22. In laws which confer power, the greater authority implies the less. Thus, those who have the right to give their property, have, with still greater reason, the right to sell it.

SEC. 23. In laws which prohibit acts, the lesser prohibition implies the greater. Thus, spendthrifts who are forbidden to manage or control their property, a fortiori cannot alienate or transfer it.

SEC. 24. The implications spoken of in the two last sections are to be restricted to subjects of the same nature as those to which the law applies, or to which it ought to apply, according to the preceding rules. Thus, the liberty that a minor adult enjoys to make a donatio causa mortis should not be extended so as to sustain a gift inter vivos.

SEC. 25. If a law grants an amnesty, or pardon for past offences, it is to be understood as prohibiting similar acts for the future. Cum lex in preteritum quid indulget, in futurum vetat.-L. 22, Ff. de Legibus.

SEC. 26. If a right be vested in a person by reason of a law, it is of no consequence whether the person só vested be cognizant or ignorant of the law, or whether he know or be ignorant of the fact on which the vesting of the right depends. Thus, the son is heir to his father, though he be both ignorant of the law of succession and of his father's death.

SEC. 27. Persons competent in law to act may waive any benefit or priv ilege created by law in their favor. Thus, one of full years may renounce an inheritance devolved on him by law. But this liberty of renunciation or waiver does not extend to the rights of third persons, nor to those cases in which the waiver would be contrary to equity, or to good morals, or to any other law.

SEC. 28. The rules of law cannot be modified by any private contract or agreement. Jus publicum privatorum pactis mutari non potest.

Professor LIEBER, in his work on Legal and Political Hermeneutics, gives the following rules for interpretation and construction. I have, supra, p. 191, referred to the distinctions drawn by him between these two operations of the mind, and the classifications which he adopts.

1. A sentence, or form of words, can have but one true meaning.

2. There can be no sound interpretation without good faith and common

sense.

3. Words are, therefore, to be taken as the utterer probably meant them to be taken. In doubtful cases, therefore, we take the customary signification, rather than the grammatical or classical; the technical, rather than the etymological-verba artis ex arte-tropes as tropes. In general, the words are taken in that meaning which agrees most with the character of both the text and the

utterer.

4. The particular and inferior cannot defeat the general and superior. 5. The exception is founded upon the superior.

6. That which is probable, fair, and customary, is preferable to the improb able, unfair, and unusual.

7. We follow special rules, given by proper authority.

8. We endeavor to derive assistance from that which is more near, before proceeding to that which is less so.

9. Interpretation is not the object, but a means; hence superior considerations may exist.-Lieber's Hermeneutics, p. 120.

XVII. Recapitulating the general principles of construction, we find the following to be most essential points:

1. All principles of interpretation, if at all applicable to construction, are valid for the latter.

2. The main guide for construction is analogy, or rather reasoning by parallelism.

3. The aim and object of an instrument, law, &c., are essential, if distinctly known, in construing them.

4. So also may be the causes of a law.

5. No text imposing obligations is understood to demand impossible things. 6. Privileges or favors are to be construed so as to be least injurious to the non-privileged, or unfavored.

7. The more the text partakes of the nature of a compact, or solemn agreement, the closer ought to be its construction.

8. A text imposing a performance, expresses a minimum, if the performance is a sacrifice to the performer;-the maximum, if it involves a sacrifice or sufferance on the side of the other party.

9. The construction ought to harmonize with the substance and general spirit of the text.

10. The effects which would result from one or the other construction, may guide us in deciding which construction we ought to adopt.

11. The older a law, or any text containing regulations of our actions, though given long ago, the more extensive the construction must be in certain

cases.

12. Yet nothing contributes more to the substantial protection of individual liberty, than a habitually close interpretation and construction.

13. It is important to ascertain whether words were used in a definite, absolute, and circumscribed meaning, or in a generic, relative, or expansive char

acter.

14. Let the weak have the benefit of a doubt, without defeating the general object of a law. Let mercy prevail, if there be real doubt.

15. A consideration of the entire text, or discourse, is necessary in order to construe fairly and faithfully.

16. Above all, be faithful in construction. Construction is the building up with given elements, not the forcing of extraneous matter into a text.-Lieber's Hermeneutics, p. 144.

The author subsequently gives (pp. 167-172) the following as the most general rules and principles applicable to all interpretation:

1. The true meaning of words can be but one.

2. Honest, faithful, bona fide interpretation is all-important; common sense must guide us.

3. Words are to be taken according to their customary, not in their original or classical signification.

4. The signification of a word, ort he meaning of a sentence, when dubious, is to be gathered from the context, or discovered by analogy, or fair induction. Yet the same word does not always mean the same in the same discourse or text. This would, in fact, militate with the important rule, that we are to take words in their natural sense, according to custom and their connection.

5. Words are always understood as having regard to the subject-matter. 6. The causes which led to the enactment of a law are guides to us. If one interpretation would lead to absurdity, the other not, we must adopt the latter. So, that interpretation which leads to the more complete effect which the Legislature had in view, is preferable to another.

For the above rules, see Blackstone and Puffendorf. As to rule 6, see Dig. L. 50, tit. 17, 67.

7. Two chief objects of all government are peace and security; the State

can never be understood to will anything immoral, so long as there is any doubt. Laws, therefore, cannot be construed as meaning anything against the one or the other. Security and morality are the supreme law of every land, whether this be expressly acknowledged or not.

8. The general and superior prevails over the specific and inferior; no law, therefore, can be construed contrary to the fundamental law. If it admits of another construction, this must be adopted.

9. A law contrary to the fundamental or primary law, may at any time be declared so, though it has already been acted upon; for that which was wrong in the beginning cannot become valid in the course of time. Dig. L. 50, Tit. 17, 24.

10. If, therefore, the law admits of two interpretations, that is to be adopted which is agreeable to the fundamental or primary law, though the other may have been adopted previously.

11. Custom of the country, where the law was made, supplies the deficiency of words.

12. In dubious cases, the fairer interpretation is to be adopted. Everywhere, especially in law, equity is to be considered."-Dig. L. 50, Tit. 17, 90, 192, 200.

13. That which is probable, or customary, is preferable to that which is less so, wherever obscurity exists.

14. If two laws conflict with each other, that must yield the effect of which is less important; or, that is to be adopted by the-adoption of which we approach nearest to the probable or general intention of the legislator. Specific rules, adopted for the protection of private individuals, must be followed.

15. The more general the character of the law is, the more we ought to try strictly to adhere to the precise expression. Without it, it would be a wavering instead of a stable rule, and we must presume that the words have been the better weighed. Many considerations, however, may exist, which would oblige us to follow a different course; e. g., the cruelty of a law, its antiquity, and consequent unfitness.

16. If any doubt exists in penal laws or rules, they ought to be construed in favor of the accused; of course, without injury to any one else.

17. In cases of doubt between the authority and an individual, the benefit of the doubt, all other reasons being equal, ought to be given to the individual, not to the authority,-for the State makes the laws, and the authority has the power; yet it is subversive of all good government, peace, and civil morality, if subtlety is allowed to defeat the wise object of the law, or if a morbid partiality for an evil-doer guides the interpreter.

18. The weak (hence the individual arraigned by the State) ought to have the benefit of doubt; doubt ought to be construed in mercy, not in severity. A law may be rendered milder, but not more severe.—Lieber's Hermeneutics, p. 172.

Copious extracts from the writers on the civil law in regard to the subject of this note, will be found in the 12th chapter of Mr. Smith's work on Statutes.

Mr. ROBERT PHILLIMORE, in his very able and useful work upon International Law, devotes a chapter (part v, chapter viii) to the subject of the Interpretation of Treaties. He arranges the principles and rules appertaining. to this subject under three heads.

self.

Authentic Interpretation; or, the exposition supplied by the lawgiver him

Usual; or, that founded on usage and precedent.

Doctrinal; or, that founded on a scientific exposition of the terms of the instrument--this being subdivided into, 1. Grammatical, and 2. Logical Exposi

tion.

The learned and sagacious SAVIGNY, in his recent work on Contracts, remarks that, with respect to agreements, the principles of interpretation to be found in the Civil Law-which are substantially those of Vattel and Domatare of a very general and superficial character, and scarcely afford any aid, beyond that which an intelligent and dispassionate consideration of each particular case would furnish. His words are as follows:

"Für die Auslegung nun in Anwendung, auf die meisten Fälle dieser letzten lassen sich durchgreifende Grundsätze der Auslegung nicht wohl aufstellen. Auch sind die meisten Aesserungen der Römischen Juristen herüber von einem sehr allgemeinen Character, und ziemlich auf der Oberfläche liegend, so dasz sie in zweifelhaften Fällen nicht leicht weiter führen werden, als wohin die besonnene Erwägung des einzelnen Fälles ohnehin führen musste. Folgende Aussprüche werden diese Behauptung anschaulich machen, und zur Ueberzeugung bringen."-Das Obligationen Recht, ii, 189.

I refer to this with satisfaction, as it goes to confirm what has been said in the text as to the practical utility of these minute and precise Codes of Interpretation.

See also Mr. Justice STORY's criticisms on Vattel's Rules of Interpretation. -Story on the Cons., vol. i, p. 291.

CHAPTER VII.

OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION, AND OF LIBERAL OR EQUITABLE

CONSTRUCTION.

The Line Separating Judicial Construction from Judicial Legislation.-Strict Construction, and Liberal or Equitable Construction.-Statutes when Strictly Construed. Statutes Conflicting with a Constitution or Fundamental Law.-Statutes Prescribing Forms of Procedure, Modes of Proof and of Practice.-Statutes of Frauds. Statutes of Wills.-Statutes of Limitations.-Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law.-Penal Statutes.-Revenue Laws.-Usury Laws.-Statutes Granting Franchises and Corporate Powers.-Statutes Granting Exemptions from General Burthens.-Statutes Authorizing Summary Judicial Proceedings.-Statutes Authorizing Summary Administrative Proceedings.--Statutes of Explanation. -The Stamp Acts.-Statutes Giving Costs.-Statutes when to be Liberally or Equitably Construed.—Remedial Statutes.-Equity of a Statute.-When Statutes Treated as Directory merely.-General Rules.

I HAVE in the preceding chapter, endeavored to state the general rules of construction with regard to the means to be employed, for the purpose of solving doubts in regard to the true intent of a given legislative act. We have now to consider a very different class of cases. There are, as have been already observed, many cases of ambiguity or irreconcilable. contradiction, where all aids fail, and the task of arriving at the intent of the legislator may be said to be hopeless. Still, the doubt is to be resolved, the case to be decided, the statute to be interpreted and applied; and the functions of the judge in these cases necessarily approach those of the legislator. There are again other cases of great apparent hardship, where the statute is on its face sufficiently intelligible, but where its provisions are sweeping and arbitrary, and where its literal operation and application involve really innocent parties in great suffering and, it may be, remediless disaster. Out of these cases has grown the idea already stated, that the judiciary have the right to make a distinction between different statutes, or classes of statutes; and that while some are to be strictly construed and