Retroactive Effect of Laws (a).-We have already spoken* of laws in this aspect; and we have stated the general rules to * Ante, p. 160, et seq. (a) Retrospective Laws.-The discussion in the text and in this note properly be. longs in the chapter upon state constitutional law, and falls under the general topic of "due process of law," or "law of the land." Laws in relation to civil matters which act retrospectively, unless they impair vested rights or the obligation of contracts, are constitutional and valid in the absence of any peculiar constitutional provisions forbidding them. The following are illustrations of such statutes which have been sustained: A law taxing capital employed in trade during a past year. Municipality v. Wheeler, 10 La. Ann. 745; New Orleans v. Cordeviolle, 13 La. Ann. 268; State v. Manhattan &c. Co. 4 Nev. 318; and see "Taxation." A law enlarging a remedy or giving a new one for an existing cause of action, though the Legislature cannot retrospectively create a cause of action. Coosa R. S. Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120; Stokes v. Rodman, 5 R. I. 405; and see supra, "Vested Rights." A statute changing joint tenancies into tenancies in common, was held in New Hampshire not to be a "retrospective law" in the sense of the Constitution of that State, which expressly forbids such laws. Stevenson v. Cofferin, 20 N. H. 150; but that such a statute is retrospective, see Boston &c. Co. v. Condit, 4 C. E. Green, 394; and see "Vested Rights." It was said in Ohio that retroactive laws are constitutional "where they violate no principle of natural justice." Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio, N. S. 225, 231. In.laying down this criterion, however, the Ohio court plainly overlooked the true matter of inquiry, and confounded two entirely different subjects. It is, in fact, entirely a question of power, whether a Legislature may pass a retroactive law, and not a question of expediency, or of morality, or of whether such laws are in themselves just. The doctrine quoted comes to this, when put into plain English: The Legislature may pass a retroactive law when such a law is right, but may not do so when such a law is wrong. This method of statement shows the utter absurdity of the supposed rule. It is this constant confusion of ideas, especially in matters relating to governmental powers, this constant confounding of "powers" with the method of exercising those powers, which has made the constitutional law such a mass of contradictions, and has obscured the plainest principles. Our State Legislatures cannot pass retroactive laws which violate certain principles of "natural justice," simply because they are expressly forbidden to do so in certain instances, such as when vested rights would be invaded, or the obligation of contracts impaired; but there is no general constitutional limitation or restriction which shuts up the Legislature to the passage of such statutes as are wise, just, equitable, moral, and upright. After an act has been construed by the courts, the Legislature cannot expound it differently so as to alter vested rights. Gordon v. Ingraham, 1 Grant's Cas. 152; West Br. B. Co. v. Dodge, 31 Penn. St. 285; People v. Supervisors &c. 16 N. Y. 424 ; and see note "what is law," supra. But a legislative curing of irregularities, though retrospective, is not unconstitutional, e. g., resolutions of a city council not properly approved by the mayor, may be validated. State v. Newark, 3 Dutch. 185. And the want of a stamp on a contract may be remedied, and the stamp act having been repealed, and all unstamped contracts declared valid by the Legislature, it is the duty of an appellate court to reverse the decision of an inferior court made before the repeal, excluding evidence of an unstamped contract. State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195. On the same principle a statute declaring that marriages shall not be impeached or be, that retrospective laws which conflict with a State Constitution,* which violate the provisions of the Constitution of the United States by impairing the inviolability of the obligation of contracts, or which tend to divest vested rights of property, are absolutely void, as not being within the scope of the legis lative power; and that the courts will always struggle to give laws a prospective construction or interpretation. But in cases which do not come within the foregoing exceptions, it is in the power of the Legislature to pass retroactive laws; and the judi ciary will not interfere with them. The question is of so much practical importance, that the following decisions ought not to. be overlooked. "It is not in the power of the Legislature," says the Supreme Court of Maryland, "to give a statute a retrospective operation, so as to divest vested rights acquired under a will." + Says the Supreme Court of Louisiana,-" However repugnant to logic and sound policy retrospective laws may be, retrospective laws in civil matters do not violate the Constitution unless *The Constitution of Tennessee, art. xi, Wilderman v. Mayor and City Council § 20, contains a positive declaration, "That of Baltimore, 8 Maryland, 551. no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made." questioned collaterally on the ground of insanity or idiocy, is valid in its application to past marriages. Goshen v. Richmond, 4 Allen, 458. And an act regulating legal proceedings, e. g., competency of witnesses, may operate retrospectively. Ralston v. Lothain, 18 Ind. 303. It was also held in Pennsylvania that a statute making uncontested probates final after five years from their dates, and allowing two years from its passage to contest past probates, was valid. Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Penn. St. 179. The Legislature cannot, however, make corporators retrospectively liable for corporate debts, for this would be to create a cause of action, and to invade vested rights of property. Coffin v. Rich, 45 Me. 507. When bridges had been built by railroads under the provisions of a statute requiring such building on order of town authorities, but imposing no liability for resulting damage, a subsequent statute imposing upon the railroads a liability for damages to abuttors from such bridges already built, was held void in New Hampshire as being in violation of the express provision of the State Constitution forbidding retrospective laws. Towle v. Eastern R. R. 18 N. H. 547. A statute affecting substantial rights will not be construed as retrospective unless the intent that it should act so is clear. Kelley v. Kilso, 5 Ohio, N. S. 198; and see "Retrospective Laws," under the head of "Construction of Statutes." The existing Constitutions of the following States expressly prohibit retrospective or retroactive legislation: Louisiana, art. vi, § 110; Missouri, art. i, § 28; New Hamp shire, pt. i, art. 23; Tennessee, art. i, § 20; Texas, art. i, § 14. . they tend to divest vested rights, or to impair the obligation of contracts.* In Pennsylvania, it has been held that no statute should be held to operate retrospectively, unless its language admits of no other construction; and so it was decided that the act of 26th of April, 1850, in regard to the lien of judgments on the estates of decedents, was not retrospective.† In Michigan, this language has been held: "In these United States, it is said that in a private case between individuals, the court will struggle hard against a construction which, by a retroactive operation, will affect the rights of parties; and statutes are generally to be construed to operate in future, unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended;" but the mere fact of a statute being clearly retrospective does not of itself make it unconstitutional. In Connecticut, an act authorizing a sale by the courts of equity of real estate, and of any rights corporeal or incorporeal existing or growing out of the same, which are held in joint. tenancy or coparcenary, whenever partition cannot be made in any other way, has been held "not to be retroactive within the legal import of that term, but to be purely a remedial law acting upon existing rights, and providing a remedy for existing evils;" and it was added, "if this were in fact a retroactive law it would not for such reason be an unconstitutional one." | · In Massachusetts, where a statute was passed giving towns a remedy against paupers for expenses incurred for their sup port, it was held that, as prior to the act no such suit could be maintained, the act must be construed to have a prospective operation only, on the ground that the Legislature could not have entertained the opinion that a citizen free from debt by the laws of the land, could be made a debtor merely by a legislative act declaring him one. The subject of the retroactive effect of statutes constantly Municipality No. 1 v. Wheeler, 10 La. Ann. R. 745, 746. And the court cites Marçadé, § 62: "Mais enfin, tant qu'une loi existe, si mauvaise, si peu logique qu'elle puisse être sous tel ou tel rapport, le pouvoir judiciaire ne peut pas ne point l'appliquer. Dura lex, sed est lex. En fait, done, le legis lateur peut porter une disposition rétroactive; * presents itself in connection with the subject of vested rights. and their immunity from legislative interference. We have already considered the difficulty of drawing a line between those vested rights that are absolutely sacred, and those held to be under the control of the Legislature. The subject is of vast importance in reference to the daily exercise of legislative power; but until some clear and settled rules are declared by authority, we can only hope to arrive at an approximation to correct principles by a careful examination of the adjudged cases. In Ohio, it has been held that a retrospective act passed in March, 1835, to render valid previous conveyances by married women, which were then void as not complying with a statute of 1820, is an unauthorized exercise of legislative power, and as such null-on the ground that the act divested married women of their property, without consent, without compensation, and not for crime.t A Pennsylvania act of Assembly, declaring the children of a particular bastard child "able and capable" to inherit and transmit the estate of the deceased mother of the bastard as fully as if the bastard had been born in wedlock, has been construed not to divest real estate which had previously passed by descent from the mother to her brother, so as to vest it in the children of the deceased bastard. Such a construction would be in hostility to the rule of the common law, that a bastard cannot inherit; if construed retrospectively, the act would divest vested rights, and be in direct hostility to the provision of the bill of rights of the State, which declares that no citizen shall be deprived of his property, unless by the law of the land.+ Prior to 1848, the courts of Pennsylvania had decided that a testator's mark to his name at the foot of a testamentary paper, but without proof that the name was written by his express direction, was not a valid signature under their statute of wills of 1833. To overrule this, an act was passed in 1848, directing, that every will theretofore made, or thereafter to be made, to which the testator had made his mark, except such as might * Ante, p. 152. 394. So as to defective releases of dower. The Lessee of Good v. Zercher, 12 Ohio, Russell v. Rumsey, 35 Ill. 362. have been finally adjudicated prior to the passage of the act, should be valid. A question arose as to the applicability of the act to a will executed in 1840; and the court held that the act of 1848, if retroactive, was an exercise of judicial power in settling a question of interpretation, and as such was void; and moreover, if construed retroactively, it was void on the further ground that it violated the constitutional provision giving to property the protection of the law of the land; they consequently held that the act was merely prospective in its operation.* The subject of the retroactive effect of statutes with reference to vested rights, has been examined in a very interesting case in Maryland. Suit was brought in 1846 on a single bill executed by the defendant in 1840. The defendant pleaded that the note was usurious and void, under an act of 1704. The plaintiff replied a statute passed on the 10th of March, 1846, declaring substantially that in any suit or action thereafter to be brought in any court of law or equity upon any contract, the plaintiff should be at liberty to recover the principal and legal interest. It was insisted on behalf of the defendant, that the act of 1846 should not be construed retrospectively; that if retrospective, it was unconstitutional, or beyond the sphere of legislative power, so far as operating on existing contracts, upon the ground that it divested the vested right of pleading usury as it existed before the act of 1846. But the act was held valid. The court admitted the rule to be that an act is to be construed as prospective in its operation in all cases susceptible of doubt; but held that this could have no application to a case where the Legislature had directed, in a language too express and plain to be mistaken, that they designed to give the statute a retroactive operation, -that in such a case there was no room for interpretation.† The objection as to the unconstitutionality of the law was also overruled, on the ground that it was obvious that no provision of the Constitution of the United States was violated; ‡ and as * Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Penn. 489. See C. J. Gibson's interesting opinion and cases cited. See also on this point Goshen v. Stonnington, 4 Conn. 220. Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Peters, 413; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Peters 110. |