principles, a mere democracy, or rule of the people, was established. Every power, deliberative and active, was invested in the freemen or their delegates; and the supreme executive magistrate of the empire, by an inattention which does little honor to the statesmen of those days, was wholly excluded.' He expresses his own doubts whether the king had a right to grant such charters.

"But, although in all the other provinces the charters were originally granted, or subsequently modified, so as to exclude the principle of representation from the executive department, these two provinces, at the time of our Revolution, retained it undiminished. The suggestion of the full, unqualified extension of the principle of representation may, therefore, be justly attributed to the example of Rhode Island and Connecticut, which, when converted into States, found it unnecessary to alter the nature of their governments, and continued the same forms in all respects, except the nominal recognition of the king's authority, till 1818, when Connecticut made some minor changes and adopted a formal Constitution. Rhode Island, however, is still satisfied with the charter of Charles II, from which it has been found sufficient to expunge the reservation of allegiance, the required conformity of its legislative acts to those of Great Britain, and the royal right to a certain portion of gold and silver ores, which, happily for that State, have never been found in it.—Rawle on the Constitution, p. 9.

"Connecticut," says the Federalist, Letter 38, "has always been considered as the most popular State in the Union."

Mr. Hoffman, in his Legal Outlines, defines the Constitution of a State to be "The fundamental regulations which determine the manner of executing the public authority, and which define the relation between the political body and its members." Lect. ix, p. 365.

Mr. Hoffman's work was, unhappily, left incomplete, the first volume only, relating to the elements of natural, political, and feudal jurisprudence, was published. The second and third volumes, intended to treat of the elements of municipal law, never appeared. The volume which we have is the production of an accomplished lawyer and scholar, full of the marks of extensive reading and accurate reflection. The seventh chapter, of law and its general properties, is particularly valuable.

CHAPTER XI.

LIMITATIONS IMPOSED UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Clauses of the Federal Constitution which operate as Checks on Legislative Action.— General Nature of the Legislative Power of the Union.-General Principles of Constitutional Construction or Interpretation.-Interpretation and Application of Particular Clauses. Habeas Corpus. - Bills of Attainder.-Ex post facto Laws.-Fugitives from Justice.-Fugitives from Labor.-Religious Freedom.— Freedom of Speech and of the Press.-Search Warrants and Seizures.-Only one Trial for Offences.-Due Process of Law.-Compensation for Private Property taken for Public Purposes.-Trial by Jury.-Excessive Bail and Cruel Punishments. The Obligation of Contracts.-Vested Rights.-Conclusion.

In my consideration of the Constitution of the United States, with reference to the subject of this work, I shall pursue the same general course which I have followed in regard to the Constitutions of the several States. I shall, therefore, not treat of the organization of political authority, nor of the distri bution of power between the State Legislatures and the General Government, resulting from the provisions of the Federal charter. I shall, on the contrary, confine myself mainly to the consideration of those clauses of the instrument which act as limitations on the action either of Congress or of the Legislatures of the several States, in regard to matters of private right.

I omit, therefore, as falling outside of the scope and province of this work, all the interesting cases growing out of the clauses of the Federal Constitution in regard to the judiciary, the regulation of commerce, emission of bills of credit, the borrowing of money, levying of taxes, naturalization, bankruptcy, coinage, the post-office, patents, copyrights, and the like. These belong, strictly, to a treatise on the Constitution. of the United States, a subject that has already been treated by a hand far abler, far more familiar with the theme, but

which now, unhappily, rests from its useful and incessant labors.*

My chief object, as I have said, being to treat of written law as settling and declaring private rights and duties, I shall, after an examination of the general principles of interpretation applicable to the Constitution of the United States, limit myself almost exclusively to a consideration of those clauses which have no direct connection with the organization or distribution of political power, but are intended, by limiting legislative supremacy, to operate as definitions of private duty or guar、 anties of private right-to those clauses, by virtue of which it has been said that the Constitution of the United States contains what may be deemed a Bill of Rights for the people of each State; and in regard even to these, I shall discuss them in a brief and summary way, for the same reason that they may be found ably and amply discussed elsewhere.

The sections of the Constitution of the United States containing the clauses designed to perform the functions to which I have referred, will be found to be the following:

Article I, Section 9.

(2.) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. (3.) No bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, shall be passed.

Section 10.

(1.) No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility.

Article III, Section 2, § 3.

The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been

* In addition to the great work of Mr. Justice Story, and the volumes of Mr. Rawle and Mr. Sergeant, the student of constitutional law who wishes haurire fontes will recur to the Madison Papers and the Federalist, Mr. Tucker's Blackstone, the writings of Jefferson and Hamilton passim, and to our truly national work, the Commentaries of Mr. Chancellor Kent. In recent days, the speeches and writings of Mr. Webster and of Mr. Calhoun, great rival chiefs of widely adverse schools, furnish most important instruction.

There is no better or more pleasing compend for popular use or elementary instruction than the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Hon, Wm. Alexander Duer, 2d edition, 1856.

Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138. "In like manner," says the Federalist, "the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the Bill of Rights of the Union." (Letter 84). That it did not contain a Bill of Rights in form was, as is well known, one of the chief arguments used against its adoption.—Story, Com, § 1858.

committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may, by law, have directed.

Section 3.

(1.) Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

(2.) The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

Article IV.

Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other State; and the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

Section 2.

(1.) The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

(2.) A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

(3.) No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

Article VI.

(3.) The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

AMENDMENTS.-Article I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohiliting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Article II.

A well-regulated militia being necessary for the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

Article III.

No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Article IV.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article V.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, (a) except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service, in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any crim. inal case, to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

Article VI.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously

(a) Indictment.-For cases under similar provisions in State Constitutions, describing the particularity and form requisite in setting out the offence, see Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468; State v. Corson, 59 Me. 137; Hewitt v. State, 25 Tex. 722; Wolf v. State, 19 Ohio, N. S. 248; Turpin v. State, 19 Ohio, N. S. 540. The Legislature may limit the time and manner of objections to indictment. Commonwealth v. Walton, 11 Allen, 238; Commonwealth v. Greener, 11 Allen, 241. And may provide that upon a plea of misnomer, the proceedings shall go on against the accused under his right name as pleaded. Lagare v. State, 19 Ohio, N. S. 43. But an indictment amended by adding a venue is not, it seems, the indictment of a grand jury. State v. Chamberlain, 6 Nev. 257. For cases where indictments were held not sufficient within the constitutional provision, see Murphy v. State, 28 Miss. 637; Norris v. State, 33 Miss. 373; Lemons v. State, 4 W. Va. 755. The Legislature cannot make valid a complaint in which the accusation is not "formally, fully, and precisely set forth." State v. Lerned, 47 Me. 426.

The provisions of the United States Constitution as to indictment by a grand jury are not addressed to the States, and do not bind them. Jane v. Commonwealth, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 18. The same provisions in the State Constitutions do not restrict the Legislatures in prescribing forms of indictment, providing a grand jury passes upon the complaint and assents to the prosecution. State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 409.

When there are degrees of murder differently punished, a statute is not unconstitutional which authorizes the indictment to charge murder simply, without specifying the degree. Commonwealth v. Gardner, 11 Gray, 438. And a statute is equally valid which authorizes, upon indictments for felony, an acquittal of part of the offence, and a conviction for the residue, if such residue is substantially charged in the indictment. Commonwealth v. Long, 10 Gray, 11. As to the constitutionality of a statute of South Carolina, dispensing with the grand jury in the district courts, see State v. Starling, 15 Rich. Law, 120.