tofore insisted, that the meaning of a written law is to be found in its terms, and that we are not at liberty to resort to extrinsic facts and circumstances to ascertain what the framers might have intended, has frequently been declared to apply to the Constitution of the United States. "It is well settled that the spirit of a Constitution is to be respected no less than its letter; yet that spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words, and neither the practice of legislative bodies nor other extrinsic circumstances, can control its clear language." Such was the language of Marshall, C. J., in answer to the objection that the State insolvent laws did not contravene the prohibition upon laws impairing the obligation of contracts, because they were supported by the unbroken practice of the State Legislatures for thirty years; and he proceeded to say, It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer from extrinsic circumstances, that a case for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation. Where words conflict with each other, where the different clauses of an instrument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be varied, construc. tion becomes necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is justifiable. But if in any case the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.* Words to be Taken in their Natural Sense.-Chief Justice Marshall has said, "As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said." + Transposition of Clauses.-In regard to the transposition of sentences in order to arrive at the construction of a constitutional provision, Mr. Justice Washington has used this sensible language: *Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202, 203. + Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 188, per Marshall, C. J. In the construction of this clause of the tenth section of the Constitution, one of the counsel for the defendant supposed himself at liberty so to transpose the provisions contained in it as to place the prohibition to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, in juxtaposition with the other prohibition to pass laws making any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, inasmuch as the two provisions relate to the subject of contracts. That the derangement of the words and even sentences of a law may sometimes be tolerated in order to arrive at the apparent meaning of the Legislature, to be gathered from other parts or from the entire scope of the law, I shall not deny. But I should deem it a very hazardous rule to adopt in the construction of an instrument so maturely considered as this Constitution was by the enlightened statesmen who framed it, and so severely examined and criticised by its opponents in the numerous State conventions which finally adopted it.* Reference to Clauses struck out.-It has been said by the Supreme Court, that although a clause may have been struck from the Constitution by amendment, it may still be referred to as an aid in the construction of those clauses with which it was originally associated.† Acts void in part and valid in part.-It is well settled that an act may be void in part by reason of its violation of a constitutional provision, and good as to the remainder. "If any part of the act be unconstitutional," said the Supreme Court of the United States, "the provisions of that part may be disregarded, while full effect will be given to such as are not repug nant to the Constitution of the United States, or of the State, or to the ordinance of 1787." Effects of Unconstitutionality. The effect of a judgment or decree declaring a statute void for unconstitutionality, is very stringent. It has been said by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, that an act of the Legislature which it has no constitutional right or power to pass, is a nullity, and all proceedings. under it are void. (a) So, where an insolvent debtor is discharged from his debts by virtue of an unconstitutional State 268. Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. pp. 267, Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 139. be, but that a law may be void in part and good in part; or in other words, that it may be void so far as it has a retrospective application to past contracts, and valid as applied prospectively to future contracts." See also, Nelson v. People, 33 Ill. 390; People v. Mahany, 13 Mich. 481. (a) White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443. bankrupt law, a creditor will not be considered to have assented to, or ratified the discharge, notwithstanding he may have proved his debt under the commission and received a dividend, or have acted as one of the assignees. The dividend received by him will be considered as a payment pro tanto of his debt.* In closing this branch of our subject we may remark, that it is settled that where the limitations on the law-making power contained in the Constitution of the United States are 'expressed in general terms, they are naturally and necessarily applicable to the Government created by that instrument alone, and have no application to the legislative power of the State Governments. So, it has been decided in regard to the fifth amendment, declaring that private property shall not be taken without compensation. So, in regard to the sixth amendment, securing the right of trial by jury in criminal cases. So, in regard to the seventh amendment, in regard to the right to trial by jury in civil cases. (a) So, in regard to the fourth amendment, protecting individuals against unreasonable seizures. So, too, in regard to the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.** In all these cases the limitations act upon Congress, and not on the State Legislatures. It is also to be observed, that the judiciary of the United States has no general authority to declare acts of the States void simply because they are repugnant to the Constitution of the particular State. Such power only belongs to it when it administers the local law of the State, and acts as a State tribunal must act.++ It is important to notice the rule which has been stated, that where a Constitution passes, taking away the power from *Kimberly v. Ely, 6 Pick. 440. Barron v. The Mayor &c. of Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243. Murphy v. The People, 2 Cow. 815; Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cowen, 819. Livingston v. The Mayor, 8 Wend. 100; Colt v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243. Reed v. Rice, 2 J. J. Marsh. 45. ** James v. The Commonwealth, 12 Serg. and Rawle, 220; Barker v. The People, 3 Cowen, 687. ++ Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters, 380. The Supreme Court has no authority on a writ of error from a State court, to declare a State law void on account of its collision with a State Constitu- . tion, it not being a case embraced in the judiciary act, which alone gives power to issue a writ of error. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Peters, 289. (a) But this amendment applies to cases removed from the State into the U. S. the Legislature to pass laws on a particular subject, this is equivalent to a repeal of existing laws on that subject.* Having thus considered the principal general rules which govern in the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, I proceed to consider some of the leading decisions made upon the above-cited clauses of the instrument, reserving to the last the examination of the provision contained in the tenth section of the first article, in regard to the obligation of contracts, which thus far has proved, in regard to private rights, to be practically the most important clause that the instrument contains.(a) Habeas Corpus. Art. i, sect. 9, § 2.-The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, was first secured to English liberty by the famous statute 31 Car. II, c. 2; but in England, like all the other guaranties of private right, it is subject to the pleasure of Parliament. Here, we have fixed it in the Constitution, and declared that it can only be forfeited during periods of warfare or rebellion. Practically, as yet, Congress has never authorized the suspension of the writ. It is understood that as the unlimited power is vested in Congress, the right to judge of the expediency of its exercise is also absolute in that body.+ * Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 278, per Johnson, J. I may here notice that it has been said in Illinois, that a proviso in a Constitution, as in a statute, cannot enlarge the enacting clause; it can only restrain, qualify, or explain. Sarah v. Borders, 4 Scam. 344; see this case as to the ordinance of 1787, and the Constitution of Illinois. On the subject of the ordinance of 1787, see also, 1 Missouri, 472, 725; Walker, Miss. 36; 20 Martin, 699. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19. (a) Treaties. As to the binding effect and force of treaties under the constitutional provision in reference to them. An act of Congress passed after a treaty cannot affect private titles under it. Congress has no power to settle rights under treaties except in matters purely political. The construction of treaties is the peculiar province of the judiciary in a case between individuals and touching their private rights. Wilson v. Wall, 6 Wall. 83. How far the stipulations, and especially the promissory stipulations, of treaties are binding upon Congress, has been and still is a disputed question. But so far as the acts to be done were political, and so far as the questions arising from the observance or the violation of such stipulations by Congress were political, the courts of the United States would have no jurisdiction; such acts and questions are not within the range of the judicial function. That courts are bound by a political act of Congress imposing a duty, although inconsistent with a treaty, see The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 617; U. S. v. Tobacco Co. 1 Dillon C. C. 264; Ropes v. Clinch, 8 Blatch. C. C. 304. It has been held that the treaty of extradition with France is binding upon the State courts without any legislation upon it. Matter of Metzger, Edm. Sel. Cas. 399. Bills of Attainder. Art. i, sect. 9, § 3.-Bills of attainder (the enactment of which is forbidden with us as well by the States as by Congress), as they are strictly called when inflicting capital punishments, and bills of pains and penalties, or those which award lesser punishment, are believed to be equally within the scope of the constitutional restriction.* They both belong in fact, as we have already noticed, to the most vicious class of judicial legislation. The history of England is filled with instances of the gross abuse of this tremendous engine of political power; but they are now appar ently, as little likely to be resorted to there as here, unless some violent domestic convulsion should disturb the equilibrium of that eminently practical and conservative people. Ex post facto Laws. (a) Art. i, sect. 9, § 3.-This phrase is *Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 138. + Ante, p. 121. See Wooddeson's Law Lectures, lect. 41. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentary, § 1338, says that the power of passing bills of attainder was used during the American Revolution with a most unsparing hand. In Jack son v. Catlin, 2 J. R. 248, it is said: "The act of 22d October, 1779, attainted, among others, Thomas Jones, of the offence of adhering to the enemy of this State. It was a specific offence, and was not declared or under stood to amount to treason; because many of the persons attainted had never owed alle giance to this State. The forfeitures arising from the attainder must be sought for in the act and nowhere else." It is an interesting case as to the effect of an act of attainder. Mr. Austin, in his valuable work on Jurisprudence, says: "The sovereign Roman poople solemnly voted or resolved, that they would never pass, or even take into consideration, what I will venture to denominate a bill of pains or penalties. This solemn resolution or vote was passed with the forms of legislation, and was inserted in the twelve tables in the following imperative termsPrivilegia ne irriganto." (a) Ex post facto Laws.-The recent cases illustrative of ex post facto laws are arranged in general classes according to the subject-matter of the statute. The rebellion gave birth to an unusual number of such laws, and of decisions upon them. Forfeitures and Confiscations.—Provisions in a statute and in State Constitution declaring forfeiture of office by curators of a college for failure to take a test oath, were held void as ex post facto in State v. Adams, 44 Mo. 570. This and other Missouri cases cited follow decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court, and overrule doctrines in earlier cases in the same State; see remarks on the subject of test oaths, infra. Statutes of Congress and of States requiring a test oath from attorneys as condition of being allowed to practice, were also held void in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333; In re Murphy and Glover, 41 Mo. 339; State v. Heighland, 41 Mo. 388; per contra, Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293; Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241; State v. Garesché, 36 Mo. 256; but these last cases are certainly overruled by the U. S. Supreme Court. A similar requirement as to clergymen as a prerequisite to their exercising their clerical functions, State v. Cummings, 4 Wall. 277, overruling s. c. 36 Mo. 263, and other Missouri cases. The Supreme Court of the United States in the two leading cases, State v. Cummings, and Ex parte Garland, discussed the subject of ex post facto laws at length, and held that all statutes, either of State or of Congress, which require test oaths of loyalty during the rebellion, and prescribe as a result or consequence of |