judges to the electorate, is the fact that there is a chief justice over them with large powers as to where the judge shall sit and what sort of cases he shall hear. An ugly disposition on the part of a judge can be more effectually disciplined through the power of such a chief justice than in any other way. The fact that judges are part of an organization with a chief over them who is responsible to some extent for their behavior, and the esprit de corps of the court as a whole, are important safeguards against arbitrariness and lack of judicial temper on the part of individual judges. In a metropolitan district where the judges are many and the dockets long, the judges will sit in different divisions for handling special classes of litigation. There would probably be an appellate division, a chancery division, a common law division and a criminal causes division. Each would have a presiding justice, and the several presiding justices and the chief justice would form a judicial council or executive committee with powers of management of the court as a whole which were not delegated to the chief justice alone. Among other powers such a judicial council should have power to hear complaints against judges and to discipline them by public or private reproval. It would be entirely feasible to give such council power, upon a trial and for cause shown, to remove from office any judge except the chief justice. The causes for such removal should be general, such as inefficiency, incompetency, neglect of duty, or conduct unbecoming a judge. A small part of the above powers would free judges from all tendencies to arbitrariness or ill-treatment of lawyers and litigants. Those who think that its novelty is an objection to the plan of selecting judges by the appointment of an elected chief justice are reminded that half a dozen years ago the lawyers had practically never heard of the plan of giving to the courts the power to make rules of practice and procedure. To-day no other method is seriously advocated. FOURTH PLAN. ELECTION OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE FOR A SHORT TERM. THE APPOINTMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGES BY HIM WITHOUT ANY PROVISION FOR THE RETIREMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGES BY POPULAR VOTE. The provisions for carrying out this plan are precisely the same as those set out for the Third Plan, omitting the sections which provide for the retirement of associate judges by popular vote. The reasons in support of this plan are as follows: (1) It is suggested that the modes of retirement otherwise provided — removal by the Judicial Council and removal or impeachment by the Legislature -are ample for ridding the bench of an incompetent person. And their procedure is sensible and practical. For charges resting upon specific facts requiring careful investigation, the Judicial Council forms a skilled, responsible and impartial tribunal. For charges resting upon general and indefinite dissatisfaction, or upon open and positive public policies not requiring specific inquiry, the Legislature is a suitable tribunal, representing popular convictions but still having some sense of responsibility, and small enough to offer at least the chance of fair argument before judgment. (2) The modes of discipline, otherwise provided to be exercised by the Judicial Council, amply take care of minor shortcomings, and relieve a large part of the supposed need for popular recall. Moreover, the effect of such a discipline now wholly lacking in our system - will so tend to improve the individual judge in his shortcomings that the community will get an added protection - now lacking - from the judge's shortcomings, and will thus take away a large part of the risks of long judicial tenure. (3) Retirement by popular vote, especially in a metropolitan district, submits an issue of fact to a tribunal largely incompetent to judge upon it. In the first place, the evidence of the facts can never be got effectively to the minds of even a small fraction of the tribunal. In the second place, the tribunal is unqualified with standards of judgment upon many of these considerations which affect the propriety of judicial conduct. In the third place, only a small fraction of the tribunal ever would weigh the evidence or the arguments. One has only to peruse the method outlined on page 32 for hearing charges before the Judicial Council to realize how inferior is the process of hearing before a popular tribunal. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Hall, James Parker. 'The Selection, Tenure and Retirement of Judges," American Judicature Society, Bulletin X. Choate, Rufus. "Judicial Tenure," Massachusetts Law Quarterly, II, No. 3. Gilbertson, H. S. "Short Ballot and an Efficient Judiciary." Case and Comment, XIX, 332 (1912). 66 Harley, Herbert. Ontario Courts and Procedure." Michigan Law Review, XII, 344-347. "Taking Judges Out of Politics." Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1916. Kales, Albert M. Unpopular Government in the United States. Chap. XVII. The English Judicature Acts." Illinois State Bar Association Report, 1913, 325. Proposed Amendments to the (Chicago) Municipal Court Act Relating to the Selection and Retirement of Judges. "Methods of Selecting and Retiring Judges in a Metropolitan District." The Annals of the American Academy, LII, 1 (March, 1914), and Bul. VI, American Judicature Society. Rosenbaum, Samuel. "Election of Judges, or Selection." Illinois Law Taft, William Howard. "The Selection and Tenure of Judges." Report All the books named in the bibliographies printed with these Bulletins may be found in the rooms set apart for the Delegates to the Convention in the State Library. PUBLICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT APPROVED BY THE SUPERVISOR OF ADMINISTRATION. |