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of God and Spirits, its own Reflex Thoughts, or Consciousness of its own Operations. And if it were now capable of no Thoughts, but fuch as have some dependence upon the Body; yet this can never prove, that the Soul it felf is Material, or that Matter Thinks. A Man writes with his Pen, and cannot write without one; Is it therefore his Pen properly that writes, and not the Man? The Body is the Inftrument of the Soul, in its Operations here; and as the Inftrument is fit or unfit, fo must its Operations be more or lefs perfect. ! But it is ftrange, that the chief part of us fbould be of fuch a Nature, that we can form no Idea of it. We may form an Idea of it, though but an imperfect one: And do we not know, that the Eye, the nobleft part of the Body, cannot fee it felf, but imperfectly, and by Reflection? And let any Man try, whether he can form a better Idea of a Material Soul, than of an Immaterial one. But this Writer, by Idea, feems to mean a Material Idea, or Imagination: and we cannot, indeed, form a Material Idea of an Immaterial Spirit. Yet, after all which he, or any Man elfe, has faid, the Nature of the Soul is as clearly understood, as that of the Body: and there is nothing encumbred with greater Difficulties than Extenfion, if that be the Ef fence of Matter; and if that be not, it is as hard ftill to know what the Effence of Matter is. The Inftance which he brings of Brutes, is eafily answered, Whether they can think, or not. If they cannot, the Objection falls of it

felf:

felf: If they can, I fhould rather suppose, that their Souls may be annihilated, or may tranfmigrate and pass from one Brute to another, than that the Souls of Men must be Material, that the Souls of Brutes may be Material too.

Or

Another Gentleman, of late, has afferted, > That it is impoffible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Idea's, without Revelation, to difcover whether Omnipotency hath not given to fome Systems of Matter, fitly difpofed, a Power to Perceive or Think; and, That there is a Poffibility that God may, if he pleafes, fuper-add to Matter a Faculty of Thinking: which is what he likewife calls a Modification of Thinking, Power of Thinking. But it feems not intelligible, how God fhould fuper-add to Matter this Faculty, or Power, or Modification, of Thinking, unless he change the Nature of Matter, and make it to be quite another thing than it is, or join a Substance of another Nature to it. But the Question is, Whether a Faculty of Thinking can be produced out of the Powers and various Modifications of Matter? And we can have no more conception, how any Modification of Matter can produce Thinking, than we can, how any Modification of Sound fhould produce Seeing: all Modifications of Matter are the fame, as to this Point; and Matter may as well be made no Matter by Modifying, as be made to Think by it. This is

y Mr. Locke's Humane Understanding, 1. 4. c. 3. §, 6, ter to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 66.

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Let

just

juft as if a Man fhould maintain, That though all Immaterial Subftances are not extended and divifible, yet fome of them may poffibly be, or Omnipotence may fuper-add to them a Faculty of Extenfion and Divifibility for Immaterial Substances may become Divisible and Material by the fame Philofophy, by which we may conclude, that Matter may Think, which is the fame thing as to become Immaterial, and to furpafs all the Powers and Capacities of Matter. He urges, that there may be capacities in Matter, which no Man can conceive, fince that Gravitating Power, which Sir Ifaac Newton has proved to belong to all Bodies, would before have been thought incredible. But there is nothing in this Power above the Nature of Matter, any more than there is in Motion. For Gravitation is only a determinate Mode of Motion; and it is very eafie to conceive, that Matter is as well capable of one Determination of Motion, as of another; fince Matter is herein, only Paffive, and not Active, or enabled to move voluntarily, and determine it felf, as humane Souls do. That, which is capable of any one Determination of Motion, may be capable of all kinds of Determination; but that, which may be determined all ways, may not be capable of determining it felf any one way. Matter muft ever remain uncapable of Thinking, unless, it could change its Nature, and become Immaterial, and

Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Anfwer to his Second Letter, p. 404, &c.

then

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then it would not be Matter, which would think, but fomething elfe. And it is of little Ufe or Confequence to enquire, what Omnipotence can do by a Super-addition of Faculties to Matter; when, between thofe, who prove the Soul to be immaterial, and fuch, as fuppofe it to be material, the only Queftion in difpute is, not what a Divine Power can effect, (for these Men are unwilling to grant any fuch Power prefiding over Matter) but whether a Faculty of Thinking can be produc'd out of Matter, by any Modifi cations, or any Changes and Determinations of Motion. But tho' I have, upon this occafion, mention'd this Gentleman here; yet it would be a great Injury done him, to rank him with the Authors of The Oracles of Reafon.

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There is prefix'd to thefe Pieces, an Account of the Life and Death of that unhappy Gentleman, Mr. Blount, with pretence to vindicate his Murther of himself, becaufe his deceas'd Wife's Sifter refus'd to be marry'd to him; by all the Topicks and Arguments of Reafon and Philofophy. Which is fuch an Undertaking, as I am confident was never heard of before, to prove, that a Man may very gravely and philo fophically kill himfelf, if a Woman, whom he ought not to marry, will not be his Wife. It is ftrange to fee, that Men fhould think it fit to vent fuch things as thefe in the Face of the World: but this discovers the Reafon and Phitofophy of these Men, and is a fit Preface to fuch a Book This Wisdom defcendeth not from Above. Behold the Men in their Principles and Practices, b 4

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the demure Pretenders to Humane Reafon, and Moral Vertue, and the Enemies of Reveal'd Religion!

We are fallen into an Age, in which there are a fort of Men who have fhewn fo great a Forwardness to be no longer Chriftians, that they have catch'd at all the little Cavils and Pretences against Religion; and, indeed, if it were not more out of Charity to their Souls, than for any Credit Religion can have of them, it were great pity but they fhould have their With for they both think and live fo ill, that it is an Argument for the Goodness of any Cause, that they are against it. It was urged, as a Confirmation of the Chriftian Religion, by Tertullian, that it was hated and perfecuted by Nero, the worst of Men: And I am confident, it would be but small Reputation to it, in any Age, if fuch Men fhould be fond of it. They fpeak evil of the things they understand not; and are wont to talk with as much Confidence against any point of Religion, as if they had all the Learning in the World in their keeping, when commonly they know little or nothing of what has been faid for that againft which they difpute. They feem to imagine, that there is nothing in the World, befides Religion, that has any Difficulty in it: but this fhews how little they have confider'd the Nature of Things, in which multitudes of Objetions and Difficulties meet an obferving Man in every Thought. And after all, Religion has but one Fault, (as they account it) which they

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