ing troops used to send to the kutwahl or head man of the village for coolies and bullocks; but this practice having been found to be productive, occasionally, of great oppression and injustice, the system was very properly altered and placed on its present footing, by which the agents of government provided those means of transport. The neglect, on Lord Amherst's part, to secure such a provision, was another argument to show his entire ignorance of the wants of an Indian army. He (Mr. Hume) recollected that at the time of the Mahratta war, so different a feeling pervaded the native troops, from that which had been manifested on the unhappy occasion in question, that for every vacancy in the forces, they had at least fifty candidates among the native officers, when it was not then thought necessary to incite, as he was sorry to perceive had been the case under Lord Amherst's government, by promises and rewards. There was then nothing like desertion heard of, but on every side the greatest eagerness to serve was testified. It was urged, in mitigation of the severe example which had been lately made, that only eleven out of sixty mutineers were hung: but were the house aware of the effect that so ignominious a punishment was likely to produce on the native troops? The Bengal infantry was composed principally of Bramins of a high caste-men of as high and delicate a sense of honour as ever composed the ranks of any army in any country. The hon. gentleman then alluded to the exposure of bramin sepoys in chains, upon the public roads, as another punishment calculated to have a worse effect on the feel ings of the native population than any other that could by possibility have been devised. In 1814 and 1815, the court of directors having determined to re-organize, in a great degree, the regulations and allowances of the army in India, instructions were sent out to the Marquis of Hastings, directing him to remodel them in various ways. The marquis, with that attention which he ever showed, to the comfort of the soldiers, did not feel himself warranted in carrying those orders into effect; but to show to the company at home that they were proceeding in error, he appointed a committee, composed of military officers and civilians (at the head of whom was Mr. Adam), directing them to inquire into, and report to him upon, every office that it was proposed to alter, and every allowance that was to be regulated anew. After receiving all the various reports in 1816-1817, Lord Hastings drew up that important document which he (Mr. Hume) was so anxious to see laid on the table of that house, and despatched it to England. His lordship therein first stated his own opinion on the subject of the court of directors' instructions to him; and he then availed himself of the best opinions that the military and the civil services in India afforded, and these universally supported his own view of the matters reported on; the result being that he did not feel himself, without further communications, warranted in acting upon the instructions that had been sent out to him. The answer from the court of directors he (Mr. Hume) wished also to see; he believed that it was not at all in conformity with Lord Lord Hastings' opinions. In point of fact, he understood that Lord Amherst went out determined to carry into effect all the directors' orders which had appeared to Lord Hastings so inexpedient to be adopted. And here again was a striking proof of the incompetency of Lord Amherst for his office; because it was impossible for any governor-general of India to determine beforehand that he would carry any orders of this kind into effect. A governor-general must of necessity be guided by circumstances. After further animadversion upon the fitness of Lord Amherst for his office, the hon. gent. observed, that having, since he gave notice of this motion, understood that the court of inquiry had not, at the last advices, terminated its investigations, he would of course dispense with so much of his original motion as was intended to call for the minutes of their proceedings: but as he could not imagine that any danger to the public welfare, or to our empire in India, could arise from the papers he wished to be produced, he concluded by moving-" That there be laid before the house a copy of the military dispatch, transmitted by the Marquis of Hastings in the year 1819, to the secret committee of the court of directors, relative to the organization and allowances of the British army in India; also for a copy of the dispatch of the court of directors to the government of India, dated in 1823, on the same subject; together with a copy of any dispatches from India, in reply thereto, stating how far such orders and instructions of the court of directors had been carried into effect." Mr. C. W. Wynn entirely concurred with the hon. gent. in thinking, that to the administration of so vast an empire as India, containing so many millions, and situated at so great a distance from this country, a very large discretion must be left as to the execution of any orders transmitted to him from home. At the same time he was surprised that the same principle had not reminded the hon. gent. that any individual placed in a situation of such difficulty, and having so large a discretion confided to him, was entitled to the confidence of his country, at least till he had an opportunity of being heard in answer to any charges brought against him. Of the mutiny at Barrackpore we possessed in this country no official account, but one that was written only five days after the mutiny itself occurred, and before the court of inquiry had finished its investigations. Under these circumstances, he (Mr. Wynn) felt that it would be the height of injustice to lay any information on the subject before parliament, till the government should be in possession of more complete and ample documents, and thereby be better enabled to meet the calumnious misrepresentations on this painful subject which had been circulated in private letters. None of the papers for which the hon. gent. moved could throw the least light upon the subject which he desired to elucidate. The new regulations referred to were not likely to be productive of the bad effects apprehended by the hon. gent. Ôn the contrary, they were likely to be attended with great benefit, and to remedy the most serious evils hitherto experienced in that very valuable service, the Indian army-namely, the tardiness of promotion. The right hon. gent. denied that the Indian government had manifested inattention to the complaints of the sepoys. Inquiries were instituted at the express command of Lord Amherst into the truth of them; and being found to be true, an issue of 5000 rupees was immediately made for the regiment. In a letter written by the commanderin-chief in India, it was expressly said, "that some dissatisfaction having been noticed to the commander-in-chief as prevailing among the sepoys, in consequence of a want of bullocks for baggage, an immediate order was issued to furnish them with bullocks;" and Sir Edward Paget ascertained that those provided for the 47th regiment were actually in line. This was before the mutiny. The right hon. gent. expressed his regret at the calamity that ensued on the mutiny, in the destruction of so many lives-180, as he understood; not 450 or 500, as had been mentioned in private letters. The difficulty of stopping the progress of such a calamity at the moment the officer who commanded could have wished it, must be obvious, when it is recollected that the artillery was sweeping away and destroying in the midst of a multitude. He (Mr. Wynn) dissented from the honourable gentleman as to the punishment that had been imposed on some of the guilty parties. The exposure of them in chains was a more salutary punishment than those military penalties that were but too common in India. With respect to the policy adopted by Lord Amherst, he thought it was most unfair, in the absence of any positive evidence, to make observations which could only have the effect of exciting prejudice against that nobleman. He might have had very good reasons for adopting those measures which the honourable member had condemned. The honourable member had argued that the war was ill-timed. But the question was, whether the Indian government were allowed an opportunity to select their time. If a provocation were offered, the government must, of course, proceed to war; and, in this instance, when war was determined upon, it was admitted that it could not be prosecuted in any quarter with so much advantage as at Rangoon, Lord Amherst proceeded on the best opinions that could be collected; and, having done so, it was rather hard that so much censure should be cast upon him. Lord Amherst was particularly guided by the authority of a brave and meritorious officer, Major Campbell, who had since fallen a victim to the insalubrity of the climate. That officer had been four times up to Ava, and his opinion was, that, by capturing Rangoon, and preventing the enemy from deriving any resources from that quarter, he would inevitably be reduced to come to terms. The object, or the justice, of this war had never been called in question; and when the necessity for hostilities was proved to exist, that, he thought, would be but an indifferent sort of policy which could induce a government to resort to half measures. He of course admitted that it would be better if war could be avoided. This country had already domi nions enough in India--more, indeed, than could well be managed. But, in his opinion, Lord Amherst was compelled to enter into this war; and he could not overlook the aggravating conduct of the Burmese government without lowering and degrading the British character. On this point he should say nothing more, as the honourable member had stated that he would introduce the subject in a more formal and tangible shape; but when it was so brought before the house, he should be ready to meet all the arguments which the hon. member might advance on the question. With respect to the abilities of Lord Amherst, he thought the hon. member had expressed too decided an opinion. When he was sent out, the company's territories were in a state of the most profound peace. It was hoped that that state of peace might have been preserved and Lord Amherst appeared, from his feelings and his character, the most likely person who could be selected for the purpose of ensuring the continuance of tranquillity. It was quite fallacious to, suppose that no danger was ever apprehended from the Bur mese. : Lord Minto had himself stated his conviction, that if the Nepaul war terminated unsuccessfully, the Burmese would appear in arms against us. It was very true that during the administration of the Marquis of Hastings, a war with the Burmese government had been prevented. But how was it got rid of? Why, by sending back the letter of the Burmese monarch, and declaring that our government conceived it to be a forgery. Such a plan might succeed once, but it certainly would not be efficient a second time. (Mr. Hume here asked, "What did the right honourable gentleman say to the destitution of the native officers of the 17th regiment ?") Mr. Wynn observed, that the opinion of every person with whom he had conversed on the subject was, that it was quite impossible the mutiny could have been carried on without the knowledge of the native officers, if they had performed their duty. They had, therefore, brought this destitution on themselves. If he stated his own opinion on the subject, (founded, as it undoubtedly was, on very slight materials,) he should say, that the native officers had been guilty of very great neglect, and that they deserved the punishment of destitution. It appeared to him to be equally necessary for the interest of the public service, that they should be dismissed under the peculiar circumstances of the case, as it would have been, had they taken an active part in the mutiny. The hon. member had adduced many reasons for the alleged unpopularity of Lord Amherst; but he had omitted one, which he (Mr. Wynn) begged leave to notice. He really believed, that the circumstance of Lord Amherst having placed the lady of a commodore above the ladies of the senior merchants, on the table of precedence, had excited excited more hatred, jealousy, and ill-feeling, against Lord Amherst, than any other of his acts since he became governorgeneral. Mr. Robertson viewed this as a most serious question, and one on which the fullest information ought to be afforded. The present con test test in India ought to be viewed, not merely with reference to the Burmese, but with reference to the contiguity of the Burman empire with the empire of China, which contained a population of 150,000,000. He protested, most strongly, against our waging any war in India, unless we were actually forced into it. It appeared to him, that the course adopted to put down the late mutiny placed the life of every European in India completely in jeopardy. That the native troops were bold and resolute, could at once be proved by the well-known fact, that three companies of them had put to the rout 11,000 of the Burmese troops. So formidable a body of men ought not to be treated with harshness or severity. He hoped that such information would be laid before parliament as would enable gentlemen to understand correctly the present state of India. Colonel Davies condemned, in strong terms, the conduct which had been pursued towards the native officers, who had separated themselves from the mutineers, and had in all respects behaved with propriety. How had the mutineers themselves been treated? Had gentle measures been adopted to bring them back to a sense of their duty? No; artillery was placed in their rear, and they were suddenly assailed with a tremendous fire. He believed that, if they had been properly addressed, they would have given up their arms, and expressed their contrition. Every man's blood must boil in his veins when he thought upon this catastrophe. Numbers were shot on the mo ment; and a whole day was spent in hunting and cutting down the unhappy fugitives. He had not much acquaintance with Indian affairs, but he had been informed by officers who had served in India, that a braver, a more loyal, or "better disposed set of men" did not exist, than those who composed our Indian army. He could not think without strong feelings of indignation of the treatment which the native officers had received on this occasion. The government had adopted the system of Rhadamanthus. They had punished those individuals, but they were yet to be heard. He trusted, the moment fresh advices were received from India, that the whole of this business would be sifted to the bottom. Mr. Freemantle said, he could not but be astonished at the line of argument taken by the gallant officer who had just sat down. As a military man, he ought to see the necessity of at once putting down a mutiny, under all circumstances. At the very moment when the gallant officer was speaking, a military inquiry was going on for the purpose of investigating the whole case. This, therefore, he considered a very unfit period for the promulgation of such statement as had that night been made. The mutiny, he would take leave to say, was not put down by force until every other means had been resorted to for the purpose of bringing the troops back to a state of subordination. The gallant officer had truly observed, that there was not an army on the face of the globe more loyal, more determined, more eager to do their duty, than the |