86 contract. This principle is especially applicable to overdue coupons; but it has also been extended in many jurisdictions to cover a case where by the agreement of the parties a fixed sum is payable on a stated day as interest. Often, interest on this amount is recoverable.87 For breach of a fiduciary obligation compound interest is often allowed in the discretion of the court if the breach was fraudulent or wilful as distinguished from negligent, or if the fiduciary has had the use of trust money or property in such a way that he has or may be supposed to have received compounded profits upon it.88 In Stickney v. Moore, 108 Ala. 590, 19 So. 76; Lee v. Melby, 93 Minn. 4, 100 N. W. 379; Graeme v. Cullum, 23 Gratt. 266. See also Covington v. Fisher, 22 Okla. 207, 97 Pac. 615; Goodale v. Wallace, 19 S. Dak. 405, 103 N. W. 651, 117 Am. St. 962. United States Mortgage Co. v. Sperry, 138 U. S. 313, 343, 11 Sup. Ct. 321, 330, 34 L. Ed. 969; Skinner v. Franklin Co., 179 Fed. 862; Drexel State Bank v. La Moure, 207 Fed. 702; Stickney v. Moore, 108 Ala. 590, 19 So. 76; Lake County v. Linn, 29 Colo. 446, 68 Pac. 839; Fox v. Hartford, etc., Co., 70 Conn. 1, 38 Atl. 871; Humphreys v. Morton, 100 Ill. 592; Kentucky Title Co. v. English, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 2024, 50 S. W. 968; Lexington v. Union Nat. Bank, 75 Miss. 1, 22 So. 291; Philadelphia & Reading R. v. Knight, 124 Pa. 58, 16 Atl. 492; Rice v. Shealy, 71 S. C. 161, 50 S. E. 868. But see contra Shaw v. Norfolk County R., 16 Gray, 407; Force v. Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 408, and in New York interest is not given on overdue coupons if still held by the owner of the bonds. Bailey v. Buchanan County, 115 N. Y. 297, 22 N. E. 155, 6 L. R. A. 562; Williamsburg Savings Bank v. Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E. 1058. Vaughan v. Kennan, 38 Ark. 114; Wofford v. Wyly, 72 Ga. 863; Hall v. Scott, 90 Ky. 340, 13 S. W. 249, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 819; Greenleaf v. Kellogg, 2 Mass. 568; Hayward v. Cain, 110 Mass. 273; Rix v. Strauts, 59 Mich. 364, 26 N. W. 638; Townsend v. Riley, 46 N. H. 300; Cook v. Courtright, 40 Oh. St. 248, 48 Am. Rep. 681; Stokely v. Thompson, 34 Pa. 210; Angel v. Miller, 90 Tex. 505, 39 S. W. 916; Cullen v. Whitham, 33 Wash. 366, 74 Pac. 581; Genin v. Ingersoll, 11 W. Va. 549. But see contra Broughton v. Mitchell, 64 Ala. 210; Doe v. Vallejo, 29 Cal. 385; Denver B. & M. Co. v. McAllister, 6 Colo. 261; Rose v. Bridgeport, 17 Conn. 243; Grimes v. Blake, 16 Ind. 160; Stone v. Locke, 46 Me. 445; Lee v. Melby, 93 Minn. 4, 100 N. W. 379; Stoner v. Evans, 38 Mo. 461. See also Hodgkins v. Price, 141 Mass. 162, 5 N. E. 502. 88 See Barney v. Saunders, 16 How. 535, 14 L. Ed. 1047;McIntire v. McIntire, 192 U. S. 116, 48 L. Ed. 369; Primeau v. Granfield, 184 Fed. 480; Silver King Consol. Min. Co. v. Silver King Coalition Min. Co., 204 Fed. 166, 122 C. C. A. 402; Price v. Peterson, 38 Ark. 494; Miller v. Lux, 100 Cal. 609, 35 Pac. 345, 639; Arnold v. Maxwell, 230 Mass. 441, 119 N. E. 776; Dissenger's Case, 39 N. J. Eq. 227; Watts v. Watts Ex'x, 104 Va. 269, 51 S. E. 359; Speiser v. Merchants' Exch. Bank, 110 Wis. 507, 86 N. W. 243. In England compound interest is not thus allowed unless the fiduciary has used the money in his private affairs, and has presumably made a mercantile profit. Vermont compound interest is allowed upon an ordinary running account.89 Burdick v. Garrick, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 233; cf. Davis v. Davis [1902] 2 Ch. 314, where the defendants having acted in good faith, the plaintiffs were said to have the alternative of reclaiming the actual profits or of charging the defendants with simple interest. 89 Tudor v. Tudor's Est., (Vt. 1919), 107 Atl. 132, and cases cited. Equity will not make a decree impossible of performance. 1422 Equity will not make a decree involving excessive difficulty to execute. 1423 A decree need not be capable of complete immediate performance. 1432 A vendor with an incomplete title may be compelled to convey. 1436 A contract may be enforced though the plaintiff has not satisfied the statute of frauds.... 1437 Mutuality as a reason for giving relief where the plaintiff has an adequate Enforcement in the United States of negative promises correlative to a more extensive affirmative... 1450 ..... § 1418. General principles of specific performance. The remedy of specific performance enables a court having equitable powers to compel a party to a contract to perform, if not exactly at least substantially, what he has undertaken to do. Save where a defendant's obligation is negative a threatened breach of contract rarely affords ground for judicial action,1 so that affirmative performance enforced by the court must almost invariably take place at a later day than the contract required. From comparatively early times the English chancellors gave this redress. Equity requires generally that a contract in order to be specifically enforceable shall be capable of enforcement in a court of law. That is, the requisites of a contract are the same in equity as at law. Where an exception is made to this principle, as in enforcing contracts for the sale of land where the Statute of Frauds has not been satisfied, or in enforcing voluntary promises to convey land on which the promisee has made improvements, the interposition of equity is said to be due to its desire to prevent a fraud. It may be observed, however, that there are many cases where a plaintiff who has relied to his injury on a gratuitous promise of the defendant, even though it be one relating to land, can get no relief. If it be assumed, then, that a valid contract exists and has been broken, the general rule defining the instances where specific performance will be granted is where damages are an inadequate remedy and the nature of the contract is such that specific enforcement of it will not involve too great practical difficulties, equity will grant a decree of specific performance. The fact that there is a remedy at law does not preclude the equitable remedy. The applications of this prin 5 1 Bills for instructions by trustees prior to any action taken by or against them have been common, but similar relief though in the nature of the case equally possible has not been common with regards to contracts; but now by statute in England a person interested in a contract may not only seek its interpretation from the court, but may seek a binding declaration of his right. This useful extension of remedial justice will 4 doubtless become more common in the United States. 2 With one exception (Cokayn v. Hurst, 10 Selden Soc. No. 142) the earliest clear instances discovered by Ames are reported in the reign of Elizabeth. See Lectures on Legal History, 248; 1 Green Bag, 26; Cas. Eq. Jur. 37, n. See supra, § 494. "In order to deny one the relief ciple are not, however, always free from technicality. In the course of centuries, rules of equity tend to become rigid, and like rules of law do not always yield readily when reason makes it desirable. There is, however, a distinct tendency in modern times to extend the remedy where justice requires it. The converse statement, that any contract which is valid at law is also enforceable in equity if its subject-matter is appropriate for that jurisdiction, is generally true, but subject to the exception that equity reserves a discretion in granting its relief; and to one rule that is laid down perhaps too positively, namely, that equity will not grant specific performance of a contract unsupported by valuable consideration even though under seal." 6 § 1419. Specific performance of contracts to buy and sell. Partly because a specific piece of land is in its nature different from every other piece, and presumably partly because of the overshadowing social and economic importance of land when the doctrines of equity were developed, a contract to convey land is always specifically enforceable by the purchaser whatever may be the form of contract, whether an ordinary contract to purchase, or an agreement to exchange lands, to re-convey on the mortgagor finding a purchaser, to partition land held in common, or to make a conveyance by way of compromise. 10 A contract to convey any interest in land is as fully enforceable as a contract to convey a fee.11 On the other hand, which a court of equity can give, it is not in all cases sufficient that there be a remedy at law. The remedy must be plain and adequate, and as certain, prompt, complete and efficient to attain the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity." Dailey v. City of New York, 170 N. Y. App. Div. 267, 274, 156 N. Y. S. 124. citing Texas Co. v. Central Fue, Oil Co., 194 Fed. 1, 114 C. C. A. 21, and cases cited; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. 1, 43 L. Ed. 341, 19 Sup. Ct. 77; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 36 L. Ed. 82, 12 Sup. Ct. 340; Kilbourn v. Sunder land, 130 U. S. 505, 32 L. Ed. 1005, 9 Sup. Ct. 594; Erie Railroad Co. v. City of Buffalo, 180 N. Y. 192, 73 N. E. 26. See infra, § 1425. 7 Jefferys v. Jefferys, Cr. & Ph. 138; Crandall v. Willig, 166 Ill. 233, 46 N. E. 755. See also supra, § 217. 8 Dixon v. Anderson, 252 Fed. 694, 164 C. C. A. 534; Bowman v. Gork, 106 Mich, 106 Mich. 163, 63 N. W. 998. 'Porter v. Farmers' Savings Bank, 143 Iowa, 629, 120 N. W. 633. 10 Fortner v. Wiggins, 121 Ga. 26, 48 S. E. 694; Sumner v. Early, 134 N. C. 233, 46 S. E. 492. 11 Lever v. Koefflr, [1901] 1 Ch. |