fact that the remedy only is barred, is also thought to be involved in the well-recognized principles concerning the revival of barred debts by subsequent promises. 16

It is also true as is later shown 16 that statutes in the early English form do not necessarily bar all remedies by action when a contract is broken if the statute in terms bars an action in one form. Where the law allows an election of remedies one remedy only may be barred.

§ 2003. Against whom and by whom advantage of the statute can be taken.

It was a fundamental principle of the English law that no lapse of time operated to bar a right of the Crown," and it is equally well recognized that an American State 18 and the Federal government 19 are similarly exempt from the operation of the statute unless it contains an express contrary provision.20 This exemption operates in favor of one who has acquired by subrogation a right of the government, 21 but the principle is

not applicable where an individual brings suit to enforce a private right in the name of the government.22

Municipal corporations, and other governmental subdivisions of the State, have the same privilege as the State itself when seeking to enforce public rights, 23 but in the enforcement of merely private rights, such corporations are subject to the statute, even though not expressly included within its terms, as they sometimes are.24 Thus the statute runs against an action on behalf of a county to collect from sureties fees received by a sheriff, 25 or to enforce other liabilities of an official.26 Public corporations supported by the State and carrying on a work appropriate to the government on its behalf are subject to the same rule, though differences of decision in applying it may be found. The right of a public hospital to recover charges from those whom it has served has been held free from the bar of the statute. 27

Third persons cannot generally avail themselves of the fact that a debt is barred by the Statute of Limitations. 28 There

22 Curtner v. United States, 149 U. S. 662, 13 Sup. Ct. 985, 37 L. Ed. 890; United States v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 70 Fed. 435, affd. in 84 Fed. 40, 28 C. C. A. 267; Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 48 Am. Dec. 210; State v. Halter, 149 Ind. 292, 47 N. E. 665.

23 Louisville Sinking Fund v. Buckner, 48 Fed. 533; Reed v. Birmingham, 92 Ala. 339, 9 So. 161; Russell v. Lincoln, 200 Ill. 511, 65 N. E. 1088; County v. Bennett, 185 Mich. 544, 153 N. W. 814; Caruthersville v. Huffman, 262 Mo. 367, 171 S. W. 323; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. St. 358; Gustaveson v. Dwyer, 83 Wash. 303, 145 Pac. 458.

24 Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, 33 L. Ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. 19; County v. Montgomery, 195 Ala. 197, 70 So. 642; School Dist. No. 5 v. School Dist. No. 1, 105 Ill. 653; Burlington v. Burlington R. Co., 41 Iowa, 134; Mellinger v. Houston, 68 Tex. 36, 3 S. W. 249.

25 People v. Putnam, 52 Col. 517, 122 Pac. 796, Ann. Cas. 1913 E. 1264; People v. Davis, 157 Ill. App. 438; People v. Rebstock, 157 Ill. App. 440.

26 Polk County v. Rowe, 164 Ia. 302, 145 N. W. 868; Clark v. Logan County, 138 Ky. 676, 128 S. W. 1079; Putnam County v. Johnson, 259 Mo. 73, 167 S. W. 1039; County Commissioners v. Willett, 49 Okl. 254, 152 Pac. 365, L. R. A. 1916 E. 92. But see contra Jackson County v. Herbert, 173 Ill. App. 184; State v. Smith (Okl.), 188 Pac. 96.

27 State v. Moore, 90 Kans. 751, 136 Pac. 233; Central Hospital v. Adams, 134 Tenn. 429, 183 S. W. 1032, L. R. A. 1916 E. 94; Eastern State Hospital v. Graves, 105 Va. 151, 52 S. E. 837, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 746. Cf. May v. School District, 22 Neb. 205, 34 N. W. 377, 3 Amer. St. Rep. 266.

28 Allen v. Smith, 129 U. S. 465, 32 L. Ed. 732, 9 Sup. Ct. 338; Mathesius v. Railroad Co., 96 Fed. 792; Hanchett v. Blair, 100 Fed. 817, 41 C. C. A. 76; Wright v. Wright, 103 Fed. 580;

fore, payment by an insolvent debtor of a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations is not a fraudulent conveyance; 29 but barred claims are not provable in bankruptcy,30 and where an estate is distributed by a court of equity, any creditor can oppose the claim of other creditors if the statute has run against them.31

§ 2004. Statute runs from breach of contract.

The general rule governing the commencement of the running of the statute is that the statutory period is computed from the time when the right of action which the plaintiff seeks to enforce first accrued; that is, ordinarily in an action based on a contract, as soon as there is a breach of contract. In determining the time when a right of action accrues on a contract it is, therefore, necessary to have in mind the question previously considered, 32 what constitutes a breach of contract. The only necessary qualification of this principle is that where the plaintiff's right of action depends upon a preliminary act to be performed by himself he cannot suspend indefinitely the running of the statute by delaying performance of this act.33

The statute runs from the time of the breach though no damage occurs until later; 34 and it is no exception that on an obligation to indemnify against loss there must be damage

Vansickle v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 105
Fed. 16; Brookville Bank v. Kimble, 76
Ind. 195; Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind.
592, 36 N. E. 345, 37 N. E. 14, 23 L. R.
A. 588; City Bank v. Wright, 68 Iowa,
132, 26 N. W. 35; Ullman v. Thomas,
126 Mich. 61, 85 N. W. 245; Frost v.
Steele, 46 Minn. 1, 48 N. W. 413;
Quirk v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co.
(Mo. App.), 210 S. W. 106; Dayton
Co. v. Sloan, 49 Neb. 622, 68 N. W.
1040; Manchester v. Tibbetts, 121
N. Y. 219, 24 N. E. 304, 18 Am. St.
Rep. 816; McConnell v. Barber, 68
Hun, 360, 33 N. Y. S. 480; McAfee
v. McAfee, 28 S. Car. 188, 5 S. E. 480.
29 French v. Motley, 63 Me. 326.
30 See supra, § 1997.

31 Shewen v. Vanderhorst, 1 Russ. & M. 347; Re Lafferty, 122 Fed. 558;

Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16; Sawyer v. Sawyer, 74 Me. 579; Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N. C. 766, 36 S. E. 172; McCartney v. Tyrer, 94 Va. 198, 202, 26 S. E. 419; Callaway's Admr. v. Saunders, 99 Va. 350, 38 S. E. 182; Werdenbaugh v. Reid, 20 W. Va.

588.

32 See supra, §§ 1288 et seq.
33 See infra, § 2041.

34 Battley v. Faulkner, 3 B. & Ald. 288; Howell v. Young, 5 B. & C. 259, 265; In re Herbert, 262 Fed. 682 (C. C. A.); Manning v. Perkins, 86 Me. 419, 29 Atl. 1114; Everett ". O'Leary, 90 Minn. 154, 95 N. W. 901; O'Connor v. Ætna L. Ins. Co., 67 Neb. 122, 93 N. W. 137, 99 N. W. 845; Woodland Oil Co. v. Byers, 223 Pa. 241, 72 Atl. 518, 132 Am. St. 737.

before the statutory period begins, for by the nature of such a contract there is no breach until there is damage. 35 On the other hand, if the promise is to pay a debt or discharge the debtor from liability, a right of action is complete and the statute begins to run as soon as the debt is due and unpaid.35 Conversely, a cause of action may not accrue until long after damage has been caused or services rendered or money owed, if the law or the contract interposes a condition precedent to the right to bring suit and the condition has not been satisfied. 36

§ 2005. There must be in existence parties and tribunal for enforcement.

No right of action accrues within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations until there is not only a theoretical breach of duty but also a legal possibility that some one exists who can enforce the right and another against whom it can be enforced. 37

35 Collinge v. Heywood, 6 Ad. & E. 633; Tunstall v. Bartlett, 14 L. T. R. 400; Gilbert v. Selleck (Conn.), 106 Atl. 430; Parker v. Dickson, 88 N. J. L. 443, 97 Atl. 46.

In Northern Assurance Co. v. Borgelt, 67 Neb. 282, 286, 93 N. W. 226, the court said: "A cause of action accrues upon a bond conditioned to do a certain act as soon as there is a default in performance, whether the obligee has suffered damage or not. If, however, the bond is conditioned to indemnify, damage must be shown before the party indemnified is entitled to recover, so that a cause of action accrues, not from the date of the act which causes damage, but from the time when pecuniary loss ensues thereon. Wilson v. Stilwell, 9 Ohio St. 467, 75 Am. Dec. 477; American Building, etc., Assoc. v. Waleen, 52 Minn. 23, 53 N. W. 867; Gilbert v. Wiman, 1 N. Y. 550, 49 Am. Dec. 359; Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 18 L. Ed. 752; Hicks v. Hoos, 44 Mo. App. 571, 579; Terre Haute & I. R.

Co. v. Peoria, etc., R. Co., 81 Ill. App. 455."

35a In re Herbert, 262 Fed. 682 (C. C. A.).

36 A statute in Massachusetts gives a creditor the right to recover "from the proceeds of the policy" the amount of premiums, paid by the insured while insolvent, on a life insurance policy, subject to the Statute of Limitations. It was held that the statutory period on such payments did not begin to run until the death of the insured, since until then there were no proceeds. York v. Flaherty, 210 Mass. 35, 96 N. E. 53. See also Lehman v. Gunn, 124 Ala. 213, 27 So. 475, 51 L. R. A. 112, 82 Am. St. Rep. 159; Tonkin v. Baum, 114 Pa. 414, 7 Atl. 185.

Therefore, where a cause of action has not accrued until after the death of the person whose representative becomes entitled as such to the right of action, the statute will not begin to run until after grant of administration, 38 and where a cause of action has not accrued until after the debtor's death, the statute does not begin to run until administration of the decedent's estate has been granted.39 So while the debtor, an ambassador, is exempt from suit when the debt arises, the statute will not begin to run. 40