tax for

able repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for public travel such township, village or city is hereby authorized to levy such additional sum upon the taxable property Additional of such township, village or city, not exceeding five mills on repairs. the dollar, in any one year, as will enable such township, village or city to keep its public highways, streets, bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, and culverts in good repair at all times. Highway commissioners, together with the township board, and all other officers having special charge of highways, streets, bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, and culverts, and the care or repairing thereof, are hereby made and declared to be the officers of the township, village, city, or corporation wherein they are elected or appointed, and shall be subject to the general direction of such township, village, city or corporate authorities in the discharge of their several duties.

REASONABLE REPAIR: The later enactments substituted "reasonable" for "good" and indicated a purpose to prevent any responsibility for more vigilance than reasonable care requires. McArthur v. Saginaw, 58 / 360. See Weisse v. Detroit, 105/484; Phalen v. Detroit, 126 / 683. The duty to keep the highways, streets and sidewalks in reasonable repair, refers only to the traveled way, and does not impose upon a city an obligation to trim trees growing between the sidewalk and curb in a public street.--Miller v. City of Detroit, 156 / 630; Patow v. Village of Oakwood, 176/351; Lamb v. Village of Clam Lake, 175/77.

SAFE AND FIT FOR TRAVEL: The statute makes a city liable not only for injuries occurring through neglect to keep the streets in repair, but also such as occur by reason of the neglect of the city to keep its streets in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel; and if, in so doing, it becomes necessary to place signals or other safeguards at certain points, or give other proper warning, the city must see that it is done or the street closed for travel-Joslyn v. Detroit, 74/458; Malloy v. Walker Twp.. 77/460. This protection to the public travel extends also to members of a city fire department and the city is fiable in damages to one who is injured on account of a street being out of repair. Coots v. Detroit, 75 / 628. The statute is imperative to make a road reasonably safe, and whether it is so safe and fit for travel is a question for the jury-Malloy v. Walker Twp. 77/462 This act does not require streets and highways to be kept absolutely safe.-Harris v. Clinton Twp., 64/447; Woodbury v. Owosso, 64/245; Shippey v. Au Sable, 65 / 501; Bigelow v. Kalamazoo, 97/124; Weisse v. Detroit, 105 / 486. The safety required by the statute is secured to travelers as well by night as by day, and the dangers surrounding the traveler in the darkness of night are conditions that should be taken into consideration by the authorities whose duty it is to construct and keep in repair the roadway. Sebert v. Alpena, 78 / 167. On the question of what is, or is not "reasonably safe," consult Schrader v. Pt. Huron, 106/173; Yotter v. Detroit, 107/4; White v. Riley, 113 / 295; Perkins v. Delaware Twp., 113/377; Minkley v. Springwells Twp., 113/347; Shaw v. Saline Twp., 113/342. Where streets are undergoing repair.- Beattie v. Detroit, 137 / 319. It is the duty of a municipality to keep its streets reasonably safe and fit for travel, and it is not relieved of that duty because the street is made unsafe by the act of third persons.-Davis v. Adrian City, 147 / 301. Extra assessments. --Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 140/185. A city is not chargeable with negligence for permitting a depression, three inches deep and about the area of a washtub, to exist in its asphalt pavement.- Jones v. City of Detroit, 171 / 608. When a sidewalk is reasonably safe.-Baker v. City of Detroit, 166597.

DEGREE OF CARE: Municipalities must exercise, through their officers, a reasonable supervision over its ways and bridges, and, within fairly practicable limits, to be watchful of their condition and safety. Medina Twp. v. Perkins, 48/71-2; Dotton v. Albion, 50 / 129. It is neglect which renders them liable. Davis v. Jackson, 61/530; Moore v. Kenockee Twp., 75 / 332. Township and city officers are required to exercise only ordinary care and prudence and reasonable intelligence in performing their duty of supervising the condition of roads and bridges and keeping them in repair.--Medina Twp. v. Perkins, 48/72; Stebbins v. Keene Twp., 55 / 557; Woodbury v. Owosso, 64/239 ; Moore v. Kenockee Twp., 75 / 332. A great deal fairly depends on local usage in determining duties concerning highways in winter.-McKellar v. Detroit, 57/161. See McKormick v. West Bay City, 110 / 265.

ROADWAY: It is the roadway that the statute requires to be kept in a reasonably safe condition; and whether such way requires the use of the entire width of the street must depend entirely upon the necessities of travel in any given case, and of this the authorities of a township or city must take notice at their peril.Sebert v. Alpena, 78 / 168. It is the right of the municipality to determine what part of the highways shall be devoted to the uses of public travel and passage and what part for sidewalks, trees, gutters, etc.-McArthur v. Saginaw, 58 / 359. See Keyes v. Marcellus, 50/439. Where there is nothing upon the surface of a highway to give notice or knowledge that a hole was

Highway

officers de

clared officers

of township.

being eaten away underneath by water, a township is not chargeable with negli gence, by a person breaking through and receiving an injury.-Wakeman v. St. Clair Twp., 91 / 17.

BRIDGES: When it is generally known that a bridge has become decrepit. or when it has stood so long that there is much suspicion of it, the officers of the township may not disregard the warning conveyed by these circumstances and think to excuse their neglect to take action on the ground of having had no actual notice of a dangerous infirmity.-Medina Twp. v. Perkins, 48/72: Campbell v. Kalamazoo, 80/661. But the law does not impose an impracticable rule of duty. Township officers are not expected to be experts, nor learned engineers, nor persons liberally instructed in mechanics, nor individuals equipped with the resources of experienced specialists, and nothing more can be demanded of them than reasonable intelligence and ordinary care and prudence.—Id. While it is necessary that every bridge constructed shall be made safe, as far as the uses for which it is designed are concerned, yet it does not follow that it must be adapted to all possible uses. Nor can it be expected that its designers will anticipate uses which have not been known and necessities not within ordinary experience.-Fulton I. & E. Works v. Kimball Twp, 52/150. But when a bridge is built upon a plan adapted to allow the passage of heavy weights, such as portable engines, the township is bound to keep it in such repair as is required of such a bridge (distinguishing from Fulton I. & E. Works v. Kimball Twp.)-Stebbins v. Keene Twp., 60 / 214. See further as to bridges, Blank v. Livonia, 79/1; McKeller v. Monitor Twp., 78/845; Scharman v. Bay Co. Bridge Commission, 158/77. Boos v. Twp. of Northfield, 186 / 387. Authority to repair.-Pearl v. Benton Twp., 136 / 697.

SIDEWALKS: Actionable defects.-Bennett v. St. Joseph City, 146 / 382 See Welton v. Crystal Twp., 152/486; McIntyre v. Kalamazoo, 154/301. Notice to street commissioner of a village of defects in a walk is notice to the village.--Weitzel v. Fowler Village, 143 / 700. In unincorporated villages, county not made responsible for defects in sidewalks of, by adoption of county road system. Ferguson v. Muskegon Co., 181 / 335. See also Brown v. City of St. Johns, 187 / 641.

CROSSWALKS: The statute does not impose the duty upon a city to construct crosswalks, but to keep them in repair when once built.-Williams v. Grand Rapids, 59/51. If crosswalks are constructed in unincorporated villages and the public are thereby induced to use them, they become for such use parts of the traveled way, and the township must be held liable in case they are suffered to become unsafe and dangerous.-Frary v. Allen Twp., 91/669. A crosswalk, in order to fall within the protection of the statute, need not necessarily span the entire street.-Frary v. Allen Twp., 91 / 670. The construction of a crosswalk in accordance with the requirements of the locality, adopting the means usually adopted, and which are best adapted for the convenience of the public, cannot be said to be negligent construction. A crosswalk must be reasonably safe, in view of the purpose for which it is constructed, the necessary uses of the street and all the varying conditions.-Bigelow v. Kalamazoo, 97 / 123. Village authorities have the right to determine how their crosswalks shall be built.-Shippey v. Au Sable, 65 / 494.

CARE AND CONTROL: Highways or bridges within the limits of an incorporated village are not always under the care and control of the village authorities. (Quinlan v. Manistique, 85 / 22.) The words "under their care and control" must be held to be intended to exempt villages so situated from liability.-Frary v. Allen Twp., 91 / 669.

DEFECTS: Township officers must be on the watch for hidden defects in township bridges, and their neglect of reasonable and ordinary effective watchfulness will make the township liable for injuries resulting from such defects.-Stebbins v. Keene Twp., 55 / 557. See Carver v. D. & S. P. R. Co., 61/590; Sebert v. Alpena, 78/165.

OBJECTS LEFT IN STREETS: As to an injury to a horse from stepping on one of the several cobble stones scattered about the street, the supreme court was equally divided and the action of the circuit judge in taking the case from the jury was not disturbed.-McCool v. Grand Rapids, 58 / 41. See Agnew r Corunna, 55/428; McArthur v. Saginaw, 58 / 361. When a municipal corporation is negligent for permitting the obstruction of a street by a pile of crushed stone and sand.-Walls v. City of Detroit, 171 / 612.

SNOW AND ICE: This act applies only to injuries that are due to a way's being out of repair and not to such as are caused by the mere accumulation of ice and snow.-McKellar v. Detroit, 57/158; Hutchinson v. Ypsilanti, 103 / 13; Rolf v. Greenville, 102/544; Kannenburg v. Alpena, 96/53. See Canfield v Railway Co., 78/356; Black v. Manistee, 107 / 60; Gavett v. Jackson, 109 / 408 See Pringle v. Detroit, 152/445; Jefferson v. City of Sault Ste Marie, 166/340. But a township may be liable if it constructs a public road in such a manner as to be unsafe whenever covered with a natural accumulation of ice and snow.Stanton v. Township of Webster, 170/428. See Lubbers v. Township of Manlius, 172/387; Mayo v. Village of Baraga, 178/171.

HOLE BESIDE ROAD: A stump had been left beside a road leading from a village to the country and children had dug a hole near the stump. A woman in the dark started to go across lots and fell into the hole. Held that this was not a defect which the village authorities were bound to remedy, if they did not suppose the needs of public travel required it.--Keys v. Marcellus, 50 / 439.

WHEN MUST BE CLOSED: The law was not meant to apply to highways in progress of construction or repair. A city while grading and paving a street must close to public travel that portion thereby rendered unfit or unsafe, in order to suspend the duty imposed by statute to keep its streets which are open to public travel in good repair. And the same rule would apply to a highway or

bridge in the country.-Southwell v. Detroit, 74 / 438. See Joslyn v. Detroit, 74/460; Speck v. Township of Bruce, 166/550. See Beattie v. Detroit, 137/319.

PLAN OF CONSTRUCTION: Municipalities have the right to determine for themselves the plan and manner of constructing their streets, bridges, crosswalks, etc., and will not be liable merely because the plan is defective or not so good as some other might be.-Shippey v. Au Sable, 65/500; Williams v. Grand Rapids, 59/51; Davis v. Jackson, 61/500; Fulton I. & E. Works v. Kimball Twp., 52/150. But this statute cannot be given a construction that would relieve a municipality from liability by saying that it had adopted a method of construction and had built according to that plan. A municipality cannot construct a road, not safe and convenient for public travel, and shield itself behind its legislative power to adopt a plan and method of building.-Malloy v. Walker, 77/462; Bigelow v. Kalamazoo, 97/127. See also, Sebert v. Alpena, 78 / 165; Barron v. Detroit, 94/601.

(309) § 4587. SEC. 4. The provisions of this act shall not apply to public highways which have not been in use ten years; but nothing in this section shall be construed as exempting townships, villages and cities from maintaining their streets, bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks and culverts, and the approaches to bridges in a safe condition for public travel.

TEN YEARS: The first clause withholds the remedy as to all public highways which have not been in use ten years.-McKeller v. Monitor Twp., 78/491. This same principle was applied in the case of a village street.Clark v. North Muskegon, 88/309. See also Gage v. Pittsfield Twp., 120 / 436. But later it was held that this provision applies only to public highways in townships; and, as to sidewalks, a city is bound to keep them in safe condition for public travel from the time they are built and opened for travel.-Fuller v. Mayor, etc., 92/199. See Schelske v. Orange Twp., 147 / 135.

Act not to aphighways.

ply to certain

Liability of

municipality under act.

(310) § 4588. SEC. 5. No township, village or city in this state shall be liable in damages, or otherwise, to any person or persons for bodily injury, or for injury to any property sustained upon any of the public highways, streets, bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks or culverts, in such townships, villages or cities, except under and according to the provisions of this act, and the common law liability of townships, villages and cities of this state, for or on account of bodily injuries sus- Common law tained by any person by reason of neglect to keep in repair abrogated. public highways, streets, bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks or culverts, is hereby abrogated.

COMMON LAW LIABILITY: The supreme court of this state held that there was no common law liability, but the federal courts have held otherwise. This section was aimed at the holding of the federal courts, which enabled a non-resident to recover, while an inhabitant of this state had no remedy.Racho y. Detroit, 90/96; Face v. Ionia, 90/108. See also Roberts v. Detroit, 102/64; Forsyth v. Saginaw, 158/201.

(311) § 4589. SEC. 6. If said public highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, crosswalk or culvert is in a condition which is not reasonably safe and fit for travel either by persons, animals or vehicles, because of defects in the original construction, then it shall not be necessary to show that any notice thereof was brought to the attention of such township, village or city, before a recovery can be had. If the defect is caused by said highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, crosswalk or culvert becoming out of repair, it shall be conclusively presumed that the township, village or city had notice thereof and a reasonable time in which to repair the same, provided said defect has existed for a period of thirty days or longer.

liability

Defects in struction.

original con

Notice

unnecessary.

Conclusive presumption.

Service of written notice

unnecessary.

Actual

constructive

notice.

Written

notice within sixty days.

What to specify.

(312) § 4590. SEC. 7. In the event any person shall sus tain an injury either to his person or property upon any defective highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, crosswalk or culvert, because of the defective condition thereof as herein provided, it shall not be necessary before such person can recover damages therefor to show that any written notice was served upon the township, village or city or any officers thereof, of such defective condition before the injury took place, but in cases where a notice is necessary, in order to make such town ship, village or city liable, either actual or constructive notice shall be sufficient.

(313) § 4591. SEC. 8. In the event damages are sus tained by any person, either by bodily injuries or to his property, because of the defective condition of any highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, crosswalk or culvert in any city or incorporated village of this state where written notice of such inquiry and defect is now required by law to be served upon such village or city before recovery can be had, it will be nec essary to show that such person did serve written notice upon said city or village within sixty days from the time of the How served. happening of such injury. Said notice may be served upon any member of the common council, city or village clerk, board of public works, street commissioner, marshal or other city or village officer, except policeman or fireman. The notice will specify the location and nature of said defect, the injury sustained, and the names of the witnesses known at the time Witnesses be- by claimant. If required by the common council or committee thereof, said claimant shall produce his witnesses before said common council or committee, and they may be sworn and examined as to the nature of the claim, the amount thereof, and the extent of the injury. The common council or committee shall have power to subpoena witnesses for such hearing. No other or further notice shall be required. The intent and purpose of the provisions of this chapter are to make the law of liability on the part of townships, villages and cities for injuries sustained by persons because of the defective condition of the highways and the procedure in giving notice thereof, uniform throughout the state, and to repeal all laws or acts of the legislature be the same general, local or special which are inconsistent with or contravening the provisions herein. All actions in court under this act must be brought within two years from the time said injury was sustained.

fore council.

Intent of chapter.

Limitation of action.

Drive to the right.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LAW OF THE ROAD.

(314) § 4592. SECTION 1. Whenever any persons shall meet each other on any bridge or road, traveling with carriages, wagons, carts, sleds, sleighs, or other vehicles, each person shall seasonably drive his carriage or other vehicle to

the right of the middle of the traveled part of such bridge or road, so that the respective carriages, or other vehicles aforesaid, may pass each other without interference.

See extracts from motor vehicle act, in sec. 553.

USE OF HIGHWAY: A highway is for the use of the general public for passage and traffic, and the restrictions upon its use are such only as are required to secure to the public the largest practical benefits from its use.Macomber v. Nichols, 34/212. And the use of them with horses, steam engines and other methods of transit is permissible if not inconsistent with present methods.-Id. And they must be used with regard to their lawful use by others.-People's Ice Co. v. The Excelsior, 44/229; Burford v. Grand Rapids, 53/98. Those using them for passage and travel have the first right; and their use must not be obstructed if it can be avoided.---Id. The "traveled part of the road" means that part which is wrought for traveling, and is not confined simply to the most traveled wheel track.-Daniels v. Clegg, 28 / 33. The rights of travelers on a public highway are mutual and co-ordinate, and it is the duty of each to so use his right of passage as not to cause injury or detriment to another having a like right.-Pigott v. Engle, 60 / 221.

KEEP TO THE RIGHT: In the use of a public highway one has a right to expect from others ordinary prudence and to rely upon that in determining his own means of using the road; he may travel upon any portion of it except when he is about to meet and to pass another vehicle, when he must seasonably turn to the right of the middle of the traveled part of the road. Daniels v. Clegg, 28/32. Where a jury finds that a party was traveling in a beaten track there can be no finding that he was on the wrong side of the road.-Joslin v. LeBaron, 44 / 160.

FAST DRIVING: Potter v. Moran, 61/61. Fast driving an ambulance upon a public street.-People v. Little, 86/125. Negligent driving.-Hill v. Snyder, 44/318; Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice and Coal Co., 53/322; Williams v. Edmunds, 75/92; Post v. U. S. Express Co., 76/574; Boick v. Bissell, 80/261; Lazell v. Kapp, 83/39; Tyler v. Nelson, 109 / 37.

(315) § 4593. SEC. 2. Every person offending against Penalty. the provisions of the preceding section, shall, for each offense, forfeit a sum not exceeding twenty dollars, and shall also be liable to the party injured for all damages sustained by reason of such offense: Provided, That proceedings shall be Proviso, sults commenced for the recovery of such forfeiture within three months after the offense shall have been committed, and any action for such damages shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action shall have accrued.

(316) § 4594. SEC. 3. No person owning, or having the direction or control of any coach, or other carriage or vehicle running or traveling upon any road in this state, for the conveyance of passengers, shall employ, or continue in employment, any person to drive such coach, carriage, or other vehicle, who is addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors; and if any such person shall violate the provisions of this section, he shall forfeit at the rate of five dollars per day for all the time during which he shall have kept such driver in such employment.

for recovery.

Unlawful to addicted to employ driver drink.

charge driver.

(317) § 4595. SEC. 4. If any driver, while actually em- Owner to disployed in driving such coach, carriage, or vehicle, shall be guilty of intoxication, it shall be the duty of the owner or person having charge or control of such coach, carriage, or other vehicle, on receiving written notice of the fact, signed by any passenger who witnessed the same, and certified by him under oath, forthwith to discharge such driver from such employment; and every person who shall retain, or have in such service, within six months after the receipt of such notice, any driver who shall have been so intoxicated, shall forfeit at the rate of five dollars per day for all the time