tunately, however, this did not take place; and for several nights after the army was before Flushing, the enemy succeeded in throwing from the opposite coast, probably from the canal of Ghent, considerable reinforcements into the place, which enabled him constantly to annoy our out-posts and working parties, and finally to attempt a sally in force, though happily, from the valour of your majesty's troops, without success. I have already stated that Rammekins surrendered on the evening of the 3d of August. Immediately upon this event, feeling, as I did, great uneasiness at the delay which had already taken place, and the departure from the original plan, I wrote a letter to the admiral, then at Ter Veer, expressing my hope that the ships would now be able to enter the West Scheldt by the Sloe passage, and that no time should be lost in pressing forward as speedily as possible our further operations; and I requested at the same time that he would communicate to me the extent of naval co-operation he could afford, as well for the future blockade of Flashing, as with a view to protecting the coast of South Beveland, and watching the passages from the Meuse to the East Scheidt, as this consideration would govern very much the extent of force I must leave in South Beveland, when the army advanced... To this letter he did not seply fully till the 8th of August; but had a note from him on the 5th, assuring me: the transports should be brought forward without delay and I had also a very long conversation with him on the morning of the 6th, on the arrangements to be taken for our further opera

tions; when I urged, in the strongest manner, the necessity of not losing a moment in bringing up the cavalry aird ordnance ships, transports, store ships, victuallers, &c. in order that the armament might proceed without delay to its destination; and I added my hopes, that they would receive the protec tion of the ships of war, none of which had yet entered the West Scheldt. The frigates, however, did not pass Flushing till the evening of the eleventh, and the line of battle ships only passed to the anchorage above Fiushing on the fourteenth, the second day of the bonbardment. These ships began to proceed up the river on the eighteenth, and arrived on the nineteenth; one division as high as the bay below Waerden, the other off the Hauswent, where they remained; the Courageux passed above Batz; the cavalry ships only got through the Sloe passage into the West Scheldt from the twentieth to the twenty-third, and arrived off Batz on the twenty-second and twentyfourth; the ordnance ships, and store ships passed through from the twenty-second to the twenty-third, aud arrived at their destination off Batz on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth; the transports for Lieutenant General Grosvenor's division only came up to receive them on the nineteenth, on which day they embarked; and those for Major General Graham's division, on the twentieth and twenty-first; and they arrived off Batz on the twentyfourth. The corps of Brigadier General Rottenburgh, and the light battalions of the German legion, proceeded to join the Earl of Rosslyn's division in South Beveland. From this statement your majesty

will see, that notwithstanding every effort on my part with the admiral, the armament was not assembled at the point of its destination till the twenty-fifth, and of course that the means of commencing operations sooner against Antwerp were never in my power. It now became at this advanced period my duty to consider very seriously the expediency of landing the army on the continent. On comparing all the intelligence obtained as to the strength of the enemy, it appeared to be such as to leave (as stated in my dispatch of the twenty-ninth of August) no reasonable prospect of success to the force under my command, after accomplishing the preliminary operations of reducing Fort Lillo as well as Liefkenshoek, on the opposite side of Antwerp, with-out the possession of which the destruction of the ships and arsenals of the enemy could not be effected; and in addition to this, the sickness which had begun to attack the army about the twentieth, and which was hourly increasing to an alarming extent, created the most serious apprehensions in the minds of the medical men, as to its further progress, at that unhealthy season, and which fatal experience has since shown to have been too well founded. Your majesty will not be surprised if, under these circumstances, I paused in requiring the admiral to put the army on shore. That a landing might have been made, and that any force which had been opposed to us in the field would have yielded to the superior valour of British troops, I have no doubt: but then, any such success could have been of no avail towards the attainment of the ultimate object; and there was still less chance that

the enemy would have given us the opportunity. Secure in his fortress, he had a surer game to play; for if ever the army, divided as it must necessarily have been in order to occupy both banks of the river, exposed to the effect of inundation on every side, and with all its communications liable to be cut off, while the force of the enemy was daily and hourly increasing, had once sat down before Antwerp, it is unnecessary for me to point out to your majesty how critical must in a short time have been their situation. But when, added to this, sickness to an alarming extent had begun to spread itself among the troops, and the certain and fatal progress of which, at that season, was but too well ascertained, it appeared to me that all further advance could only tend to commit irretrievably the safety of the army which your majesty had confided to me, and which every principle of military duty, as well as the direct tenour of my instructions, alike forbade.

are said to have rendered it "so clear and evident," were not such as he was competent to appreciate. Upon the second point, Why the army was not sooner assembled at Batz, to recommence further operations, the gallant admiral enters into a long, and we think, satifactory explanation. He says that the original determination of landing in Zoutland Bay was laid aside while at Deal, and another plan for landing on Domburgh Beach adopted; but in consequence of a strong westerly wind, the landing there was impossible, and it became necessary to take shelter in the Roompot and Veergat, where the constant succession of gales for many days made it impossible, independently of other obstacles, to recur to the original intention of entering the western mouth of the Scheldt. The disembarkation was ultimately effected. Sir Richard then proceeds: "When, therefore, Lord Chatham contends in his statement, that the second point, namely, why the army was not brought up sooner to the destination from whence all its operations were to commence, is purely a naval consideration,' his position is certainly true in words, but as certainly incorrect in its implied meaning. It is obvious that the army might have marched to Batz in the course of a few days; but it is also obvious that it could not be conveyed on board a fleet of 400 transports, besides frigates, sloops, and flotilla, through a very intricate channel, without some delay. The difficulty of conducting such a fleet at all through the mazes of such a navigation, can only be appreciated by professional men; it was very greatly increased by an adverse wind,

blowing for some time with such violence as to render the expedient of warping the only means of proceeding) totally impracticable; such obstacles to our progress were only to be overcome by great exertions and perseverance, by a considerable, but not, as I trust, an unnecessary expenditure of labour and time." The gallant admiral totally denies the assertion that an agreement was entered into for a stimultaneous attack by sea and land upon Flushing, for the purpose of avoiding the delay of a regular siege: it was impossible, he says, for such an agreement to have been made; as, under the well-ascertained circumstances of the garrison, it was too desperate an enterprise to be entertained. He thinks, however, that if the plan he had suggested had been adopted, namely, to land the cavalry on South Beveland, and select a limited number of transports-that a delay of only a few days would have resulted from the adverse accident which gave a different course to the direction of our operations. The first part of the flotilla which got through the Slough were applied to the cutting off the communication between Cadsand and Flushing. It was not until the 7th of August that the sea blockade of Flushing could be established, owing to the adverse winds; and all the other parts of the naval service were expedited as soon as the various difficulties could be overcome. Sir Richard then concludes: "From this period I considered myself bound implicitly to accede to the wishes of the commander-in-chief. With him alone was there an option between a march of thirty-six hours and a voyage of indefinite length.

I trust

touching his proceedings in the execution of such warrants; the notices of the speaker referred to your committee; the demand made upon the serjeant-at-armis of a copy of the warrant under which he arrested Sir Francis Burdett; the writ served upon the serjeant, and the summons served upon the speaker, and the notice of declaration filed against the serjeant; which said notices, demand, writ, and summons, are all at the suit or on behalf of the said Sir Francis Burdett, and all bear the name of the same solicitor, John Ellis:-That the said proceedings have been brought against the speaker and the serjeant on account of what was done by them respectively in obedience to the order of the house; and for the purpose of bringing into question, before a court of law, the legality of the proceedings of the house in ordering the commitment of Sir Francis Burdett, and of the conduct of the speaker and the serjeant, in obedience to that order.

I. Your committee, not in consequence of any doubt upon the question so intended to be raised, but for the purpose of collecting into one view such precedents of the proceedings of the house, upon cases of breach of privilege, as might afford light upon this important subject, have in the first place examined the journals, with relation to the practice of the house in commitment of persons, whether members or others, for breaches of privilege, by offensive words or writings derogatory to the honour and character of the house, or of any of its members; and they have found numerous instances, in the history of parliament, so far as the journals extend, of the frequent,

uniform, and uninterrupted praetice of the House of Commons to commit to different custodies, persons whom they have adjudged guilty of a breach of their privileges. by so offending.

The statement of these prece dents, which establish the law of parliament upon this point by the usage of parliament; the utility of such law; and the necessity which exists for its continuance, in order to maintain the dignity and independence of the House of Commons; its analogy to the acknowledged powers of courts of justice, and the recognition of such rights in various instances, by legal authorities, by judicial decisions, and by the other branch of the legislature; as well as the invariable assertion and maintenance of it by the House of Commons, are topies which may be reserved for a further report. And although there are some instances in which the House has thought fit to direct prosecutions for such offences, yet the committee confidently state, that the more frequent practice of the House, at all times, has been to vindicate its own privileges by its own authority.

II. The subject which appears to your committee to press most urgently for an immediate report, is the state of the law and the practice of the House in cases either of criminal prosecution or civil action against any of its members, for any thing spoken or done in the House of Commons; or for any proceed, ing against any of its officers, or any other persons acting under its authority.

The principal instances to be found under this head arose out of those poceedings which, in the time of Charles the First, Charles the

Second,