may fail us; we should give more time to the study of tactics and should have more actual practice.

I am not yet convinced that it would be advisable to entirely wipe out the direct method of performing an evolution from our tactics. From personal observation, when the Columbia and Minneapolis were cruising in the same squadron, I can testify to the very uncomfortable sense of nearness which was felt when these two vessels were manoeuvring. Could we not modify or use the distance with a sliding scale to fit the ships which compose the fleet? Unquestionably the best results will be obtained in any practice with the best types of similar ships; but it seems to me that the theory of keeping "bows on" to an enemy is a good one.

It would seem, as the essayist admits, that an admiral would hesitate some time before signalling a vessel to expose her broadside to an enemy when that enemy is approaching, which would be necessary in performing the rectangular method, for by so doing he gives the greatest target possible and exposes it to the heaviest fire from the enemy, which will not interfere in any way with the enemy's advance. By training his turret but a few degrees he covers the ship which is performing the rectangular movement within the range of his heavy guns only. The rectangular movement is undoubtedly safer, and for ordinary manœuvres gives officers an opportunity of learning the capabilities of their ships, but when they have mastered these points, surely they should try the next step and drill with the direct movement, which will involve more care. To my mind the advantage carried with it more than outweighs, at times, the risk which will be incurred with extreme types of ships such as the Columbia and Minneapolis, although we are not likely to repeat the experiment of building any more of this class. It seems hardly fair to condemn the method because two extreme examples seem to interfere with the practice of it. When the tactics were written this type of vessels was overlooked, and in this special case it would seem as if these vessels might well be relegated to their original functions, viz.: commercedestroying, and keep them out of the fighting line. They are not strong either offensively or defensively; then why harass the remainder of the line with a type which does not belong there? Let us change the distances if necessary, but let us retain the direct movement, which, with practice, could, in certain cases, be made an effective one.

It will depend on circumstances which formation will be more advantageous to use, and I frankly admit that the essayist's reasons for using the rectangular as much as possible are excellent. I simply plead that both should be retained in the tactics and practiced. I will also admit that I have tried to imagine formations where the direct method would be so much better than the rectangular that it would justify the additional care which would be necessary to perform it, but I have been unable to think of more than a very few cases.

I fully agree with the essayist in thinking that the more we can reduce the need of signals in action, as well as insure certainty of being able to

It would be interesting to see experiments with some method of day fireworks. The Japanese are clever in showing floating shapes of horses, boats, etc., in the air, and we might make use of paper shapes which would float in the air to indicate numbers or even well-known manœuvres.

The smoke may interfere at times, but these would be more likely to be visible than any system of flags or shapes which we could hoist on board ship, and in closer quarters the whistle would be used.

There is no question in my mind that an admiral or captain would be unable to remain cooped up in the present conning-tower during an action. He would require a position from which he could see more, and if we cannot improve the present tower, might we not materially increase his power of observation by having a second tower aft? There a subordinate would be stationed who should be in direct communication with the other tower. Both towers should be fitted with the same instruments, and perhaps it might be well to have the captain of the ship and the navigator in the after tower and the admiral and his chief-of-staff in the forward one. It is surely better to separate those who will succeed to the command in case of accident to the commanding officer.

Another point which the essayist has touched on lightly, but which would seem to merit a little more attention, is the following: "We do not know the tactical qualities of many of the newer ships, and it is not good policy to publish the tactical data of those now in commission." Knowledge of the tactical data of an enemy's ships would be of great advantage in or before an action. Let us then cherish the little we have found out about our ships and throw at least this obstacle in the way of an enemy knowing as much as we do. We invite foreign officers, naval and military attachés, to our gun tests; armor and steel contractors are so anxious to advertise their products that they give all possible information in regard to them, and the contractors for our ships are equally ready to furnish foreigners with information to show the handiness of the vessels they have built. Are we not a little too willing to give foreigners all the data they request?

The essayist's diagrams of gun-fire and effectiveness of ships give an excellent idea of the powers of the various types of ships.

As regards the manoeuvre of "charging through" an enemy's line, which is claimed to be the great desideratum to be striven for, I do not entirely agree. That such a movement may be advantageous at times is evident, but it would seem that the second or third line of weaker ships would be in a most embarrassing position should the enemy turn short under their sterns and form column, provided, of course, that the lighter vessels could survive an action at such close quarters as they would be exposed to in passing between two of an enemy's ships. Another point which seems worthy of consideration: would not the fire of our own adjacent ships be likely to prove decidedly uncomfortable, if not actually dangerous, to our friends? We aim to hit our enemy, of course, but even at such close quarters an error of a few degrees would carry a projectile clear of an enemy's top works and land it in a friend's side. If,

our ships, would not this be our time to use them from the forward broadside tubes? There is a risk of their being struck before they leave their tubes, but the risk is really no greater than at any other time when they are carried in action. There will only be a short time that the tubes will be a target for an enemy's guns, whereas in column they are exposed fully from 45 degrees forward to 45 degrees abaft the beam. In this formation only the 45 degrees forward will be the dangerous zone when an enemy approaches from the bow. It would seem as if the torpedo would prove less dangerous to our friends in the "charge through" than the gun-fire. With fleets of about equal power, the charge through might be advisable; with the superior fleet it would be likely to prove most advantageous; but with a slightly inferior fleet the manoeuvring to cut off part of the other fleet would be the wiser course to pursue.

In closing I should like to join my voice with that of the essayist and second most heartily what he says in his closing paragraph in regard to the utility of the Naval War College.

Lieut.-Comdr. RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. N.-Lieutenant Niblack's essay is a most valuable contribution to the art of naval tactics, and will be read with interest by all students of that branch of the profession of a naval officer. In the following sentence he sounds the keynote of fleet tactics: "The object of all manœuvres in a fleet action is to get and keep the enemy within effective range; to blank some of his gun-fire by getting a superior position; to hold an advantage gained, or, losing it, to manoeuvre for a fresh one." Holding this in mind as the introduction to 31 tactical propositions, one is naturally surprised by the 24th, which is as follows: "Under average conditions, the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line in some form or other. If the enemy is not in line also, and a charge through is not practicable, column will probably be used until a charge through, line to line, can be forced on the enemy." This is more fully explained under the heading "The Fleet in Action on the Open Sea”; on page 21 is the following sentence: "3d. The attack.-It will be a surprise to many to meet with the statement that a charge through, line to line, with the enemy, should be eagerly sought for and tactically striven for. If, in the approach, the enemy is not in line there is no use remaining long in line, for if he is in any other formation, column is the best form of attack under most conditions. To remain in line, the enemy being in any other formation, is to invite a concentrated attack on either flank." In other words, the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line, and charge through with both fleets in that formation should be eagerly sought for. Does this agree with "the object of all fleet manoeuvres," as stated in the opening sentence? Is there any attempt to get a superior position, to blank some of the enemy's gun-fire or to gain an advantage? Both fleets being equal in all points, the charge through leaves the advantage to be gained to the chances of a lucky shot. Most of the propositions and conclusions of the essayist are

It would be interesting to see experiments with some method of day fireworks. The Japanese are clever in showing floating shapes of horses, boats, etc., in the air, and we might make use of paper shapes which would float in the air to indicate numbers or even well-known manœuvres. The smoke may interfere at times, but these would be more likely to be visible than any system of flags or shapes which we could hoist on board ship, and in closer quarters the whistle would be used.

There is no question in my mind that an admiral or captain would be unable to remain cooped up in the present conning-tower during an action. He would require a position from which he could see more, and if we cannot improve the present tower, might we not materially increase his power of observation by having a second tower aft? There a subordinate would be stationed who should be in direct communication with the other tower. Both towers should be fitted with the same instruments, and perhaps it might be well to have the captain of the ship and the navigator in the after tower and the admiral and his chief-of-staff in the forward one. It is surely better to separate those who will succeed to the command in case of accident to the commanding officer.

Another point which the essayist has touched on lightly, but which would seem to merit a little more attention, is the following: "We do not know the tactical qualities of many of the newer ships, and it is not good policy to publish the tactical data of those now in commission." Knowledge of the tactical data of an enemy's ships would be of great advantage in or before an action. Let us then cherish the little we have found out about our ships and throw at least this obstacle in the way of an enemy knowing as much as we do. We invite foreign officers, naval and military attachés, to our gun tests; armor and steel contractors are so anxious to advertise their products that they give all possible information in regard to them, and the contractors for our ships are equally ready to furnish foreigners with information to show the handiness of the vessels they have built. Are we not a little too willing to give foreigners all the data they request?

The essayist's diagrams of gun-fire and effectiveness of ships give an excellent idea of the powers of the various types of ships.

As regards the manoeuvre of "charging through an enemy's line, which is claimed to be the great desideratum to be striven for, I do not entirely agree. That such a movement may be advantageous at times is evident, but it would seem that the second or third line of weaker ships would be in a most embarrassing position should the enemy turn short under their sterns and form column, provided, of course, that the lighter vessels could survive an action at such close quarters as they would be exposed to in passing between two of an enemy's ships. Another point which seems worthy of consideration: would not the fire of our own adjacent ships be likely to prove decidedly uncomfortable, if not actually dangerous, to our friends? We aim to hit our enemy, of course, but even at such close quarters an error of a few degrees would carry a projectile clear of an enemy's top works and land it in a friend's side. If,

our ships, would not this be our time to use them from the forward broadside tubes? There is a risk of their being struck before they leave their tubes, but the risk is really no greater than at any other time when they are carried in action. There will only be a short time that the tubes will be a target for an enemy's guns, whereas in column they are exposed fully from 45 degrees forward to 45 degrees abaft the beam. In this formation only the 45 degrees forward will be the dangerous zone when an enemy approaches from the bow. It would seem as if the torpedo would prove less dangerous to our friends in the "charge through" than the gun-fire. With fleets of about equal power, the charge through might be advisable; with the superior fleet it would be likely to prove most advantageous; but with a slightly inferior fleet the manoeuvring to cut off part of the other fleet would be the wiser course to pursue.

In closing I should like to join my voice with that of the essayist and second most heartily what he says in his closing paragraph in regard to the utility of the Naval War College.

Lieut.-Comdr. RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. N.-Lieutenant Niblack's essay is a most valuable contribution to the art of naval tactics, and will be read with interest by all students of that branch of the profession of a naval officer. In the following sentence he sounds the keynote of fleet tactics: "The object of all manoeuvres in a fleet action is to get and keep the enemy within effective range; to blank some of his gun-fire by getting a superior position; to hold an advantage gained, or, losing it, to manoeuvre for a fresh one." Holding this in mind as the introduction to 31 tactical propositions, one is naturally surprised by the 24th, which is as follows: "Under average conditions, the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line in some form or other. If the enemy is not in line also, and a charge through is not practicable, column will probably be used until a charge through, line to line, can be forced on the enemy." This is more fully explained under the heading "The Fleet in Action on the Open Sea "; on page 21 is the following sentence: "3d. The attack.-It will be a surprise to many to meet with the statement that a charge through, line to line, with the enemy, should be eagerly sought for and tactically striven for. If, in the approach, the enemy is not in line there is no use remaining long in line, for if he is in any other formation, column is the best form of attack under most conditions. To remain in line, the enemy being in any other formation, is to invite a concentrated attack on either flank." In other words, the best initial formation for the approach to the attack is line, and charge through with both fleets in that formation should be eagerly sought for. Does this agree with "the object of all fleet manœuvres," as stated in the opening sentence? Is there any attempt to get a superior position, to blank some of the enemy's gun-fire or to gain an advantage? Both fleets being equal in all points, the charge through leaves the advantage to be gained to the chances of a lucky shot. Most of the propositions and conclusions of the essayist are