of the principal house. With regard to the other case of the Calcutta jute mills, which also has been so fully and elaborately gone into by my Lord, I am bound to say that at one time I thought this case also a strong one in favour of the appellants. The learned counsel put it very strongly, and summed up his arguments as to the result of the case in very clear and terse language. He said in fact this: The only transactions in England are the receipts of the amount transmitted for the payment of the English expenses and dividends, and the declaration of their amount and its division amongst the English shareholders. Again, I look at the articles of association and the case. The office was no doubt

66

lent to the company, or allowed to be used by them for the purpose; from that office would issue all the orders to the managing director in Calcutta, and no doubt until he received orders to the contrary he would have full power and discretion to do what he liked there; but at any moment they might from their head office have revoked his authority or altered any arrangement which he had made connected with the working of the company. The meetings were held in London. The operation of the company in London was, not to divide the money sent among the shareholders, but it was to declare the dividend." And I apprehend that within the meaning of that clause the directors in London, who had full power, might disapprove of the system upon which the division had been made, and require a different dividend for the future, thus showing that they exercise the authority and are the principal body, while the Calcutta direct or is only their agent for the purpose of the manufacture and sale of the jute, as the Cesena Company is the agent of the London company for the purpose of the manufacture of the sulphur. Mr. Matthews argued with great ingenuity that, assuming the place of business to be in England, still the only division of the profits here is to be a division of the profits earned by the English shareholders; and he argued that if this were a partnership, then, on the authority of Sully's case, the English portion of the partnership only would be liable to pay on the profits received by them, whereas the Indian portion would not have to pay on their profits. If this artificial being, a corporation, could be made a partnership, and every shareholder a partner, that argument would be in accordance with, as be said, natural justice, and would be very striking. But I fear the simple answer is this, that a corporation is not a partnership, and the shareholders are not partners. For these reasons I cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that the place of business of both these companies is in London, and that, therefore, they are within the provisions of the Income Tax Act.

KELLY, C.B.-This is, I think, the first time this question has been raised, and, looking to the peculiar circumstances of the case, I do not think that we ought to give costs to the Crown. Each party, therefore, will pay its own costs.

Judgment for the Crown in each case, with

out costs.

Solicitors for the Calcutta Jute Mills Company, Solicitors for the Cesena Sulphur Company, Nash, Field, and Matthews.

Solicitors for the Crown, The Solicitor of Inland Revenue.

[DIV. App.

DIVISIONAL COURT FOR APPEALS FROM INFERIOR COURTS.

Reported by M. W. MCKELLAR, J. M. LELY, and R. H. AMPHLETT, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

May 19 and 20, 1876.

(Before CLEASBY, B., and GROVE, J.)
COLLIER v. NORTH.

Statute 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, s. 42—Meaning of the word "town."

By 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, s. 42, any person who sells fish within the town of Rochdale, except in the market place (unless such sale take place from a shop or dwelling house), is liable to a penalty not exceeding 5l.

The respondent sold four herrings in an open-street, not in the market place. The street was a main thoroughfare with houses on both sides, in a populous part of the ancient municipal borough of Rochdale, and there was a continuous line of buildings from the market place to the street where the sale took place. When the Act was passed the street in question was not made, and the site of it was in fact green fields. There was no definition in the Act of the meaning of the expression "town of Rochdale." The justices refused to convict, being of opinion that the words "town of Rochdale' were limited to the town as it then existed, but stated a case for the opinion of the court.

Held, that the justices were wrong in refusing to convict, inasmuch as the section was intended to apply to all parts of what might be fairly termed the town of Rochdale, whether in existence at the time of the passing of the Act or not.

THIS was a case stated under the statute 20 & 21 Vict., c. 43.

At a petty session of the justices holden on the 22nd March 1876, at the Town Hall in Rochdale. Charles Collier, hereinafter called "the appellant," appeared before us in support of a summons issued on an information preferred by him against Bridget North, hereinafter called "the respondent," charging: "That she, on the 4th March 1876, at Molesworth-street, in the said borough, not then and there being in the old or new market place in the said borough, but within the town of Rochdale aforesaid, unlawfully did sell certain fish, to wit four berrings, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided."

And the said information was heard and determined by us at the said petty sessions, and upon such hearing we dismissed the said infor mation.

And whereas the appellant, being dissatisfied with our determination upon the hearing of the said information, as being erroneous in point of law, hath duly applied to us in writing to state and sign a case setting forth the facts and grounds of such our determination as aforesaid for the opinion of this court, and hath duly entered into a recognisance as required by the said statute in that behalf, now we do hereby accordingly state and sign the following case :

Upon the hearing of the information the following facts were either proved before us or admitted by both parties:

1. The appellant is the inspector and superintendent of the Rochdale New Market Place, established by the Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, intituled

Div. App.]

[Div. App.

or

2. In sect. 42 of the said Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, it is enacted "that it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to kill, slaughter, or dress, or cause to be killed, slaughtered, or dressed, any beast, swine, calf, sheep, or any other cattle, in any shop, standing, or other place in the said new market, except in such buildings places as may be erected or set apart for that purpose, nor shall any person or persons, from and after the space of eighteen calendar months from the passing of this Act, put, place, or set up, or cause to be put, placed, or set up, in any shop, stall, show, or standing, or any basket, or stool, table, or board, for the purpose of showing or selling or exposing to sale, any corn, grain butchers' meat, fish, poultry, butter, eggs, cheese, vegetables, fruit, or other marketable conimodities, matters, or things, on any of the public footpaths or highways in the said town of Rochdale, other than within the limits of the said Old Market Place and the said New Market Place, nor shall any person or persons hereafter, on any market day or days or on any other day, sell or expose to sale within the said New Market Place, any meat, butter, poultry, eggs, garden stuff, potatoes, roots, or vegetables, or any fish, at any time within the said town, except as hereinafter mentioned; and if any person or persons shall offend in any of the cases aforesaid, such person or persons so offending shall forfeit and pay for every such offence, on conviction before one or more justices of the peace for the county, any sum not exceeding 5l., to be recovered and applied as hereinafter directed. Provided, nevertheless, that nothing herein contained shall extend or be construed to extend, to prevent or hinder any person from selling or exposing to sale any marketable commodities, matters, or things whatsoever, in his or her own private dwelling house, or in his or her own shop, in any part of the said town of Rochdale."

3. The respondent did on the 4th March 1876, expose for sale, and actually sell, to one Elizabeth Holt, in a certain street in Rochdale, called Molesworth-street, in the present municipal and parliamentary borough of Rochdale, four herrings at the price of 2d.

4. Such sale was made in the open street, from a basket carried by the respondent from door to door, and was not sold in the private awelling house or shop of the respondent.

5. Molesworth-street aforesaid is not in the said Old Market Place or the said New Market Place of Rochdale,

6. There is no definition in the said Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, of the limits of "the town of Rochdale,' nor has any subsequent Act local to Rochdale defined what shall be the meaning of the expression "of the town of Rochdale," as used in the said Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, for the purpose of the said Act.

7. At the time of the passing of the Act (3 Geo. 4, c. 58), the said street, called Molesworth-street, was not then made, and the site of it was in fact green fields. The said street is now a inain thoroughfare, with houses on both sides thereof, in a populous part of the present municipal borough of Rochdale, and there is a continuous line of building from the Rochdale Market Place to Molesworth-street aforesaid, and such line of

It is contended, on the part of the appellant, that the expression, "the town of Rochdale," used in the Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, must be taken to mean the aggregation of buildings erected at the time of the passing of the said Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, and of those erected since that time.

It is contended in reply, on the part of the respondent, that the expression, the town of Rochdale," as nsed in the Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, has reference only to the aggregation of continuous buildings forming the town of Rochdale at the time of the passing of the said Act.

We were of opinion that the meaning of the said expression, "the town of Rochdale," as used in the said Act 3 Geo. 4, c 58, was the aggregation of buildings erected and in existence at the passing of the said Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, and that Molesworth-street aforesaid, being then fields unbuilt upon, was not within the town of Rochdale, as intended to be defined by that Act. We, accordingly, dismissed the information against the respondent.

The question of law arising on the above statement for the opinion of the said court, therefore, is, what is the present meaning of the expression, "the town of Rochdale," as used in the Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58. The court is to make such order in relation to the matters aforesaid as to the court may seem fit.

Manisty, Q.C. and E. A. Owen, for the appellant. The justices were clearly wrong in refusing to convict. The place where this sale took place was within the town of Rochdale within the meaning of 3 Geo. 4, c. 58, s. 42. The spot where this sale took place is within the present limits of the town, and the Act was intended to apply to all parts of the said town then and thereafter to be laid out in streets. This case is concluded by authority. In Elliot v. The South Devon Railway (2 Ex. 725; 17 L. J. 262, Ex.), the question was raised as to the meaning of the word "town" in the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 11), and it was held that it meant a collection of inhabited houses so near to each other that they may reasonably be said to be continuous, and that the term will include a space of open ground surrounded by continuous houses. The case of Reg. v. Cottle (16 Q. B. 412; 10 B. & S. 548; 20 L. J. 162, M. C.) is a strong authority in favour of the appellant's contention. That was an indictinent against certain trustees appointed under a local and personal Act, which was to be in operation for thirty-one years. The trustees were not to continue or erect any turnpike or tollgate across roads in the towns of Taunton or Wellington, or in any other town through or into which the roads might pass or be made, and the iudictment charged the trustees with erecting and continuing a turnpike-gate within the town of Taunton. It was admitted that the gate was not, when first erected, within the town of Taunton, as the town then stood. Two questions therefore arose, first, as to the meaning of the word "town;" secondly, whether the operation of the Act was intended to apply merely to the town as existing at the time of passing the Act, or to whatever should become the town from time to time during the thirty-one years for which the Act was to be in force. At the trial, the

learned judge told the jury that the word "town' in the Act was to be used in a popular sense as a congregation of houses, and they were to consider whether the spot where the gate stood was surrounded by houses so reasonably near that the inhabitants might fairly be said to dwell together. As regards the second point, leave was reserved to move to enter a verdict for the defendants. A rule nisi was afterwards obtained to enter a verdict for the defendants on the point reserved, or for a new trial on the ground of misdirection. Lord Campbell, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the court, expressed his approbation of the direction to the jury respecting what ought to be considered the limits of a town, and that the enactment was not confined to the town as constituted at the time when the Act passed. The case of The Commissioners for Paving, &c., the Town of Milton v. The Faversham District Highway Board (10 B. & S. 548), is to the same effect, and Cockburn, C.J., approve of the decision in Reg. v. Cottle (ubi sup.).

No counsel appeared to argue on behalf of the respondent.

The

CLEASBY, B. The question reserved to us is as to the meaning of the expression "the town of Rochdale" in the Act 3 Geo. 4, c. 58. I con fess it appeared to me at first that the Act had referrence to an existing state of things, and in some sense that is correct. But the town of Rochdale manifestly does not remain the same, but is of a varying nature from generation to generation. At the time of the passing of the Act the town was a growing one, and the Legis lature intended that the Act should have reference to a thing not always remaining the same. Act itself commences by saying, "Whereas the town or parish of Rochdale hath of late years greatly increased in population and building," &c., showing that the town was an increasing one so far as regards its population. It appears to me, on consideration, therefore, that it would be unreasonable to hold that the words "town of Rochdale" only referred to the town as it existed when the Act was passed. If there had been two separate towns which by continual extension had become joined together, different considerations would have arisen. But when it is manifest that a growth was contemplated, the word "town" should be applied to the old town, together with its natural growth. Therefore I come to the conclusion that this sale took place within "the town of Rochdale," and that the justices ought to have convicted the respondent; the case must, therefore, be remitted to them for that purpose. GROVE, J.-I am of the same opinion. When we look at the object of the Act, and the state of things intended to be remedied, it is clear that the word town" did not mean town limited at any particular time, but was intended to include what was commonly called the town of Rochdale. The preamble is as follows: "Whereas the town or parish of Rochdale, in the County Palatine of Lancaster, hath of late years greatly increased in population and buildings, and the present market place, &c., has become so inadequate, that the passages along the public streets within the said town are greatly obstructed, and rendered dangerous to the inhabitants of the said town, and also to travellers by reason of the number of stalls and standings placed therein; and whereas it would be a great convenience to

66

[DIV. APP.

the inhabitants of the said town, and the persons frequenting the said town on market and other days, and would tend to remove nuisances and obstructions if a new or additional market place was provided and established," &c., which clearly shows that the very object of the Act is, as the town of Rochdale was increasing, to confine parties to selling in the market place, and that as the then existing market was inadequate, to provide a new market place for the town. It is worth while observing, however, that sect. 33 provides for the widening of the streets, and for certain buildings being taken down if necessary. Therefore we find direct provisions in the Act having reference to the increasing town of Roch dale, beyond what it was in 1822, when this Act came into operation. If we were to hold that the operation of the Act was confined to the thea existing town, then any portions of a street which had been widened would not be within the Act, while the remaining portion which originally formed the street would be within the Act. So that in such a case a sale of fish would be permitted in one portion of a street and not in another portion of the same street. This certainly would be a great absurdity, but, as it seems to me, it would be the necessary consequence of holding that the "town of Rochdale" in the Act intended to include only the then existing town. For if you so limited the word “town,” if some of the streets were elongated, on the part so elongated a sale could be legally effected, while on the other part a sale would render the seller liable to a penalty. Therefore the definition of the "said town of Rochdale" ought not to be so limited; and the word said" merely has reference to the town to which the Act applies, and the expression was intended to include what might fairly be called the town. A row of cottages might be a mere suburb of the town, aud not within the town; but that would depend on circumstances. only other argument that could be raised for the respondent is, that the town may become so extended as to make the market place quite in sufficient to meet the requirements of some of its inhabitants. The answer is, that if such a state of things should arise, another application must be made to Parliament for still further accommodation. For the reasons I have given, I think the justices were wrong in refusing to convict the respondent. Case remitted to Justices. Solicitors for the appellant, Norris, Allen, and Carter.

66

Thursday, May 11, 1876. COOPER (app.) v. OSBORNE (resp.).

The

licensed premises, and that the conviction must be quashed.

THIS was a case stated by two justices of the peace acting for the Newark Division of the county of Nottingham under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, for the purpose of obtaining the opinion of the court on a question of law which arose before them as hereinafter stated.

At a petty sessions holden at Newark-on-Trent, in the said county of Nottingham, on the 5th Jan. inst, Charles Cooper, of Spalford, in the county of Nottingham, farmer (called the appellant), was charged before the said justices on the information of John Osborne, of Newark-on-Trent, police superintendent (called the respondent), for that he, on the 29th Dec. 1875, at the parish of South Clifton, in the said county of Nottingham, was on certain licensed premises (to wit), the Red Lion Inn, there situate, during the period during which the said premises were required under the provisions of the Licensing Act 1872 to be closed contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.

Henry Derbyshire, a police constable, stationed at Clifton, proved that on the 29th Dec. last he was passing the Red Lion Inn at South Clifton about eleven o'clock at night, when he heard voices within and distinguished that persons were playing cards for money. He subsequently obtained admission to the premises, and then found several persons present, including the appellant in the present case. The landlord stated that they were his private friends, and he considered that he had a right to entertain them as such.

The said justices' attention was drawn to the case of Patten v. Rhymer (29 L.J., 189 M. C.) The appellant's advocate admitted the persons in the inn were playing at cards for money, but contended that the Legislature, when inserting clause 30 in the Licensing Amendment Act of 1874, whereby a licensed persons was authorised to entertain and supply liquors after the hours of closing to his private friends at his own expense, intended that the licensed person should have the same rights as any private person to entertain his friends in any manner he pleases, and that, therefore, neither the landlord nor his friends were liable to any penalties under the Licensing Acts.

The said justices were of opinion that notwithstanding the persons on the licensed premises were, as they had no reason to doubt, and found as a fact that they were, private friends to whom the landlord might after hours give at his own expense intoxicating liquors under sect. 30 of the Licensing Act 1874; yet he was not thereby justified in allowing them to play for money; the said justices, therefore considered they were there in contravention of the Licensing Act, as to the closing of licensed premises (sect. 25 of the Licensing Act 1872), and they therefore convicted the appellant.

The appellant being dissatisfied with their decision, as being erroneous in point of law, requested a case to be stated for the opinion of the court.

Should the court be of opinion that the appellant, being a private friend of the licensed person, was upon the premises in contravention of the Licensing Acts, then the conviction is to stand; otherwise it is to be quashed.

The court having remitted this ease to the said justices, who stated and signed the same to be restated by pointing out how the defendant had MAG. CAS.-VOL. X

[DIV. APP.

contravened the Licensing Acts, they hereby stated as follows:—

'The reasons for our decision were: By sect. 3 of the Licensing Act 1874, it is provided that all premises in which intoxicating liquors are sold by retail, shall be closed at the hours in such sect. named, unless extended by the licensing justices, which had not been done. The appellant was found upon the licensed premises after closing time. He gave no evidence that he was an inmate, servant, or lodger, or bonâ fide traveller, and only contended that his presence on the premises was not in contravention of the Licensing Acts, but that he was a private friend of the landlord. As he was not there for the purpose only of being entertained by the landlord as a private friend with intoxicating liquors, as allowed by sect. 30 of the Act. of 1874, but (though still a private friend of the landlord) it appearing to us that he was there for an unlawful purpose (to wit), gaming for money, we considered he was aiding and abetting the landlord (as the licensed person named in sect. 17 of the Act of 1872), in suffering unlawful games to be carried on on the premises; and therefore that he was on such premises in contravention of the Licensing Acts, and in consequence liable to the penatly in which we convicted him."

The case came on to be argued first at the same time with Hare, appellant, v. Osborne, respondent. on the 17th Feb. 1876, reported 34 L. T. Rep. N. S. 294; that was a case stated at the request of the landlord, who was convicted for suffering gaming on the occasion when the appellant was charged in this case. The court affirmed that conviction, but remitted the case of the charge against the appellant as stated by the justices.

Rolland now argued for the appellant on the amended case. The charge against the appellant, as it appears by the information, is not one of aiding and abetting the landlord in suffering gaming, as suggested by the justices in the reasons for their conviction, but for being on licensed premises after closing time, which is provided for by sect. 25 of the Licensing Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94); by that section, "If, during any period during which any premises are required under the provisions of this Act to be closed any person is found on such premises, he shall, unless he satisfies the court that he was an inmate, servant, or a lodger on such premises, or a bonâ fide traveller, or that otherwise his presence on such premises was not in contravention of the provisions of this Act with respect to the closing of licensed premises, be liable to a penalty not exceeding 40s." Although under that Act, taken by itself, the appellant might have been liable to conviction, he is by implication now clearly exempt, in consequence of sect. 30 of the Licensing Act 1874 (37 & 38 Vict. c. 49), by which "No person keeping a house licensed under this or the principal Act shall be liable to any penalty for supplying intoxicating liquors after the hours of closing, to private friends bonâ fide entertained by him at his own expense. Sect. 17 of the Act of 1872 imposes a penalty upon the licensed persons only, and not upon his guests, if the former suffers gaming or any unlawful game to be carried on on his premises; there is, therefore, no such offence as that suggested by the justices, even if the appellant were charged with it.

The respondent did not appear.

2 S

DIV. App.]

CLEASBY, B.-I believe we are all agreed. My opinion is that the conviction cannot stand, because the appellant was not guilty of the offence charged against him. The 25th section of the Licensing Act 1872, which imposes a penalty upon any person found upon licensed premises during the period the premises are required to be closed, must now be read with the 30th section of the Licensing Act 1874, which exempts licensed persons who supply intoxicating liquors after the hours of closing to private friends bona fide entertained by him at his own expense. That section of the later Act must also exempt such private friends so entertained, for their presence on such premises is no longer, to use the limiting words of sect. 25 of the first Act, in contravention of the provisions of the licensing Acts, with respect to the closing of the licensed premises. There is no provision for the conviction of a guest in a licensed house, whether during the hours of closing or not, for gaming or any unlawful game; but the magistrates have somehow introduced section 17 of the Act of 1872, which imposes a penalty on a licensed person for such an offence, into the subsequent sect. 25, so as to make the guest liable for his presence at the time of the landlord's contravention of the Act, although exempted by the second Act. The reasons given by the justices are in this case certainly erroneous, and it cannot be said that the appellant's presence on the premises was under the circumstances in contravention of the provisions of the Acts. The appeal, therefore, must be allowed.

DENMAN, J.-I am of the same opinion. The magistrates find as a fact that the appellant was, within the words of sect. 30 of the Act of 1874, a private friend of the landlord, and being entertained by him at his own expense. The landlord, therefore, was justified in allowing the appellant to be on the premises after the time of closing, and the appellant has not thereby contravened the Act. There was nothing illegal in what the appellant did, at all events until the playing at cards for money commenced. Although the landlord may be convicted for suffering such a proceeding, it seems that there is no penalty upon the persons playing cards either during the open or close hours. More might, perhaps, be said in support of a conviction if the appellant had been charged with aiding and abetting the landlord in a breach of the 17th section, but there seems to be no summary remedy for such an offence. At all events, there is nothing here to support the charge under the 25th section, which is made against the appellant, and the conviction must be quashed. FIELD, J.-I am of the same opinion. Judgment for appellant. Solicitor for appellant, R. W. Marsland.

June 2 and 15, 1876.

(Before BRAMWELL, B. and GROVE, J.)
WILLIS v. MACLACHLAN.

Registration court-Qualification of voter-Power of revising barrister to remove from courtInterruption of business-Stat. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 36, s. 16.

By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 36, s. 16, a revising barrister may order the removal of any person who interrupts the business of the court, or refuses to obey lawful orders in respect of the same.

[Div. App. At a court held in 1874, by the defendant, who was a revising barrister, the vote of W., plaintiff's brother, was objected to, on the ground that he claimed as a freeholder, but was only a copyholder. In 1875 W. claimed to be put on the list as a copyholder. The plaintiff then produced certain deeds to show that W. was a freeholder, and, in answer to the defendant, admitted that he was present in court in 1874, when W.'s right to have his name on the list as a freeholder was objected to, and had the deeds in his pocket, though he did not produce them. Thereupon the defendant, after censuring him, ordered him to leave the court, and gave instructions to the police to remove him if necessary. The plaintiff then left the court, and afterwards commenced an action in the County Court for false imprisonment. The defence was that the plaintiff was interrupting the business of the court. The judge nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground that the act complained of was done in the exercise of a judicial discretion.

Held (reversing the decision of the County Court Judge), that the nonsuit was wrong, inasmuch as the plaintiff was guilty of no interruption of the business of the court, as alleged by the defendant in his plea.

THIS was an action for false imprisonment, tried in the County Court of Sunderland.

The following were the material facts, as proved by the plaintiff: In Oct. 1875 the defendant, who was the revising barrister for the district at North Shields, held his court at that place for the purpose of revising the list of voters. Among others Robert Willis, brother to the plaintiff, claimed to have his name put on the list as a copyholder. The plaintiff then produced certain deeds which proved that Robert Willis was a freeholder. It appeared that at a court held in the previous year

Robert Willis's name had been inserted in the list as a freeholder; but it was then objected that his claim could not be allowed, inasmuch as he was a copyholder and not a freeholder. Plaintiff admitted, in answer to questions put to him by the defendant, that he was present at the court held in 1874, when his brother's claim to a vote as a freeholder was disposed of, and that the deeds were at that time in his pocket, though he had not produced them. The defendant then severely censured the plaintiff for his conduct, ordered him at once to leave the court, and gave instructions to the police to remove him if necessary. The plaintiff then left the court, and brought his action for false imprisonment.

The notice of defence was that the defendant was a revising barrister holding his court, and that the plaintiff was interrupting the business of the court.

The learned County Court judge held that the act complained of was done by Mr. Maclachlan in the exercise of a judicial discretion, and that he not liable; accordingly he nonsuited the plaintiff. A rule nisi was afterwards granted to set aside the nonsuit; against which

was

Butt, Q.C. and John Edye, showed cause.-The defendant has done nothing to render himself liable to an action for false imprisonment. By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 36, s. 16, it is enacted that "it shall be lawful for any revising barrister, whether revising the lists of a county, city, or borough, to order any person to be removed from his court who shall interrupt the business of the court, or refuse to