Appellant sold, as a bottle of gin, liquid composed of 26 per cent. alcohol, 70 per cent. water, and 4 per cent. sugar. Evidence was adduced that gin was sold by retailers at varying strength from proof to 20 per cent. under proof. This liquid was 44 per cent. under proof, but the analyst said he should call it " gin whose alcoholic strength was exceedingly low." Justices convicted the appellant under the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 63), s. 6.

Held, upon a case stated, that the facts justified the justices' finding that this liquid was not of the quality of gin, but that the excess of water was a fraudulent increase of the measure of the article within the enacting part of the said section. THIS was a case stated by the two justices of the peace for the parts of Kesteven in the County of Lincoln, under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

On the 24th Jan. 1876, the respondent, who is a superintendent of police, and the proper officer appointed under "The Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875" (38 & 39 Vict c. 63), for carrying into execution the said Act, laid information in due form of law against the appellant, for that he the said Baxter Pashler, on the 2nd Dec. last, at the parish of New Sleaford, in the said parts and county, did unlawfully sell to the prejudice of the said Thomas Stevenett, the purchaser, a certain article of food, to wit, gin, which was not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by such purchaser, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.

The appellant is a licensed victualler carrying on business at Sleaford in the County of Lincoln.

On the 31st Jan. 1876, the said information came to be heard before one of the said justices alone, when both parties appeared; the hearing was adjourned to the 14th Jan. 1876, when both parties again appeared.

The evidence on the part of respondent consisted of that given by the respondent and by George May Lowe, M.D., the public analyst for the County of Lincoln. The respondent proved that he visited the ordinary place of business of the appellant and asked for a bottle of gin, with which he was furnished by the appellant and for which he was charged, and paid 2s. 6d. He did not ask for any particular quality or strength of gin, nor did the appellant give any intimation of the quality or strength of that supplied. No label or descriptive mark was on the bottle.

The respondent notified to the appellant his intention of having the gin analysed by the public analyst, and offered to divide the gin according to the provisions of the 14th section of the Act 38 &

S. K. 28, gin.

Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875.-Form of certificate. To Mr. Thos. Stevenett, of Sleaford.

I, the undersigned public analyst for Lincolnshire, do hereby certify that I received on the 3rd Dec. 1875, from Mr. Thos. Stevenett a sample of gin labelled S. K. 28, for analysis, and have analysed the same, and declare the result of my analysis to be as follows:

I am of opinion that the same is a sample of gin, water, and sugar in the following proportions. I am of opinion that the said sample contains the parts as under, or the per centage of foreign ingredients as under: Pure alcohol Water Extract...

26 per cent.

70

The alcholic strength is exceedingly low.
As witness my hand this 10th Jan. 1876, at Lincoln.
G. M. LOWE.

Dr. Lowe proved his certificate. He stated that spirits known as 'proof" contained about onehalf part of water and one-half part of pure alcohol. He also said that he found from Professor Atcherley's work on the adulteration of food, that gin as sold by retailers varied in strength from proof to 20 per cent. under proof. The appellant's gin was about 44 per cent. under proof, as tested by Sykes' hydrometer. He did not know that there was any fixed standard for gin, and he did not know from personal experience at what strength it was usually sold in the retail trade. He would not say how low its strength might be reduced without its ceasing to be gin; and when asked how he should describe that which he had analysed, he said he "should call it gin, whose alcholic strength is exceedingly low."

The appellant tendered no evidence whatever. The appellant was fined 18. and costs.

The question for the opinion of the court is whether or not, upon the evidence above stated, the appellant was properly convicted under the 6th section of the Act 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63 ?

Graham (with him Raymond), argued for the appellant.-The words of this sect. 6 are, "No person shall sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any article of food or any drug which is not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by such purchaser, under a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, provided that an offence shall not

be deemed to be committed under this section in the following cases, that is to say, (1) where any matter or ingredient not injurious to health has been added to the food or drug because the same is required for the production or preparation thereof as an article of commerce, in a state fit for carriage or consumption, and not fraudulently to increase the bulk, weight, or measure of the food or drug, or conceal the inferior quality thereof; (2) where the drug or food is a proprietary medicine, or is the subject of a patent in force, and is supplied in the strength required by the specifi cation of the patent; (3) where the food or drug is compounded as in this Act mentioned; (4) where the food or drug is unavoidably mixed with some extraneous matter in the process of collection or preparation." By sect. 7 "No person shall sell

any compound article of food or compounded drug which is not composed of ingredients in accordance with the demand of the purchaser under a penalty not exceeding twenty pounds." "Provided that (by sect. 8) no person shall be guilty of any such offence as aforesaid in respect of the sale of an article of food or a drug mixed with any matter or ingredient not injurious to health, and not intended fraudulently to increase its bulk, weight, or measure, or conceal its inferior quality, if at the time of delivering such article or drug he shall supply to the person receiving the same a notice, by a label, distinctly and legibly written or printed on, or with the article or drug, to the effect that the same is mixed." These sections do not create any offence upon the evidence before the justices. liquid sold was of the nature, substance, and quality of the substance demanded; no provision is made as to the proportion of the ingredients, nor to the strength of the article. The anaylist himself stated, in his evidence, that he should call the liquid gin," which is what the respondent asked for.

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No counsel appeared for the respondent. CLEASBY, B.-I do not think we can interfere with this conviction. This is an article of food which is not of the substance and quality of the article demanded by the purchaser. It does not appear to me to come within either of the exemptions; the first is the only one at all applicable, and it cannot be maintained that this excess of water has been added to the liquid because the same is required for the production or preparation thereof as an article of commerce in a state fit for carriage or consumption; indeed, it may be said, upon the facts proved, that the object was fraudulently to increase the bulk, weight, or measure of the food, or to conceal the inferior quality thereof. The justices have come to the conclusion that a mixture of alcohol and water, so far as 44 per cent. below proof, is not of the quality of gin as known commercially, but a fraudulent increase of the measure of the liquid. It is impossible for us to say they were wrong, and they were therefore justified in convicting the appellant.

GROVE, J.-I am of the same opinion. We cannot decide whether, upon the weight of the evidence, the case comes within the first exception or not; that is a question for the magistrates. The witness certainly said he should call the liquid gin, or rather qualified gin, but the magistrates had to use their discretion upon all the facts and statements before them. If 44 per cent. beyond the ordinary proportion be not adulteration, it must be difficult to discover anything to which the statute could apply. It is really a question of fact, and I think the justices have decided it rightly.

Judgment for the respondent. Solicitors for appellant, Varley and Toynbee, for Toynbee, Larken, and Toynbee, Lincoln.

Saturday, May 27, 1876.

WILLIAMS (app.) v. EVANS (resp.) Highways- Riding furiously - Driver-OffenceConviction-5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, s. 78. The Highway Act 1835, s. 78, enumerates various acts and omissions by persons on highways having charge of carriages and animals, and also by per

[Div. App.

sons interrupting others; amongst them, if any person, riding any horse or beast, or driving any sort of carriage, shall ride or drive the same furiously, so as to endanger the life or limb of any passenger, then follow the words," Every person so offending in any of the cases aforesaid, and being convicted of any such offence," shall "for every such offence forfeit any sum not exceeding 5l., in case such driver shall not be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage; and in case the offender be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage, then any sum not exceeding 10l. The appellant was convicted by justices of riding furiously on horseback along a highway, and fined a sum less than 51.

Held, upon a case stated, that the penalty under 51. was applicable to all offences mentioned in the section, whether the offenders were drivers of carriages or not; and that the conviction was right.

THIS was a case stated by justices of Denbigh, under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.

An information was preferred by one John Evans, of Llandyrnog, in the parish of Llandyrnog, in the county of Denbigh, police constable (hereinafter called the respondent), against Edwin Williams, of Shopywaen, in the parish of Llandyrnog, aforesaid, labourer (hereinafter called the appellant), under sect. 78 of the Act 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, charging for that he, the said appellant, on the 14th March 1876, at the parish of Llandyrnog, in the county aforesaid, unlawfully did ride a horse furiously on a certain highway there situate, leading from Denbigh to Llandyrnog aforesaid, so as then to endanger the lives and limbs of passengers on the said highway, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. The justices convicted the appellent and fined him 208. The justices, on application, stated and signed the following case.

Upon the hearing of the information and com. plaint it was proved on the part of the respondent, and found as a fact, that the said appellant, on the 14th March 1876, at the parish of Llandyrnog aforesaid, unlawfully did ride a cart horse furiously, he being on the back of such horse without saddle, and urging the same forward on a certain highway there situate, leading from Denbigh to Llandyrnog aforesaid, so as then to endanger the lives and limbs of passengers on the said highway.

It was contended on the part of the appellant that the justices had no power to impose a penalty or convict for riding furiously, as the penal part of sect. 78 of the Act 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, omitted all mention of a rider.

The said justices, however, on reading and considering such section, decided that not only persons driving furiously, but those riding also to the danger of the public and furiously, were intended to be and are included in such section and Act; and for the above reason they adjudged the case to be brought within the operation of the 78th section, and gave their determination against the appellant, in manner hereinbefore stated.

The question of law arising on the above statement for the opinion of this court therefore is :Whether a person on a horse, and urging the animal furiously forward on the highway, to the danger of passengers, is liable to be convicted and fined under the 78th section of the Act 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50? If the court should be of opinion that the said conviction and fine was legally and

properly made and imposed, and the appellant is liable as aforesaid, then the said conviction is to stand; but if the court should be of opinion otherwise, then the said information and complaint is to be dismissed.

W. C. Yale argued for the appellant.-This 78th section of the Highway Act 1835 provides a penalty for a great number of offences, but it omits any penalty for riding furiously on horseback, although such a proceeding is classed amongst the other offences created by the section. It enacts, among other things, that "if any person riding any horse or beast, or driving any sort of carriage, shall ride or drive the same furiously so as to endanger the life or limb of any passenger; every person so offending in any of the cases aforesaid, and being convicted of any such offence either by his own confession, the view of a justice, or by the oath of one or more credible witnesses, before any two justices of the peace, shall, in addition to any civil action to which he may make himself liable, for every such offence forfeit any sum not exceeding 51. in case such driver shall not be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage; and in case the offender be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage, then any sum not exceeding 101., and in either of the said cases shall in default of payment be committed to the common gaol or house of correction, there to be kept to hard labour for any time not exceeding six calendar weeks, unless such forfeiture shall be sooner paid." In a trial for perjury alleged to have been committed on a charge of furious riding under this section, Kelly, C.B. held, on the Western Circuit, that justices had no jurisdiction to convict on such a charge; and therefore there could be no perjury: Reg v. Bacon (11 Cox Cr. Cas. 540), that, so far as it goes, is a direct authority in the appellant's favour. The Chief Baron is reported to have said, "It is quite clear that the Act does not give the justices any power to inflict any punishment for furiously riding. The statute imposes a penalty only on those who furiously drive. This is, no doubt, a casus omissus, but it is not for me to supply the omission." Similarly Cockburn, C.J. declined to supply an omission in the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 108); by sect. 9, the owner or agent of a mine or colliery, who in case of loss of life to any person employed in such coal mine or colliery, by reason of any accident, or in case of serious personal injury arising from explosion therein, does not send notice of such accident to the inspector of the district within twenty-four hours next after such loss of life is to be liable to a penalty. The appellants were owners of a coal mine in which serious personal injury arose from explosion. They did not give notice to the inspector, and were convicted for not doing so under this section. It was held that words had been omitted which were necessary to create the offence which the appellants were supposed to have committed, and that as those words could only be supplied by the Legislature, the appellants were not liable to the penalty: (Underhill v. Longridge, 29 L. J. 65 M. C.). In other statutes containing enactments of this nature the distinction between riding and driving is recognised and provided for: as in the Act for the more effectual prevention of cruelty to animais (12 & 13 Vict. c 92), where by sect. 29 "the word overdrive shall also signify override." So too the

[Div. App.

fifth offence in sect. 54 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1840 (2 & 3 Vict. c. 47), is " Every person who shall ride or drive furiously so as to endanger the life or limb of any person, or to the common danger of the passengers in any thoroughfare." [FIELD, J.-The 78th section treats of riders, drivers, and persons who are neither.] It cannot be said that driving a carriage means riding on horseback without express words to make it so. No counsel appeared for the respondent.

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CLEASBY, B.-It is impossible to come to any conclusion on this point without some doubt, and I feel great difficulty in agreeing with my learned brothers that this was a right conviction. There are two alternatives which may be adopted in the construction of this section; either the conviction of a person riding on horseback is a casus omissus, or we must extend the application of the enactment beyond the words actually used. Both my brothers concur that we ought to interpret the section to include the case before us in its application, and I am not prepared to dissent from their conclusion. The question which arises is, whether the use of the word driver" only in the part relating to the penalty, excludes its application to a person riding on horseback. If capable of being so read, the remainder of the section supports the decision of the justices, which made "driver" include a "rider." The same word too must be applied in the same way to a person having no carriage or horse of his own, who interrupts the passage of another, or his carriage or animal on the highway; my brothers, however, think we may read this part of the section in a broad sense, and if so, it is certainly not unreasonable to do so. Although it is somewhat a strong step to impose a penalty by implication, ard my doubts are not removed, yet I assent to the decision of the rest of the

court.

GROVE, J.-I cannot say there is no doubt about the matter, but unless a large portion of this clause be rendered merely nugatory, the justices have adopted the only possible interpretation. The old-established rule is, that you must construe a statute grammatically, except when such construction leads to a manifest absurdity. I think the result would be an absurdity if we were to treat the conviction of a furious rider as a casus omissus. The section creates various offences, amongst them, "if any person, riding any horse or beast, or driving any sort of carriage, shall ride or drive the same furiously so as to endanger the life or limb of any passenger." The appellant is found to have committed this offence, but he says, although convicted of riding on horseback furiously, he must go in peace and cannot be fined, because a penalty is imposed only upon persons driving who commit any of these offences. The words immediately following those I have quoted relate to the whole of the previous part of the section, every person so offending in any of the cases aforesaid, and being convicted of any such offence," shall "for every such offence forfeit any sum not exceeding 51, in case such driver shall not be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage; and in case the offender be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage, then any sum not exceeding 101." I cannot think that the word "such limits the application of penalties only to persons driving their own or other person's carriages. The expression is somewhat elliptical, but I read the words, “in case the

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offender be the owner of such waggon, cart, or other carriage," to be a mere proviso that such an offender shall suffer a heavier penalty. All other offenders, including drivers who are not owners of carriages, are to forfeit sums within the lower limit of 5., by force of the earlier part of the sentence. Another view which may be adopted is that the word "driver" is used in a wider sense than that generally given to it, and that it includes a person who rides on the back of a horse, and may be said to conduct or drive it. I do not think any very great strain would be necessarily put upon the word if it were made to include every person in charge of a horse or carriage, and upon that interpretation also this conviction might be sustained. I prefer, however, to look at the whole of the section, and to apply the penalty to all offences mentioned in it; 101. being the amount to which a person offending is liable if he is owner of the carriage by which he commits the offence, 51. being the amount in all other cases.

FIELD, J.—I have arrived at the same conclusion, not without great doubt nor some fluctuation of opinion. The object of the section is clearly the protection of persons passing along highways, and all the acts and omissions enumerated are rendered offences against the law, and persons committing them may be convicted. It would be an absurdity if a penalty were to attach only to a part of such convictions, and that would be the result of a strictly grammatical construction of the clause. I think, therefore, that the first interpretation suggested by my brother Grove is the right one; that, notwithstanding the words,

"in case such driver shall not be the owner of such waggon, cat, cr other carriage," the penalty of 51. or less is imposed for every offence in the section, and if committed by the owner of the carriage which he is at the time driving, he is liable to a penalty of 101. Ut res magis valeat quàm pereat is a rule of construction better in some cases than to follow the strictly grammatical meaning of the words. The conviction will be affirmed.

Judgment for respondent.

Solicitors for appellant, Finney and Bruff, for Louis and Edwards, Ruthin.

ARCHES COURT OF CANTERBURY.

Reported by A. H. BITTLESTON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

(Before the Right Hon. Lord PENZANCE, Dean of Arches.)

PARISHIONERS OF HATCHAM v. TOOTH. Mode of enforcing order of the Court of ArchesNature and jurisdiction of that court-Public Worship Regulation Act.

A clergyman, who neglects to obey an order of the Court of Arches, will, upon application, be pronounced by that court to be contumacious and in contempt, and a direction will be given that the same be signified to the Queen in Chancery; whereupon a writ "De Contumace Capiendo" will issue for the arrest and detention in custody of such person, until he shall submit to the order of the court. The Court of Arches explained to be a purely ecclesiastical court.

The Public Worship Regulation Act deals only with matters of procedure, and does not in any respect enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court of Arches.

[ARCHES.

THE Complainants in this case were the promoters of a suit against the Rev. Mr. Tooth, under the Public Worship Regulation Act, which resulted in an inhibition issuing from this court against him, in respect of the irregularities in his conduct of the Church services which his parishioners complained of. Mr. Tooth having disregarded this inhibition, the present application was made to the court to enforce its order.

A. J. Stephens, Q.C. (with him B. Shaw), for the promoters, said that Mr. Tooth was guilty of contempt of court, both by reason of his disobedience to the order of the court, and also by reason of the disrespectful language he had made use of with regard to it.

Mr. Tooth did not appear.

Lord PENZANCE.-The parishioners of St. James's, Hatcham, who have promoted this suit, have at length applied to this court to enforce upon Mr. Tooth obedience to the orders which it has made. It cannot be a matter of surprise that their patience should have been at last exhausted; the only wonder is that it should have endured so long. But from first to last the greatest consideration has been shown to Mr. Tooth in his irregu larities and breaches of the law; and even up to the present moment no inhibition has been asked for or issued against him in respect of those matters which, though they have been declared illegal by the Court of Appeal in the Purchas case, are the subject of appeal now pending in the case which arose at Folkestone. On all the points, therefore, in which Mr. Tooth's obedience is sought by the promoters of this suit to be enforced, the law has been already settled-no appeal is pending and Mr. Tooth has not attempted, either in this court or by way of appeal, to uphold the legality of his proceedings. In this state of things the promoters of the suit require at the hands of the court the exercise of such powers as it possesses to enforce the decrees they have obtained, an application which the court has no discretion to refuse. But some misappre hension appears to exist as to what those powers It has been suggested that the 9th section of the Public Worship Act confers upon this court new powers for the enforcement of its decrees. This is an erroneous interpretation of the statute, the new powers given to the court being confined to proper facilities for a due hearing of the case under the new forms of procedure which that Act has introduced. The powers which this court possesses for the enforcement of its decrees are such, and such only, as it possesses as the Provincial Court of the Province of Canterbury. It need hardly be necessary to call to mind that the Provincial Court of the Archbishop is a purely ecclesiastical court; that as such it has no temporal or secular jurisdiction, and no inherent authority over the property or liberties of the Queen's subjects. And accordingly, from the most ancient times, the chief means at its disposal for enforcing obedience to its mandates consisted in a sentence of excommunication. The time, however, came when these sentences of excommunication were further enforced by the civil power by means of the King's writ De Excommunicato Capiendo. It is not necessary to refer particu larly to the statutes on this subject. As time went on, it was thought desirable by the Legisla ture that the sentence of excommunication should, except in certain cases, be abolished and discon

are.

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tinued, and the statute of 53 Geo. 3, c. 127, accordingly provided that the judges of the ecclesiastical courts "whose lawful orders or decrees have not been obeyed" should in future pronounce the person disobeying them "contuma· cious and in contempt," and signify the same to the King in Chancery, and that thereupon a writ De Contumace Capiendo should issue against such persons, and they should be detained in custody until they made submission to the orders of the ecclesiastical court. The civil power has thus been brought in to the aid of ecclesiastical authority, and the declining efficacy of the sentence of excommunication has been supplemented by a power of imprisonment entirely foreign to the original jurisdiction of a purely ecclesiastical court. Applying these powers, as I am bound to do, I have no hesitation in pronouncing Mr. Tooth to be contumacious and in contempt, for disobeying the inhibition issued by this court; and I direct the same to be signified forthwith to the Queen in Chancery, with a view to his imprisonment. Under ordinary circumstances there would, in granting this application, be little more to say. But the circumstances are not ordinary; for the jurisdiction of this court has been openly denied, and mischievous delusions have been propagated as to its functions and authority. In the case of Mr. Ridsdale, the first which occurred since the Public Worship Regalation Act, I made some observations on this subject, and I still think it worth while, for the sake of others (however little Mr. Tooth may regard anything that falls from this court), to point out in what those delusions consist. They consist primarily in the idea that this Court of Arches is a secular and temporal court, and not a spiritual or ecclesiastical one. Those who take part with Mr. Tooth conceive, as I understand it, that the only courts which can properly take cognisance of any irregularities in his ministration, are the ecclesiastical and not the temporal courts and this, they say, is founded on an existing right in the Church of England to govern herself in spiritual matters, including matters of ritual. The Public Worship Act, they say, was an innovation and invasion of this right by referring questions of ritual to a secular tribunal. It would be well if those who maintain these propositions were to read the statutes by which the ritual of the Church of England at the time of the Reformation was prescribed and enforced-I mean the statutes authorising and establishing the two successive Prayer Books of King Edward VI. and the Prayer Book of Queen Elizabeth, which regulated the ritual of the Reformed Church for the first hundred years after its establishment. They would there find that a clergyman departing in the performance of Divine service from the ritual prescribed in the Prayer Book was liable to be tried at the assizes by a judge and jury (the bishop if he pleased assisting the judge), and, if convicted three times, was liable to be imprisoned for life. The interposition therefore of a temporal court, if any such were in question, to enforce obedience in matters of ritual, would at least be ro novelty; the novelty, if any, is in the claim to be exempt from it. But suppose this claim, for the sake of argument, be admitted, what, I may ask, are the ecclesiastical courts to whose judgment Mr. Tooth, and they who act and think with him, would be willing to defer? it is not to be presumed that Mr. Tooth proposes

[ARCHES.

to settle for himself, as the minister of an Established Church, how the Divine services of that Church, which are intended to be uniform throughout the country, should be performed. If he arrogates to himself this right, every beneficed clergyman in the kingdom has it also, and there might be as many forms of worship in the Church as there are parishes in the land. But if he is not to settle the form of worship for himself, and he considers himself bound by the directions of the Prayer Book, who is it that in his opinion ought to determine what it is that the rubrics of the Prayer Book enjoin? What is the court that has the jurisdiction to which he is ready to render obedience? Is it the court of his bishop? If so, he must surely be aware that by the ecclesiastical law of this country, as well before the Reformation as since, an appeal from the bishop's court lies, and has always lain, to the court of the archbishop-this Court of Arches whose jurisdiction he now denies. And not only so, but he must be further aware that for a long series of years it has been the practice of the bishops to transfer suits commenced in the diocesan courts at once to this Court of Arches, by the well-known form of "letters of request," and thus save the expense and delay of two decisions in place of one. To this very court, therefore, any proceedings against Mr. Tooth, had they been commenced in the court of his diocesan, might, and in all probability would, according to the ancient ecclesiastical laws of the realm, have come either by way of transfer or by appeal. If so, what question is there of a secular court, or an invasion of the rights of the Church? Let me make my meaning plain. Before the Public Worship Act passed, suits for restraining irregularity in ritual were commenced in the diocesan courts; they may be so still, though I often see the misstatement that these courts have been abolished. Such were the suits now well known against Mr. Mackonochie and Mr. Purchas. But these suits were no sooner commenced in the bishops' courts, than they were transferred, by the request in each case of the bishop, to this court, the court of the archbishop, to be here heard and determined. So that the jurisdiction of this court in matters of ritual is not only an ancient jurisdiction dating from time immemorial, as well before the Reformation as after it; but it is the jurisdiction, and the only jurisdiction, to which in modern times, and down to the moment when Mr. Tooth has chosen to deny its authority, all questions of ritual have been referred. Has, then, the Public Worship Act robbed this court of its claim to obedience in matters ecclesiastical ? All that the Act has done is to arm it with new powers, and these only in the way of procedure. Can any reasonable man argue that the conferring of such powers as these, which did not alter or affect the jurisdiction of this court, annihilatel that jurisdiction? The existence of these additional powers cannot secularise a court deriving authority solely from the archbishop of the province, and whose only secular feature is that of being presided over by a layman. But this again is no new thing: a series of distinguished judges who have presided here, in the last as well as the present century (and it needs not, to inquire how much further back), testifies to the contrary, for they have without exception been laymen and lawyers. The chancellors or officials who preside in the bishops'