CROWN CASES RESERVED. Reported by JOHN THOMPSON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Saturday, June 9, 1877.

(Before Lord COLERIDGE, C.J., MELLOR, J., LUSH, J., DENMAN, J., and POLLOCK, B.)

REG. v. W. COOPER. False pretences-Proof-Construction of a letter. An indictment for false pretences alleged that the prisoner falsely pretended that he was a dealer in potatoes, and as such dealer in a large way of business, and in a position to do a good trade in potatoes, and able to pay for large quantities of potatoes as and when the same might be delivered to him.

The only evidence thereof was the following letter from prisoner to prosecutor: " Please send me one truck of Regents and one truck of Rocks as sample, at your prices named in your letter. Let them be good quality, and then I am sure a good trade will be done for both of us. I will remit you the cash on arrival of goods and invoice."

Held, that the false pretences alleged were proved, the letter reasonably conveying to the mind the construction put upon it in the indictment. CASE reserved for the opinion of this Court at the West Riding of Yorkshire Quarter Sessions.

At the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the West Riding of the county of York, holden at Wakefield, on the 2nd April 1877, the defendant William Cooper, was indicted for and convicted of having obtained 8 tons 15 cwt. and 2 qrs. of potatoes, the property of one John Gellatly, by false pretences. Copies of the indictment and of the letter of order for the potatoes, signed by the prisoner and addressed to John Gellatly containing the alleged false pretence, are subjoined.

"West Riding of Yorkshire to wit. The jurors for our Lady the Queen upon their oath present that William Cooper, on the 17th Jan. 1877, at the parish of Sheffield, in the West Riding of the county of York, unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly did falsely pretend to one John Gellatly that he the said William Cooper then was a dealer in potatoes, and as such dealer in potatoes, then was in a large way of business, and that he, the said William Cooper, then was in position to do a good trade in potatoes, and that he, the said William Cooper, then was able to pay for large quantities of potatoes, as and when the same might be delivered to him, by means of which said false pretences, the said William Cooper, did then unlawfully obtain from the said John Gellatly, eight tons, fifteen hundred weights and two quarters of potatoes, of the goods and chattels of the said John Gellatly, with intent thereby then to defraud, whereas in truth and in fact, the said William Cooper was not then a dealer in potatoes, and was not then as such dealer in potatoes in a large way of business, and whereas in truth and in fact the said William Cooper was not then in a position to do a good trade in potatoes, and whereas in truth and in fact the said William Cooper was not then able to pay for large quantities of potatoes as and when the same should be delivered to him as he, the said William Cooper, well knew at the time when he did so falsely protend as aforesaid; to the great damage and deception of the said John Gellatly, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, against MAG. CAB.-VOL. X

[C. CAS. R.

the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her Crown and dignity.

"And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, further present that the said William Cooper afterwards, to wit, on the 17th Jan. 1877, at the parish aforesaid in the Riding aforesaid, did incur a certain debt and liability to one John Gellatly, to wit, a debt and liability to the amount of 321. 168. 8d., as and for the price of certain potatoes supplied to him, the said William Cooper, by the said John Gellatly. And the jurors aforesaid upon their oath aforesaid do further present that the said William Cooper in incurring the said debt and liability, unlawfully, knowingly, and designedly did obtain credit from the said John Gellatly under false pretences, to wit, by falsely pretending to the said John Gellatly that he, the said William Cooper, then was a dealer in potatoes, and as such dealer in potatoes then was in a large way of business, and that he, the said William Cooper, then was in a position to do a good trade in potatoes, and that he, the said William Cooper, then was able to pay for large quantities of potatoes as and when the same might be delivered to him, whereas, in truth and in fact, the said William Cooper was not then a dealer in potatoes, and was not then as such dealer in potatoes in a large way of business, and whereas, in truth and in fact, the said William Cooper was not then in a position to do a good trade in potatoes and whereas, in truth ̄and in fact, the said William Cooper was not then able to pay for large quantities of potatoes as and when the same should be delivered to him, as he, the said William Cooper, well knew at the time when he did so falsely pretend as aforesaid; to the great damage and deception of the said John Gellatly, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace of our Lady the Queen, her crown, and dignity."

The following was a copy of the letter of the prisoner to the prosecutor:

Hamerton, Sheffield, Jan. 17th, 1876. Dear Sir, Please send me one truck of Regents and one truck of Rocks as sample at your prices named in your letter Let them be good quality, then I am sure a good trade will be done for both of us. I will remit you cash on arrival of goods and invoice. Yours truly, WILLIAM COOPER.

P.S.-I may say if you use me well I shall be a good customer. An answer will oblige saying when they are put on.

It was amply proved in evidence that the prisoner when he ordered the Regents and Rocks, which are kinds of potatoes, had no intention of paying for them; that he held from time to time a stall in the public market, for which he paid by the day, and also dealt as a buckster carrying about fruit in a small cart drawn by a donkey; and several of the witnesses, though very well acquainted with him and his trade, were ignorant of his dealing in potatoes. The potatoes were sold by the prisoner in part at the railway station at a less cost than they would have stood to him, and as to the other part, when on receipt of a telegram from the seller inquiries were made by the railway people, the prisoner, who was at the railway station filling his sacks, left the potatces and his sacks, and could not be heard of for several weeks, though the police were in active search of him.

4 F

It was contended by the prosecution that the letter of order of the prisoner amounted to a representation that he was a person trading in a considerable way, and that the order given was on a scale consistent with his ordinary transactions. Whereas his ordinary dealings were on a very small scale, to which the large order for potatoes was disproportionate, and that consequently the prisoner had misrepresented his real character and position, and thereby had made the false pretence alleged in the indictment. The falsehood of the pretence, supposing this construction be correct, being amply proved by evidence.

I left the case to the jury, holding that the contention of the prosecution was consistent with law, but leaving it to them, that if they thought the letter did not prove the false pretence, as alleged in the indictment, the prisoner should be acquitted.

The jury convicted, and the prisoner was admitted to bail, to appear to receive sentence at the next Quarter Sessions to be held at Bradford on the 2nd July next.

The opinion of the Court for the Consideration of Crown cases reserved is requested, whether upon the facts proved the defendant was properly convicted upon this indictment.

WM. ALDAM, Chairman of Quarter Sessions for the West Riding of Yorkshire.

S. Tennant, for the prisoner.-The conviction cannot be sustained. The letter of the 17th Nov. was the only evidence in proof of the false pretences alleged in the indictment. There was no light thrown upon that letter by any other evidence. It is consistent with the statements in the letter that the prisoner never had up to that time, dealt in potatoes, but that he was about to commence dealing in them. The words "sample" and " a good trade will be done" all have reference to the future. To sustain the conviction the false pretences charged must be necessarily contained by implication in the letter. The words "I will remit you the cash on the arrival of the goods" do not necessarily import present ability to pay for them. Where a person obtained money by the false pretence that he was going to pay his rent, it was held not to be a false pretence within the statute: (Reg. v. Lee, L. & C. 309; 9 Cox C. C. 304.) In Reg. v. Jennison (L. & C. 157; 9 Cox C. C. 158), where a married man obtained money from a woman by falsely representing himself to be unmarried, although there was no express statement by him to the woman that he was unmarried, yet that was necessarily conveyed by his promise to marry her. In Reg v. Burrows (11 Cox C. C. 258), on an indictment for fraudulently obtaining goods in a market by falsely pretending that a room had been taken at which to pay the market people for their goods, the jury found that the well-known practice was for buyers to engage a room at a public-house, and that the prisoner pretending to be a buyer, conveyed to the minds of the market people that she had engaged such a room, and that they parted with their goods on such belief; yet it was held that there being no evidence that the prisoner knew of such a practice, and the case being consistent with a promise only on her part to engage such a room, and pay for the goods there, a conviction could not be sustained. The cases of

[C. CAS. R.

Reg. v. Giles, L. & C. 502; 10 Cox C. C. 44; and
Reg. v. Hasleton, L. Rep. 2 C. C. R. 134; and 13
Čox C. C. 1,

were also cited.

Lockwood, for the prosecution.-It is sufficient if, upon the evidence produced, the false pretences will reasonably bear the construction imputed by the indictment. They need not be the necessary implication from the acts and conduct of the accused-the test is, what conclusion would a man reasonably draw from them? In Rex v. Barnard (7 C. & P. 764), the wearing of a commoner's cap and gown at Oxford naturally suggested that the person wearing them was student at the university. So here, the giving of a large order by the prisoner, and the suggestion that a good trade might be done, naturally conveyed the idea that the prisoner was in a large way of basiness. So the promise to remit cash on the arrival of the goods naturally imports that the prisoner was able to pay for them. In Reg. v. Giles Blackburn, J. said, "It is not necessary that the false pretence should be made in express words, if the idea is conveyed." Taking the whole of the defendant's letter together, the idea was conveyed that the prisoner was a dealer in potatoes, in a good way of business, and able to pay for the potatoes he ordered on their arrival.

Tennant was heard in reply.

At

Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-The question for the court, as I understand the case, is whether there was evidence upon which the false pretences alleged in the indictment could fairly be sustained. The indictment alleges that the prisoner falsely pretended that he was a dealer in potatoes, and as such dealer, then, was in a large way of business, and that he was in a position to do a good trade in potatoes, and that he then was able to pay for large quantities of potatoes as and when the same might be delivered to him, and that a large quantity of potatoes was obtained by means of those false pretences. It is not contended by the prisoner's counsel that if the false pretences were truly alleged in the indictment they were negatived by the evidence. The question is whether the letter set out in the case, which was the only evidence of the false pretences, sustains the allegations thereof in the indictment. first I was under the impression that it was enough for the prisoner to show that the false pretences alleged to be conveyed by the letter to the prosecutor did not necessarily arise from the letter, but that if the letter would bear an innocent construction the charge would not be made out; but upon consideration I am satisfied that that was a mistaken view, and that it was a question for the jury whether the false pretences alleged did or did not reasonably arise from the letter. I have no desire to protect persons who conduct their business in a loose and careless manner, but at the same time we must be guided in our decisions by the principles of the criminal law. The true principle applicable to this case was well enunciated by Blackburn, J., during the course of the argument in Reg. v. Giles," it is not requisite that the false pretence should be made in express words if the idea is conveyed." The question in all these cases is what was intended to be conveyed to the mind of the prosecutor by the acts, silence, or conduct of the prisoner. If a particular idea is intended to be conveyed to his mind, and was conveyed, and if it be false, the statute is

C. CAS. R.]

[Q.B. Div.

warranted in agreeing with the judgment of the

court.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion.

LUSH, J.-The substantial question is whether there was any evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find that the false pretences alleged were made by the prisoner. The falsity of the pretences alleged was abundantly proved, and the only question is, whether there was evidence of the pretences as alleged, in other words, were those pretences, or either of them, proved to have been made by the prisoner. There must be a false pretence of an existing fact which may be proved by the act or words of the prisoner, or by both combined. If it is to be proved by words, it is not necessary that the words should bear but one meaning-it is sufficient if they are fairly capable of bearing the meaning imputed to them in the indictment. In this case the question is whether the prisoner intended, by his letter to the prosecutor, to convey the meaning put upon it in the indictment, and did the prosecutor so understand the letter? If so, the letter is just as much evidence of the false pretences charged as if the very words had been in the letter.

I am

of opinion that this letter is capable of the meaning imputed to it by the allegations of the false pretences in the indictment. If a man orders goods by a letter in those terms without any further explanation, that letter is fairly capable of the meaning of it imputed in the indictment. The jury found that it was capable of that meaning, and the letter was read by the prosecutor in that sense. I therefore think the conviction should be sustained.

DENMAN, J.-I agree with the judgment of the court, but I still entertain considerable doubt about one part of the case. I doubt whether we are not going too far in holding that the letter contains a representation of facts. There is one statement in the letter which, when construed by one of the decided cases may amount to a false statement of fact, and in that view I think the conviction may be upheld, but upon no other part of the letter do I think that there is any representation of a fact. It appears to me that if the letter had said merely, "Please send me one truck of Regents," &c., &c., it would not have been sufficient to establish the false pretences alleged. Then as to the latter clause, "I will remit you the cash on arrival of the goods," that appears to me to be a mere promise and not a statement that the prisoner had actually then the means of remitting cash. But there is an intermediate statement. "Let them be good quality, then I am sure a good trade will be done for both of us," which may be considered to be a statement of fact. In Reg. v. Giles the prisoner pretended that he had power to bring the prosecutrix's husband back, and that was held to be a statement of fact. That warrants us in holding that where a man is not in a position to do what he professes he will do at a given time, he is making a false statement of fact. The indictment charges that the prisoner falsely pretended that he then was able to pay for large quantities of potatoes, as and when the same might be delivered to him, and that pretence,

POLLOCK, B.-Having heard the whole of the argument, I have come to the conclusion that the conviction should be affirmed. It is not sufficient for the prisoner to show that the letter might bear another meaning, if it is reasonably capable of bearing the meaning imputed to it in the indictment. It is the duty of the prisoner to show by special circumstances that it bore the construction he contends for. I think that the false pretences charged may be fairly inferred from the letter, and that the conviction should be affirmed.

Conviction affirmed.

Supreme Court of Judicature.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Reported by J. M. LELY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Friday, April 13, 1877.

LONDON SCHOOL BOARD v. MURPHY. Education-Neglect of child to attend school-Prosecution of parent under bye law-Habitual neglect of parent proved-Elementary Education Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75), s. 74-Elementary Education Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 79), s. 11. Where a parent habitually neglects to provide instruction for his child, it is not in the discretion of the local authority to proceed against the parent for a fine under one of their bye laws, but they are bound to apply, under the Education Act of 1876, to a court of summary jurisdiction for an order compelling the child to attend some certified efficient school.

By a bye law made under the powers of the Education Act of 1870, s. 74, the parent of every child of not less than five, nor more than thirteen years of age is required to cause such child to attend school, and by another bye law under the same section every parent not observing the bye law is liable to a penalty of 58., which penalty is by virtue of the same section recoverable in a summary

manner.

By sect. 11 of the Elementary Education Act 1876, it is enacted that "if the parent of any child above the age of five years habitually and without reasonable excuse neglects to provide efficient elementary instruction for his child, it shall be duty of the local authority to complain to a court of summary jurisdiction," which court" may order that the child do attend some certified efficient school willing to receive him."

The child of the defendant having failed to attend school, the prosecutors summoned him before a stipendiary magistrate under their bye law. The facts proved at the hearing of the summons amounted in the opinion of the magistrate to an "habitual neglect on the part of the parent within the meaning of the 11th section of the Act of 1876. Thereupon the magistrate dismissed the summons under the bye law, but offered to grant a summons under the Act.

Held, that the magistrate was right, and a rule calling upon him to act under the bye law discharged.

Q.B. Div.]

THIS was a rule under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 44, s. 5, calling upon John Bridge, Esq., stipendiary magistrate of the Wandsworth and Hammersmith Police Court, to show cause why he should not grant a summons against one J. Murphy for unlawfully neglecting to cause his child to attend school, in contravention of a bye law made by the London School Board under the authority of the 74th section of the Elementary Education Act 1870.

The facts were that the School Board had applied to the magistrate for a summons against J. Murphy under a bye law made by them as above stated. The magistrate had asked certain questions of the School Board Officer who applied for the summons, and coming to the conclusion from the answers to such questions that the parent bad habitually neglected to provide education for the child, refused to grant the summons applied for, on the ground that the offence came within the meaning of the 11th section of the Elementary Education Act 1876.

The following sections of the Education Acts are material:

Elementary Education Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75), 8. 74:

Every School Board may from time to time, with the approval of the education department, make bye laws for any of the following purposes: (1.) Requiring the parents of children of such age not less than five years, nor more than thirteen years, as may be fixed by the bye laws, to cause such children (unless there is some reasonable excuse) to attend school. ... (4) Imposing penalties for the breach of such bye laws.... Any proceeding to enforce any bye law may be taken, and any penalty for the breach of any bye law may be recovered, in a sum. mary manner. . . .

Elementary Education Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 79), s. 11:

11. If either

(1.) The parent of any child above the age of five years, who is under this Act prohibited from being taken into full time employment, habitually and without reasonable excuse, neglects to provide efficient elementary instruction for his child; or (2.) Any child is found habitually wandering or not under proper control, or in the company of rogues, vagabonds, disorderly persons, or reputed criminals;

It shall be the duty of the local authority, after due warning to the parent of such child, to com. plain to a court of summary jurisdiction, and such court may, if satisfied of the truth of such complaint, order that the child do attend some certified efficient school willing to receive him and named in the order, being either such as the parent may select, or, if he do not select any, theu such public elementary school as the court think expedient; and the child shall attend that school every time that the school is open, or in such other regular manner as is specified in the order.

An order under this section is in this Act referred to as an attendance order.

Any of the following reasons shall be a reasonable

exouse:

(1.) That there is not within two miles, measured according to the nearest road, from the residence of such child, any public elementary school open which the child can attend; or

(2.) That the absence of the child from school has been caused by sickness or any unavoidable cause. Sect. 50:

Where any act, neglect, or default is punishable under this Act, and also under any other enactment or any bye law made a School Board or other local authority for the time being in force, proceedings may be instituted in respect of such act, neglect, or default under this Act, or auch other enactment or bye law, in the discretion of the authority or person instituting the proceedings, so that proceedings under one enactment or bye law only be

[Q.B. DIV. instituted in respect of the same act, neglect, or default; and any bye law made either before or after the com. mencement of this Act by any School Board or other local authority under sect. 74 of the Elementary Educa tion Act 1870, if otherwise valid, shall not be rendered invalid by reason that it is more stringent than the provisions of this Act; and nothing in this Act shall prejudice the effect of or derogate from any provision relating to the committal of children to industrial schools or the employment of children contained in any previous Act of Parliament which may be more stringent in its provisions than this Act.

The following bye laws (inter alia) had been made by the prosecutors:

No. 2. The parent of every child of not less than five years nor more than thirteen years, is required to canse such child to attend school, unless there be some reason. able excuse for non-attendance.

No. 7. Every parent who shall not observe or shall neglect or violate these bye laws or any of them shall, upon conviction, be liable to a penalty not exceeding 5s. including costs, for each offence.

Ottaway showed cause, and argued that the words of the 11th section of the Elementary Education Act 1876, were imperative, and left no option to the School Board to proceed under the bye law against a person guilty of "habitual neglect" within the meaning of that section; and

that it followed from this that as soon as the "habitual neglect" under the 11th section was proved, the jurisdiction of the magistrate to convict under the bye law was gone.

Holl, Q.C. (Fullarton with him) in support of the rule, argued that the School Board had a discretion to proceed under the bye law or the 11th section of the Act of 1876, and that the School Board, and not the court of summary jurisdiction, were the proper judges whether a particular parent ought to be proceeded against under the bye law or the statute, and they relied strongly on the express words of sect. 50 of the Act of 1876, by which bye laws under sect. 74 of the Act of 1870, were preserved intact.

COCKBURN, C.J.-I am of opinion that the stipendiary magistrate was right. The only question is, whether the School Board might have proceeded under the bye law, or whether they were bound to proceed under the 11th section of the Elementary Education Act of 1876. Now it seems to me that the offence under the bye law and the statute are perfectly distinct, the offence under the bye law being an isolated offence, and the offence under the statute being an habitual one. If the offence under the statute be proved, the magistrate obtains power to deal with the child in the manner pointed out by the statute, but not otherwise. The School Board, however, maintain that they may adopt whichever mode of proceeding they please, and this contention is attempted to be supported by a reference to the 50th section of the Act of 1876, by which the powers of the School Board to proceed under the bye laws is expressly preserved. At first I was much struck by the argument founded upon this 50th section, but upon consideration i think that the words of the 11th section are too forcible and express for that argument to prevail. The 11th section does not deal with one act, but with a series of acts, and provides that "it shall be the duty" of the local authority to proceed against the parent in the manner and for the purposes pointed out. Words like these leave not one atom of discretion in the local authority. What happened here was that the School Board sought to prove an offence under the bye law, and in fact proved

an offence under the statute. That being so, it became their duty to proceed under the statute, and it became the duty of the magistrate to dismiss the summons under the bye law. The protection of the child is the main object of this legislation, and that object would not be attained by granting a summons under the bye law.

MELLOR, J.-I am of the same opinion. I had at first some doubt whether the School Board had not a discretion to proceed under the bye law. But when I consider the whole policy of the Education Acts, I see that the bye law applies to ordinary, and the statute applies to extraordinary, cases. The great object of these Acts is to secure the education of children, and that object is sought to be attained, in the case of parents unable or unwilling to have their children educated, by the wide and important provisions of the 11th section of the Act of 1876. As soon as the magistrate found that an offence under the statute was proved, he was justified in dismissing the summons under the bye law, inasmuch as the School Board have no power to free themselves from the obligations imposed by the 11th section.

Rule discharged.

Solicitors for the School Board, Gedge, Kirby, and Millett.

Solicitors for the Magistrate, Walker, Martineau, and Co.

April 25 and May 2, 1877.

REG. v. CUMBERLEGE AND OTHERS. Vestry clerk, remuneration of Preparation of valuation list-Disallowance by auditor-Union Assessment Committee Act Amendment Act (27 & 28 Vict. c. 39), s. 7-Vestry Clerks Act (13 & 14 Vict. c. 57), 8. 7.

By the Vestry Clerks' Act, sect. 7, the vestry clerk is to make out, when required by the vestry, the poor rate, and to assist the churchwardens or overseers in preparing and making out all other parochial assessments or accounts. And by the Union Assessment Committee Act Amendment Act, 8. 7, the overseers of a parish may charge any expense incurred by them, with the consent of the vestry, in making out any valuation list upon the poor rate.

The vestry of the parish of St. Paul's, Covent Garden, having charged in their accounts the sum of 100l. paid to their nestry clerk for preparing the valuation list, the poor law auditor disallowed the charge on the grounds (1), that the preparing of the vestry list was among the statutory duties of the vestry clerk, for which his salary, under the statute, was to be taken as payment ; and (2) that the charge was excessive, in the absence of particular evidence that any person had received any part of the 100l.

Held, by Lush, J., that the valuation list was not an assessment, that the amount charged might have been and had been sanctioned by the vestry, that the claim of the vestry clerk was not restricted to disbursements out of pocket, and that a rule to quash the disallowance upon certiorari ought to be made absolute.

THIS was a rule to quash on certiorari the disallowance by Hugh Lloyd Roberts, Poor Law Auditor of the Metropolitan Poor Law Aadit District, of the sum of 100l. paid to John Claxton Button, Vestry Clerk of the Parish of St. Paul,

[Q.B. Div.

Covent Garden, in the County of Middlesex, in accordance with the resolution of the vestry of the parish for his services in preparing the valuation list, and to quash also the surcharge of the said sum of 100l. upon the Reverend Samuel Francis Cumberlege, George Bell and William Barringer.

The following are extracts from the return to the writ of certiorari:

The following entries appeared on the payments side of the account of the parish of Saint Paul, Covent Garden, for the half year ending 25th March, 1876:

February 7. John C. Button, preparing, &c.,

valuation list

March 25. Messrs. Shaw and Sons' Subscription to the Justice of the Peace...

£ s. d.

100 0 0

1 4.6

The following was the certificate of disallowance entered in the book of account of the parish:

I do hereby certify that in the account of the half year ended at Lady Day, 1876, of the Vestry Church wardens and Overseers of the Parish of St. Paul, Covent Garden, I have disallowed the sum of 1017. 4s. 6d. as payments illegally made out of the funds of the said parish.

And I find that Samuel Francis Cumberlege, clerk in holy orders, George Bell, and William Barringer, Esquires, authorised the making of a portion of such illegal payments, to wit, of the sum of 100l., and I do hereby surcharge upon them the sum of 100%., and I do hereby further certify that the said sum of 100%. is due from them.

And I find that Samuel Francis Cumberlege, clerk in holy orders, George Bell and James Richmond and John Coutts, Esquires, authorised the making of the remainder of such illegal payments, to wit, the sum of 1l. 4s. 6d. ; and I do hereby surcharge upon them the sum of 17. 4s. 6d., and I do hereby further certify that the sum

of 11. 4s. 6d. is due from them.

As witness my hand this 31st day of July, 1876.
H. LLOYD ROBERTS,

(Signed)

Auditor of the Metropolitan Audit District. The following was the statement of reasons entered in the book of account of the parish of Saint Paul, Covent Garden, with respect to the disallowance of the sum of 100l.:

In the account of receipts and payments with respect to the poor rates for the half year ended at Lady Day, 1876, of the Vestry, Churchwardens, and Overseers of the Poor of the Parish of Saint Paul, Covent Garden, I disallowed the sum of 101l. 4s. 6d., which sum is composed of the undermentioned items, entered and charged in the said account as and for payments made out of the poor rates of the said parish, to wit:

Mr. John C. Button, the Vestry Clerk of the
said Parish, for preparing the valuation
list
Messrs. Shaw and Sons Subscription to the
Justice of the Peace

£ s. d.

100 0 0

146

£101 4 6

A statement of my reasons being required with respect to the sum of 100l., a portion of such disallowance, I now state that I made such disallowance because the said sum is charged in respect of work and labour performed by Mr. Button, the vestry clerk of the said parish, which come within the official duties imposed upon vestry clerks by the statutes in that behalf made and provided; and because the vestry clerk of the said parish was bound, as part of his official duties, to have performed the duties in respect of which such sum was charged without any fee or recompense beyond the annual salary of 150%. which he enjoys and receives as such vestry clerk, and because the said vestry, churchwardens, and overseers were not authorised in law to make such payment and charge the amount thereof upon the poor rates of the said parish, and because no statements of particulars, with vouchers of payments, were produced to me with regard to the payment of any part of such sum of 100l. by the said vestry clerk to any other person or persons.