Parks v. Mason. chaser of the last mentioned tract, namely, that on Sugar creek. The sole question, made by the defendant on the trial, was whether the land was sufficiently described in the constable's return. It appeared upon the evidence, that Sugar creek and its branches watered a large portion of the county of Mecklenburg, in which the land is situate: that one of the streams was called "Big Sugar creek," another "Town Sugar creek," and another "Little Sugar creek ;" and that they came together in the edge of South Carolina. The plaintiff, then, in order to identify the land, gave evidence, that the late Robert Watson owned a tract of land in the County of Mecklenburg, on the "Town Sugar creek," and did not own any other land in the county, and that the premises now sued for adjoined that tract of Watson's, and was on that branch of Sugar creek, known as "Town Sugar creek," and also that it lay on the main road from Salisbury to Charlotte. Upon that evidence, the Court held that there was not sufficient certainty in the description of the land in the levy, and non-suited the plaintiff, who thereupon appealed. J. H. Wilson, for the plaintiff. RUFFIN, C. J. The levy is returned, strictly in compliance with the Act of Assembly, which directs, that the constable shall set forth what lands he levied on, where situate, on what water course, and whose land it adjoins, Rev. St. c. 62, s. 16. That was done literally in this case; and looking to the return alone, there is no ambiguity in the description, nor any room to doubt, that by it the land could be identified, so that the sheriff could tell what land he was to sell, and bidders also understand what they were buying: which are the objects of the statute in requiring the particularity of description prescribed. Parks v. Mason. This return must be sustained, for it follows the very words of the Act. The land is situate in Mecklenburg county, lies on Sugar creek, and adjoins the land that belonged to Robert Watson, lately deceased. It is true as was observed in Smith v. Low, 2 Ired. 458, a levy though returned in the precise words of the Act, may require extrinsic evidence to identify the land, as indeed, may be the case with the most accurate description in a deed. Here, for example, an ambiguity, not appearing on the return, was raised by evidence dehors that there were three Sugar creeks in Mecklenburg. But that cannot absolutely avoid the levy and return, which conform to the statute. It only made it necessarry, that evidence should be given, which would connect the return with one of those creeks, and make it appear on which of them the land, according to the description in the return, must lie. This was completely done, by proving that the Watson land, which is called for in the return, lies on a particular branch of the creek, and that Watson had no other land, and that this tract in fact adjoined that one of Watson's. How, better evidence could be given, to show on which of the streams the land lies. or to identify the parcels levied on and sold, it is difficult to conceive. PER CURIAM. Judgment reversed and venire de novo. JOHN WELCH vs. WILLIAM W. PIERCY & AL. The County Court has full power to order the laying out of public roads; but none to lay them out. The last power is given to a jury. The Court has the power to decide, whether the public convenience requires the laying out of a road, and to order a jury for the purpose of laying it out; but it has no power, except as to the termini, to direct the jury or any one else, how it shall run, that being the exclusive province of the jury, their verdict being of course subject to the judgment of the Court, whether it shall be received or not. An order of the Court directing how a road shall be run and opened does not justify an overseer, who acts under it, and he is liable to an action by the party grieved. Every man is presumed, in law, to intend any consequence, which naturally flows from an unlawful act, and is answerable to private individuals for any injury so sustained. Therefore the defendant was liable, in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, for the loss of hogs, &c. occasioned by the unlawful breaking down of the plaintiff's fence. The cases of State v. Marble, 4 Ire. 321, and Baker v. Wilson, 3 Ire. 170, cited and approved. Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Cherokee County, at the Spring Term, 1846, his Honor Judge PEARSON presiding. This is an action of trespass quare clausum fregit,brought to recover damages, for throwing down the fences of the plaintiff, whereby he lost several hogs and other property. The defendant pleaded in justification, that he was appointed by the County Court of Cherokee County, to open a public road, at the place where the fences were thrown down. He produced in evidence the record of the County Court, whereby it appeared, that, at June Term, 1840, a petition was filed, wherein it is stated "that it will be of great convenience to the neighborhood, that a public road be established, leaving the State road at or near Joel Vannoy's, valley river, passing by Andrew Colvert's, W. W. Piercy's, and to intersect the State Road at or near James Ring's." At June Term 1840, an order was made Welch v. Piercy. by the Court, directing the Sheriff "to summon a jury to view, mark and lay off a road from Thomas G. Forney's line passing Andrew Calvert's, and William W. Piercy's and intersect the State road at James King's." The jury was duly summoned, and their return is as follows: "The jury met according to the order, and agree that the road be made." They then recommend that the defendant, Piercy, be appointed the overseer, with the hands within certain designated boundaries. The order of the Court, appointing Piercy'overseer, is as follows: "Ordered by the Court, that William W. Pearcy be overseer of the road, leading from James King's, down the South side of valley river, crossing the said river at Joel Vannoy's to the Hanks branch, and that he command all the hands on the South side of the said river, a due South course from these points, &c." It then directs the overseer "to work out the same, &c." Acting under this order, the defendant, in opening the road, committed the trespass com. plained of. It was admitted by the defendant's counsel, that he had failed in proving, that the road had been laid off by the jury, along the place, where the alleged trespass was committed; and he moved the Court to instruct the jury, that, as the road had not been laid off and marked by the jury at any place, the defendant was justified, under his order, in opening out the road, along the nearest and best route between the points mentioned in his order. This instruction was refused, and under the charge of the Judge, a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, in their damages the injury sustained by the loss of the hogs and other articles. From the judgment on this verdict the defendant appealed. Francis and Edney, for the plaintiff. 1st. That the County Court had no power to make the orde, under which the defendant acted. 2ndly. That one writ lies for several trespasses. Fitz. Nat. Brev. title Trespass 196, 198, 201. Viner 38, 39, Co. Rep. pt. page 173. 3rdly. Welch v. Piercy. Any consequential damages may be laid in aggravation. Anderson v. Brickton, Strange 192. Burnett v. Alcott, 2 Term 166 166, Taylor v. Cole, 3 Term 292, Bulleis N. P. 82. Lears v. Lyons, 3 Eng. Cow. L. Rep. 362. Gaither, for the defendant. NASH, J. The defendant asks for a new trial, because of the refusal of the Judge to instruct the jury as required, and because he charged them, that they might give damages for the loss of the hogs and other property, if they thought it resulted from the pulling down of the fences. We entirely agree with his Honor on both points; and very much for the reasons assigned by him. The County Court of each County is vested with " full power and authority to order the laying out of public roads," but none whatever to to lay them out. That authority is given to another tribunal. that is, a jury. By the 2nd section of the Act of 1784, Rev. Stat. ch. 104,sec. 4, it is ordained that "all roads shall be laid out by a jury of freeholders, to the greatest advantage of the inhabitants, and as little as may be to the injury of inclosures." And to secure a faithful discharge of their duty, the jury make their return on oath. The Court, then, have the power to decide whether the public convenience requires the laying out of the road, and to order a jury to be summoned to lay it out; but they have no power, except as to the termini, to direct the jury or any one else how it shall run, that being the exclusive right of the jury; their verdict being, of course, subject to the judgment of the Court, whether it shall be received or not. It has been urged before us, that, as the defendant was acting under an order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, he could not be a trespasser, as the order was not void but only voidable. If this were the fact, the argument would be sound; but the order is not voidable alone, it is absolutely void, both for uncertainty and want of power in the Court to |