191 competent afterwards for the Court, on his petition, to allow him to prosecute in forma pauperis, though the defendant objected to the surety and obtained a rule that further surety should be given or the suit should be dismissed. Holder v. Jones, 8. The Court ought either to have dismissed the suit,. according to the rule, or to have made an order on the plaintiff's petition. permitting him to carry on his action, without giv ing further security. Ibid. 9. The Court could not discharge the first sureties from their responsibilities, without the consent of the defendant. Ibid. 10. A plea, that the amount claimed by the plaintiff) together with the costs then due, had been ten-{ dered to him since the commencement of the suit, is, as a plea, no bar to the plaintiff's action, though? the money has been paid, into Court under that plea. Murray v. Windley, 201 11. The proper course, when pays the costs. If the plaintiff prefers going on to trial, and he does not recover more than the amount so admitted, he is liable for the costs incurred subsequently to the payment into Court. Ibid. 12. A special verdict is in itself a verdict of guilty, as the facts found in it do or do not constitute in law the offence charged. There is nothing to do on it but to enter a judgment thereon for or against the accused, unless the Court should deem the verdict, as found, not to be sustained by the evidence, when they may set it aside and order a venire de novo. State v. Moore, 228 13. A judgment on a special verdict leaves the matter of law distinctly open to review in a higher Court. Ibid. 14. But when the Court sets aside a special verdict, as they may do, they cannot of themselves enter a general verdict of guilty or not guilty. That must be done by a new jury. Ibid. no tender has been made (15. If done by the Court, it before action brought, is for the defendant to move the Court that he may be permitted to pay into Court the amount he ad mits to be due. If the plaintiff agrees to receive this amount in full of his claim, the suit is at an is a mistrial. Ibid. 16. A defendant, in his exception, must shew some error to his prejudice; otherwise this Court will not set aside the verdict of the jury. State v. Cow end and the defendant an, 239 17. There is no obligation a Judge to interrupt on counsel in stating their conclusions, either of law or fact. It is the right and the duty of the presiding Judge, if counsel state facts as proved, upon which no evidence has been given, to correct the mistake, and he may do it? at the moment, or wait till he charges the juryperhaps the most appropriate time. State v. O'Neal, 251 18. An omission on the part of a Judge to instruct the jury on a particular point, if no instruction be asked from him on that point, is Ibid. 19. The plea of not guilty to an action of trespass on the person, merely denies that he committed any trespass at all. Meeds v. Carver, 20. If, in such an action, the defendant hath matter of? cannot justification, he not error. 273 a give it in evidence under the general issue, but must plead it specially. Ibid. 21. The County Court has no power to reverse judgment, rendered at a preceding term. Ramsour v. Raper, 346 22. Where a Judge told the jury in his charge, that they must find for one of the parties, unless they believed his witness had committed perjury, the charge was erroneous, because the credit of the 23. witness was a matter for the jury, not for the Court, and the witness might have been mistaken, and not guilty of perjury. State v. Thomas, 381 This Court cannot act upon affidavits offered in the Court below. It is the province of that Court exclusively to determine the facts, and the Supreme Court can only review so much of the judgment, as involves matters of law, Rhinehardt v. strictly. Potts, 408 24. A defendant, who is sued upon a judgment, obtained before a Justice of the Peace, has no right to plead that he was an infant, when that judgment was rendered. Ludwick 422 v. Fair, 25. A judgment by a Justice of the Peace, though not a matter of record, dethe termines, between parties, their respective rights in the matter of controversy. Neither party can, in a subsequent proceeding to inforce it, deny or contest the matters of fact, ascertained by it. Ibid. 26. Where a warrant is issued against three, and returned "executed," and the judgment is against the "defendant" in the singular, and so also is the entry in the stay of execution, and especially where the Justice, who rendered the is used as the foundation for reviewing summary convictions, or other proceedings, before inferior tribunals in a case of false judgment, it is in the nature of a writ of error, and in fact always lies as a matter of right. lbid. Where the recordari is to bring up the proceedings in a case of forcible entry and detainer, although the plaintiff may have en. tered no traverse before the Justice, yet he shall be permitted to assign as many errors as he thinks proper. Ibid. REGISTRATION. Where the purchaser of a slave has two different places of residence in two different counties, the registration of his deed in either of those counties is sufficient. Carter v. Spen RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES. 1. Where a conveyance is made to A. B. and C. for a certain tract of land, as trustees for the Methodist Episcopal Church, a suit of trespass quare clausum fregit may be brought by A. B. and C. against the wrongdoers, though they may not have been appointed trustees according to our Act of Assembly in relation to the ap pointment of trustees by INDEX. religious congregations. > Walker v. Fawcett, 441. 2. The title is vested in them individually and they may recover at law, though in the writ and declaration they style themselves "trustees." The latter word may be rejected as surplusage. 66 Ibid. 3. It is only when a suit is brought by persons, who claims as successors," that the question arises, whether the original bargainees were duly chosen the trustees of a religious congregation, and whether the suing were persons also duly chosen trustees, so as to give them legally the character of "successors" to the former, and thereby vest in them the title to the property,which is necessary to support an action. Ibid. ROADS. See HIGHWAYS. SEDUCTION. An action by a father for the seduction of his daughter will not lie, when the daughter is of full age, and not living in her father's family, but in the actual employment of another person, though her father was to receive part of her wages. Daniel v. Edwards, 2. SET OFF 531 The plaintiff' commenced his action of assumpsit on the 3rd of July, 1846. On the 13th when the Court, to which the action was returnable sat, the defendant pleaded as set-offs certain bonds of the plaintiff's due the 3rd of July. On these bonds the defendant had sued out warrants against the plaintiff on the 7th of July and recovered judgments on the 10th of July 1846. Held, that these bonds could not be introduced as set-offs, because they were merged in judgments before the plea pleaded. Mizell v. Moore, 255 A set-off must not only be due at the commencement of the suit, but must continue to be due in the same form, when pleaded. Ibid. 3. A. had collected a sum of money for B and, being sued for it by B's administrator, pleaded only the general issue. Held, that A. could not give in evi dence, that B. had lived with him and that the expenses of her maintenance amounted to more than the money collected. He should have pleaded this Donaho v. as a set-off. Witherspoon, SHERIFF. 351 Mc-1. A sheriff is bound to mark 408 on process delivered to man, a writ against James Bowles, which was returned “non est inventus;" the plaintiffs in their joint names may sustain an action for a false return, as informers or as the parties grieved. Houser v. Hampton, 7. The ignorance of a she 8. him the true day on which it came to his handsotherwise he will forfeit the penalty of $100 imposed by an Act of Assembly, Rev. Stat. ch. 31, sec. 43. Hathaway v. Free109 2. A sheriff, to whom a writ has been delivered, but who goes out of office before the return day of the writ has no power to make the return on it, and therefore is not liable to amercement for not doing so. State v. Woodside, 296 3. It is the duty of the sheriff, going out of office, to deliver all the process remaining in his hands, to his successor. Ibid. 4. A judgment of an amercement against a sheriff is not conclusive against the sureties on his bond. They 9. may show that the judg ment was either fraudulently or improperly obtained against their principal. Ibid. 5. When a sheriff returns,) that a writ came to his hands "too late to execute," the writ having been delivered to him more than ten, but less than twenty days before? the term of the Court, he is liable to the penalty of five hundred dollars, prescribed by the Statute, Rev. Stat. ch. 109, sec. 18, for making a false return. Lemitt v. Freeman, 317 6. The plaintiffs sued out 333 riff's deputy, who makes a false return, if in fact it was false, does not excuse the sheriff from the penalty. Ibid. When a defendant in a writ is openly and at large in a County, non est inventus is a false return; and, if he cannot be taken elsewhere, the statute requires, that the sheriff shall go to his place of residence, before he makes that return. Ibid. If a sheriff, who has mesne process in his hands, finds the defendant and really endeavors to arrest him, and is prevented by any sufficient cause, or if, after arrest, the defendant is rescued, he should return the facts in excuse for not taking the body, and not return generally non est inventus, contrary to the fact. Ibid. 10. Rescue is a good return in excuse, and the sheriff may return, that he did not take the body, because he was kept off by force of arms. Ibid. 11. The sheriff is not obliged to summon the power of |