1966. I am here for no reason except wanting peace. I have been beaten. I have been shackled. But I still speak out for peace.

Earlier this month, an American doctor, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stated that he had spoken recently in Saigon with a number of prisoners shortly after their release from the "tiger cages." The prisoners, he said, told him that after the American delegation left, the monk in this picture remained incarcerated in the tiger cages until January 6 of this year. On that day he was again. beaten in his cell by prison guards. According to some of his fellow prisoners he lay in the cell for 2 days calling for help but none was given. On January 8 he died in his cell. The ex-prisoners who recounted this story also told their own tales-tales of being shackled to the floor for months and years at a time until their legs lost all feeling and all mobility.

Such has been life on Con Son Island-the Thieu government's largest civilian prison-even after the inhuman conditions there were exposed to world opinion nearly 3 years ago. From that time until the signing of the cease-fire agreement, there was always at least one American penal adviser stationed at that prison.

President Thieu denies that his government holds any "political prisoners." However, in South Vietnam, where "neutralism" is illegal, people who are considered "dangerous to the national security" can be thrown in jail without trial and labeled as "common criminals." Most nongovernment sources-journalists and private groups familiar with South Vietnam-estimate that the number of civilian political prisoners runs into the tens of thousands.

Today I will not dwell on the numerous accounts of arrest and torture that have come out of South Vietnam in recent years. What concerns me right now, and what I feel this committee must deal with is the fact that to a very great extent Americans are responsible for what goes on in the prisons and interrogation centers of the Thieu government. We have no choice but to accept some responsibility for the activities of Saigon's National Police Force, to the extent that we have helped establish it as an instrument of political coercion and repression. It is too easy to argue that the policies and practices of the Thieu regime are no concern of ours, and an internal affair in South Vietnam. We have been deeply involved in the creation of the entire system, and we are still paying the bills. It is also too easy to argue that the Viet Cong are just as guilty as Saigon in its treatment of prisoners; to my knowledge no one has ever suggested that we are funding their operation.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO SAIGON'S POLICE AND PRISONS

The history of United States involvement in advising and training the South Vietnamese National Police goes back to 1955. Since 1961 there have been American advisors working with the prison system. By 1970, we had 195 public safety advisors in South Vietnam, plus an additional 600 advisors under the U.S. financed "Phoenix operation", a program through which thousands of political suspects were imprisoned or killed. Under U.S. sponsorship, the Saigon National Police Force has grown from around 10,000 in the early 1960's to over 120,000

at present or about one policeman for every 140 people. One AID supported program, "national police records and identification system activity" is a nationwide police program to photograph, fingerprint, and keep a file on every South Vietnamese citizen over 15 years of age; with AID support, over 10 million people have been registered under this program. The United States has built and remodeled Saigon prison facilities. U.S. funds and personnel were used in the construction of police interrogation facilities-centers where Vietnamese say that political prisoners are systematically beaten and tortured. The CIA has apparently maintained an advisory relationship with the interrogation center system and with the secret police, an organization which one AID official described as the most hated and feared entity in South Vietnam.

Justification for U.S. assistance to Saigon's police and prisons has always been presented in the most benign terms. AID officials tell us that the objective of United States public safety programs has been to help the Saigon government develop a more humane correctional system. However, in the case of the Con Son Island tiger cages, it took two U.S. congressmen to discover the atrocious conditions there, in spite of the fact that U.S. AID prison advisors had been present on the island since as early as 1963. A 1963 memorandum from one of them describes the tiger cages and mentions the practice of shackling inmates to the floor. Even after the disclosure, one public safety advisor told a volunteer in Vietnam that there had been nothing wrong with the cages; he acknowledged and defended the throwing of caustic lime powder on inmates as a necessary measure of prisoner control.

Mr. Chairman, the evidence indicates that many of AID's justifications for aid to Thieu's police force and prisons have been nothing more than hollow rhetoric designed for Congress. I cannot see how the continuation of such a program can possibly have much humanitarian benefit for the people of South Vietnam. Within the context of Vietnamese politics, I can see no other purpose in such a program than to help consolidate President Thieu's power and squash his political opposition.

With the signing of the Paris Agreement, which requires the end of American participation in Vietnamese internal political affairs, U.S. aid to Saigon's police and prisons becomes even more questionable than ever before. Perhaps this is why AID has been trying to give the impression that public safety programs in Vietnam are being shutdown. A bit of investigation shows, however, that the administration definitely intends to continue our involvement with South Vietnamese police, though perhaps without the direct presence of American police advisors, who were explicitly ruled out by the ceasefire treaty. As Senator Kennedy said in a statement in the Record 3 weeks ago, the administration's intentions in this regard are "the object of confusion and coverup."

COVERUP OF CONTINUING PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAMS

For example, in response to one citizen's inquiry about continuing public safety programs, an AID official wrote that all police advisors were leaving, the prison assistance program had been phased out and the public safety directorate had been dissolved. No hint of any con

tinuing activity could be gleaned from his letter. Even in AID's "Indochina Reconstruction" booklet, it is categorcially declared that: "AID had terminated its assistance to the National Police and to the Vietnamese Corrections System." However, in leafing through that very presentation, one can easily find several places where elements of the old public safety program are tucked away under new headings:

Technical support: $869,000 for computer training of 200 personnel of the national police;

Public works general support: $520,000 for replacement parts and $350,000 for American advisors to the police telecommunications system.

Public administration general support: $256,000 for training 64 members of the national police.

It is interesting to note that 264 Vietnamese policemen to be trained in the United States next year represent a substantial increase over the 43 trained here this year.

In addition to the funds mentioned above, the AID booklet lists $3.8 million in "unliquidated obligations" still available for public safety in South Vietnam. There is no indication of how these funds will be used.

Upon closer examination, more money for public safety can be uncovered in the relatively innocent looking "commodity import program." As all of you are well aware, under this program, imported commodities paid for by the United States with American dollars are sold in Vietnam to private businessmen for Vietnamese piasters. The first-priority use for these piasters is for general support of the Saigon civil and military budgets. In calendar year 1973, over 1.3 billion of these U.S. supported piasters-costing the American taxpayers approximately $3.3 million-will be spent by the Saigon Government for public safety programs. In view of a 1972 GÃO report which points out how little control U.S. AID really exercises over the spending of such American donated piasters, we have little assurance that the amount Saigon actually spends on police and prisons will not be even higher.

In addition, AID and the Department of Defense have agreed that DOD will continue its commodity support to the Saigon police in the next fiscal year to the tune of $9.3 million plus an additional $1.3 million in telecommunications support. Curiously, this figure represents a considerable jump in DOD spending for Vietnamese police support, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary Doolin, who puts DOD contributions at $5.4 million, $5.4 million, and $6.8 million for fiscal year 1971, 1972, and 1973. At a time when the Paris Agreement limits such support for one-for-one replacement of wornout equipment, it is hard to understand how such an increase can be rationalized.

Combining the figures I have listed so far-and there may well be public safety support funds hidden elsewhere in the budget-the administration intends to spend at least $19.7 million for Saigon's police and prisons next year.

An illuminating example of the overall coverup of the administration's public safety plans is the new description of the old public safety telecommunications program. Since 1956 U.S. AID support of the Saigon police telecommunications network has been an integral part of the "public safety" program. This year, however, the project is sim

ply described as support for the "Combined Telecommunications Directorate," a body which Dr. Hannah now refers to as "nonpolice agency of the Ministry of Interior serving all GVN civilian agencies."

By contrast, an Office of Public Safety paper written a year ago describes the telecommunications project as "communications support of civil security telecommunication system: Under the Ministry of Interior, separate and distinct from the commercial system under the Ministry of Telecommunications. The staff of the "Combined Telecommunications Directorate" is composed of personnel from the Saigon army, the National Police, the territorial forces, as well as the civil service. Clearly a police-related activity, the telecommunications project is being whitewashed this year of any connection with controversial "public safety" operations.

CONSTRUCTION OF PRISON FACILITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Other confusion and coverup regarding our public safety efforts involve the construction of prison facilities in South Vietnam. I have here a copy of a 1971 "Notice to Proceed" from the Department of Navy directing an American construction firm to spend $400.000 worth of piasters on the building of isolation cells-called by the Vietnamese "the new tiger cages"-on Con Son Island. In response to a recent congressional inquiry, however, an AID official flatly stated that Department of Defense funds had never been used for the construction of GVN prison or detention facilities. This is puzzling and certainly does not explain the whole truth. As it turns out, the funds authorized by the Navy came out of an American-supported "assistance in kind" piaster fund generated through the "food for peace" program and apparently did not come directly from the DOD.

Another question is raised by former CORDS Director William Colby's statement in 1971 to the House Government Operations Committee that U.S. funds were used to build Province Interrogation Centers. According to official statements, neither AID nor DOD funded the construction of these centers, so the implication is that some other agency, presumably the CIA, has been pouring additional unknown amounts of money into the secret police system-funds over which Congress has no control.

COVERUP OF U.S. SUPPORT

The basic point I would like to make is that we in Congress have been the victims of a monumental pile of contradictions, denials and obfuscations regarding the public safety program in Vietnam—and no doubt public safety programs elsewhere. If public safety is an honest, forth-right program, one which Members of Congress would wholeheartedly support, then it is hard to understand why the administration seems to be going to such lengths to cover it up.

In the case of Vietnam, I would say the biggest coverup of all for U.S. support of programs like the police and prisons is in the overall U.S. underwriting of the Saigon budget. Direct budgetary subsidies like the commodity import program and food for peace are only part of the story. Other income is generated when the Thieu Government collects tariffs on these U.S.-supported imports. More revenue comes in when the U.S. buys piasters from the Saigon Government

at a false rate. According to an official GAO report, we finance directly or indirectly, 70 to 80 percent of the revenues collected by the Thieu Government.

In 1971 hearings before the House Government Operations Committee. AID administrator Robert Nooter was asked to explain how the Thieu Government could afford to expand its police force from 82,000 to 120,000 within the space of a year. He responded that "the funding of the police salaries comes from the Vietnamese budget, not from AID", but then added, "indirectly, of course, in the broadest sense, we support that budget in an overall ***" Pressed way further on whether the Saigon budget would have been able to take on such an increase like that if it were not for U.S. assistance, he only replied that "our assistance does make it possible for them to meet at least a portion of their budget deficit."

I understand there is a considerable sympathy on this committee against the continuance of public safety programs and I applaud your proposal in S. 1443 [Foreign Military Sales and Assistance Act] to terminate them. However, in the case of Vietnam, I think we must recognize that even if we cut out direct public safety support but continue high level budgetary support of the Thieu government through such programs as commodity imports and food for peace, that we will still be indirectly supporting the police, as well as other political programs of the Thieu government. The Paris ceasefire agreement is quite explicit in its requirement that the United States and other foreign governments stay out of the internal political affairs of South Vietnam.

The administration's proposal for aid to Thieu is a proposal for continued massive political support to one of two South Vietnamese parties; it does not encourage participation by that government in a political settlement and therefore does not, in my opinion, honor the spirit of the Paris agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, I urge this committee to consider the following recommendations:

(1) That no funds authorized for foreign aid, nor any funds generated as a direct result of that aid, be used to support any policerelated activity, including commodity support, salary support or training, any pacification, propaganda or intelligence operations, or any other activity which would be construed as involving the United States in the domestic political affairs of other countries.

(2) That, particularly in Vietnam, there be a reduction and carefully set spending controls on any funds that will directly or indirectly go into the Saigon budget.

(3) That, particularly in Indochina, assistance be restricted as much as possible to programs that will be truly beneficial to the people as a whole on a humanitarian basis.

ENCOURAGING END OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S INTERMENT POLICY

We need not question the right of the government of South Vietnam to deal firmly with those within their country who violated the laws and committed serious criminal acts. This is the right and re