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heads are intoxicated. And keep rather two too few, than one too many. Feed them well, and pay them with the most; and then thou mayest boldly require service at their hands. 1 IV. Let thy kindred and allies be welcome to thy house and table, grace them with thy counte, nance, and father them in all honest actions. For by this means thou shalt so double the bond of nature, as thou shalt find them so many advocates to plead an apology for thee behind thy back. But shake off those glow-worms, I mean parasites and sycophants, who will feed and fawn upon thee in the summer of prosperity, but in adverse storms they will shelter thee no more than an arbour in winter.
V. Beware of suretyship for thy best friends. He that payeth another man's debts seeketh his own decay. But, if thou canst not otherwise choose, rather lend thy money thyself upon good bonds, although thou borrow it: so shalt thou secure thyself, and pleasure thy friend. Neither borrow money of a neighbour or a friend, but of a stranger; where paying for it, thou shalt hear no more of it. Otherwise thou shalt eclipse thy credit, lose thy freedom, and yet pay as dear as another. But, in borrowing money, be precious of thy word; for he that hath care of keeping days of payment is lord of another man's purse.
VI. Undertake no suit against a poor man without receiving much wrong. For, besides that thou makest him thy compeer, it is a base conquest to triumph where there is small resistance. Neither attempt law against any man before thou be fully resolved that thou hast right
on thy side; and then spare not for either money or pains. For a cause or two, so followed and obtained, will free thee from suits a great part of thy life.
VII. Be sure to keep some great man thy friend, but trouble him not for trifles. Compliment him often with many, yet small gifts, and of little charge. And, if thou hast cause to bestow any great gratuity, let it be something which may be daily in sight. Otherwise, in this ambitious age, thou shalt remain like a hop without a pole, live in obscurity, and be made a football for every insulting companion to spurn at.
VIII. Towards thy superiors be humble, yet generous : with thine equals familiar, yet respective : towards thy inferiors show much humanity, and some familiarity, as to bow the body, stretch forth the hand, and to uncover the head : with such like popular compliments. The first prepares thy way to advancement : the second makes thee known for a man well bred : the third gains a good report; which, once got, is easily kept. For right humanity takes such deep root in the minds of the multitude, as they are more easily gained by unprofitable courtesies than by churlisb benefits. Yet I advise thee not to affect, or neglect, popularity too much. Seek not to be Essex, shun to be Raleigh.
IX. Trust not any man with thy life, credit, or estate. For it is mere folly for a man so to enthral himself to his friend, as, though occasion being offered, he should not dare to become thine enemy.
X. Be not scurrilous in conversation, nor satiri
cal in thy jests. The one will make thee unwelcome to all company; the other pull on quarrels, and get thee hated of thy best friends. For suspicious jests, when any of them savour of truth, leave a bitterness in the minds of those which are touched. And, albeit I have already pointed at this inclusively, yet I think it necessary to leave it to thee as a special caution ; because I have seen so many prone to quip and gird, as they would rather lose their friend than their jest. And, if perchance their boiling brain yield a quaint scoff, they will travail to be delivered of it as a woman with child. These nimble fancies are but the froth of wit.
LORD BURGHLEY TO QUEEN ELIZABETH.
MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY, Full of assurance that my unfeigned zeal for
in what-I humbly presume to remonstrate to your majesty, I shall venture to speak my mind with a freedom worthy the noble end and aim of my design. When any man that is as ambitious as myself of engaging your majesty's good opinion of my actions, and your favour in my endeavours, shall attempt to plead against any particulars engrossing your royal ear, he cannot be well suspected of directing his discourse and solicitations on that head to any private interest and advantage. Since by advancing the contrary position, he might hope perhaps in time, and in
his turn, by the force of industry and application, to enjoy the benefit of it.
Secure, therefore, in my zeal for the welfare of my prince and my country, I shall venture to appeal to your majesty's knowledge of history, whether it afford any one instance of that nature which has not been, or was very likely to be, of fatal consequence to the prince, or the people, or both. I will not insist on Sejanus, or any other of the Roman minions, to whose ambition or avarice, when the nobility had fallen in numbers, and the people felt the rage of their exorbitant passions, unsatisfied with what they possessed, they have aimed at the life and throne of the prince that raised them. The reason of which is plain ; because, having only themselves and their own private advantage in view, they make use of the prince only as the means of their own grandeur, without any regard to his real service or the public good, against which it is impossible to do the prince any.
A king, by his royal office, is the father of his country, whose eye ought to watch over the good of all and every one of his subjects, in the just execution of the laws and the impartial dispensation of prerogative; in redressing of grievances, rewarding virtues, punishing vice, encouraging industry, and the like. But princes, though the vicegerents of Heaven, being not endued with omniscience, can only know these grievances, virtues, vices, industry, &c. of the people, and their several exigencies, by the eyes and informa. tion of others ; nor can this be done by trusting to any one particular favourite, who having no
more nor larger qualifications than his prince, can have no other means of informing him aright, than what his prince has without him. Nay, it may very well be said, that he has not any means so sure and infallible : for the prince, if he consult his great councils, and only adhere to their public decisions, cannot miss of knowing all that is necessary to be known for his own glory and his people's good, which are inseparable ; but the favourite, having private designs to carry on, receives his information from those who must represent things to him as he would have them, by that means to make their court, and secure that success to their wishes for which they daily pay the adoration of so much flattery. But if, by the wonderful perspicuity and application of the favourite's, he should attain a true knowledge of the state of things, of the inclinations and desires of the people ; it is forty to one that these clashing with his private aims, he gives them another face to the prince, a turn more agreeable to his separate interest, though equally destructive of his master's and country's good.
The only way, therefore, for a prince to govern, with satisfaction to his own conscience, is to be the common father of all his country, to hear the advice of all his counsellors, and have an open ear to all the grievances and necessities of all his people: which can never be done, while any one man has the luck to possess the royal favour, so far as to make his advice an over balance to the whole nation. They gain, by that means a power, which they extremely seldom, if ever, use for the people's or prince's advantage, but most