a word of well known popular meaning. "A bon" is, I presume, its equivalent, and is also a word very well known. In fact, I think, in this country, it is a word used instead of the "I. O U." of known old country significance. Assuming it to bear the same meaning as the common I. O. U., we have to consider its effect in evidence without any explanation of the circumstances under which it is given. By itself I think it sufficiently imports a consideration. The case cited of Tyke v. Cosford bears on that point, and is supported by Davies v. Wilkinson, 10 A. & E. 98.

There is no doubt that it is always open to defendant to rebut any inference to be raised by the production of such an instrument; and if in fact no debt be due or account stated, the document goes for nothing. In support of this view may be cited Lemere v. Elliot, 6 H. & N. 658, where the late Chief Baron says, "An I. O. U. professes to be the result of an account stated in respect of a debt due, and it is important not to make fiction supply the place of truth and say that an account has been stated in respect of a debt where in reality there was none.'

A late case in our Queen's Bench, Toms v Sills, 29 U. C. 498, is also in point. The evidence shewed there was no debt due. The plaintiff, as attorney for V., had a bill of costs against the defendant, who had been sued by V. He paid part of the bill, and wrote at the foot, "I will pay the above balance in a week." He owed nothing to his opponent's attorney, and on this evidence the Court, in appeal, properly hel there could not be a recovery on an account stated. But in the absence of any contradictions or explanations of the circumstances under which it was given, I am of opinion that it is primá facie evidence to go to a jury of an account stated and settled between the parties.

In Fessenmayer v. Adcock, 16 M. & W. 449, Parke, B., says, "In Curtis v. Rickards, 1 M. & Gr. 46, the production by the plaintiff of the I. O. U. was held primá facie evidence that an account had been stated by the defendant with him, though no name was mentioned in the instrument, that is of a payee. I agree with that decision."

In Lubbock v. Tribe, 3 M. & W. 613, Lord Abinger says, "Where there is a promise to pay a sum of money as due from A. B., it is evidence of an account stated, which means this, that the simple promise, if it stand unexplained and uncontradicted, is evidence to go to a jury that the plaintiff claims that sum to be due, and that there are matters of account between the parties."

In Porter v. Cooper, 1 C. M. & R. 394 Parke, B., says, "If there is an admission of a sum of money being due, for which an action would lie, that will be evidence to go to a jury on the count for an account stated." Alderson, B., to same effect.

It remains to consider the objection as to the want of a stamp. Our Stamp Act gives us no definition of a promissory note, and is much more meagre in this respect than the Imperial Statutes. It merely declares that every promissory note, draft, or bill of exchange, shall require stamps. Sec. 3 does not help us further.

The English authorities seem to hold that an "I. O. U." simply does not require a stamp.

In Melanotte v. Teasdale, 13 M. & W. 216, Pollock, C B., says: The doctrine that an I. O. U. simply does not require a stamp, has been so long established, and so many instruments have been drawn on the faith of it, that it must be considered settled law." In that case the addition of the words, "which I borrowed of M." (the deceased), was held to carry the case no further than a mere acknowledgement. There were also the words, "to pay her 5 per cent. till paid." He says these words were mere surplusage, and that the only agreement of which the paper was evidence, is an agreement to pay interest on the £45, which is not necessarily of the value of £20. This is to shew that it did not require an agreement stamp.

Byles on Bills (1866), 11: "If there be no words amoun ing to a promise, the instrument is merely evidence of a debt, and may be received as such between the original parties. Such is the common memorandum I. O. U."

Smith v. Smith, 1 F. & F. 539.-On the authority of the last case cited, Byles, J., held the following not to require a stamp: "This is to certify that I owe £210 to A. B I promise to pay interest at five per cent," the promise only referring to the interest. See also Taylor v. Steele, 16 M. & W. 665; Bayley on Bills (1849), and cases there collected, page 3.

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In the case before us it is brought down to the point whether the introduction of the words "on demand" makes the instrument a note. I have examined a great many cases, and can find none exactly similar. If the words were to be paid on demand," according to my brother Wilson's view, in Tyke v. Cosford, it becomes a promissory note. He adds, the words to be paid' have some meaning, and that is that they create an express promise.' He cites Brooks v. Elkins, 2 M & W 74; Waithman v. Elsee, 1 C. & K. 35. The first of these cases was, "I. O. U. £20, to be paid on 22nd inst." The Court held it to be either a promissory note or an agreement for payment of money, and in either case it requires a stamp. The latter case is a Nisi Prius decision of Rolfe, B., and is to same effect. Are we then, in the absence of direct authority, to carry the decisions further, and hold the words "on demand" to import a promise to pay? The addition of the words, in the case before us, is mere surplusage, and has no effect on the operation of the instrument. An action would lie five minutes after its execution, without the aid of the words. A note specifying no time of payment is payable on demand.

In Sibree v. Trip, 15 M. & W. 23, the following was held not to be a note:-" Bristol, August 14, 1843. Mem. Mr. S. has this day deposited with me £500, on the sale of £10,300 £3 per cent. Spanish, to be returned on demand." Signed by defendant. Pollock, C. B., says, "It is difficult to lay down a rule which shall be applicable to all cases, but it seems to me that a promissory note, whether referred to in the Statute of Anne or in the text books, means something which the parties intend to be a promissory note. We cannot suppose the Legislature intended to prevent parties from making written contracts relating to the payment of money, other than bills and notes."

In Taylor v. Steele (1847), 16 M. & W. 667, Parke, B., says: The more recent cases say

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*

*

that implication is not enough, but there must be a positive engagement to pay I agree that an actual promise is not necessary, if there are words in the instrument from which a promise to pay can be collected." In that case the Court held that an instrument to this effect, after the date, "Received from A. B the sum of £170, for value received, for which I promise to pay her at the rate of £5 per cent. from above date," was not a promissory note.

Story on Notes, sec. 14: "There must be an express promise upon the face of the instrument to pay the money; a mere promise implied by law upon an acknowledged indebtment will not be sufficient."

I am wholly disinclined to carry the law any further than it has heretofore gone, and I therefore hold that this is not a promissory note requiring a stamp.

GWYNNE, J.-If this were a case wholly of the first impression I should be disposed to hold, as it appears would he held in some of the Courts in the United States, that the instrument produced in evidence here is a promissory note. The words "Good to Mr. Palmer for $850 on demand," seems to me to convey a declaration by the person signing, that the instrument should be of the worth or value to Mr. Palmer of the sum named on demand, and to import a promise to pay, and so to make good the declaration in the only way it could be effectually made good; but I agree that, upon the strength of the English decisions in respect of the well-known instruments called I. O. U., I am concluded from 80 holding, and so from giving that effect to the instrument which its tenor leads me to think the parties thereto contemplated it should have Being

Bo concluded, I find a great difficulty in bolding that this instrument upon its face, without further evidence, imports (as an " I. O. U. $850 on demand," delivered to Mr. Palmer, or "due to Mr. Palmer $850 on demand," plainly would express) a distinct unqualified absolute admission of a debt due by the party signing it.

The expression is not to be found in any of our Reports or Text-Books, nor in any Dictionary of Law Terms, nor yet in any Dictionary of the English Language. It occurs in Tyke v. Cosford (14 C. P. 64), in connection with the words "to be paid to him," which were held to involve a promise to pay; but I have been unable to find any authority to the effect that the words "good to A. B." for a sum of money on demand, have in England any recognition as a term of legal science having a defined meaning attached to them. Left to the guidance of my own judgment, unaided by authority, I am bound to say that I cannot see in such an expression any such distinct, unqualified admission of a debt due from the party signing to the party named in the document, as is indispensably necessary to render it admissible as evidence of an account stated. To my mind it conveys no more an admission of an original liability than it does an admission of money lent, or of money had and received, so as to render it admissible under those counts; but I apprehend there is no doubt that it affords no evidence whatever of money lent. Upon the whole I have been unable to bring my mind to concur in holding, without more evidence of the circumstances under which it was given, that it is evidence of an account stated; and I think, as

the plaintiff, who is the only person upon this record who may reasonably be supposed capable of supplying the evidence, has abstained from offering any, of the circumstances under which it was given, and consented to a nonsuit being entered, if the mere production of the document was insufficient to entitle him to recover, that a nonsuit should be entered, unless he desires à new trial to enable him to supply the required evidence.

GALT, J., concurred with HAGARTY, C J.
Rule discharged.

HARMAN V. CLARKSON.

Insolvency-Innkeeper not a trader.

Held, reversing the judgment of the County Court, that an inn-keeper is not a trader within the meaning of the Insolvent Act of 1869.

[22 C. P. 291.]

Appeal from the County Court of the County of Peel, in an interpleader issue.

The appellant was execution creditor to one Atchison, an inn-keeper, who, after execution issued, made an assignment to the respondent, defendant in the issue, and claimant of the goods seized.

The Judge of the County Court held that Atchison was a trader within the Insolvent Act of 1869, and that his assignment was entitled to prevail against the execution.

The ground of appeal was that an inn-keeper was not a trader within the meaning of the above Act, and that his assignment could not therefore prevail against the execution in question.

George Harman, for the appeal, contended that an inn-keeper was not a trader within the meaning of the Insolvent Act; that the definition of a trader was one who bought and sold, while an inn-keeper could not be said to buy and sell, as he only bought for a particular object, namely to spend in his house, and that a great portion of his gains arose from the use of his rooms, the attendance of his servants, &c.; and in the cases decided upon the Imperial Statute, 21 Jas. I., ch. 19, in which a trader was defined to be one "seeking to gain his living by buying and selling," an inn-keeper was expressly held not to be a trader within the meaning of that Act. Referring to the judgment of the County Court Judge, he contended that our Statute, 7 Vic. ch. 10, in which an inn-keeper is mentioned as coming under the definition trader, "within the meaning of that Act,' not being now in force, could not consequently be relied on to explain the meaning of the word, nor could our Courts be influenced by the decisions of the Courts in the Province of Quebec, whose decisions were based upon a different system of jurisprudence, namely, the French code. He cited the following cases: Crip v. Pratt, Cro. Car. 549; Newton ▼ Trigg, 3 Mod. 329; Saunderson v. Rowles, 4 Burr 2065; Willett v. Thomas, 2 Chitty 657; Buscall v. Hogg, 3 Wil. 146; Putnam v. Vaughan, 1 T. R. 572.

Lash, contra. In all the English cases evidence was given of the particular nature of the business carried on, and each case was decided on its own merits. There is nothing here to shew what Atchison's business was: he may have been a trader. Our Act, 7 Vic. ch. 10, and the Imperial Act, 12 & 13 Vic. ch. 106 sec. 65,

both include inn-keeper in the word "trader " The Insolvent Act of 1869 should receive a more liberal construction than the Act of James, as that Act was penal in its nature. In Bagwell v. Hamilton, 10 U. C. L. J. 305, the Judge referred to 7 Vic. ch. 10, for a definition of the word trader. An inn-keeper buys and sells food, fodder for cattle, liquors, &c, and in some cases deals very largely with wholesale and retail merchants, and should be held to be a trader.

HAGARTY, C. J.-The sale question presented by this appeal is, whether an inn-keeper" is a "trader" within the operation of the Insolvent Act of 1869

This Act professes to assimilate the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Laws of the different Provinces, and its first section declares that "This Act shall apply to traders only," giving no definition or explanation of that term.

The Act of 1864, sec 2, declares, "This Act shall apply in Lower Canada to traders only, and in Upper Canada to all persons, whether traders or non-traders." In sec. 3 sub-secs. 2 and 3, provisions are made as to traders not meeting commercial engagements. Sec. 12 subsec. 5, declares that all the provisions in the Act respecting traders, shall be held to apply equally to unincorporated trading companies and co-partnerships

The Amending Act, 1865, sec. 3, makes a further provision respecting a trader's permitting an execution to remain unsatisfied, &c.

No definition is given of the word. The Bankrupt Act of 1843, 7 Vic. ch. 10, made liable to its provisions all persons being merchants, or using the trade of merchandize, bankers, brokers, persons insuring ships or other vessels, &c., builders, carpenters, shipwrights, keepers of inns, taverns, hotels, coffee houses, millers, &c., and all persons who, either for themselves or as agents or factors for others, seek their living by buying or selling, or by buying and letting for hire, or by the workmanship of goods or commodities, shall be deemed traders within the scope and meaning of this Act. This Act, originally limited to two years, was continued from time to time, and finally was allowed to expire about the year 18-.

An Insolvent Court was established, 8 Vic. ch. 48, but containing nothing bearing on this question: Consol. Stat. U. C., ch. 18. See also Consol. Stat. U. C. ch. 26, for relief of insolvent debtors.

The various Imperial Statutes are set out in Cook's Bankrupt Law, No. I. The Act 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. ch. 4, does not describe bankrupts beyond "divers persons craftily obtaining into their hands great substance of other men's goods, suddenly fleeing to parts unknown."

13 Eliz. ch. 7, declares who is to be deemed a bankrupt: "Any merchant or other person using or exercising the trade of merchandize by way of bargaining, exchange, rechange, bartry, chevisance, or otherwise, in gross or in retail, seeking his or her trade or living by buying or selling."

1 Jac. I. ch. 15, reciting that "frauds and deceits, as new diseases, daily increase," repeats the definition, with slight verbal alterations, substituting "persons" for "merchants."

21 Jac. I., ch. 19, (still lamenting the increase of fraud), adds to the definition, "the trade or

profession of a scrivener, receiving other men's moneys or estates into his trust or custody."

13 & 14 Car. II. ch. 24, exempts certain persons putting stock into companies from the Bankrupt Laws.

10 Ann ch. 15, repeals the description of a bankrupt in that statute of James.

5 Geo. II. ch. 30, sec. 30, makes persons dealing as "bankers, brokers and factors," liable to be bankrupts.

4 Geo. III. ch. 33, speaks of "merchants, bankers, brokers, factors, scriveners, and traders," as liable to Bankrupt Laws.

45 Geo. III. ch. 124, repeats the same description.

So the law seems to have remained till the 6 Geo. IV. ch. 16, by which, amongst many others, "victuallers, keepers of inns, taverns, hotels or coffee houses," shall be deemed traders liable to become bankrupts.

Down to the passing of this Act (1825), it seems clear that an inn-keeper, simply as such, was not a trader within the meaning of the

statutes.

In Smith v. Scott (9 Bing. 16) (1832), Tindal, C. J., says: "The question turns on the construction of the late Bankrupt Act, which for the first time has rendered subject to bankrupt law the vocation of "victualler, keepers of inns, taverns, hotels, or coffee houses." See also Gibson v. King (10 M & W. 667).

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Saunderson v. Rowles (4 Bur. 2067) is a decision of Lord Mansfield, that a victualler was not within the Act. He says: We are all olear that this man is not within these laws, upon the authority of the determined case of an innkeeper, and also upon the reason of the thing." These reasons are fully set out. "It is not such a contract as is made amongst merchants and shopkeepers, or other dealers, in the ordinary course of trade or commerce. ""

It seems perfectly clear that under the term "trader," unassisted by statutable interpretation, an inn keeper, as such, is not subject to the bankrupt laws

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The learned Judge of the Court below considered that as the 7 Vic. ch. 10, defined the expression trader," and declared that innkeepers should be considered traders within the scope and meaning of that Act, that we might consider this a Legislative declaration on the point. I am unable to accede to this view.

The Act in question was allowed to expire, and our Legislature for some years abandoned the policy of the bankrupt laws. In 1864 it passed a law, applying its principles only in Lower Canada, and to all persons, traders, or non-traders in this Province. Then the existing law of 1869 declares expressly that it shall apply to "traders only."

I do not see what right we have to give this word any larger meaning than it has in itself, or to include within its meaning the numerous classes of persons declared by a long expired, temporary Act, to be within its scope and meaning.

If the 6 Geo. had been allowed to expire in England, or had been repealed, and after some yoars a new statute had reverted to the already cited definition of 13 Eliz. ch 7, I am of opinion that it would have been impossible to apply the Act to the classes embraced by the repealed

Act. If our expired Act absolutely made all the persons therein specified "traders," they would be so for all purposes other (I presume) beside those of bankruptcy But it only makes an innkeeper, as I understand it, a trader "within the scope and meaning of the Act." Our Legislature, I consider, have advisedly used a special term, "trader," without in any way enlarging its meaning. Whoever is included in the term "trader," standing in its unexplained sense, is within the Insolvent Law. No one else can be, as it seems to be. Therefore, on the express decisions in the English Courts, down to the 6 Geo. IV. ch 16, when the inn-keepers first came under the Bankrupt Law, I think we are bound to allow this appeal.

An inn-keeper may, of course, be shewn to be within the law by some trading carried on apart from the mere position of an inn-keeper; but, simply quatenus inn-keeper, he was held not to be within the law.

The

I have referred to the authorities mentioned in the decision below. Popham on the Insolvent Law p. 18, states: "In the Province of Quebeo, there is a wider signification given to the meaning of the word, as regards its application to the Insolvent Law. The word "trader" is there held to embrace (here follow many classes): "Hotels, tavern, eating-house, and boardingkeepers," referring to Patterson v. Walsh (Robertson's Digest 49), McRoberts v. Scott, (Ib). first case is a decision in the year 1819, and decides that a tavern-keeper is a trader and dealer, and his note to a merchant, payable to his order, may be transferred by a blank endorsement, it is a commercial note. So in McRoberts v. Scott, in 1821. I have examined all the cases referred to in the book, as far as I can find them. They all seem to hold merely that such persons are to be governed by commercial law, and do not refer to Insolvent or Bankrupt Acts. For instance, to shew that "auctioneers" are traders, Pozer v. Clapham (Stuart's Appeal Cases, 122,) is cited; an action brought by co-partners in trade against a merchant, to recover money overpaid to him on a sale: Per curiam," This is clearly a commercial matter, and consequently the proof must be weighed, according to the rules of evidence, by the law of England. It refers to a decision of 1809, that the transactions of tradesmen and artisans, in the way of their trade, are to be considered as commercial matters, and recourse must be had to the English laws of evidence, under 10th sec., Ord. 15, Geo. III. ch. 2.

I can find no decision of a Lower Canada Court on this Insolvent Act. There may be such, no doubt. In Ontario I see no rule for our guidance, but the statute law already referred to.

GWYNNE, J.-The Act appears to be defective in not having a clause defining the meaning of the term "traders" as used in the Act, and

NOTE. Richardson's Dictionary: "Trading or Trade, a way or course, trodden and re-trodden, passed and repassed, a way of course pursued or kept, a concourse or intercourse, a regular or habitual course or practice, employment, occupation in merchandize or commerce, intercourse for buying, selling or bartering, commerce, traffic."

Imperial Dictionary: "Trader, one engaged in trade or commerce, a dealer in buying, in selling or barter. Trade is chiefly used to denote the barter or purchase and sale of goods, wares and merchandize, either by wholesale or retail,"

giving to it a more extended application than in its ordinary acceptation it has. There are interpretation clauses (142 & 143) defining the meaning to be attached to divers words used in the Act; but the term "traders" is not one of them. In the absence of a statutory declaration of the description of persons intended to be comprehended in the term, we must construe it according to its ordinary acceptation. It was at a very early period decided, in Swift v. Eyres, Cro. Car. 546, and Newton v. Trigg, 3 Mod. 329, that an inn-keeper, qua inn-keeper, was not a trader within the statutes relating to bankrupts, unless so declared to be by those statutes. Ever since these decisions it has been customary for the Legislature to declare, in the several Bankrupt Laws which have been enacted, who shall be deemed to be traders within their provisions. In the absence of such a declaration we must be governed by the old decisions, and hold that within the Insolvent Act of 1869, an inn-keeper, qua inn-keeper, is not a trader.

The judgment to be entered below will be judgment for the plaintiff therein, the now appellant, with costs.

In Hilary term last F. Osler obtained a rule to quash By-law No. 210, entitled "A by-law to aid the Hamilton and Lake Erie Railway Co., by a free grant or doration of debentures, by way of bonus, to the extent of $20,000," on certain terms, &c., on the ground that it was passed by the County Council without having been submitted to the vote, and without securing the assent of the ratepayers, and on other grounds. It was admitted that the by-law had not been submitted to the ratepayers.

The by-law recited the desire of the council to aid the railway by a free grant or donation of debentures to the extent of $20,000, and that it would require $2,200 to be raised annually by special rate to pay the debentures and interest. The debentures were to be payable within twenty years, interest at six per cent., half yearly.

Burton, Q. C., now shewed cause, and urged, first, that on the construction of the Act, it was not necessary to submit any by-law granting & bonus to a railway to the ratepayers, irrespective of the amount.

Secondly, that, as this by-law was for an amount not exceeding $20,000, it need not be so submitted. He cited Bramston v. Mayor of Colchester, 6 E. & B. 246.

Osler, contra, referred to Mc Lean v. Cornwall, 31 U. C. 314; Jenkins v. Corporation of Elgin, 21 C. P. 325; Dwarris' Statutes, 568.

HAGARTY, C. J.-Section 349 of the Municipal Act of 1866, declares that a municipality may pass by-laws, 1st For subscribing for shares or lending to or guaranteeing the payment of any sum of money borrowed by a railway corporation,

to which section 18 of 14 & 15 Vic. ch. 51, (Ry. Consol. Act), or sec. 75 to 78 of the Consolidated Railway Act have been, or may be made applicable by any special Act. 2nd. For endorsing or guaranteeing debentures of railway companies. 3rd. For issuing debentures therefor 4th. For prescribing the manner and form of debentures, and how they are to be signed. "But no municipal corporation shall subscribe for stock or incur a debt or liability for the purposes aforesaid, unless the by-law, before the final passing thereof, shall receive the assent of the electors of the municipality in the manner provided by this Act."

By the Ontario Act 34 Vic. ch. 30, sec. 6, the following sub-section is added to section 349 of said Act, "For granting bonuses to any railway, and to any person or persons, or company, establishing and maintaining manufacturing establishments within the bounds of such municipality, and for issuing debentures payable at such time or times, and bearing or not bearing interest, as the municipality may think meet, for the purpose of raising money to meet such bonuses."

Mr. Burton urged that this new sub-section was to be added to section 349, and would properly come after and not before the proviso as to submitting the by-law to the ratepayers.

We are fully satisfied that this view cannot be sustained. The last Act gives a further power to pass by-laws under a new sub-section, which we think is to form one of the group of sub-sections, and that the added sub-section, equally with the original subsections, is to be followed by and subject to the general proviso as to the assent of the electors.

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We cannot understand any other construction according to the rules for interpretation of statutes, and apart from anything to be learned from authority, the natural construction of writing would place the sub-section in such a position. No debt shall be incurred for the purposes aforesaid, uuless," &c. These purposes were set forth in the preceding sub-sections, and here it is declared, not that a new section shall be added to the Act, but that a new sub-section shall be added to the 349th section.

It is, we think, to form part of that section, to be one of the "purposes "of the section, and must be subject to the general proviso as to "the purposes" aforesaid.

We can hardly concur that the Legislature could have designed, while forbidding the council from taking stock in a railway company without the electors' consent, to permit the council to make a present to the company of any amount they might please, without such assent.

The charter of this company (33 Vic. ch. 36, sec. 7.) makes it lawful for any municipality to aid the company by loaning, guaranteeing, or giving money, by way of bonus, or other means; provided that no such aid, loan, bonus, or guarantee shall be given except after the passing of by-laws and their adoption by the ratepayers as provided by the Railway Act, and provided also that such by-law be made in conformity with the Municipal Acts.

Section 77, Consolidated Railway Act Canada ch. 66, provides that no municipality should subscribe for stock, or incur any debt or liability un

der this Act, except by by-laws passed with the assent of the electors, &c.

It is then argued that counties can pass any by-law for a debt not exceeding $20,000 without such assent.

Section 227 of the Municipal Act enacts that every by-law (except for drainage under section 282) for raising upon credit any money, not required for ordinary expenditure and not payable within the year, must receive the assent of the electors, except that in counties the councils may raise by by-law, without submitting the same to the electors, for contracting debts or loans, any sum or sums over and above the sums required for its ordinary expenditure, not exceeding in any one year $20,000.

The decision of the first question seems to involve the second also.

If, as we think, the council cannot incur a debt by by law to grant a bonus to a railway except with the ratepayers' assent, it seems to follow that the rule must equally apply to a bonus below as above $20,000.

The power to pledge the credit of the county to the extent of $20,000, without the electors' assent must, we think, be certainly confined to lawful purposes, and not to a grant to a railway company, which can only be done with such

assent.

The case may be shortly summed up thus:

By-laws to raise money for all lawful purposes beyond the ordinary expenditure, and not payable within the year, must be submitted to ratepayers, except that counties may raise on credit inoney not exceeding $20,000 in any one year without such submission.

But all aid to railways must be with the assent of the ratepayers; therefore no money can be given without such assent without reference to

the amount.

GWYNNE, J.-If it had not been for the earnest manner in which Mr. Burton, for whose opinion I entertain the greatest respect, pressed his view upon us, I should have thought the point to be free from doubt. The whole force of his argument was that the additional sub-section, added by 34 Vic. ch. 30 to sec. 349 of the Municipal Institutions Act of 1866, must be read after the proviso at the end of the 4th sub-section of section 349; from which he drew the conclusion that the additional sub-section was not subject to the proviso. Now there is nothing in the language or structure of the sub-section enacted by 34 Vic. ch. 30, which requires that it should be so placed as contended for. The words of the 34 Vic. are, The following sub-section is added to section 349" of 29-30 Vic. ch. 51, "For granting bonuses to any railway, &c." Now the 349th section, to which this new sub-section is added, is as follows: "The council of every township, county, city, town and incorporated village may pass by-laws." Then follow four sub-sections stating the respective purposes, all beginning with the word,For," and stating the purpose. Now the additional sub-section enacted by 34 Vic., will read as well, whether placed before the first sub-section or between it and any of the others, as after the 4th; but assuming that, having regard to the time of its being passed being subsequent to the enacting of the original section, it should be inserted and read after the fourth, then its proper place ap