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posed amendments, we will have the right to strike them down as
we reserve the right to strike down certain Presidential actions by
veto power we vote ourselves. We can do the same thing here.
Mr. MCMILLAN. Is that provided in this bill?

Mr. JOHNSON. There is very clear language I would say in my bill, H.R. 4715. There is language which I think is adequate, although not as sharply stated as in S. 1681, which was approved by the Senate; but whether in one form or another, we certainly cannot abandon our constitutional powers. We can delegate them, but we cannot delegate them without the right of recapture, any more than the Congress in delegating power in 1802 did not reserve the right to recapture and did recapture it later in the same century.

The other point I would make, Mr. Chairman, is, if you read section 8 of article 2, the Congress

shall have the power to levy and collect taxes, et cetera, power to borrow money, regulate commerce with foreign nations, to coin money, regulate the value of the money, to establish post offices, post roads, securing exclusive rights for authors and scientists, to declare war, raise and support armies— et cetera.

Some of these powers clearly indicate we are to do nothing more than write the rules, but other powers are so broadly stated that technically we could administer the function ourselves.

We can borrow money, we can coin money, we can levy taxes and collect them, et cetera.

What we do here, of course, is to pass a basic law. We give a member of the executive department of the Government, in most cases, although we have these independent regulatory commissions in certain cases using these powers--but we have turned over to other agencies, be it the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Reserve Board, or the Interstate Commerce Commission, or some other agency, the actual power which we have.

What I am saying is that in effect the entire section of that article of the Constitution makes it crystal clear that our powers are, of course, inherent legislative powers and they are specifically spelled out in these particular cases. That includes this power. But just as we give very broad authority to the Secretary of the Treasury or to the Federal Reserve Board or to the Interstate Commerce Commission to make a whole host of decisions, far more important in their impact than some of the decisions which, unhappily, we still must make in the Congress, it seems to me it is perfectly proper under the functions of the executive and legislatíve and judicial tripartite system we have here that we should pass a basic statute such as this and in effect divest ourselves of some of the details.

We still pass too many private bills. We have a Court of Claims now. We at least have unburdened ourselves of a wide variety of detailed items which need not have concerned the Congress and no longer do concern the Congress except to vote the funds needed to pay them.

Mr. DAVIS. Those are not constitutional provisions. They are simply congressional actions.

Mr. JOHNSON. The power to coin and borrow money, the powers we have given the Federal Reserve Board, are powers of the Congress. They are not to provide rules for, but to do these things.

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Mr. MCMILLAN. Would the gentleman consider the U.S. Congress on the same status with the U.S. Treasury? The Constitution mentions Congress and not the executive department.

Mr. JOHNSON. I think in the same sense we leave a great deal to the discretion of the administrative agencies and the independent boards and commissions that we have created. We define the broad areas within which they are to operate. We have set down guidelines within which they must proceed. The same is done here. The same is done by the existing municipal code.

Mr. DAVIS. What the gentleman has referred to is simply part of the process of coining money. The gentleman, of course, knows that it was never contemplated that Congress would set up a smelter and the Members go and pour the silver in and pour the money. They had to provide detail.

Mr. JOHNSON. The point is, if you read the entire section, we establish a uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws in regard to bankruptcy. We regulate the value of money and fix the standard of weights and measures.

We provide for the punishment of counterfeiting; we establish the post offices, promote the progress of science and useful arts, constitute the tribunals, define and punish piracies, declare war, or grant letters of mark and reprisal. We do not delegate that function, though, unhappily, in modern time, I think in fact we have delegated it. We raise and support armies-obviously through appropriation-provide and maintain a Navy-through appropriation. We make rules for the governing of land and naval forces.

Mr. MCMILLAN. There are 18 of those different laws and powers. Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Mr. MCMILLAN. Only one uses the word "exclusive."

Mr. JOHNSON. To exercise exclusive legislation-I confess I think Mr. Foley's recital on the floor the other day indicates the historical basis of this.

I would note, not only was the article in the Federalist papers on the point, but the action of the early Congress in promptly granting home rule to the District of Columbia makes it perfectly clear on the rule of construction that the intent is best understood by the people who wrote it and their actions.

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Johnson, we are going to have to adjourn. We will be glad to have you come back at the next meeting, which will be Friday, at 10 o'clock, and resume your statement.

Mr. JOHNSON. I have completed what I had to say, except if you are really interested in retrocession and if Maryland would accept it, I would have no quarrel with that approach, because that would solve the constitutional problem, the right to have a representative in the Senate and Congress. I had gotten the distinct impression Maryland was glad to be rid of us and did not want us back.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you very much for your statement. We will adjourn now until 10 o'clock Friday morning.

(Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, August 7, 1959.)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA HOME RULE BILLS

FRIDAY, AUGUST 7, 1959

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE No. 3 OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 445, House Office Building, Hon. James C. Davis (subcommittee chairman) presiding.

Also present: William N. McLeod, Jr., clerk of the Committee on the District of Columbia, Hayden S. Garber, counsel, Ann L. Puryear, assistant clerk, Leonard O. Hilder, investigator, and Donald Tubridy, minority clerk.

Mr. DAVIS. The committee will come to order, please.

This is a continuation of the hearings on the legislation involving home rule for the District of Columbia. All the bills on this subject are before this subcommittee.

At the conclusion of the last hearing Congressman Byron Johnson was on the witness stand, and I notice Congressman Johnson is with us again this morning.

I believe you had finished your formal statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. JOHNSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

Mr. JOHNSON. At the time we finished the hearing the other day time had run out and the committee had asked that I be more specific with respect to the law on the question of constitutionality_which was raised in the letter Chairman McMillan wrote to me. In that letter, of July 27, 1959, he said:

I hope that you will make arrangements to appear in person before the House District Committee and give us your opinion and suggestions as to how the Congress can bypass article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution by delegating our legislative powers to a local government.

And I said I would complete the research on which I was engaged and bring back in more detail the supporting documentation for the principles I had set forth in my testimony the other day. I am prepared to do so now.

Mr. DAVIS. You may proceed.

Mr. JOHNSON. Before I do so, I would like to add one footnote to my testimony the other day which I found in my notes, but which I had not covered.

In 1946, when I was employed by the U.S. Government, I was a voluntary ballot clerk in the one election held in the District of Columbia by the Board of Trade.

Mr. DAVIS. What year was that?

Mr. JOHNSON. 1946.

There were 116,559 votes cast for home rule and 49,669 against home rule in that election. Members of the executive agencies were asked if they would care to serve as ballot clerks, and I was myself a ballot clerk in that election and am reasonably familiar with it, and I think that was a fair indication of the opinion of the residents of the District as of that time. I left the city the next year and have not been here until this year to stay, therefore I offer no further comment. However, if the committee is interested in the detail of that election, I have the returns for each voting place in the District as they appear in the Evening Star of Wednesday, November 6, 1946, and you can see by each area of the city how the election went at that time.

I do not know that we should clutter the record with this, but if the chairman so desires I will be glad to have that inserted in the record.

Mr. DAVIS. I do not think it would be worthwhile to put the details in.

Mr. JOHNSON. The facts are as stated, and those interested in the detail can find it in the press report at that time.

That was one footnote I did want to add to my testimony before turning to the purely legal questions.

If I understand the letter which the chairman has sent me, one of the primary concerns of this committee relates to the question as to the interpretation which we should give to clause 17 of section 8 of article I of the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over the District, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, docks, yards, and other needful buildings.

I think the two parts of the clause could be taken together because of the "like authority." A very similar problem arises in respect to forts, magazines, arsenals, docks, yards, and other needful buildings in each of the 50 States.

I would call to the attention of the chairman and members of the committee that the United States Code Annotated contains almost 40 pages of citations of cases detailing-it is surprising the complete detail-the cases which have arisen under this clause of the Constitution. They will be found at pages 696 to 730 of volume I, United States Code Annotated.

Obviously we need not take the time today to review those, but any person interested in the law under clause 17 can find a recap of the law at that point.

An even more interesting source for any person interested in examining the law with respect to Federal areas within the States and congressional control generally is to be found in a two-part report of the Interdepartmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States. Part I sets forth the facts

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