senting for settlement an account or claim against the corporation, to be sworn before him as to any facts relative to its justness, that the word claim included claims for damages for personal injuries. The court distinguished the case of Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 513.

In Reining v. Buffalo, 102 N. Y. 308, the term claim in a similar statute was held to apply to torts.

Same - Taxes.-In Ruggles v. Fond du Lac, 53 Wis. 436, it was held that an action for the recovery of taxes wrongfully collected was not an action on contract within the meaning of a charter requiring presentation of claims to the city council.

Claims Against County-Sale of Land for Taxes. (See also the title COUNTIES.) - In Fuller. Colfax County, 33 Neb. 716, it was held, where land was wrongfully sold for taxes by a county treasurer, that the county was liable to the purchaser, and that his right of action against the county was a claim which should be presented to the county board.

Fees Claims Against State. (See also the title STATES.)- Under the Missouri statute barring claims against the state when not presented to the state auditor within two years, it has been held that the term claims applies to fees of the circuit attorneys, omitted in original bills of cost. State v. Draper, 48 Mo. 56.

Claim to a Patent to Lands. - Congress has jurisdiction, through the Court of Claims, over all claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States, etc. It has been held that the word claims embraces a claim to a patent to lands. The court said: "The word claim is very broad and comprehensive in its signification; quite as comprehensive as any of its synonyms-demand, pretension, right, privilege, title. That the construction is not to be limited to money demands is evident from other expressions in the Act." Southern Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 38 Fed. Rep. 56.

Iowa Land Law. - In Doolittle v. Harrington, 1 Morr. (Iowa) 226, the court says that the term claim had a legal significance given to it by the Statute of January 25, 1839. In that Act. says the court, the word claim is frequently used, and it refers to a portion of the public lands settled upon by an individual, to which he has no other right or title than that which arises from his settlement upon said lands." See also Bowman v. Torr, 3 Iowa 571.

Claim and Claim Committee. - In Rogan v. Walker, I Wis. 586, the court said: To those not familiar with the terms claim and ' claim committee,' used in the evidence in this case, a few words may be proper in explanation. It is well known to the early settlers of the country that its settlement and cultivation outstripped the government in its survey and sale of the public lands. For some three or four years or more previous to the government sales the immigrants to and settlers in the eastern portion of the territory had entered upon tracts of land of greater or less extent, in most instances erected tenements thereon, intending to purchase the lands whenever the general government should bring them into market. Sometimes extensive and costly improvements were made, and sometimes barely sufficient to answer the requirements of the general regulations adopted by the settlers.

These regulations were drawn up by the settlers, and committees were appointed in different localities, and for convenient districts, to settle and determine all disputes in regard to the claims which might arise. The claims thus made were respected by the settlers and citizens generally, and held by such title only, until the public sale, when, by common consent, each claimant was permitted to bid off the land claimed by him, and no one was permitted to bid against him, or, what was more commonly the case, some one or more of their number was appointed to bid off all the lands, each tract being bid in the name of the claimant thereof. The general and local governments have rather encouraged this kind of settlement of the public lands, and so strictly have these claims of the settlers been regarded, that immense money and property have been laid out upon them, and they have passed from one to another, by deeds of bargain and sale, [with] scarcely an infringement upon the rights thus acknowledged."

"The

Claim as Locator. - In Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. (U. S.) 474, the court said: claim as locator, and the terms in which it is expressed, are peculiar terms in Kentucky. In early times many contracts were made between warrant holders and others, by which those others agreed to locate the warrants for a portion of the land secured by location; and in many other cases one man located the warrants of another without any special agreement as to compensation, but with an expectation of receiving as compensation the portion of land usually given for such services. The phrase 'claim as locator' grew out of this state of things, and has been univ rsally understood by the people of the country to signify the compensation of a portion of the land located agreed to be given by the owner of the warrant to the locator of it for his services. The term is believed never to have been used in any other sense, or as signifying the acquisition of property by any other species of contract, than a contract to locate for a portion of the land. According to well-settled rules of construction, the language of the statute must be understood in this its popular acceptation." Land or Real Estate. In De Cordova v. Knowles, 37 Tex. 19, it was held that a power of attorney to sell claims and effects could not be construed to authorize the sale of land or real estate. See also EFFECTS.

Claim Compared with Grant. (See also GRANT.) In McGarrahan v. Maxwell, 28 Cal. 96, the court said: In the Act of Congress of 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in the state of California, the word claim is used as comprehending every species of right, title or interest, legal or equitable, in or to lands derived from the Spanish or Mexican government. The words claim and grant are not entirely synonymous, but a claim will include a grant, and also a right or interest that did not pass by grant, but is based upon some equity possessed by the claimant, entitling him to have his right perfected by the government, by a conveyance of the legal title. A mere naked assertion of right or title does not constitute a claim within the meaning of the Acts to ascertain and settle private land claims, or of the Act of 1862; and we do not

understand that the plaintiff relies upon anything else than his title, as constituting his claim to the land."

Averment of Ownership.

(See also ENCYC

OF PL. AND PR., title TITLE, OWNERSHIP, AND POSSESSION.)- In Marshall v. Shafter, 32 Cal. 191, it was held that an allegation in a complaint in ejectment, that the plaintiff was possessed of certain land, which said premises the plaintiff claimed in fee simple absolute, was an allegation of title in the plaintiff to the premises in fee simple absolute. The court said: "It is therein alleged that the plaintiff, on a day named, was possessed of certain lands therein described, which said premises the said plaintiff claims in fee simple absolute.' The plaintiff insists that this is not an allegation of ownership in fee, but amounts only to this, that the plaintiff claims such title, without saying that he in fact holds it; that a denial of that branch of the allegation would amount only to a denial that the plaintiff claimed such title, which of course would be an immaterial issue in the action of ejectment. The defendant argues that the word claims is equivalent to says, avers, states, or shows. But substituting each of those words for claims, it would be necessary to interpolate the words he owns,' or others of the same import, in order to make the sentence sufficient by itself to present the issue of title. Claim, when used as a noun and in relation to land, has, in most of the states, a signification beyond that of a mere demand a right not reduced to enjoyment, but to be enforced against another; but it is used as well to express all the rights which a person holds and enjoys in the land. Pre-emption claims, homestead claims, and mining claims familiar instances. A conveyance of the grantor's claim to the land passes all the title he holds. And so of the verb claim. In common speech, a person says he claims the land to which he has the title, and in a contest for the possession each party, relying on title alone, would perhaps as frequently say that he claimed title, as that he held the title."

are

Same Note. In Douglas v. Beasley, 40 Ala. 142, it was held that in an action by an assignee upon a note against the maker, the complaint must contain some averment showing the plaintiff's ownership. The court said: "It is contended that the assertion in the complaint that the plaintiff claimed the sum due on the note, and interest, involves, or is equivalent to, an averment of property in the plaintiff; and that therefore the complaint really contained an allegation that the plaintiff was the owner of the note. The obvious import of the word claims, in the connection in which it occurs, is that the plaintiff seeks to recover, or demands; and such, think, is the general acceptation of the word. Besides, it is expressly decided in Crimm v. Crawford, 29 Ala. 623, that the phrase 'the plaintiff claims,' in a complaint for the recovery of chattels in specie, does not imply an assertion of title, but that all averment of title in that action was dispensed with. See also George v. English, 30 Ala. 582. The word claims, in the prescribed forms, has therefore a construction established by a decision of this court, and that decision would be overruled by holding that it includes an averment of title."

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Homestead Exemption. — In Robinson v. Wiley, 15 N. Y. 489, it was held that the representation by the owner of a house that there was no claim or incumbrance thereon was not shown to be false by proving that he had previously taken steps to exempt such house as his homestead from sale or execution. Covenants - Incumbrances. (See also the title COVENANTS.)- Incumbrances are within the term claims, and a covenant against all claims has been held to embrace incumbrances. Johnson v. Hollensworth, 48 Mich. 143.

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Same Claims and Demands. Where a deed contained a covenant to save harmless certain premises against all actions, suits, claims, and demands whatsoever, both in law and equity, which might be made, etc., by H. W. P. or T. B. W. P.; and breaches were assigned, first, that H. P. P. claimed to have a right and title to the premises, entered and cut trees, etc., and, second, that certain title-deeds relating to the premises were withholden by A. W. at the instance and through the claim and demand of T. B. W. B.; it was held that the acts upon which the breaches were assigned were claims in law within the meaning of the covenant. Fowle v. Welsh, 1 B. & C. 29, 8 E. C. L. 14.

Whether "Claim" Implies a Lawful Claim. (See also the titles COVENANTS; INDEMNITY CONTRACTS.) A covenant against claims has been held to extend only to lawful claims. Kent, C. J., said: “The law will never presume that the covenant applied to the wrongful claims of others, unless it be so expressed, because the law gives full protection against all such claims.' Folliard v. Wallace, 2 Johns. (N. Y.)

402.

A bond reciting a conveyance of land and covenanting to indemnify and save harmless the obligee against all actions brought for the recovery of the land, and against all costs and expenses in consequence, is an indemnity only against all lawful claims, and the breach assigning the bringing of a suit, and without alleging title in the party prosecuting, will not give a right to recover. Luddington v. Pulver, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 404.

A grant of public lands to a railroad excepted lands to which a pre-emption or homestead claim had attached. It was held that by the word claim were not meant such claims as should afterwards ripen into perfect titles. The court said: "If by the use of this word Congress intended that such an interest must have attached as should afterwards ripen into a perfect title or right to a patent from the United States, then the company was entitled to the land, under the grant; for no such claim is shown. But, on the other hand, if it were intended to include all claims to preemption or homestead, formally entered and recognized by the land department, without regard to their continuance, or final perfection, as against the government, then the company was not entitled to the land, for it is abundantly proved that such a pre-emption claim had attached at the time of the definite location of the line of the road. We regard the latter of these views as the correct one, and in taking it we believe we are supported by the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States upon similar questions, especially by the decision in Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S.

751, where, in construing the word claimed in a statute which, in terms, excluded from preemption and sale all lands claimed under any foreign grant or title, this language was used: 'It is said this means lawfully claimed; but there is no authority to import a word into a statute to change its meaning. Congress did not prejudge any claim to be unlawful.'

See also Wood v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 104 U. S. 329. So, too, here in the statute we are considering, Congress, by using the word claim simply, not lawful claim,' must have intended it to be taken in its ordinary sense, and as implying a demand of a right or supposed right; a thing claimed or demanded as, a settler's claim (Webster).'" etc., R. Co. v. Abink, 14 Neb. 95.

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Burlington,

In People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491, it was held that, by a provision authorizing the comptroller of the state of New York to audit, adjust, and pay claims of certain fire companies, the legislature did not mean to declare the legality of the claims. The court said: "When, then, that Act used the word claims, it did not mean that which was due of right, and could be maintained as such. It meant no more than something which was asked for, or asserted to be due, for which a pretense was set up.' That claim implies a legal claim, see Fellows v. Clay, 4 Q. B. 319, 45 E. C. L. 319. Legal Claim. In Cowan v. New York, 3 Han (N. Y.) 633, it is said: A legal claim is one which the party asserting it may enforce by action, or by some proceeding at law or in equity."

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Honest Claim. - See HONEST.

Unassigned Dower. An unassigned dower interest in land is neither a title nor an estate in the scientific sense of those terms, but is an adverse claim, which the holder may be called upon to defend under the statute relating to the quieting of titles. Benoist v. Murrin, 47 Mo. 537. See also Lawrence v. Miller, 2 N. Y. 254.

In

Taxation Title or Possession.-A Nevada statute provided that all real estate including the ownership or claim to any land or improvement should be subject to assessment. construing this statute the court, in State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 Nev. 259, said: "While the language of the statute is quite broad, it must be remembered that it is always property, and not a mere claim to it, that is to be assessed. The terms used must be considered as largely convertible and synonymous. This is the view that seems to have been taken by the courts. Thus, in People v. Frisbie, 31 Cal. 146, it is said: The term claim, as used in this provision, means something more than the mere assertion of the party assessed that he owns the property described in the list. While the word carries with it the idea of such assertion, it involves also the idea of an actual possession of the land claimed.' It is possession claiming the land' that is liable to be taxed. Barrett v. Amerein, 36 Cal. 322. State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645; Hale, etc., Gold, etc., Min. Co. v. Storey County, 1 Nev. 104, are to the same effect."

seems to be a good place to remark that in the common parlance of the mining districts the word claim, used as a noun, has a definite and particular meaning, denoting, when coupled with the name of a miner, a particular piece of ground to which that miner has a recognized, vested, and exclusive right of possession for the purpose of extracting precious metals therefrom; and there is reason to suppose that, in framing the reservation clause of this grant, Congress selected the word claims for the express purpose of excluding from the grant lands held in possession of, and claimed by, miners according to local customs."

The Act referred to reserves from lands granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company lands subject to certain claims.

Forgery Claims Against Government. (See the titles FORGERY; UNITED STATES.) The Revised Statutes of the United States, § 5421, provided for the punishment of any one who presents to any officer of the United States any deed, power of attorney, order, certificate, writ, receipt, or any other writing in support of or in relation to any account or claim, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited. In U. S. v. Spaulding, 3 Dakota 85, it was held that the word claim included the claim of exercising the right of pre-emption and the claim to thereby acquire from the United States Government title to public land. And so a claim for bounty land was held to be included in the same statute. The court said:

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In respect to each [of the papers described] it was argued that the word claim as used in the statute can have reference only to a demand for money, and does not embrace a claim for bounty land. The careful addition after the word' account' of a term of a much broader signification, and the use of the very comprehensive language which immediately precedes those terms, satisfy me that it was the intention of Congress to embrace all claims, whether for land or money, and that the construction insisted upon by the defendant cannot be maintained." U. S. v. Wilcox, 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 389. See also U. S. v. Bickford, 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 341.

Same-Pension Claim. (See also the title PENSIONS.) In U. S. z. Rhodes, 30 Fed. Rep. 433, Brewer, J., said: "Two offenses, as heretofore stated, are provided for. Whoever makes or presents, for payment or approval, a false claim is denounced by one part of the section. Clearly, the word claim is not here used in the sense of a demand already theretofore presented. It implies only a demand then existing, and known to be wrongful, and the act of presenting it in the first instance is denounced as a crime. And the further language of the section is, such claim,' and denounces the making of a false deposition for the purpose of obtaining the payment or approval of such a claim. Is the word claim used in the same sense in this part of the section, or is it narrowed and limited so as to refer only to such claims as have been already presented, and are pending for action? Grammatically and ordinarily the same meaning would be understood."

Salary. In Lopez v. U. S., 24 Ct. of Cl. 96, the court quotes from a circular of the First

parties, an award will not be set aside, although the arbitrators open an account which had been settled as an account stated twenty-three years previous to the submission, notwithstanding the opening of such account was objected to on the hearing. Emmet v. Hoyt, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 410.

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Allowance. The Constitution of Ohio provides that no money shall be paid on any claim, the subject-matter of which shall not have been provided for by pre-existing law, unless such claim be allowed by two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the general assembly." The Act of March 30, 1864, providing for the appointment of commissioners to examine claims growing out of the Morgan raid," and prescribing their duties, was not passed by a two-thirds vote. The commissioners having allowed the plaintiff's claim on mandamus by him against the auditor of the state to compel payment, it was held that under the provisions of the constitution the claim could not be paid out of the state treasury till allowed by the concurrent votes of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the general assembly. The court said: "The word as here used [in the constitution] is by implication limited to claims against the state, and of a pecuniary character. Claims for the payment of money may be preferred against the state on various grounds. They may be either of a legal or of an equitable character. All such de

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mands against the state for the payment of money, whatever be their character or origin, are, we think, claims within the meaning of the constitution." Fordyce v. Godman, 20 Ohio St. I.

Release or Compromise of Claims. The Act of the legislature of New York, passed December 14, 1847, to release the prior lien of the state on the Hudson & Berkshire Railroad, does not violate the fourth section of the seventh article of the Constitution of New York of 1846, which forbids the release or compromise of the claims of the state against any incorporated company, to pay the interest and redeem the principal of the stock of the state theretofore loaned or advanced to such company, and provides that such claims shall be fairly enforced. The constitution only requires that claims originating in loans of state credit, made before its adoption, and the securities taken on such loans shall be held as the property of the state, and be managed for its direct pecuniary benefit, and shall not be released, reduced, or surrendered for the benefit of the borrowing corporations, in disregard of the pecuniary inerest of the state in its distinct and single character of a creditor of the corporation. With these restrictions the exercise of the ordinary legislative discretion in the management of the claims is not prohibited. Darby v. Wright, 3 Blatchf. (U. S.) 170. See also the title RELEASE.

"Claims" Include Notes. Where an agreement stipulated that" neither party would take any advantage of the statute of limitations

having run, or being about to run, upon the other's claims, but would thereafter settle without any objection on that account," and a party to the agreement sought to recover on two notes, against which the statute had run, it was held the notes were included in the term claims, and were clearly within the agreement of the parties excepting them from the effect of the statute of limitations. Noyes v. Hall, 28 Vt. 645.

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In a Will-Bank Stock Not Embraced. Where a testator, after several legacies of bank stock and other stock and money, concluded his will: "The remainder of my worldly substance, consisting of furniture, bedding, etc., I give to my two daughters, to be divided between them. *These, with all money of mine that may remain in bank at the time of my death, with all claims or demands of whatever nature, I give to my two daughters;" and the testator had several shares of bank stock and other stock not specifically bequeathed, it was held that they did not pass under the above bequest. Delamater's Estate, I Whart. (Pa.) 362.

Under Whom They Claim. A covenant in a deed by the grantors that the land is free from all incumbrances done or suffered by "those under whom they claim," refers to those from whom they derive title, while a similar covenant against the acts of " all claiming under him" would probably be construed to have a different signification, and would not be held to include a vendee of the entire estate of the grantor. Williamson v. Hall, 62 Mo. 405; Fellowes v. Clay, 4 Q. B. 319, 45 E. C. L. 319.

66 Claiming Under." — On a purchase of lands which were under mortgage the purchaser paid the principal and interest due on the mortgage and took a conveyance, in which mortgagor and mortgagee joined, of the premises, and of the mortgagor's equity of redemption and all the residue of his interest. It was held that the purchaser was a person claiming under " a mortgage within Stat. 7 Wm. IV. and I Vict., c. 28; and that the twenty years' limitation under Stat. 3 and 4 Wm. IV., c. 27, § 2, ran from the paying off of the mortgage and interDoe v. Massey, 17 Q. B. 374, 79 E. C. L.

est. 374.