constructing wharves and charging wharfage, which has never before been in contest between these parties."

Same-Distinguished from Park. — The owners of certain land, in platting it as a city, dedicated a strip" to be and remain a common forever." They brought an action against the city for a misuser of this strip, contending that by common was meant a park. It was shown that the strip in question was used by the public for the exchange of merchandise and that the only permanent structure was a transfer railway track. It was held that this was not a misappropriation of land, and that common was not synonymous with “ park." Goode v. St. Louis, 113 Mo. 257.

Town and City Plat. - A statute provided that whenever the proprietor of land should lay out a city, town, or village, he should have made a map, setting forth all parcels of ground reserved for public purposes, and whether such parcels were intended" for avenues, streets, lanes, commons.” The court said: "It is shown by this section that by the word commons as used in both this Act and the Act previously referred to, [are] meant lands included in or belonging to a town, set apart for public use, and in fact the natural import of the word when used in connection with or with reference to towns and villages is public grounds belonging to or appurtenant to the town or village. The word commons, as used in the statute, was certainly never meant to include the farms and farming lands of individuals who happened to reside and own lands in the vicinity of a town or village. It, I think, follows that the County Court, under the Act of the legislature first referred to, only had power to incorporate towns and villages as laid out and surveyed into lots, streets, alleys, or other public grounds and commons belonging thereto, as laid out and designated for public uses, and that any attempt by the county court to incorporate the farming lands of the country, even in the vicinity of a town, would be wholly without authority and inoperative." State v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 210.

French and Spanish Villages. (See also the title SPANISH LAND GRANTS.)- The term is also applied to the common fields of the French and Spanish villages of the Louisiana Territory. The inhabitants of Upper Louisiana resided in villages almost exclusively and cultivated common fields, inclosed by only one fence; each person who cultivated the soil having assigned to him by the syndic of the town a certain portion of land to cultivate. These common fields were confirmed to the villages by Act of Congress June 13, 1812. See, in reference to them, Mackay v. Dillon, 7 Mo. 7;

Swartz v. Page, 13 Mo. 603; Robbins v. Eckler, 36 Mo. 494: Harrison v. Page, 16 Mo. 182; State v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 210; Fine v. St. Louis Public Schools, 39 Mo. 59; Vasquez v. Ewing, 42 Mo. 247; Chouteau v. Eckhart, 2 How. (U. S.) 344; Mackay v. Dillon, 4 How. (U. S.) 421; Carondelet v. St. Louis, 1 Black (U. S.) 179; Glasgow v. Hortiz, 1 Black (U. S.) 595; Dent v. Emmeger, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 308; Lavalle v. Strobel, 89 Ill. 370; Haps v. Hewitt, 97 Ill. 498.

1. Aymette v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 158. the court in that case was construing that provision of the Constitution of Tennessee which guarantees the right to keep and bear arms for common defense. See also CARRYING WEAPONS, Vol. 5, p. 729.

Held in Common. A thing is said to be held in common when there are more owners than one. Chambers. Harrington, III U. S. 350. Common in the Sense of General. (See also GENERAL.) — Common is frequently used as equivalent to general." Koen v. State, 35 Ñeb. 678; Kirkendall v. Omaha, 39 Neb. 6.

In the Sense of Ordinary. (See also ORDINARY.) In Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Howard, 79 Ga. 44, it was held that the terms common and ordinary were equivalents, and that it was not error to use them interchangeably in an instruction upon ordinary care. See also O'Donnell v. Sweeney, 5 Ala. 470.

Common Employment. (See the title FELLOWSERVANTS.)-By common employment it is meant that the work upon which the servants are engaged is of the same general character. Johnson v. Armour, 18 Fed. Rep. 492.

Common Inclosure. (See also the title FENCES.) -Section 984, Mississippi Code of 1880, which provides that "every owner of cattle, horses," etc., shall be liable for all injuries and trespasses committed by such animals running at large in a common inclosure, within which more than one person is cultivating land, without the consent of all such persons," does not require a lawful fence for the common inclosure, but gives the right of action in the state of case mentioned, without regard to the character of the common fence. The court

said: "The common inclosure is not required to be a lawful fence. No matter how defective or ineffectual it may be as against stock from without, stock are prohibited from running at large in a common inclosure, within which more than one person is cultivating land, without the consent of all such persons." Montgomery v. Handy, 63 Miss. 46.

Common Inn. (See also the title INNS AND INNKEEPERS.) A common inn is defined to be a house for the entertainment of travelers and passengers, in which lodgings and necessaries are provided for them and for their horses and attendants. Cromwell v. Stephens, 2 Daly (N. Y.) 21.

Common Control. A statute provided that its provisions should apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in transportation wholly by railroad or partly by railroad and partly by water, when both are used under a common control. The court said: "To make

these carriers subject to the Act, the railway and vessel must, as therein provided, be operated or used under a common control -a control to which each is alike subject, and by which rates are prescribed and bills of lading given for the carriage of goods over both routes as one." Ex p. Koehler, 30 Fed. Rep. 870. See also the title INTERSTATE COMMERCE. Common Sewer. - A sewer laid by a city, not only to carry off sewage from the streets and houses, but also to divert the waters of a brook, is a common sewer within the provisions of a charter authorizing the city to lay such. Bennett v. New Bedford, 110 Mass. 434. See also the title DRAINS AND SEWERS.

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The Words "Common Proceeding," in an act defining a civil action as a common proceeding in a court of justice by one party against another for the enforcement or protection of a private right, or the redress or prevention of a private wrong," means "that kind of proceeding which is instituted and conducted in a manner common to other civil actions.' Brown v. Crego, 29 Iowa 323.

Common Tools of a debtor, which are by statute exempt from levy and sale on execution, do not include a lawyer's library. Lenoir v. Weeks, 20 Ga. 596. See the title EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION.

Common Sense. After instructing a jury, in a criminal case, that they are judges of the law as well as the facts, it is error to instruct them that common sense is their best guide, without limiting its application to the value and weight of evidence. Wright v. State, 69 Ind. 163, 35 Am. Rep. 212.

Common Currency. (See also CURRENCY, and the title MONEY.) A note payable in common currency in Arkansas was held a note payable in Arkansas Bank money. Dillard v. Evans, 4 Ark. 175.

Common Usage. (See also ENCYC, OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, vol. 6, p. 612, title DEPOSITIONS.)

Section 866 of the Revised Statutes of the United States authorized a dedimus potestatem to take depositions according to common usage; it was held that the words " common usage,' as used in said section, referred to the usage prevailing in the courts of the state in which the federal court might be sitting. U. S. v. Cameron, 5 McCrary (U. S.) 94.

Common School. (See also the titles EDUCATION; SCHOOLS.) · A common school is a public school; a free school; one not confined to a class, but open to all in a certain locality. Le Couteulx v. Buffalo, 33 N. Y. 333; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94; Roach v. St. Louis Public Schools, 7 Mo. App. 567.

The phrase common schools" and "public schools are synonymous. Amherst, 12 Allen (Mass.) 508. Same Studies.

Common in this connection is said to have no reference to the studies to be taught. Roach v. St. Louis Public Schools, 7 Mo. App. 567. On the other hand, it is held that "common school" has a well-settled signification, and is never applied to higher seminaries of learning such as incorporated academies and colleges. Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen (Mass.) 508. In Powell v. Board of Education, 97 Ill. 378, it is said: "Without being able to give any accurate definition of a common school,' it is safe to say that common under

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Same-Denominational School. - In People v. Board of Education, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 400, it was held that a denominational school was not a common school. The court said: • The word common, as applied to our schools, bears the broadest and most comprehensive signification. It is equivalent to public, universal, open to all; for such is their character, subject only to such general statutory regulations as are prescribed by the legislature. They are common to all children, in the sense that public highways are common to all persons who may choose to ride or drive thereon, observing only the law of the road. Thus have they been treated by the legislature in the various enactments on the subject. They have always been kept distinct from academies, colleges, and private seminaries of learning; and especially have they been kept and ought they to be kept free from everything savoring of sectarian influence or control."

Common Form. (See the title PROBATE.)The proof of a will is said to be in common form when the executor presents the will for probate in the absence of the parties in interest, and without citing them, and proceeds, ex parte, with his proof; and it is said to be in solemn form when the parties in interest are cited to be present at the probation or approbation of the will. Straub's Case, 49 N. J. Eq. 264.

Common Pleas. By common pleas are generally understood such actions as are brought by private persons against private persons, or by the government where the cause of action is of a civil nature. Dallett v. Feltus, 7 Phila. (Pa.) 628, in which case it was held that the courts of common pleas' was not confined to courts of that name, but included courts of nisi prius and district courts.

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Common Recovery. - A common recovery is a conveyance of record invented to give a tenant in tail an absolute power to dispose of his estate as if he were a tenant in fee. Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 364. See the titles EsTATES; REAL PROPERTY. And see RECOVERY. Common Assurances. - In 2 Bl. Com. 294, it is said: "A translation or transfer of property being thus admitted by law, it became necessary that this transfer should be properly evi-` denced, in order to prevent disputes, either about the fact, as whether there was any transfer at all; or concerning the persons, by whom and to whom it was transferred; or with regard to the subject-matter, as what the thing transferred consisted of; or, lastly, with relation to the mode and quality of the transfer, as for what period of time (or, in other words, for what estate and interest) the conveyance was made. The legal evidences of this translation of property are called the common assurances of the kingdom; whereby every man's estate is assured to him, and all controversies, doubts, and difficulties are either prevented or

I. DEFINITION.

1. Common Carrier Defined. - - Parker, C. J., in Dwight v. Brewster, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 50, 11 Am. Dec. 133. This definition is also found in Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. Div. 26; The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. (U. S.) 22; Babcock v. Herbert, 3 Ala. 392, 37 Am. Dec. 695; Central R., etc., Co. v. Lampley, 76 Ala. 357, 52 Am. Rep. 334, 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 720; Schloss v. Wood, II Colo. 290; Bennett. Filyaw, 1 Fla. 453; Robertson v. Kennedy, 2 Dana (Ky.) 430, 26 Am. Dec. 466; Shelden 7. Robinson, 7 N. H. 163, 26 Am. Dec. 726; Elkins v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 23 N. H. 275: Alexander v. Greene, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 544: Blanchard v. Isaacs, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 388; Fuller. Bradley, 25 Pa. St. 120; Littlejohn

Jones, 2 McMull. L. (S. Car.) 365, 39 Am. Dec. 132; Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 118, 47 Am. Dec. 639; Doty v. Strong, I Pin. (Wis.) 324, Burn. (Wis.) 158, 40 Am. Dec. 773; Story on Bailments, $ 495; Smith's Mercantile Law (Pomeroy's ed.), § 356; 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. (Sth Am. ed.) 392.

To the elements of the definition contained in the text Mr. Hutchinson adds the proviso that the goods are of the kind which the carrier professes to transport, and that the person applying for carriage consents to the lawful terms prescribed by the carrier. Hutchinson on Carriers (2d ed.), § 47.

The employment may be limited to the mere carriage of particular kinds of property and goods; and when this is so, and the fact is known and avowed, the carriers will not be liable as common carriers for any other goods or property intrusted to their agents without their consent. Per Story, J., in Citizens' Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co., 2 Story (U. S.) 33. See also Sanford v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 13 Misc. Rep. (N. Y. C. Pl.) 88. Persons holding themselves out to the world as common carriers are bound to act as such in respect to such goods as they profess to carry and have accommodation to carry, on

such goods being tendered to them to be carried, and on a reasonable tender of proper remuneration, without subjecting the person tendering them to any unreasonable conditions. Garton v. Bristol, etc., R. Co., 1 B. & S. 112, 101 E. C. L. 112, per Cockburn, C. J.

Any man undertaking for hire to carry the goods of all persons indifferently is a common carrier. Gisbourn V. Hurst, I Salk. 249. Approved by Gibson, C. J., in Gordon v. Hutchinson, I W. & S. (Pa.) 285, 37 Am. Dec. 464. See also Mershon v. Hobensack, 22 N. J. L. 377; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. St. 208.

In The Neaffie, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 467, Woods, J., afterwards associate justice of the United States Supreme Court, after quoting the definition given in the text, said: "This definition is very broad, and in its application to facts is subject to certain limitations. A better and more precise definition is; One who offers to carry goods for any person between certain termini or on a certain route, and who is bound to carry for all who tender him goods and the price of carriage.'". The definition here approved is that given in 1 Parsons on Shipping, 245, quoted in Nugent v. Smith, 1 C. P. Div. 427, with the addition of the clause "and who is bound," etc.

A common carrier is one who undertakes and exercises as a public employment the transportation or carriage of goods, for persons generally, from place to place, whether by land or by water, and to deliver them at the place appointed, for hire or reward and with or without a special agreement as to price. McHenry v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 4 Harr. (Del.) 448.

A common carrier is one who plies between certain termini and openly professes to carry for hire the goods of all such persons as may choose to employ him. He may profess to carry all descriptions of goods, or particular descriptions only. Redman's Law of Railway Carriers, (2d ed. 1880) 1.