are invaded by either, they can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress. How wise will it be in them, by cherishing the union, to preserve to themselves an advantage which can never be too highly prized!

It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the state governments will in all possible contingencies, afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretences, so lely to escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information; they can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different states; and unite their common forces, for the protection of their common liberty.

The great extent of the country, is a further security. We have already experienced its utility, against the attacks of a foreign enemy. And it would have precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the federal army should be able to quell the resistence of one state, the distant states would have it in their power, to make head with fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned, to subdue the opposition in others, and the moment the part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistence revive.

We should recollect, that the extent of the military force must, at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of doing this increase the population, the natural strength of the community will proportionably increase. When will the time arrive, that the federal government can raise and maintain an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an immense empire; who are in a situation, through the medium of their state governments, to take measures for their own defence with all the celerity, regularity, and system, of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.

PUBLIUS.

NUMBER XXIX.

BY MR. HAMILTON.

Concerning the Militia.

THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion, are natural incidents to the duties of superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of the confederacy.

It requires no skill in the science of war to discern, that uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia, would be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence. It would enable them to discharge the duties of the camp, and of the field, with mutual intelligence and concert; an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency in military functions, which would be essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only be accomplished, by confiding the regulation of the militia to the direction of the national authority. It is therefore with the most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower the union "to provide for organizing, arm"ing, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of "them as may be employed in the service of the United States, "reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the offi"cers, and the authority of training the militia according to "the discipline prescribed by Congress."

Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to this plan, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been attacked. If a well regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation, and at the disposal of that body, which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia, in the same body, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions.

If the federal government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies, which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of preventing its existence, than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.

In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, it has been remarked, that there is no where any provision in the proposed constitution for requiring the aid of the posse comitatus, to assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favourable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the posse comitatus. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth, as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all laws necessary and proper to execute its declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution of those laws; as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would involve that of varying the rules of descent, and of the alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident, that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the posse comitatus is entirely destitute of colour, it will follow, that the conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in this extraordinary manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and conviction ?

By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself,

in the hands of the federal government. It is observed, that select corps may be formed, composed of the young and the ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitary power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were the constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him in substance the following discourse:

"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United States, "is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of being "carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military "movements, is a business that requires time and practice. It is "not a day, nor a week, nor even a month, that will suffice for "the attainment of it. To oblige the great body of the yeo66 manry, and of the other classes of the citizens, to be under "arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and ❝evolutions, as often as might be necessary, to acquire the "degree of perfection which would entitle them to the character "of a well regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the "people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would "form an annual deduction from the productive labour of the "country, to an amount, which, calculating upon the present "numbers of the people, would not fall far short of a million of "pounds. To attempt a thing which would abridge the mass of "labour and industry to so considerable an extent, would be un"wise; and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, be66 cause it would not long be endured. Little more can reasona"bly be aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to "have them properly armed and equipped; and in order to see "that this be not neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them 66 once or twice in the course of a year.

"But, though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must "be abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a "matter of the utmost importance, that a well digested plan "should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the proper establish"ment of the militia. The attention of the government ought "particularly to be directed to the formation of a select corps of "moderate size, upon such principles as will really fit it for ser❝vice in case of need. By thus circumscribing the plan, it will "be possible to have an excellent body of well trained militia,

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"ready to take the field whenever the defence of the state shall "require it. This will not only lessen the call for military esta"blishments; but if circumstances should at any time oblige the "government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to the liberties of the people, while there "is a large body of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in "discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their "own rights and those of their fellow-citizens. This appears to "me the only substitute that can be devised for a stauding army; "and the best possible security against it if it should exist."

Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed constitution should I reason on the same subject; deducing arguments of safety, from the very sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.

There is something so far fetched, and so extravagant, in the idea of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice, to instil prejudices at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism.-Where, in the name of common sense, are our fears to end, if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbours, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be from men, who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen; and who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power in the union to prescribe regulations for the militia, and to command its services when necessary; while the particular states are to have the sole and exclusive appointment of the officers? If it were possible seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia, upon any concievable establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the officers being in the appointment of the states, ought at once to extinguish it.-There can be no doubt, that this circumstance will always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.

In reading many of the publications against the constitution, a man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill written tale or romance; which, instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes“Gorgons, Hydras, and Chimeras dire,"