3. The liability of a surety in an administrator's bond is not discharged by the appointment of his co-surety as administrator de bonis non before any default on the part of the administrator has been established, as in that case the liability of the co- surety in the administrator's bond is not a debt owing to himself as administrator de bonis non, which is regarded as paid by operation of law.- Chick v. Farr, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 176.
4. An administrator's bond is liable for inter- est on balances as they become due. but not for in- terest on the aggregate sum of principal and interest found due on any former accounting.-Chick v. Farr. (S. C.) 10 S. E. 176.
5. Where it appears, in an action on an admin- istrator's bond based on a judgment against the administrator, that the judgment was entered against the administrator personally, and the exe- cution issued thereon is de bonis propriis, a non- suit will be granted.-Ramsey v. Cole, (Ga.) 10 S.
6. Where an intestate has acquired the equi- table title to land charged with the balance due on an incumbrance, his administrator may pay off and discharge the lien, under the discretionary powers given him by Code N. C. § 1415, providing that nothing in the chapter relating to executors, etc., shall be construed to affect the discretionary pow- ers, trusts, and authorities of an executor or other trustee, etc., provided creditors are not delayed thereby, nor the order changed in which by law they are entitled to be paid.-Pate y. Oliver, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 709.
7. When an intestate has shown by his con- duct an intention to complete his title to land which he has purchased subject to incumbrance, having purchased all the legal and equitable interests outstanding, and having on his own motion ob- tained a decree, making him in effect the equitable owner of the land, charging him with the amount of the incumbrance, and adjudging that he pay it into court, such judgment becomes a debt which on his death may be discharged by his administra tor out of his personal estate.-Pate v. Oliver, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 709.
Administrator de bonis non.
S. When there is a decree in the circuit court against an administrator for money to be paid out of the assets in his hands to be administered, and the administrator then dies, the administrator de bonis non, and not the administrator of the de- ceased administrator, is the proper party to appeal from such decree; and it is not necessary for him to make himself a formal party to the record by an order of the circuit court before petitioning for such appeal.-Miller v. Neff's Adm'r, (W. Va.) 10
9. Powers conferred on an executor to continue testator's business so long as profitable, in his judgment, and to pay out of the profits such amount as should be necessary for the support of testator's widow and children, are personal to the executor; and on his death they do not vest in the administrator c. t. a., though Code N. C. § 2168, provides that an administrator c. t. a. "has all the rights and powers, and is subject to the same duties, as if he had been named executor in the will."-Creech v. Grainger, (N. C.) 10 S.
10. Under Code N. C. § 1493, which expressly provides that a power to sell land conferred on the executor by the will shall pass to the admin- istrator c. t. a., and section 2168, which confers on the administrator c. t. a., "all the rights and powers" given the executor by the will, the ad- ministrator c. t. a. may exercise the general pow ers of an executor in settling the estate, including that of selling testator's land.-Creech v. Grain- ger, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1032.
11. A bequest of $6,000 in trust to an execu- tor, to be invested in United States bonds, or de- posited in "some safe bank of this state, as in his judgment he may think best," the interest to be applied to the education of testator's children, v.10s. E.-72
passes to the administrator c. t. a., as the discre- tion vested in the executor is only as to the man- ner of safe-keeping,-an incidental matter, that does not extinguish the trust at his death.-Creech V. Grainger, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1032. Presentment of claims.
12. Where the personal property of decedent was used for the support of the widow and heirs, they cannot set up laches on the part of the cred- itors in permitting it to be wasted.-Scott v. Ash- lin, (Va.) 10 S. E. 751.
13. Under Code Va. 1873, c. 127, § 3, which makes all the land of a decedent in the hands of his heirs assets for the payment of his debts in the order in which the personalty is applied, the creditors of a decedent are not barred by laches from enforcing their claims against the land, where it appears that the principal debtor, for whom decedent was surety, survived him several years; that within two years after decedent's death his widow, as administratrix and guardian, filed her bill setting forth such claims, and praying that part of the land be sold, and the proceeds reinvested for the children, and her dower assigned; that five years after decedent's death the creditors recovered judg ments, and promptly asserted their claims, in the suit brought by the widow, and were partly paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the land; and that, after its resale and purchase by the widow, they never ceased to demand payment.-Scott v. Ashlin, (Va.) 10 S. E. 751.
Settlement and accounting.
14. Where a will gives to the executors a naked power to sell real estate, neither the title nor the right to the possession passes to the executors, and they are not chargeable for the failure to rent the same until the sale can be made.-Dunn's Ex'rs v. Renick, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 810.
15. If the heirs permit real estate to be returned delinquent for the non-payment of taxes, and the executors pay said taxes to prevent the loss of the land, they will be entitled, as against the residuary legatees, to credit for the taxes so pa d, whether or not the executors, having a naked power to sell, were under a duty to pay such taxes.-Dunn's Ex'rs v. Renick, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 810.
16. Where a testator directs his executors to sell a certain farm, and out of the proceeds to pay, first, the debts of one of his sons on which another of his sons is surety, the executors cannot pay any such debt which before payment becomes barred by the statute of limitations, when the statute is relied on by the debtors.-Dunn's Ex'rs v. Renick, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 810.
17. Defendant's intestate died in possession of vendor took possession without objection from a saw-mill which he had not fully paid for, and the defendant, before the last payment on it was due, and, after having resold it, deducted from the pro- ceeds the amount due from intestate, and paid the balance to defendant. He did not deduct interest, to which he was entitled, and which exceeded the rental value of the mill from the time of intes- tate's death to the time the last payment was due on it. Held that, as the estate did not suffer, de- fendant could not be charged with rents for the mill after intestate's death.-Pate v. Oliver, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 709.
18. A judgment, under which execution had been levied on the excess of the judgment debt- or's land, after his homestead had been set apart, was assigned to defendant's intestate. No steps were taken for over three years after the death of intestate, and after defendant had qualified as his administrator, when, the judgment being dormant, defendant instituted proceedings to ob- tain leave to issue execution on it. The judg- ment debtor filed his affidavit that he had paid the judgment to defendant's intestate, and the court found that it was satisfied. Held, that de- fendant could not be held liable for laches in de- laying to take steps to enforce the judgment.--Pate v. Oliver, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 709.
19. Where an administrator sells leases held by his intestate to the lessors, a counter-claim for rent will not be allowed in an action for the pur-
chase price of the unexpired term, if the estate is insolvent, since to the extent of such rents the lessors are creditors of the estate, and no counter- claim can be allowed against the estate that will give undue priority to particular creditors; and, when the administrator voluntarily allows such set-offs, he should be charged with them, less the pro rata part to which the debts to which they were applied were entitled.-Pate v. Oliver, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 709.
aside for fraud on motion in the cause simply, but only by independent action, after the order of confirmation is made, as it is a final judgment.- McLaurin v. McLaurin, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1056. 29. Before a license is granted to an adminis- trator to sell land to pay debts, controversies in regard to claims should first be settled.-Brittain v. Dickson, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 701.
30. Where it appears that a former administra- tor died insolvent, and that his estate has ever 20. If such counter-claims were set up in an ac- since been insolvent, and his bond as administrator tion against the lessors for the amount due from was lost, and his sureties are unknown, the ad- them for the purchase of the unexpired term, and ministrator de bonis non need not sue the former were resisted by the administrator in good faith, administrator's administrator for funds misappro- and a judgment was rendered against the adminis-priated by him before applying for a license to sell trator allowing such claims, he will be exonerated; land to pay debts.-Brittain v. Dickson, (N. C.) 10 and it is not necessary, to entitle him to such exon- S. E. 701. eration, that he shall have taken an appeal.-Pate v. Oliver, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 709.
21. Where it appears that the exigencies of an estate required the collection of notes belonging to it in Confederate money, the only currency in cir- culation at that time, on a subsequent accounting of the administration the amount due the estate on these notes should be scaled, under the act relating to the value of such currency, as of the dates of maturity of the notes; it being presumed, in the absence of any evidence, that they were collected at maturity.-Chick v. Farr, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 176. Liabilities and misconduct.
22. Imprisonment for debt being abolished, at- tachment for contempt is not a remedy for oblig- ing the payment of a mere debt from the execu- tors to a legatee, adjudged upon citation to account before the ordinary under Code Ga. § 2598.-Wood v. Wood, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 501.
23. An administratrix c. t. a., who permits the trustee under the will to take possession of the personal property belonging to the estate before the payment of its debts, is guilty of a devastavit, and, to the extent of such property, she becomes personally chargeable with the debts of the es- tate.-Lewis v. Mason's Adm'r, (Va.) 10 S. E. 529. 24. Where the estate of a deceased obligor on a bond has been fully administered in a suit for par- tition to which the holder of the bond was not a party, and the assets were sufficient to pay all claims, and the personal representative took no re- funding bond, a personal decree against him in a suit by the holder is proper.-Beverly v. Rhodes. (Va.) 10 S. E. 572.
25. A return of "No property to be found," on an execution against a certain person individually, issued on a judgment recovered against him as ad- ministrator, is no evidence of a devastavit as to him in that capacity.-Forrester v. Tift, (Ga.) 10
26. An administrator bought land, which his intestate had sold, by surrendering the note and mortgage taken by intestate in payment. The conveyance was to intestate's widow, and his in- fant son. It was afterwards resold in probate proceedings, to which the infant was not properly made a party. Held, that the infant's remedy was not against the purchaser, but was against the administrator, since he, being accountable for the note and mortgage, became the owner of the land for which the note and mortgage were exchanged. -Harrison v. Lightsey, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 1010. Executor de son tort.
27. Under Gen. St. S. C. § 1906, providing that one who, not having been appointed executor nor obtained administration, possesses himself of the property of the deceased, shall be considered ex- ecutor de son tort, the attorney of certain persons who held a mortgage of the entire property of a deceased person to secure a debt is liable, as ex- ecutor de son tort, for the excess of the property over the debt, when he has possessed himself of it, sold it, and distributed the proceeds.-Davega v. Henry, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 72.
Sales under order of court.
28. An order of sale of land of an intestate to pay debts, granted in special proceedings by the administrator for that purpose, the sale thereun- der, and the order of confirmation, cannot be set
31. Under an order of court an administrator sold land of a decedent at a very low price, and immediately stipulated with the bidder to take the land for himself at an advance of $50, the bidder having neither paid the purchase money nor taken a conveyance. He then executed a deed to the bidder, in which the co-administrator refused to join, received a check for the amount of the bid, re- turned the check, and took a deed from the bidder, paying the agreed $50. Held, that the land re- mained the property of the estate, both legally and equitably; and the two deeds ought to be canceled, as a fraudulent cloud upon the title, and the land be resold.-Ridgeway v. Ridgeway, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 495.
32. An agreement between an administrator, who is also one of the heirs of his intestate, and the other heirs, by which the administrator is to live on the land, and receive the rents and profits, in consideration of his paying the debts of the in- testate, and supporting the widow, is no defense to a proceeding by the administrator to subject the lands of his intestate to the payment of debts. Proctor v. Proctor, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1036.
33. Where heirs, in their answer to a proceed- ing by an administrator to obtain a license to sell land for the payment of his intestate's debts, plead that the action was not brought within the time pre- scribed by law, and the court below fails to con- sider the merits of the plea, and there is some ev- idence to sustain it, a new trial will be granted, as the plea raises an important question under the statute.-Proctor v. Proctor, (N. C.) 10 S. E.
34. An executor who waives a cash payment on a public sale of land belonging to his decedent's estate, and who puts the purchaser into possession under an independent contract whereby the pur- claims for dower and for a year's support have chase money is not to be paid until the widow's been settled, and who subsequently receives a part of the purchase price, loses the right given him by Code Ga. § 3655, to resell the land at the purchaser's risk on his failure to pay the balance of the pur- chase money; the executor's remedy being a suit for the unpaid balance.-Penn v. Willingham, (Ga) 10 S. E. 1085.
Widows' and children's allowance.
35. General allowance from the estate of a dece- dent for a year's support, if not consumed during the year, will stand over for the support of the widow and minors afterwards, so long as they are members of the family, and fill this description Children attaining majority, or ceasing by mar riage to be of the family, cannot during that time coerce partition of land thus allowed and set apart: the whole land being charged with the support of the family.-Whitt v. Ketchem, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 503
36. Though a court of ordinary has exclusive original jurisdiction to order an administrator to sell the perishable property of the estate, yet where it has no power to revoke such order ex- cept in term, a court of equity will enjoin a sale of such property ordered to take place in vaca- tion, where sufficient thereof has not been set apart for a 12-months support of the intestate's minor children, to which they are entitled under Code Ga. § 2571, as such sale would deprive the ap praisers therein authorized to be appointed of the discretion conferred on them to set apart such
support out of the property or money of the estate. | Tyer v. Charleston Rice Milling Co., (S. C.) 10 S. -Simmons v. Crumbley, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 1090. Actions.
37. In an action against an administrator c. t. a. by testator's widow for money paid out by her for the tuition of testator's children, she should allege that she did so at the request of either the executor or administrator c. t. a.; the will di- recting the executor to apply the income of $6,000 to the education of testator's children.-Creech v. Grainger, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1032.
38. Under Code N. C. § 164, providing that "if a person against whom an action may be brought die before the expiration of the time limited for the commencement thereof, and the cause of action survive, an action may be commenced against his personal representative after the expiration of that time, and within one year after the issuing of let- ters testamentary or of administration," an action on a judgment against an administrator, not barred by limitation at the death of the administrator, may be maintained against the administrator de bonis non, though more than the period of limita- tion of a judgment had elapsed between the death of the administrator and the appointment of the ad-
ministrator de bonis non.-Brittain v. Dickson, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 701.
39. In an action against executors for an ac- counting of the proceeds of sale of decedent's prop- erty, the assent of the executors to plaintiff's leg. acy appears where they state in their answer that there are no debts against the estate, that they make no claim as executors to any part of it, and expressly admit each and every allegation of the complaint, one of which is "that, with the assent of the said executors, the plaintiff took possession of the entire estate of decedent as legatee and dev- isee. "-Green v. Iredell, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 545.
40. There being unpaid debts which it was the administrator's duty to pay, a fund realized by him from the sale of decedent's land for payment of debts, and deposited with the clerk of court, was not the property of the heirs, and the administra- tor was entitled to sue for it.-Thomas v. Connelly, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 520.
41. Where a note is made payable to "A., exec- utor of B., or bearer, " it will be presumed that A. held it in his representative capacity, and on his death the administrator de bonis non of B. is the proper party to sue on the note, and not the admin- istrator of A.-Ballinger v. Cureton, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 664.
See Bankruptcy.
Property exempt.
1. In South Carolina, the exemption allowed the head of a family applies to personal property held in partnership. Moyer v. Drummond, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 952.
Excess-Appointment of receiver.
2. Code Ga. § 2034, providing that, upon the ap- plication of any person for exemption of personalty, when the schedule shows an excess of personal property over the amount allowed as exempt, it shall be the duty of the ordinary to turn the excess over to a receiver, who shall dispose of it for the benefit of creditors, it is the duty of the court to appoint the receiver without an application by ei- ther party.-McWilliams v. Bones, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 723.
Application for exemption.
3. Under Code Ga. § 2005, requiring the appli- cant for exemption to make a full and fair disclos- ure of all personal property of which he is pos- sessed at the time, and providing that all property in excess of the exemption shall be delivered up for the benefit of his creditors, the sale by him of any of the scheduled property defeats his applica tion, unless he delivers up the proceeds.-McWill- iams v. Bones, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 723.
4. Code Ga. § 2003, allowing the amendment of a petition for exemption, authorizes an amend- ment of the schedule required to be appended to the petition, only by adding omitted articles, not by striking out anything.-McWilliams v. Bones, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 723.
Assignment of exempt note.
5. A note held as part of the personal property exemption of a judgment debtor loses its quality of exemption when assigned, and the assignee holds it subject to the counter-claim of judgments against the assignor owned by the maker of the note.- Lane v. Richardson, (Ñ. C.) 10 S. E. 189.
42. Equity has jurisdiction of a suit by a cred- See Evidence, 17, 18. itor at large of a decedent against his personal rep- resentatives, for an accounting, for the payment of complainant's claim, and for general relief.— Beverly v. Rhodes, (Va.) 10 S. E. 572.
43. A judgment creditor may make the admin- istrator of his deceased judgment debtor a party to the judgment by scire facias, so as to bind him, in case he has no leviable assets. -Fulcher v. Man- dell, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 582.
EXPRESS COMPANIES. Regulations-Receipt of money for ship-
Code N. C. § 1964, provides that agents "of railroads and other transportation companies, whose duties it is to receive freights, shall receive 44. The administrator may show, as a defense all articles of the nature and kind received by such to the scire facias, that he has no assets belong- company for transportation, whenever tendered at ing to his intestate's estate, or that he has fully a regular depot, * and shall forward the administered them, or that the assets in his hands same by the route selected by the person tender- were taken possession of by intestate as sole heir ing the freight under existing laws." Held, that of his deceased wife, and that there are outstand-the words "whenever tendered" could not be lim- ing debts against the wife sufficient to exhaust ited further than to require the tender to be made such assets. -Fulcher v. Mandell, (Ga.) 10 S. E. during reasonable business hours, and were not 582. qualified by the words "under existing laws, 45. An administrator, with money of his dece- which could be construed as qualifying the word dent, paid, on a note made by his decedent, an "forward;" and that a rule of an express company amount in excess of the sum applicable out of the forbidding its agents to receive money for ship- assets to that debt, under the mistaken belief that ment, except on and before the day when trains he was surety in such note, and that the estate went to the point of destination, was invalid. would pay a somewhat larger per cent. of its lia--Alsop v. Southern Exp. Co., (N. Ĉ.) 10 S. E. 297. bilities than it did. Held, that he could not main- tain an action of assumpsit against a surety on the note to compel the surety to refund the amount so paid in excess of the ratable share of the assets applicable to such debt.-Proudfoot v. Clevenger, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 394.
46. Where a mortgage and the bond which it was intended to secure were executed to plaintiffs, though in the capacity of executors, they are en- titled to sue for foreclosure in South Carolina with- out having there taken out letters testamentary.
FACTORS AND BROKERS. Compensation.
Where defendant employed plaintiff to sen certain timber, a revocation of plaintiff's author- ity before the sale is consummated does not defeat plaintiff's right to compensation for services ren- dered in pursuance of the employment.-Martin v. Holly, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 83.
Of sheriffs, see Sheriffs and Constables, 2. witnesses, see Witness, 16, 17.
Code Ga. $$ 1449-1455, providing for elec- tions, upon petition to the ordinary of a specified number of freeholders, to determine whether the provisions of the stock law shall be adopted in any
militia district, makes no provision for a counter- petition, or for any contest or hearing before the ordinary. Held, that the ordinary's action upon a petition for such an election is ministerial, not ju- dicial, and certiorari will not lie for the correction of any error or mistake in his conduct.-Meadows v. Taylor, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 204.
1. At the time of the dissolution of the part- nership existing between P. and K., by the terms of which K. agreed to assume all firm liabilities and pay P. a certain amount, their firm note was held by plaintiff, to whom P. wrote, informing him of the terms of the dissolution, and urging him to push K. for a settlement. Instead of doing so, plaintiff continued to sell to K. After the dissolu- tion P. executed his bond to plaintiff for an indi- vidual indebtedness, and offered to sell him certain land in payment of this and the firm debt, which offer was refused. Thereafter P., being about to remove from the state, conveyed the land to his brother in payment of a debt equal to the value of the property. Held, that the facts did not show fraud for which the conveyance would be set aside in favor of plaintiff.-Saunders v. Parrish, (Va.) 10 S. E. 748.
2. Where one member of a mercantile firm pur- chases the interest of the other member, and in consideration thereof assumes to pay all the part- nership debts, the firm and both members being on the eve of insolvency, and shortly thereafter the purchasing partner, without paying any of the firm firm to a trustee, in such a manner as to devote the debts, conveys the whole of the assets of the late whole thereof to the payment of his individual debts, such sale, being without any valuable con- sideration, is ineffectual to convert the social as table rights of the firm creditors, such trust-deed sets into individual property; and, as to the equi- is fraudulent and void.-Darby v. Gilligan, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 400.
3. A conveyance by one partner, being appre-
Of mortgages, see Chattel Mortgages, 6-8; Mort- hensive of embarrassment personally on account gages, 10-19.
Former Jeopardy.
See Criminal Law, 12-14.
Evidence. On trial for fornication, evidence of acts of defendant prior to a former conviction is admissi- ble to show the character of subsequent acts. State v. Wheeler, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 491.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. Promise to answer for debt of another. 1. An agreement between a contractor, his subcontractor, and a third person, under which the contractor is to pay for all goods purchased of the third person by the subcontractor out of mon- eys to come into his hands for the latter, and re- ceive a percentage on the amount, is not within the statute of frauds, as a collateral agreement to an- swer for the debt of another, but is an original promise, founded on a sufficient consideration.- Ledbetter v. McGhees, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 727. Agreements relating to land.
2. A written contract for the sale of land can be discharged by matter in pais.-Miller v. Pierce, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 554.
of outstanding claims against him, of his interest in partnership land to his copartner, to facilitate the adjustment of the partnership affairs, and in order that the partnership property should not be embarrassed by his outstanding personal indebted- ness, is not in fraud of partnership creditors, be- cause, whether the title to the land is in one or both partners, it is alike liable for partnership debts; nor is it in fraud of the individual creditors of the grantor, because the land, still continuing to be in fact partnership property, is liable for individual debts after those of the partnership are paid.- Jones v. Smith, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 340.
4. The mere fact that in a sale of all its assets made by an insolvent partnership there is an agree ment by the purchasers to employ one of the part- ners at a stipulated compensation per month to manage the business, will not per se render the sale void as against creditors.-Cribb v. Bagley, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 194.
5. Under Code N. C. § 685, a chattel mortgage of its property, executed by a corporation, is void as to its creditors existing at the time of the ex- ecution of said mortgage, who commence proceed- ings to enforce their claims within 60 days after its registration.-Duke v. Markham, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 1003.
6. An insolvent, in pursuance of an agreement that his wife would abandon her purpose to sue for a divorce, and that she and her sons would pay certain specified debts, which he asserted and they believed were all he owed, amounting to over $500,- caused to be conveyed to the wife real estate worth from $600 to $800. The wife and sons, in good faith and without notice of any fraud, paid off
Agreements not to be performed in a said debts. Held, that the conveyance was valid
3. An agreement to leave a person a support after the death of the promisor, in consideration of services to be rendered by the promisce during the balance of the promisor's life, full perform- ance of the contract being dependent upon a con- tingency that may happen within a year, is not within Code Va. § 2840, cl. 7, prohibiting an ac- tion upon an agreement not to be performed within a year, unless the same is in writing.-Thomas v. Armstrong, (Va.) 10 S. E. 6.
as against the creditors of the husband whose debts but of which the wife had no notice.-Casto v. Fry, existed prior to and at the time of the conveyance, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 799.
Knowledge of grantee.
7. An absolute deed, made with intent to delay or defraud creditors, though made also to secure a debt, is void as against creditors if the grantee takes it with notice of the fraudulent intention.- Palmour v. Johnson, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 500.
S. C. transferred a leasehold interest in lands to B., his wife's brother, receiving the notes of the latter. B. transferred such interest to the wife through her cousin, receiving back his notes, which the wife obtained from her husband. There was no proof that the wife paid any consideration for the notes. At the expiration of the lease, a new lease was executed to the wife, but the considera- tion was furnished by the husband. Held, that the assignment was void as to creditors of the hus- band.-Mayhew v. Clark, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 785.
9. Where a wife purchases land at a commis- sioner's sale, which her husband pays for out of moneys which were placed in his hands by his wife before her marriage to him, the land cannot be subjected to judgments against the husband obtained after such sale and confirmation, under Code W. Va. 1868, c. 66, p. 447, § 2, providing that the property which any woman shall own at her marriage shall not be subject to her husband's debts.-Cale's Adm'r v. Shaw, (W. Va.) 10 S. E.
10. A husband, owing no debts, can pay his wife any debt contracted to her before his mar- riage.-Cale's Adm'r v. Shaw, (W. Va.) 10 S. E.
11. Failure to pay an adequate price for land, where the parties to the deed are husband and wife, raises a presumption of fraud, and the bur- den of rebutting it is on those claiming under the deed.-Woodruff v. Bowles, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 482.
12. Where, in a deed from husband to wife, part of the consideration is feigned, the deed is not on that account fraudulent as to creditors.-Woodruff v. Bowles, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 482.*
13. Land bought by the husband prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1868, with the wife's money, and subsequently deeded by the husband to the wife, cannot be sold to satisfy a judgment against the husband, where there is proof of a verbal agreement between the husband and wife at the time of purchase that the land should belong to her, and it does not appear that the deed to the wife was made by the husband with intent to hin- der, delay, or defraud his creditors.- Woodruff v. Bowles, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 482.*
14. A deed from a husband to his wife, made for a recited valuable consideration, and the added one of natural affection, it not appearing therein that the husband was then indebted to any one, is not fraudulent on its face.-Woodruff v. Bowles, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 482.*
15. Where R. purchased and paid for land, but, to defraud his creditors, procured the title to be made to his father, the remedy of R.'s creditors was an action, in the nature of a bill in equity, to subject the land to the payment of their debts.- Everett v. Raby, (N. C.) 10 S. E. 526. Actions to set aside-Evidence.
16. In an action to set aside a deed as fraudu- lent, because voluntary on its face, it is compe- tent to show a valuable consideration by parol evi- dence. Following Jackson v. Lewis, 7 S. E. 252.— Jackson v. Lewis, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 1074.
17. An action to set aside a deed, voluntary on its face, was brought by creditors of a grantor, who has since died, to subject the property to pay- ment of their debts. It appeared that the debts were allowed to be contracted on the faith of a re- corded deed, conveying the property to the gran- tor for a valuable consideration. Held, that it was inadmissible to show, by evidence of parol declara- tions of the grantor, that, though conveyed to her, the property did not in fact belong to her, but was intended for the grantee in the alleged voluntary conveyance. Following Jackson v. Lewis, 7 S. E. 252.-Jackson v. Lewis, (S. C.) 10 S. E. 1074.
18. When a deed is assailed by third parties on the ground of fraud, it is admissible to show, in addition to the consideration expressed in the deed, that a substantial and valuable consideration was paid.-Casto v. Fry, (W. Va.) 10 S. E. 799.
19. Where a grantor in a deed made with intent to defraud creditors swears he gave notice to the grantee beforehand of his fraudulent purpose, the latter, by denying in rebuttal other statements in the testimony of the former, but not this, virtually admits the fact of notice, there being no explana- tion of the failure to deny such notice.-Palmour v. Johnson, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 500. Instructions.
20. Code Ga. § 1952, par. 1, provides that a trans- fer of property by an insolvent debtor in trust for creditors shall be void as to creditors, if any ben- efit is reserved to the debtor. The second para- graph of such section provides that every convey- ance made with intent to defraud creditors shall be void as to them. Held, that though a transac- tion, attacked as fraudulent as to creditors, be one second paragraph of section 1952, yet, for illustra- of sale to persons not creditors, and falls under the tion, the court may give in charge to the jury the first paragraph of such section, as well as the sec- ond, since they serve to illustrate each other with regard to benefits reserved by the debtor.-Cribb v. Bagley, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 194.
1. Though a room be rented out, if the land- lord use it to serve drinks to his bar customers, and to play cards with them for money, having a table, cards, and "chips" in the room for the pur- pose, he may, notwithstanding his tenauts are al- so using it for storing their property, etc., be con- victed of keeping it as a gaming-house.-Stephen- son v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 234. Indictment.
2. Under Code Va. 1887, § 4011, which provides that no exception shall be allowed for any defect or want of form in any indictment under the gam- ing act, objections that the record did not set forth the appointment and oath of the foreman of the grand jury, and that the names of the grand jurors and witnesses on whose information the indict- indictment, are properly overruled.-Lawrence v. ment was found were not written at the foot of the Commonwealth, (Va.) 10 S. E. 840. Evidence.
3. In a prosecution for keeping a gaming- house, the fact that the accused, in selecting his witnesses to reply to the state's evidence, chose those who did not know the material facts, rather than those who did, though the latter were equally accessible, was proper to be considered by the jury as adding force to the case made out by the state. Stephenson v. State, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 234. Gambling contract.
4. One who has deposited money with another, to be used in a speculation upon chances, or the purchase of "futures," has no right of action to re- cover it back until after demand for its return or repayment.-Dancy v. Phelan, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 205.
5. A demand is not dispensed with by a fraud. alent execution of the illegal trust or a false and fraudulent account of the result.-Dancy v. Phe- lan, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 205.
6. Losses sustained in buying and selling what are commonly called "futures "cannot be recovered in a court of law, and an item arising from such losses in an account will be stricken out.-Lawton v. Blitch, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 353.*
GARNISHMENT.
Employe's wages--Exemption.
1. Money exempt from garnishment in the hands of the employer is exempt from seizure by a rule against the sheriff, when paid to the latter by the employer on a judgment in favor of the em- ploye.-Cox v. Bearden, (Ga.) 10 S. E. 627.
2. Wages, as such, may be recovered in Geor- gia by an employe wrongfully discharged before the expiration of his term by suit after the term expires; and money thus recovered will be exempt from garnishment where wages earned by actual
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